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*Military Management in
the Battles of
the Prophet*

Muhammad Dhahir Watr

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ

(Military Management in the Battles of the Prophet (s

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point

A very detailed and fully referenced text about the management, organization and
mode of operation of the Islamic military in the battles that the Muslim community
.[engaged in under the leadership of the Holy Prophet (s

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Translator's Introduction

Orientalists have, from the very beginning, propagated that Islām is a violent religion
that was spread by the sword. This myth is even promulgated today albeit in a
different form and context. At present, the 'violence' of Islām is portrayed by small
fanatic groups who kill innocent civilians. Ironically, these extremist groups like the

.Tālibān, kill more Muslims than people following any other creed

Yet since 9/11, the world has been bombarded with repeated messages against this 'violent religion'. As if those who are making these accusations are themselves any less violent. The USA is the only country in the world to

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use the A-bomb and kill a large civilian population without any remorse or apology. They are the ones who violently invade and ravage lands belonging to others and yet have the audacity to call Islām what they have called it. This is the highest form of
.hypocrisy

Human beings are dynamic creatures with the ability to be peaceful and loving in one instance while being hostile and aggressive the next. The same person may be smiling one minute and fuming with rage just moments later. Islām recognizes these intrinsic features in human beings and trains one to mould them and harness them properly,
.when to be angry and when to be happy, when to be kind and when to be fierce

Islām does not condone the idea of humiliation and subjugation by other human beings. For this reason we find that, after years of persecution at the hands of the Quraysh, the divine ordinance for battle was received by the Holy Prophet (S). Initially, some of the weaker Muslims showed hesitation at the idea of picking up weapons and fighting for their rights. Some lacked the courage while others were content being in the camp of the oppressed. However, the Prophet (S) recited to them the Holy verses wherein the believers were called to arms to protect their rights and property, and the
.Muslims complied

The beauty of the battles that followed was the humanity that was displayed by the Prophet (S) and his followers. Usually, when one goes to war, they tend

to lose their ability of distinguishing right from wrong and many atrocities are committed by soldiers because of this. The adrenaline rush caused by life threatening situations clouds their judgment and they end up killing innocents and doing all sort of beastly things. The latest example of this is what the USA did (and continues to do) in
Iraq, Afghanistan and Guantanamo

The Prophet (S) warned his soldiers not to fight in such a manner that they end up neglecting the basic principles that make a human being human. They were not to kill innocent women, children, old people and the handicapped. They were not permitted to cut down trees or fill up wells. They were to offer the enemy an opportunity to surrender and not pursue those who fled from battle. These were just some of the numerous injunctions that the Holy Prophet (S) laid down for the Muslims at a time when the norm among the Arabs was to treat the enemy ruthlessly and without any
mercy whatsoever

The Holy Prophet (S), or the ‘supreme commander’ as the author of this work refers to him time and again, had no interest in building a large empire. Rather, he readily made those who were willing to live peacefully, his allies. The sword was only raised
against open enemies who were out to destroy Islām and the Muslims

Further, many of the defeated prisoners of war became Muslims when they saw how the Prophet (S) treated them. Contrary to their expectation of harsh

and brutal treatment, they were treated with kindness and mercy. Just this was enough to make many of them Muslims. This was how Islām really spread, not at the tip of the blade as wrongly hypothesized by Western Orientalists

Translating this work posed a number of challenges. First, the enormous amount of transliteration. In Arabic, different dialects pronounce words differently. We have tried as much as possible to conform with the standard Arabic transliteration but this has not been a priority and at times one Arabic name may have been transliterated in two or three similar ways. Care has been taken, however, that this should in no way cause any confusion about who or what is being referred to and it should only be deemed a handicap of the English language, nothing more

Second, one will notice that this work, which was originally a dissertation for the author's PhD, has a string of footnotes as long as the eye can see! These footnotes only serve to provide a basis for his statements and refer the reader to where he or she can turn if more information or detail is required

Third, I have taken the liberty of adding my own notes wherever I thought a clarification was required. As the translator of this work, probably the hardest thing for me was to contend with some conclusions that are made by the author. Unfortunately, the esteemed author has not endeavored to carry out any scrutiny of the sources he has referred to and has

taken these reports at face value. As a student of history, the importance of carefully analyzing reports and looking for possible loopholes and inconsistencies is well known
to me

However, since my task was to translate this otherwise important work, I only added very brief notes in areas where I disagreed with the author. Readers who are interested can of course delve deeper and conduct their own research in those areas

Finally, I would like to extend my thanks and gratitude to Dr. Abu Fizza Haydari for meticulously going through my final draft, editing and proofreading it. And of course thanks is due to the publishers Heritage International Inc. for undertaking the task of getting this work translated and published. All praise, in the end, belongs only to the
Almighty

Author's Introduction

All praise belongs to the Lord of the Worlds. The Most Beneficent, the most Merciful. Master of the Day of Reckoning. Thee alone do we worship and Thee alone do we seek help from. Guide us to the straight path; the path of those whom Thou hast
blessed, not those with whom Thou art angry, nor those who have strayed. (1)

O Allah send Thy blessings on Muhammad and the progeny of Muhammad just as Thou have sent Thy blessings on Ibrahim and the progeny of Ibrahim in the worlds, indeed Thou art the Owner of Praise, the Owner of Glory. And bless Muhammad and the progeny of Muhammad just as Thou have blessed Ibrahim and the progeny of
Ibrahim in the worlds

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.indeed Thou art the Owner of Praise, the Owner of Glory

This research and study under the heading: ‘Military Management in the Battles of the Prophet of Allah, Muhammad (S)’ was presented as a doctorate thesis in the field of history at the Université Saint-Joseph, Lebanon, and is now before the respected readers. We have tried to spare no effort in this work with the hope that we would be successful in arriving at the truth [about the Prophet (S) as an exemplary military commander].

:The present work has been arranged as follows

Preface: Here the genesis of the techniques and strategies of battle in Islām and its most salient characteristics have been mentioned

Introduction: I begin by explaining my methodology of choice in this study based on what I have discussed in the different sections and precede this by mentioning the narrators and important figures who have written about the history of the Prophet (S) and those who wrote war chronicles

Section One: In this section, the characteristics of the Arab military before Islām have been discussed

Section Two: Here ‘military command’ and that which pertains to it is, including the qualities of a commander, have been discussed

Section Three: Here the different types of ‘army command centers and headquarters’ in the Muslim army have been explained

Section Four: In this section the branches of ‘security and intelligence’ and related issues are mentioned

Section Five: Details about the ‘base of operations’ along with its arrangement and plans have been outlined

,’Section Six: Here ‘relief support units’, ‘munitions’, ‘medical services

management of booty’ and, in the end, ‘role of women’ in the Muslim army have been explained.

Conclusion: Finally, the issue of ‘growth and development of the Muslim army and the causes and factors that led to their victory in battle’ is discussed; after which I have listed the most important sources and references that have been used in this study.

Muhammad Dhāhir Waṭr

Dhu al-Qa’adah ١٤٠٥ AH ٥

Preface

point

The establishment of ‘the art of Islāmic warfare’ emerged after the migration of the Holy Prophet (S) to Madina with the implementation of the first Sariya mission^(١). During this period, battles took place continuously and the Muslim army had hardly recovered from one conflict when it was faced with another battle. Wars^(٢) were also fought in a similar sequence. The foundation that the [continuous] battles and wars of the Prophet (S) formed^(٣) was like a spring that never stopped gushing in strengthening the structures of military management, which were responsible for designing the strategies of war.

The supreme commander of these battles, due to his perfect genius and insight, made this form of management perdurable and complimented it with determination, dynamism and practicality. To such an extent that many of the documenters of war chronicles, in their books of ‘Expeditions and Wars’^(٤) have made efforts to outline and survey this and present it as the principles, laws and regulations that can be referred to [and implemented] in future events by those who read [and study] about these battles in the books of expeditions and

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send contingents under the command of his companions, to find out about the enemy, carry out raids and assaults, assassinate the enemy chiefs etc. In the age of Jāhiliyya, Sariya referred to a group that was sent at night (under the cover of darkness and (secrecy). (Tr

Wars, unlike Sariya missions, were fought in the open, with a large army, after having been declared against the enemy openly. The Holy Prophet (S) participated in many of the wars, but never took part in any Sariya missions. Wāqidi narrates that among the wars in which the Holy Prophet was not present were: the Battle of Abnā', Waddān and Muta

Wāqidi, al-Maghāzi ١:٨-١٠; Ibn Hishām, al-Seerah al-Nabawiyah ٤:٢٥٦; Ibn Sa'd, al-Tabaqāt al-Kubrā ٢:١

See: Ibn Is'hāq, Zuhri, Wāqidi, Ibn Hazm, Kalā'i, Ibn Sayyid al-Nās, and from the contemporary scholars see: 'Ammād Talās, Liwā' Sheet Khattāb, Faraj and others

Indeed, because of the [consecutive] battles and wars that took place between Islām and the enemies and adversaries of this faith and its teachings, there was a need for a strong army that would be led by a skilled and capable leader who was well versed in military management and universally accepted and supported, so that he could implement Jihād as one of the most important ordinances and commandments of Islām(١). And in addition to these principles, he would give importance to the humanitarian aspect of warfare(٢) and the understanding of the human condition .(while calling for, and sparing no efforts in trying to achieve, global reform(٣)

With regards to war and its military aspects, by having clear goals that he would strive to attain and with strong foresight that results from a dynamic intellect, and also by being quick to act and carry out surprise attacks(٤) and implementing new strategies, he (S) became an excellent commander. With observation we find that this form of [military] management was superior in terms of ‘the sublime ethics of war’ meaning bravery, boldness, fearlessness and lack of lassitude in difficult situations. Aside from this, with greater intelligence and contemplation, and with insight and illumination, he sought to evaluate the important issues and take advantage of the resources and means at his disposal without negligence or indolence, presenting plans of action, and .(relying on dynamic organization and diverse leadership(٥)

As in the present age ‘ideology’ was similarly accepted as a sublime spiritual fountainhead which armies are

Bukhāri, Sahih (Bāb al-Maghāzi, hadith no. ٥٣); Tirmidhi, Sahih (Bāb Fadhā'il al- – ١
 (Jihād, hadith no. ٢٢); the Glorious Qur'an (Q٨:٤٥
 (Bukhāri (al-Jihād, hadith no. ١٠٢); Muslim (Bāb al-Imārah, hadith no. ١١٧ – ٢
 The Holy Qur'ān ٢:٢١١; Ibn Hanbal, al-Musnad ٥:٤٣٧ – ٣
 Wāqidi ٢:٤٩٤, ٣:٩٠٣; Ibn Hishām ٣:٢١٣; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٥٣, ٧٧, ٣:٢, ٩٠; Montgomery Watt, – ٤
 Muhammad fi al-Madina, translated into Arabic by Sha'bān Barakāt

Ibn Hishām ٣:٥٠, ٤:٤٢; Ibn Sa'd ١:١٤٧, ٢:٢٤; Muslim ٣:١٣٨٦; Abu Dāwud, Sunan (al-Jihād –٥
hadith no. ٨٩); Tabari, Tārikh al-Tabari ٢:٣٥٥; see also: Watt, Muhammad fi al-Madina:
١٣٠, ٥١١; Cobuld, al-Bahth 'an Allāh, translated into Arabic by 'Umar Abu al-Nasr: ١٢١

supposed to take benefit from(1), any commander who would read about their ideology [in the future, even] after centuries would take inspiration from it and follow it

Acquiring techniques of warfare depends upon various external factors, conditions and available resources that are beyond time, place(2) or numbers, and are tools that the commander has at his disposal. Verily, the most important factor that distinguishes this form of military management from other types of military management that came later is the ‘ethics and moral attributes’ of the military command, which developed from war. It is an undisputed fact that the Prophet (S) had all the qualities of a political, social and universal leader in himself, and that he sought (help from the Almighty with complete faith(3)

He had the attributes of faith, valor, steadfastness and insight in matters of principles and military sciences(4), and he inherited these lofty traits from his forefathers(5). Similarly, in his social interaction with friends and foes(6), he was magnanimous and would always keep his word and fulfill his vows and promises(7). He would spend time in contemplation and then form his opinion with regards to planning and strategizing [for battle](8) and would employ exemplary organization skills

As for the relationship between the commander and the army, he (S) was distinguished for his sacrificing and ever-friendly(9) disposition. Obedience [to him] was strengthened by full cognizance and acceptance of his prophethood by the people under him; therefore this was an impetus for them to believe in his orders out of conviction

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Q1:65; Zuhri, al-Maghāzi al-Nabawiyya: 86; Wāqidi 1:182; Bukhāri (al-Jihād hadith no. 110); Ibn Mājah, Sunan (al-Jihād hadith no. 1); Nasā’i, Sunan (al-Jihād hadith no. 18 Wāqidi 1:335; Bukhāri (al-Maghāzi 29); Abu Dāwud (al-Jihād 156); al-Kalā’i 1:105-2 (Bukhāri (al-Janā’iz 80, al-Maghāzi 18); Tirmidhi (al-Da’awāt 82-3 Bukhāri (al-Jihād 82); Tirmidhi (al-Shamā’il 1); Tabari 2:326; Kalā’i 1:101-4

Ibn Bakār, Jamharah Nasab Quraysh ١:٣٦٢; Ibn ‘Abd Rabbih, al-Iqd al-Fareed ٣:٣٢١ –٥
Ibn Hanbal ١:٤٠٦; Ibn Hishām ٤:٥٥; Tabari, Tafseer al-Tabari ١٤:١٣١ –٦
Bukhāri (al-Jizyah, al-Adab, al-Eimān, al-Sayd, al-Maghāzi); Ibn Mājah (al-Sadaqāt, –٧
(al-Janā’iz, al-Jihād
Ibn Sa’d ١:١٤٧; Tabari ٢:٣٥٥; Suhayli, al-Rawdh al-Anf ٢:٢٥٢; Kalā’i ١:٨٨ –٨
Wāqidi ١:٢٧٥; Ibn Sa’d ٢:٢٩; Tabari: ٥٢٠; Ibn Atheer, al-Kāmil fi al-Tārikh ٢:١٥٨ –٩

(that he was commanded by the Almighty) (1)

The Prophet was always aware of the problems being faced by his troops. He would be sympathetic towards them and would always, both in times of war and peace (2), be with them and act as a good role model for them so that they could emulate him in all matters and follow him (3). He would never proceed with his forces without seeking counsel first, as is observed in the battles of Badr, Uhud etc (4). His relationship with the troops was always based on the principles of humanity, compassion, compromise, sympathy, reform, magnanimity (5), aiding the oppressed, assisting in the doing of good, actively opposing tyranny and transgression, and equality among the people (6)

And this would include all the people despite their differences (7). In order to achieve this objective, he had to bring the community together at the same level under one common rubric and imbibe love and compassion for each other in their hearts (8). He needed to establish a link of brotherhood between them and counter their lassitude and uncertainty. Because of this, those who had gathered around him (9) were all pleased with him and had come to accept this matter

All the goals that he worked towards and strived to attain, and the preparations that he made so that the brutal battles may be won internally and externally, are truly astounding for the people who read about them, and all the people who have learnt about this type of leadership are left with no option but

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(Q۸:۶۵; Bukhāri (al-Jihād ۱۱۰); Nasā'i (al-Jihād ۱۸-۱)

(.Q۶:۵۴; Q۹:۱۲۸; Bukhāri and Nasā'i (Ibid -۲

Q۳۳:۳۳ -۳

Before the start of the Battle of Uhud, the Holy Prophet (S) went on the pulpit in the -۴ Masjid and said: Last night I saw a dream in which I was surrounded by shields and protected while the sword, Dhul Fiqr, had been broken from one side and I saw a cow being slaughtered. The companions asked the Prophet (S) to interpret this dream so he said: As for the shields that were surrounded, it is the city of Madina, and as for

the broken sword, it means that I will lose someone from my family (in the battle), and as for the cow being slaughtered, it means that some of my companions will be killed. Having said this, the Prophet (S) recommended that they remain in Madina and defend themselves against the attackers, however, some of the youth who were eager for battle insisted that they should leave the city and meet the enemy outside saying: If we don't go out to meet them in battle, the enemies will take this to mean that we are afraid of them. The Prophet (S) gave in to their insistence and prepared the army. Later, these same youth came to the Prophet (S) and said: We do not wish to force you to do something that you do not wish to do O Prophet of Allāh, and we will obey your command whatever it may be. But by this time it was too late and the Prophet (S) said: It is not appropriate for those who have put on their armor and prepared for battle to remove their armor now. In this instance we see how the Prophet (S) acted against his own wishes and accepted the view of the majority (See:

(.Wāqidi ١:٢١٢-٢١٥) (Tr

Q٦:٣٣; Q٧:٢٠٦, ١٦٨; Q٨:١; Q١٥:٨٨; Bukhāri (al-Hanbalā' ٥٠, ٥٤, al-Jizya, al-Adab, al- – ٥ Eimān, al-Sayd, al-Maghāzi); Muslim (al-Fadhā'il ٦٥); Ibn Mājah (al-Zuhd ٣٣); Abu

(Dāwud (al-Jihād ٤٤, ٥٤

Q١٤:٩٠; Q٤٢:١٥; Wāqidi ١:١٨٢, ١٩٤; Bukhāri (al-Madhālim ٥, ٦); Muslim (al-Amārah, al- – ٦

(Birr, al-Jihād, al-Fadhā'il ٦٣); Nasā'i (Ishrat al-Nisā' ١

(Q٦:١٩; Abu Dāwud (al-Sunan ١٠ – ٧

Ibn Sa'd ٢:١; Suhayli ٢:٢٥٢; Tabari ٢:٤٢١, ٤٩٩, ٣:٣٨٩ – ٨

(Q٣٣:٧١); Wāqidi ١:٢١; Bukhāri (al-Ahkām ٤ – ٩

to admit its greatness. The American Michael Hart says: ‘My choice of Muhammad to lead the list of the world's most influential persons may surprise some readers and may be questioned by others, but he was the only man in history who was supremely [\(۱\)](#) (successful on both the religious and secular level.’

The Englishman Montgomery Watt says: ‘His readiness to undergo persecutions for his beliefs, the high moral character of the men who believed in him and looked up to him as leader, and the greatness of his ultimate achievement – all argue his fundamental integrity. To suppose Muhammad an impostor raises more problems than it solves. Moreover, none of the great figures of history is so poorly appreciated [\(۲\)](#) (in the West as Muhammad.’

As for the reason behind my choosing this subject, it is because of the military and historic significance [\(۳\)](#) that it has. It clarifies aspects of ingenuity, management and administration that have been largely ignored by researchers or have only been mentioned by them in passing. This is because they only try to concentrate their efforts in approaching the subject of military expeditions [\(۴\)](#) in a specific manner, not in the way the great documenters of expeditions and battles [\(۵\)](#) have presented them. In this regard, this present research can be taken as an example for the personal and social interactions between all the nations and peoples of the world [\(۶\)](#). We will present certain parts of this in summary

One: The Military And Its Historical Significance

From the time he entered Madina, the Prophet (S) started raising an army

p: ۱۱

Michael H. Hart, the ۱۰۰: a ranking of the most influential persons in history, New York: Hart Publishing Company, Inc., ۱۹۷۸, p. ۳۳

W. Montgomery Watt, Mohammad at Mecca, Oxford, ۱۹۵۳, p. ۵۲ – ۲

Ibn Sa’d ۲:۷۷۰; Ibn ‘Asākir, Tārikh Madinat Dimishq ۱۵:۳۹۷; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās, ‘Uyun – ۳ al-Athar fi Funun al-Maghāzi wal-Siyar ۱:۷; Mārglyuth, Dirāsāt ‘an al-Muwarrikheen al-‘Arab, translated into Arabic by Husayn Nassār: ۱۰۸

Ibn Hishām ٢:٢٦٤, ٤:١٧٠ -٤

Wāqidi ١:١٧٧; Ibn Hishām ٣:٢٤٥; Ibn Sa'd; Tabari ٢:٥٨٣ -٥
(Bukhāri (al-Jihād ١٠٢); al-Dārimi, Sunan (Bāb al-Siyar ٨ -٦

in order to counter the threats of the enemy. He organized numerous secret fact-finding military missions(١), sending them to different parts of the Arabian Peninsula(٢). By sending these secret missions and appointing commanders for each of them, the Holy Prophet (S) was able to fight both the internal and external(٣) (i.e. outside the Arabian Peninsula) enemies. The result of these wars was the foundation of faith and conviction in humane warfare that became fundamental for the Muslims and others

Numerous scholars like Ibn Shihāb al-Zuhri, Wāqidi, Ibn Hishām and others have written about this. It is certain that this belief originated from faith in God and it was evident that it bestowed a special energy to the fighters that made them fearless and as a result, their struggles and bravery became unmatched and not even the slightest inkling of fear remained in them

As for the factors and motivations of this ideology, they were manifested in the most beautiful form in faith in a specific goal that consisted of the establishment of justice and the struggle towards universal peace and security, and also in countering oppression and exploitation, treachery, greed, evil habits and imprudent patrimony of authority and power that was practiced by the Arabs in the age of Jāhiliyya. I have studied this ideology and its basis after the advent of Islām. During the reigns of the Umayyad and Abbasid Caliphates and after that, many wars took place and in all of them lessons were taken from the past. They would

p: ١٢

The number of Sariya missions that the Prophet (S) sent has been recorded as – ١ (being anywhere between ٣٥, ٣٨, ٤٨ and ٦٦ (Tr (Q٢٨:٥٧; Bukhāri (al-Manāqib, al-Maghāzi); Abu Dāwud (al-Jihād –٢ The Prophet (S) had created an institution that was known as the Intelligence and –٣ Security Branch through which information about the enemies both within and (without the Arabian Peninsula was gathered. (Tr

.refer to this very period (i.e. the time of the Prophet) and seek to take lessons from it

That which transpired later, after the battles in the early days of Islām, was all a continuation of that which took place during the time of the Prophet (S) in its basis, motivations and factors except that it transpired under a different set of circumstances^(١). Thus we find this ideology being adopted after the companions of the Prophet (S) such as Abu ‘Ubayda Ibn Jarrāh^(٢), Sa’d Ibn Abi Waqqās^(٣) and Khālid Ibn Walid^(٤) had become accustomed to it, having implemented it with precision and understanding in the battlefields alongside the Holy Prophet (S), and after him in Qādisiyya and Yarmuk, and later during the time of the Caliphs^(٥)

Therefore, they and others gained guidance through this ideology and fundamental principle that was observed in the first battles, and these principles were like a keepsake that was brought from the biggest wars and battlefields of victory. However, with the passing of time, their successors began to forget these principles and became lax and negligent in preserving them, and for this reason they had to face losses in battles

This is a plain indication and a strong proof for the necessity of studying and analyzing the art and method of warfare at that time. So even now, after so much time has passed, the importance of studying these wars and battles has not waned. It continues to seek an in-depth reading and a profound understanding in order

p: ١٣

Of course this may be true for a specific period of time, during the reign of the first –١ Caliphs, but when the Umayyads and Abbasids took over, the situation was quite the opposite. Their motives for war was mostly material and in order to gain control and occupy fruitful and thriving lands for their own benefit. Unfortunately, the respected (author has neglected this fact. (Tr

To find out more about him refer to: Ibn ‘Abd al-Barr, al-Isti’āb fi Ma’rifat al-Ashāb –٢

٤:١٧٠; Ibn Atheer, Usd al-Ghāba fi Ma’rifat al-Sahāba ٥:٢٤٩

Ibn ‘Abd al-Barr ٢:٦٠٤; Ibn Atheer ٢:٢٩١ –٣

The respected author has followed a wrong track with regards to Khālid bin Walid. –٥
Contrary to what he mentions, Khālid bin Walid was in no way a man of strong faith and moral principles. Before becoming one of the commanders of the Muslim army, he was a commander of the disbelievers who had strong inclinations to the practices of Jāhiliyya. It was because of the continuous victories of Islām over the disbelievers that he joined the Muslims. It was for his own personal benefit that he accepted the faith. This can be clearly witnessed by his actions after becoming a ‘Muslim’. His various infringements caused the Prophet (S) much displeasure, so much so that he (S) even reproached him. (See: Muhammad al-‘Aqqād, ‘Abqariyyatu ‘Umar: ١٧٢–١٧٤). After the death of the Prophet (S) Khālid bin Walid was responsible for killing numerous innocent Muslims. The incident of his killing Mālik bin Nuwayra, despite his professing Islām, just in order to marry his wife, is well documented. So is his attack on the Bani Yarbu’ who were standing for prayer and had borne testimony to Islām. (See: Ya’qubi, Tārikh ٢:١١٠; Ibn Katheer, al-Bidāya wal-Nihāya ٦:٣١١; Kalā’i al-Balansi, Tārikh al-Radda: ٢; Ibn Atheer, al-Kāmil ٢:٣٥٩; Dhahabi, Tārikh al-Islām ١:٢٥٣). It is very unfortunate that despite all this some Muslims insist on referring to this man as the
(‘Sword of Allāh’! (Tr

to deduce and discover matters concerning warfare that are lesson-giving, because it is this aspect that does not expire. The ideas and effects related to the ‘principles of war’ have not perished or reduced in value over the period of time

Two: Novel Warfare

The Prophet (S) gave real meaning to the term ‘military management’ and aside from being a science, he gave it originality; something that the Arabs before him were unfamiliar and unacquainted with⁽¹⁾. The wars of the Muslims would take place in a manner which was unlike the wars based on vengeance and barbarism. These wars were not for personal pleasure or blind hatred in useless matters, nor were they chaotic, unplanned and disorganized onslaughts

When the Prophet (S) was appointed to Prophethood, he made a lot of efforts regarding this matter. The most important issue that he would concentrate on in war was the constant readiness for it. Many of the missions and expeditions that took place were in actuality a kind of preparation and military exercise that the troops needed. The advantage in the end, when these missions and expeditions returned home, was the invention of new arts and strategies of warfare which played an important role in the organization of the ranks of the army in the Battle of Badr⁽²⁾, in commanding these ranks, procuring arms and the necessary equipment, and the distribution of tasks among the troops

Aside from this, the most important instrument that he (S) used was the sending out of spies in order to gather information

p: ۱۴

The Arabs in the age of Jāhiliyya had no specific organization in their wars and never used to comply with any principles and rules of warfare. Obeying the commander, moving in an orderly fashion, being organized, following a plan etc. were not given importance by them. For this reason, even when they had large numbers (and many resources, they would often lose their battles. (Tr Bukhāri (al-Maghāzi ۳۱, ۳۸); Muslim (al-Jihād ۴۲). Today it is necessary to have the –۲

armed forces ready and on alert at all times. This is achieved by giving them continuous training. The Holy Prophet (S) would also train his army, but not through unreal war games (as is done today), rather he would send them for real missions. This would keep them ready and enable them to practice new tactics of war and (.would also strike fear into the hearts of the enemy (Tr

about the enemy during the preparatory stages of war, and through this he was able to secretly gain knowledge about the numbers of the enemy and their accoutrements. For example, he sent Hudhayfa in the Battle of the Confederates (Ahzāb), telling him: ‘Go and gather information about this group and during this mission do not make contact with anyone until you return back to me’.

The Holy Prophet (S) used ‘psychological warfare’ as one of the most important strategies of war and in this way he was able to put fear and awe in the hearts of the enemy so that they may be forced to flee or surrender without the need for combat. This is just what he did in the Conquest of Makkah. He ordered that the army should light ten thousand fires, so that by this he could put fear and anxiety in the hearts of the enemy.

Similarly, the Prophet (S) initiated pre-emptive war in order to avert possible threats from the enemy that he was unable to counter. In this way, before the enemy could gather all its forces for war, he would take quick action. For this type of war, he put in place rules and regulations and encapsulated them with perfect precision and profound understanding. He then placed them alongside ‘speed, agility and stealth’. In this method, by conducting ‘surprise attacks’ on the enemy, they would end up being stunned and straggled and became, from the start of the invasion, crippled and rendered helpless in

p: ١٥

In the Battle of Ahzāb, the Holy Prophet (S) sent Hudhayfa ibn al-Yamān to spy on the enemy and find out what they were doing. When Hudhayfa set forth, the Prophet (S) prayed for his success. Hudhayfa went into the enemy camp and sat beside them without anyone realizing that he had been sent to spy on them. Then he returned to the Prophet (S) and informed him of what he had heard. (For more details on this, refer to: Wāqidi, al-Maghāzi ٢:٤٩٠) (Tr Wāqidi ٢:٦٧٠; Ibn Hishām ٣:٣٤٤. During the Conquest of Makkah, the Holy Prophet (S) commanded all the soldiers, who numbered about ten thousand and were camped a few kilometers outside Makkah, to light torches and when the Makkans saw ten

thousand lights in the night, they lost all hope of resistance and in this way the Muslims were able to enter Makkah without spilling any blood as the Qurasysh simply surrendered without putting up any resistance (See: Wāqidi ٢:٨١٤; Ibn Hishām ٣:٤٠٢)

(.Tr

Wāqidi ١:١٨٢, ١٩٤; Ibn Hishām ٣:٤٦; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٢١, ٣٥, ٤٤-٣

their very own land, and this action would bring with it many other advantages and [benefits](#).)

In the same way, the Prophet (S) would conduct ‘lightening-strikes’ which was a form of war wherein it would not take a significant amount of time and would be ‘swift, short, unexpected and stealthy’. It would also require a smaller force with fewer accoutrements. This type of operation would be carried out in the face of an enemy that was larger in number and in many instances [\(۲\)](#), with [other] new strategies, it gave an upper hand to the Muslims, especially in the battles of Badr, Khandaq and Hunayn.

The Prophet (S) also employed the ‘war of uprising’ [\(۳\)](#) and through it, he would raise the inhabitants of a town, including their men, women and children, to stand up and fight against the invading armies that were intent on destroying them. This type of action was clearly seen in the Battle of the Confederates. In this instance, he made all the people participate jointly to dig a ditch in the battlefield, and this was considered a novel tactic that was previously unknown [\(۴\)](#). This method then became an example for those who took part in later wars.

He (S) similarly used the strategy of ‘laying siege’ and completely surrounding the enemy so that in this way, they would be cut off from the outside world and could not send for reinforcements and support. Of course he was careful to ensure that they were out of the range of enemy arrows.

p: ۱۶

It has always been the case that gaining an advantage over the enemy in all – ۱ aspects is considered one of the primary tactics and this is as true today as it was in the past. Countries gather large arsenals and buy or manufacture weapons in order to ensure that they are prepared to face any enemy that would dare to attack them. The Holy Prophet (S) also took this very seriously and because of this, he was able to [\(gain numerous victories over his enemies. \(Tr](#)

See: al-Harb al-Khātifah in Ibn Hishām ۲:۲۴۸, ۳:۶۹; Ibn Sa’d ۲:۷, ۲:۵۳ onwards; Wāqidi –۲

١:١١; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٢:٧٩

(Zuhri: ٨٤; Ibn Hishām ٣:١٨١; Bukhāri (al-Jihād: ٣٨ -٣

The Holy Prophet (S) commanded the digging of a trench around the city of Madina -٤ in the Battle of Ahzāb in accordance with the suggestion made by Salmān al-Fārsi. Because this task was very difficult and required a lot of time to complete, the Holy Prophet (S) instructed all the forces and even the youth to assist. They would not stop digging until the task was completed and even the Prophet (S) did his share of the work. In this way, the task was completed quickly and in time. (See: Wāqidi ٢:٤٤٥-٤٤٠)

((Tr

and would set camp in a place where he and the forces would be safe from the reach and view of the enemy, continuing this until those who were besieged were forced to [come out and surrender](#) (1)

The Holy Prophet (S) made use of the ‘war of impediments’ which was previously [unknown to the Arabs and with which they were unfamiliar](#) (2)

When the Prophet (S) was informed that the enemy had gathered at night in order to carry out a dangerous attack against him, he sought counsel from his troops. The advisers agreed with the proposal made by Salmān al-Fārsi that a ditch be dug (around the city of Madina) (3). Thus by digging a ditch, the basis of a unique and new form of war, meaning the ‘war of impediments’ was created, which was in line with the idea of defense and using of the appropriate weapon in the given situation

The result of this tactic was that it made the enemy perplexed and baffled. They did not know how to react to what they saw. Being unable to pass over or go through the ditch, they turned back hopeless. This later became known as the ‘Battle of the Ditch’ because of this great feat

When the Holy Prophet (S) foresaw rebellion, siege and one on one combat from the side of the defenders of the city, he would turn to the ‘war of the city and streets’ (4) which consisted of precise and particular measures. The Conquest of Makkah is indeed one example of

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The Prophet (S) used this strategy in the Battle of Khaybar, Bani Quraydha and Bani –۱ Nadhir, and he besieged the Jewish forces in their fortresses. This made things (difficult for them and they eventually came out and surrendered. (Tr

For more details see: Asghar Qā’idān, Tārikh wa Athāre Islāmiye Makkeye – ۲ Mukarrame wa Madineye Munawware: ۷۲

When Salmān gave the suggestion that the Muslims should dig a trench in the –۳ Battle of Ahzāb, the Muslims became so happy with the idea that each group claimed Salmān to be part of them. But the Prophet said: Salmān is from us – the Ahl al-Bayt,

and this Salmān became known as Salmān al-Muhammadi. See: Wāqidi ٢:٤٥٥-٤٦٠;
(.Tabari ٢:٥٧٤; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٢:٦١ (Tr
Wāqidi ٢:٧٩٢, ٨٠٣; Ibn Hishām ٤:٤٤; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٩٨; Tabari ٣:٥٦-٤

this type of warfare^(١). In this case, the army of Islām entered the city of Makkah in order to conquer it, after having strengthened its siege in the four corners of the city

Troops were placed in each corner according to the importance of that part of the city, and specific accoutrements were used and commanders appointed. The effect of this was that the people in Makkah became terrified as they looked at the great numbers of soldiers in the Muslim army. When this strong army entered Makkah, no blood was spilt^(٢). This was something the likes of which has never been witnessed, nor has anything like it been recorded or reported in the past^(٣)

The Prophet (S) had some strategies that he would always use against the enemies in all the battles. Some of these strategies were: ‘creating a possibility for easy movement’, ‘sending secret information gathering missions’, ‘carrying out surprise attacks on the enemy’ along with ‘movement with stealth and furtiveness’^(٤), ‘use of traps and artifices’^(٥), ‘taking advantage of the most suitable time and place and appointing the most appropriate commanders for each mission’^(٦). And in all these issues he displayed no lassitude nor did he fall short from implementing them perfectly

In order to promote the needed balance, create hope and increase the morale of the army^(٧), he would try to study the facets of the tactics and strategies used either before, during or after the battle^(٨). Every factor that contributed in giving the Muslims an upper hand over the

p: ١٨

War of the city and streets is one of the most important types of warfare that has – ١ been fought both in the past and present and has played a decisive role in the outcome of many battles. The same is true for the Conquest of Makkah. This can be seen in the books of history. (For example, see Bakri Shāfi’i, al-Durar al-Mukallalah fi Fath Makkah al-Mukarramah al-Musharrafah al-Mubajjalah, and also Wāqidi’s al-Maghāzi and Ibn Hisham’s Seerah) (Tr Wāqidi ٢:٨٢٥; Ibn Hishām ٤:٤٤; Tabari ٣:٥٤ –٢

After the polytheists had broken the Treaty of Hudaibiyya, the Prophet (S) gave the order to mobilize all the forces so that he could uproot the very existence of polytheism and disbelief from the Arabian Peninsula. With ten thousand strong, the Prophet (S) marched towards Makkah. When Abu Sufyān saw the Muslim army up close and knew that there was no hope of defeating them, he sought the intercession of the Prophet's uncle 'Abbās ibn 'Abd al-Muttalib and professed Islām. In turn, the Prophet (S) granted amnesty to all those who sought refuge in Abu Sufyān's house. After taking over the city, the Prophet decided to free all the disbelievers, and spared their lives. The way this conquest was carried out was unprecedented. An entire city was taken without the use of any force and without shedding a single drop of blood. (For more details, see: Ibn Hishām ۳:۴۰۰; Wāqidi ۲:۷۸۰; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ۲:۲۲۳-۲۴۴;

(.Ya'qubi ۲:۵۸ onwards; Ibn Sa'd ۲:۱۳۵) (Tr

Wāqidi ۱:۱۹۵, ۲:۴۹۶; Ibn Hishām ۳:۵۰; Ibn Sa'd ۲:۲۳; Tabari ۲:۱۸۱ ۹:۳-۴

Shaybāni, Sharh Siyar al-Kabir ۱:۱۱۹; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ۲:۶۴-۵

Wāqidi ۱:۴۰۴; Ibn Hishām ۳:۳۰۲; Ibn Atheer, Usd al-Ghābah ۴:۲, ۳۳۰; Ibn Hajar, al-

Isāba fi Tamyez al-Sahāba ۱:۲۹, ۳:۱۹۴, ۴:۱۱, ۱۷۶

(Q۴:۸۴; Bukhāri (al-Maghāzi ۱۷); Muslim (al-Amārah ۱۱۷-۷

Wāqidi ۲:۲۴۵ onwards; Ibn Hishām ۲:۲۶۷, ۴:۳۷, ۳۹-۸

enemy in battlefield(۱) was considered carefully and studied by him, because victory is a goal that every commander strives for in the wars he fights

At this point it is necessary mention the issue of attacking those who were fleeing and running away from the battlefield – about which many have erred. The Prophet (S) never used to attack those who were fleeing from the battlefield after having lost the battle, just in order to fulfill his desires or act upon his inclinations. However, some have said that the Muslim army would pursue the defeated enemy, especially as in the case of the battle of Hunayn. It must be said that the Prophet (S) would avail the opportunity to the defeated enemy to flee if they so wished; because throwing a spear towards the back of the enemy was something that would lower the respect of the commander in the eyes of the soldiers and would cause him to be despised

In the battles of Dhāt al-Suwayq, Dhāt al-Ruqā' and al-Ghābah, he did not attack those who were fleeing; and also in the battle of Hunayn, he only pursued those enemies who were not surrendering or fleeing(۲), but were instead trying to move to a better position in order to regroup and launch further attacks on the Muslims, because at this stage the battle had not ended and it only came to an end when the forces of the Hawāzin were defeated and Tā'if came under siege(۳)(۴). Similarly, in other missions

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Zuhri: ۶۳, ۷۱; Wāqidi ۱:۹ ۲:۵۳۴; Ibn Hishām ۴:۱۶۱, ۲:۲۴۱, ۳:۱۰۷; Tabari ۲:۴۴۸ –۱

Wāqidi ۲:۶۵۸ onwards; Suhayli ۴:۶۵; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ۲:۲۰۱ –۲

Wāqidi ۳:۹۲۷; Ibn Sa'd ۲:۱۱۴; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ۲:۲۰۱ onwards –۳

The Battle of Hunayn took place in ۸ A.H. after the Conquest of Makkah. When the –۴ enemy ambushed the Muslims, many of those who had just become Muslims after the Conquest of Makkah fled and then, with the exception of ten individuals, everyone left the side of the Holy Prophet and took to their heels. When the ten brave individuals put up a strong resistance, the army eventually returned and regrouped. Eventually the Muslims defeated the Hawāzin army and six thousand of them were captured. A group fled to Tā'if and another group went to Autās where they set up defenses. The

Prophet (S) sent Abu ‘Aāmir Ash’ari to follow them and he was able to capture nine more of them from Autās. In the end, the Muslims were victorious. (For more details, see: Ibn Sa’d ۲:۱۴۷; Ibn Hishām ۲:۷۲; Nuwayri, Nihāyat al-Urub fi Funun al-Adab ۲:۲۹۵–۲۹۷). Here, it was only because the enemy intended to regroup and launch further (attacks on the Muslims that the order to pursue them was given. (Tr

that resulted in war, the fleeing enemy was never attacked

Three: Management Of Supplies And Munitions

With the advancement of different facets of daily life and its changes, it can be observed that the issue of ‘munitions and support’ was very serious and had an important impact on the outcome of the war; because if the needs of an army are not met, the forces are faced with inconvenience, loss and dispersion, and the enemy is also likely to take the first opportunity and overpower them. In this way, its paramount importance in terms of the management of war and the tactical and strategic planning, become evident

It is necessary that different aspects of this matter and its hardships and difficulties be discussed, because people in the past have not recounted the conditions of the management of warfare for us in a way that can be relied upon or trusted

If one wanted to learn about the strength of the military infrastructure of the Muslim army at the time of the Holy Prophet (S), he would find that the first thing that the Prophet gave importance was the abundance of locally available resources that would be utilized, whether it be in the form of foods – the most important of which were dates – or other resources that the soldiers and troops would take as provisions for the war

The Muslim army never gave importance to the idea of storing or hoarding foodstuffs and for this reason, in many of the battles, the soldiers would suffer from hunger due to

p: ۲۰

Zuhri: ۱۵۱. Such an incident never transpired in any of the battles and the Prophet (S) never ordered that the fleeing enemy should be pursued. (Tr From the past up till today, the issue of supplies and provisions has been of – ۲ paramount importance in war, and it can be said with some confidence that in every war where the matter of provisions and supplies was adequately addressed, victory

was attained. And this issue has also played a key role in the loss of many a battle. This issue would always be taken very seriously by the Holy Prophet (S) in all of his (battles. (Tr

(.The author gives more details about this in the fifth section. (Tr -۳

(Bukhāri (al-Maghāzi ۱۷); Muslim (al-Amāra ۱۴۳ -۴

lack of sufficient food, and this forced the commanders to distribute the little available resources among the soldiers in an equitable manner^(١), and in situations where soldiers had nothing, they were forced to eat the meat of horses, wild donkeys etc^(٢). With respect to drinks like water, which was not always enough or accessible due to the lack of wells, the situation was very difficult^(٣) and the same procedure of equal ^(٤) distribution was applied.

As for the modes of transport that mostly consisted of camels and other animals, the soldiers would use them for traversing long distances and transferring booty that was gained from the battles. Actually, this booty was considered an important source for the acquisition of weapons and military provisions, in addition to the sale of horses ^(٥) and other equipment which constituted another source.

On the other hand, the Noble Prophet (S) gave importance to the disabled and the handicapped^(٦), because they would always remain with the army until the necessary resources for tending to their needs became available.

For this type of forces, there was no special arrangement in the Muslim army (as is the case today). Their role and important responsibilities included: Keeping watch and constant surveillance, providing partial reinforcements, tending to the injured, removing the bodies of those who were killed from the battlefield and burying them, patrolling and serving during the night, taking care of those who were in shock, gathering and settling^(٧), selecting suitable places where there were no plagues or infectious diseases – in which

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Bukhāri (al-Maghāzi ٦٥); Abu Dāwud (al-Ati'mah ٤٤); Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٢:١٥٨ – ١

Ibn Hanbal ٦:٣٤٤; Bukhāri (al-Maghāzi ٣٥); Kalā'i ١:١٣٢ – ٢

Wāqidi ٢:٥٧٨; Ibn Hazm: ٢٥١; Ibn Katheer, al-Bidāya wan-Nihāya ٥:٩ – ٣

The fact that the Prophet (S) never used to store food and grain can be derived – ٤ from the Qur'ānic injunctions against hoarding and maybe also from the economic situation in Madina at the time. In any case, the Prophet (S) would mostly get his own

food supplies from his own lands and from the enemies and would give less burden to the soldiers by not requiring them to carry and transport it, so that their movement

(.would not be slowed down. (Tr

(Wāqidi ١:٣٧٨; Bukhāri (al-Jihād ٨٠); Muslim (al-Jihād ٤٩ -٥

Dārimi (Muqaddima ٢); Abu Dāwud (al-Jihād ١٠٧); Kalā'i ١:١٣٠ -٦

(Wāqidi ٢:٦٤٤; Bukhāri (al-Madina ١٢); Abu Dāwud (al-Tibb ٢٤ -٧

the commander would himself assist them – and in the end, the injured would be taken [by them] to a tent in Madina that was erected for them next to the Masjid of [\(the Prophet \(S\)\)](#)

Despite all the difficulties [they faced], and the lack of provisions and reinforcements, the army of Islām would overpower the enemy that was better equipped in all these respects. The reason for this was that the Prophet (S) would use various forms of warfare according to what he deemed appropriate given the circumstances, based on [\(his experience and brilliance\)](#)

Four: The Subject For Discussion

In this study, the important events in the battles of the Prophet (S) have been discussed with the view of outlining the profundity of thought and consideration that was employed. In order to make things easy for the readers and students, we shall discuss the details of the subject at hand in such a manner and at such length that they would find no need to refer to numerous other available sources on the subject. This discussion regarding all the different aspects and the conclusions drawn will be presented separately

For example, the matter of *istitlā'* [\(٣\)](#) (gathering information and intelligence) which includes the modes, types and importance of intelligence gathering in battles and military missions and also the ways and methods that are used for this. In this discussion, all the tactics that are employed in information gathering, the role of every individual and group including [that of] the commander of the army and its leaders, their responsibilities

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These missions in the Muslim army were carried under the Department of Supplies – ١
and Provisions

Wāqidi ١:٢٤, ٣٩٤; Ibn Hishām ٣:١٨١, ٣٤٤; Tabari ٢:٥١٣, ٣:١٠ – ٢

Wāqidi ١:٩; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٢; Suhayli ٣:٢٧; Kalā'i ١:١٣٩; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٢:١٠٨ – ٣

and the conditions that need to be met by them and also how the information should be gotten from the enemy, the means that must be used, how to send this information to the commander of the army and how the information is used by the commander, are all explained

In these discussions, we give another example of the organization of the soldiers and their formations in different situations^(١). They would sometimes be arranged into one, two or three groups. The ‘arrow makers’ would be in the first or second group along with the archers, and the infantry would be behind the cavalry. The commander and the central watcher would be positioned in the center of the formation

Taking this into consideration, the subject being discussed comprises of both detailed and general topics about effects and consequences, and explanation of the important points and goals^(٢). Actually, we find that this subject includes a variety of topics, some of which are examined closely and thereby linked to others. All these topics are important for arriving at a clear and conclusive understanding of the subject

Fifth: Striving For Humanity

The Prophet of Allah (S) was truly a mercy for the entire human race^(٣). He never excluded anyone because of color or ethnicity. All people were considered servants of God by him^(٤). For this reason, he (S) would invite and call people towards the following

Growth and advancement of humanity as a whole^(٥). He would say: All of you are from Adam, and Adam was from clay^(٦)

Agreeing to a peace treaty

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(Ibn Hishām ٢:٢٨٧; Ibn Hanbal ٥:٤٢٠; Abu Dāwud (al-Jihād ١٠٧ -١)

In the third chapter of this book, the issue of parading the army and organizing it -٢ has been explained in detail

(Q٢١:١٠٧; Muslim (Bāb al-Birr wal-Jannah -٣

(Muslim (Bāb al-‘Itq ١٦-٤
(Bukhāri (al-Jihād ١٠٢); Muslim (al-Amāra ١١٧-٥
(Tirmidhi (al-Manāqib -٦

[\(before war\)](#)

[\(Forgiveness and pardon before punishment.\)](#)

.Leniency and clemency before retribution

Therefore, we find that all the battles he fought were always for the good of humanity, so he would not seek to punish anyone before they had done anything wrong, as [opposed to what] we see in our present day

The Prophet of Allah (S) would prevent the killing of the aged, women, children, prisoners and those who did not participate in the war and did not help the enemy[\(۳\)](#). He would prohibit this fervently. He also forbade torture and the disfiguring of dead bodies[\(۴\)](#). He instructed the Muslims to be good, kind and compassionate to the [\(people and to be affable and friendly with them\)](#)[\(۵\)](#)

He gave a perfect example of mercy in the Conquest of Makkah where, despite victory over the enemy, he treated them with the utmost kindness and compassion. If he wanted, he could have just as easily taken revenge on all of them, but instead he forgave them saying: Go, you are all freed[\(۶\)](#). In the battle of Dhat al-Ruqā', 'Amr bin Hārith was captured trying to assassinate the Prophet[\(۷\)](#), however the Prophet [\(pardoned him and set him free\)](#)[\(۸\)](#)

The Prophet (S) would treat the captives and prisoners of war with mercy and kindness. He would do favors to many of them (and set them free)[\(۹\)](#). At the same time, he told the soldiers to treat them well[\(۱۰\)](#). For example, in one of the battles, he [\(personally untied the hands of one of the prisoners whom he heard wailing\)](#)[\(۱۱\)](#)

He

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(Q۲:۲۰۸; Q۸:۶۱; Ibn Hanbal ۲:۲۴۶; Bukhāri (al-Adab ۹۱ –۱)

Bukhāri (al-Anbiyā ۵۰, ۵۴); Tabari ۳:۴۹ –۲

(Shaybāni, Sharh al-Siyar al-Kubrā ۱:۴۲; Abu Dāwud (al-Jihād ۸۲ –۳

Bukhāri (al-Madhālim ٣٠, al-Dhabā'ih ٢٥, al-Maghāzi ٣٦); Abu Dāwud (al-Jihād ١١٠, –٤
(al-Amārah ٣٣

(Bukhāri (al-Adhān ١٧,١٨); Muslim (al-Nadhr ٨); Abu Dāwud (al-Eimān ٢١ –٥

The Holy Prophet (S) conquered Makkah and purified this holy sanctuary of the –٦
impure idols. Many of those who had persecuted him over the years gathered around
him in the hope of seeking his mercy and forgiveness. The Prophet (S) let them go
(saying 'Antum al-Tulaqā' – I have set you free. (Tr

Suhayli ٣:٢٥٣; Kalā'i ١:١١٢; Qurtubi, al-Jāmi' al-Ahkām al-Qur'ān ٣:٢١٧; Ibn Qayyim, –٧
Zād al-Ma'ād fi Hudā Khayril 'Ibād ٢:٢٧٥

Amr ibn Hārith was from the tribe of Bani Mahārib. He approached the Prophet (S) –٨
with the intention of killing him. When the Prophet (S) was resting, he took his sword
and threatened him with it saying: Don't you fear me now that I have your sword and
am about to kill you? He (S) replied: No, I am not afraid of you because I know that
Allāh is there to protect me. When 'Amr heard this he could not move forward and
(dropped the sword and ran away. (Ibn Hishām ٢:٢٠٥) (Tr

Bukhāri (al-Ahkām ٣٥); Muslim (al-Jihād ٥٨); Abu Dāwud (al-Jihād ١٢٠); Bayhaqi, –٩
Sunan al-Kubrā ٦:٣١٩

Ibn Hishām ٢:١٩٩; Tabari ٢:٤٦ –١٠

This person was 'Abbās ibn 'Abd al-Muttalib, who was taken as a prisoner in the –١١
Battle of Badr, whereas he had been forced to come and fight by the Quraysh. See:

Bayhaqi ٩:٨٩; Ibn 'Abd al-Barr, al-Isti'āb ٢:٨١٠

propagated the idea of World Peace and instituted the word ‘peace’ as a greeting among all the children of Adam(۱). He showed this in the Treaty of Hudaibiyya when he sent Uthmān bin ‘Affān to negotiate with the Quraysh, and he accepted a number of representatives and groups that were selected to carry out this task. According to this treaty, he accepted the conditions put forward by the oppressive enemy for the .(cessation of war(۲

During the conquest (of Makkah), he deposed the commander whom he had given the order to take the city(۳) because of the slogans that he was chanting which gave a .(totally different impression about the goals of the conquest(۴

He paid special attention in choosing pious and righteous representatives to take the message to the rulers and kings of the world, because these representatives would have to convey the message using logic and wisdom in order to successfully invite .(them to accept Islām(۵

In the present age, there is no need that is greater than what the Prophet (S) was striving for. A strong need is felt for sincere action that is free from vain desire and hostility and for leadership that is truthful and righteous, which can lead the people towards humanity and a moral ethic of warfare that is far from mere bloodshed and .slaughter

These issues encompass a vast plethora of discussions that a humble person such as myself feels incapable of doing justice to. However, I shall spare no effort in trying my utmost to

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Ibn Hanbal ۳:۴۲۱; Bukhāri (al-Isti’dhān ۹); Muslim (al-Adab ۳۷); Ibn Mājah (al-Adab – ۱ (۱۳); Abu Dāwud (al-Adab: ۹۱); Tirmidhi (al-Isti’dhān ۲ ۱۱ Zuhri: ۵۲; Ibn Hishām ۳:۳۲۵; Ibn Hazm: ۲۰۸; Kalā’i ۱:۱۲۷–۲ Wāqidi ۲:۸۲۲; Ibn Sa’d ۲:۹۸; Suhayli ۴:۱۰۱; Kalā’i ۱:۱۳۹–۳

This person, Sa’d ibn ‘Ubāda al-Khazraji, was the ruler of the Khazraj tribe. This – ۴ was one of the tribes that were always engaged in war and fighting in order to take

control of Yathrib. As there was also enmity between the Qahtānis of Yathrib and the ‘Adnānis of Makkah, the people of Madina accepted Islām and decided to help the Prophet (S) against the ‘Adnānis. For this reason, when Makkah was conquered, many of the people of Madina who still held a grudge against their arch enemies thought of it as an opportunity to exact revenge. Sa’d took to chanting ‘Today is the day of vengeance!’ but when the Prophet heard about this, he took the flag away from Sa’d (and raised the chant of ‘Today is the day of mercy!’ instead. (Tr Sirāj al-Deen, Sayyidinā Muhammad Rasulullah (S): ۸۴ –۵

work on it. I do not claim that this research is complete and final, but I pursued this subject because I found it delectable and interesting, and I realized that the fruits of .this research would be very beneficial

I would truly like to express my gratitude to Dr. Ibrahim Baydhun of the University of Lebanon for his help and guidance in the arrangement and layout of this work and his attention to detail regarded the material presented in it. I will never forget his mentoring and the explanations and elucidations that he shared with me and assisted me with, to such an extent that he would at times leave his entire library – which is filled with many valuable works – at my disposal and I was able to gain access to .many original sources and handwritten manuscripts

I take this opportunity to thank the administrator and staff of the Dhahiriyyah Damascus Library who facilitated the access to important texts and manuscripts that I needed. I also would like to thank all those who participated in this work with me and even those who found out about my research proposal and went through it. I thank .them all

Was-salaam

Muhammad Dhāhir Watr

Scope Of Research

My method of research about the proposed subject is scientific and relies on fully documented evidence along with undisputed facts. It is based firstly on primary sources which form the foundation of the discussion and then secondarily turns to the more recent studies and views of contemporary scholars. In this

research, differing viewpoints on military management (with the aim of finding the best one), the principles of war, the fundamental role of ideology (and motivation) and the art of war in its new form are discussed alongside each other. This paper comprises of six sections and one preface – wherein the most important available sources on this subject are mentioned

:Section One

In this section, the traits and distinctions of the Arab military before Islām have been mentioned and the most important points that are related to their military management like: the purpose of battle, number of combatants, means of transport etc. have been discussed

:Section Two

This section consists of the important discussion on ‘Military Command’ in which issues like moral qualities of a commander are discussed. These include: heightened intelligence, foresight and prudence, awareness of matters that he is faced with, understanding the rules and principles of war such as defensive warfare, sudden warfare, revolutionary warfare, offensive warfare and psychological warfare

:Section Three

This section aims to explain the workings of the military bases and under this heading, details are given about staff headquarters and management issues pertaining to it :are discussed, including

Department of planning: this department deals with the general policies of the army, the enumeration of soldiers, arming them, understanding the enemy and related issues

Department of consultation: this is the consultative body or the command post of the war and its members are all recognized for their knowledge, acumen and understanding of issues pertaining to warfare

Department of spiritual guidance: this department is

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responsible for increasing the zeal of the fighters, studying the assignments and tours
.of duty

:Section Four

This section discusses the branch and department of 'Security and Intelligence' that is responsible for gathering information and intelligence from the enemy and analyzing it, and in the event of the intelligence being true, passing it to the supreme
.commander so that he may issue the correct orders

:Section Five

In this section we discuss about the 'Base of Operations' which makes arrangements for the required equipment for planning, execution, training, creation and perfection of weaponry and all the other supplies for warfare and includes the following
:departments

Department of operations: this is the department that is responsible for selecting the commander who leads the army in the battlefield, studying the assignments and
.sending troops and contingents

Department of training: this department is responsible for training the fighters in the handling of all the tools used in battle including bows and arrows, hand to hand
.combat etc

Department of armament: this department is in charge of securing all the supplies of
.war, weapons, military equipment etc

:Section Six

This section deals specifically with the department of munitions that has the responsibility of securing munitions, sending support, transport, feeding the soldiers, providing army uniforms, overseeing booty and its distribution and handling medical
:issues. This department consists of the following sub-departments

Department of munitions and relief support: this department has the task of providing

support to the troops by means of providing supplies and fulfilling their other needs
such as drinking water, tents, clothes and

.also removing the injured and dead from the battlefield

Department of booty: its responsibility is gathering the war booty and categorizing, .arranging and distributing it, and identifying those who should be permitted to use it

Department of medical services: the aim of this department is protecting the wellbeing of the forces, providing medical treatment for those who are injured and .incapacitated in battle, and burying the dead

.In this section, the role of women in providing assistance is also discussed

:Conclusion

In the end, we shall discuss the ‘growth of Islāmic Governance’ after the migration of the Prophet (S) to Madina, the formation of the Islāmic Government under his leadership. The details of his role in nurturing the military forces during wartime and the beginning of the creation and training of the corps will also be discussed. We will examine how this army gained the ability of entering into battle and achieving .decisive victory

In this regard, we find the causes of victory in the Muslim army to be the implementation of the principles and rules of war by their commanders – which the enemy was unaware of at that time and is more in line with the principles and rules of war of today. Similarly, the organization of the army in such a way that a strong spiritual ethos existed among the commanders and the troops, must be considered one of the greatest factors of the Prophet’s (S) success. When one studies the conquests that took place after the era of Prophethood, one finds that

the Prophet (S) was considered the first conqueror of Islām, because he laid the groundwork and raised the primary pillar (of these conquests) through his own battles

A Chronological Introduction And Description Of The Most Important Sources

Despite the fact that the wars of the Prophet (S) were fought over a relatively short period (10 years), his method and style of command and military leadership lasted for a long time; because Muslims and others, within the military and without, have discussed, studied and analyzed this subject from the beginning of the first century A.H. up to this day and have not neglected it

The Glorious Qur'ān is the most important source that speaks of these wars and battles, and we find a lot about this subject in its commentaries. The most important of these commentaries are: Tabari's Commentary, Nayshāburi's *Asbāb al-Nuzul*, Qurtubi's *al-Jāmi li Ahkām al-Qur'ān*, Baydhāwi's *Anwār al-Tanzil wa Asrār al-Ta'wil* and Suyuti's *al-Itqān fi 'Ulum al-Qur'ān*. Among these, Tabari's commentary, which describes the details of what takes place in the battles and also Nayshāburi's commentary, which records the occasion of revelation of specific verses in relation to the battles, are especially important

Material about these issues can [also] be found in various books of history and biography, the most important among which include: Ibn Shihāb al-Zuhri's *al-Maghāzi al-Nabawiyya*, Ibn Is'hāq's *al-Siyar wa al-Maghāzi*, al-Wāqidi's *al-Maghāzi al-Nabawiyya*, Ibn Hazm al-Andalusi's *Jawāmi' al-Sirah*, al-Kalā'i's *al-Ihtifā'* and Ibn Sayyid al-Nās' *Uyun al-Athar*. Wāqidi was more precise in his historical recordings of all the wars than the others, and by describing the affairs

of war and its management, he has been able to tackle the subject better. We cannot find complete references to the organization of the military except in his treatise. After him, Ibn Sa'd continues his work in the book al-Tabaqāt al-Kubrā and presents a picture of that which Wāqidi had not recorded

:However, the most important books of history about this subject are

Tārikh Ibn Khayyāt, Bukhāri's Tārikh al-Kabir, Tārikh Tabari, Tārikh Ibn 'Asākir, Ibn Atheer's al-Kāmil fi al-Tārikh, Ibn Katheer's al-Bidāya wa al-Nihāya, and also some biographical commentaries like Suhayli's Rawdh al-Unf have also set out to give details of such issues

Books of Hadith and Jurisprudence have also devoted specific chapters and sections for these matters. The primary ones among these are: Sahih Bukhāri (Chapter ٩ – The Book of Battles), Sahih Muslim (Chapter ٣ – The Book of Jihād and Expeditions), Sunan al-Tirmidhi (Chapter ٢ – The Book of Jihād), Sunan Ibn Dāwud (Chapter ٢ – The Book of Jihād and Expeditions), Sunan al-Nasā'i (Chapter ٩ – The Book of Jihād), Sunan al-Dārimi (Chapter ٢ – The Book of Jihād and Expeditions), Sunan al-Dārqutni (The Book of Expeditions), Musannaf San'āni (Chapter ٥), Ibn Hanifa's al-Maghāzi wa al-Musnad (The book of Jihād and Expeditions), Shāfi'i's al-Umm (Chapter ٩ – The Book of Willful Injury), Humaidi's al-Musnad (The Book of Battles and Jihād), Abi Sulaymān al-Khitābi's Ma'ālim al-Sunan and Ibn Qayyim al-Jawzi's al-Tahdhib

In this context, Sahih Bukhāri is important both historically and militarily as the author has narrated the accounts chronologically and

recounts the battles in the order in which they took place, starting from the Battle of al-‘Ashirah to the Battle of Tabuk. Similarly, when he explains the battles, he takes all the angles into account, mentioning numerous narratives about it, such that the .reader is able to come to a complete and correct understanding of these battles

Aside from the books that discuss this subject separately, there are various books of history and annals of nations that have also been beneficial in this research. The most important among these are: Arzaqi’s Akhbāru Makkah, Qutb al-Din’s Tārikh Makkah al-Musharrafah, Fāsi’s al-‘Aqd al-Tamin, Bakri’s Mu’jam Mastu’jam and Yāqut al-Hamawi’s Mu’jam al-Buldān

The most important feature of these histories and chronicles is that they mention the economic situation [at the time], military resources and battle expeditions and similarly give a clear representation of the economic life, which in this age was considered one of the more important issues, and for every discussion on the military .it is a necessary factor that needs to be taken into account

Books about the character of the Prophet (S) also consist of many points about his ‘military management’ and ‘qualities of leadership’ the most important among which include: Ibn Sa’d’s Tabaqāt al-Kubrā (vol. ١ Chapter ٢), Tirmidhi’s Shamāil, Faryabi’s Dalā’il al-Nubuwwah, Abu ‘Ali Ansāri’s Sifāt al-Nabi (S), Qādhi ‘Ayyādh’s Shifā, Suyuti’s al-Khasā’is al-Kubrā, Ibn Hajar ‘Asqalāni’s al-Mawāhib al-Daniyya, al-Dhahabi’s Tārikh al-Islām (vol. ١), Ibn Qayyim al-Jawzi’s Zād al-Ma’ād fi Hudā Khayril ‘Ibād (vol. ١ .٢) and his Furuṣiyyat al-Muhammadiyah

Books

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of biography are also not empty of material on this subject, rather, in many instances provide detailed accounts about the commanders of battles and wars and about the companions who had the responsibility of commanding the armies. Some of these (books) are: Ibn Habib's al-Muhbir, Ibn 'Abd al-Barr's al-Isti'āb fi Ma'rifat al-Ashāb, Ibn Atheer al-Jazari's Usd al-Ghāba fi Ma'rifat al-Sahābah and Ibn Hajar 'Asqalāni's al-Isāba fi Tamyiz al-Sahābah

The Islāmic conquests at the time of the Prophet (S) and the companions were studied by those who came later and the various aspects and details were presented in a well organized fashion by them. Books of geography and history expound on the conquests within and without the Arabian subcontinent and also talk of the events after the spread of Islām from Madina al-Munawwarah to Damascus, Baghdād, Madā'in, and on the east to India and to Alexandria, Constantinople, Tarablus and Tunis. It could be said that the most important of these works are Ibn Khardāba's al-Masālik wal-Mamālik [vols. ٣,٤,٥ and ٦], Ibn Rusta's al-A'lāq al-Nafsiyya [Chapter ٨] which talks about Madina, Makkah, Haramayn and the southern lands of Arabia

Ibn Faqih's al-Buldān [Chapter ١٠ and ١١] talks of Makkah and Alexandria while Ya'qubi's al-Buldān [Chapter ١٧ and ١٨] mentions the Maghreb, Baghdad and their historical importance. Balkhi's Suwar al-Aqāleem is the first book on geography written in Islām and Istakhri's al-Masālik wal-Mamālik is also the first book that describes the 'Islāmic World

In Ibn Hawqal's al-Masālik wal-Mamālik [Chapter ٣, ٤ and ٢٤] the maps of

Egypt, Syria, Iraq and the Arabian Peninsula have been drawn and the economical and social situation of Libya has also been portrayed. Muqaddasi has also given a description of Palestine and Syria in his *Ahsanu al-Taqa'seem fi Ma'rifatil Aqaleem* [Chapter ۳۲ and ۳۴].

Mas'udi's *al-Tanbih wal-Ashrāf* [Chapter ۳۷] speaks of the life of the Prophet (S), battles and expeditions in which he was the commander, military units, horses and mounts, and all that is related to the military transport. Mas'udi's recording of the 'Historical Geography of Battles', is considered an original source whose narrations can be relied upon, however, unfortunately most of his writings are lost.

Another source is Qazwini's *Athār al-Bilād wa Akhbār al-'Ibād* which discusses geographical history and related issues including the situations and conditions of different lands and their inhabitants. After this, we must mention the *Muqaddima* of Ibn Khaldun and Qalashqandi's *Subh al-A'shā*. These two books record geographical and historical information about different kingdoms, especially Egypt and Syria.

It is noteworthy that more recently books and research works, in both Arabic and English, have been written about the life of the Prophet (S) and his battles with the disbelievers. The most important works in Arabic include: *al-Rasul al-Qā'id* (S. Khattāb), *al-Rasul al-'Arabi wa Fann al-Harb* (General Mustafa Talās), *al-'Abqariyya al-Askariyya fi Ghazawāt al-Rasul*, *'Ali Hāmish al-Sirah* (Tāhā Hussain), *Hayātu Muhammad* (Muhammad Hasanain Haykal), *al-'Abqariyyāt al-Islāmiyya ('Aqqād)* and *al-Anwār al-Muhammadiyya* (Nabhāni).

The foreign books that have been translated into Arabic and discuss the same subject, we can mention: *Muhammad in Makkah*

and Madina (Montgomery Watt), Muhammad, the Prophet of Allah (Dianna), The Heroes (Thomas Carlyle), The First Hundred (Michael Hart) and others

Many of these works are only limited to military, institutional or ethical issues that form part of the seerah. Because ‘military management’ encompasses all these issues, it is necessary that we discuss all these matters together, taking into consideration their correlation with each other. It is through this that the importance of this subject and its role in revealing the secret of the success of the Holy Prophet (S) and those whom he chose as army commanders, becomes evident

Now we will take a look at the most important authors and researchers in history who have written on this subject and have left behind important works on the battles and expeditions, and since their importance in relation to this subject varies, we will first study the oldest writings that are relevant and have practical implications and thereafter we will mention others according to their chronology and relevance; in this order: Wāqidi, Ibn Is’hāq, Ibn Shihāb al-Zuhri, Kalā’i and Ibn Sayyid al-Nās

The Most Important Historians

(.Abu Bakr Muhammad Ibn Muslim Bin ‘Ubaydallah Bin Shihāb al-Zuhri (51-124 A.H.)

There is a difference of opinion about his date of birth and death. He was a learned scholar, a memorizer of the Qur’an(1) and an author who knew how to use the various expressions and idioms and he would use these in his works(2). He was a poet(3) and a genealogist(4) who would look for the chains of narrators in the traditions(5). He would strive in the quest for

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Dhahabi, Tadhkirat al-Huffadh 1:108-113; Ibn Khallikān, Wafayāt al-A’yān wa Anbā’I 1-1

Abnā’iz Zamān 4:177-178; Ibn Hajar ‘Asqalāni, Tahdhib al-Tahdhib 9:488, 450

Abu Na’im al-Isfahāni, Hilyat al-Awliyā wa Tabaqāt al-Asfiyā 3:371 -2

Marzbāni, Mu’jam al-Shu’arā: 345 -3

Abu Na’im al-Isfahāni 3:272 -4

knowledge and would guard it. He kept aloof from the events and turmoil of his time^(۱). He believed in the dissemination of knowledge among the people and used to say: ‘In the spread of knowledge there is the strengthening of religion and worldly life’^(۲) and in the path of knowledge all this comes together^(۳)

He studied about the seerah from Sa’eed bin al-Musayyab, ‘Urwa bin Zubayr and ‘Ubaydallah bin ‘Abdullah bin Utbah, and in his attitude towards his teachers, he displayed exemplary ethics and morals. He would accompany them, serve them and show the utmost reverence to them^(۴). Zuhri made efforts to author some works. He would write down what he heard. When his works became known, people turned to him and benefitted greatly from his knowledge

Zuhri started with Hadith, History and Expeditions. He wrote so much that his writings had to be carried on the backs of animals. When he died, he was in such a position that there was none more learned than him in history.^(۵) His knowledge was disseminated through his narrators. The most famous of them who lived in Haramayn and Hijāz included: ‘Umar bin Dinar, Yahya bin Sa’eed al-Ansāri, Musa bin ‘Uqba and others. From those who lived in Iraq, the most important ones included: ‘Abdullah bin ‘Umayr, Ismā’il bin Abi Khālid, ‘Atā ibn Sā’ib; and from the other places like Syria and Egypt, there were Mansur bin Sādhān, ‘Abd al-Karim Jazari, Thawr bin Yazid and others.^(۶)

The merits of Zuhri’s accounts of the expeditions over other

p: ۳۶

Ibn Khallikān ۴:۱۷۷; Abu Na’im al-Isfahāni ۳:۳۶۴ –۱

Abu Na’im al-Isfahāni ۳:۳۶۹ –۲

Ibid. ۳:۳۷۱ –۳

Ibid. ۳:۱۶۱. Unfortunately all his works and writings are non-extant. However, his –۴ narratives were used by later historians and thus can be found in these secondary sources. (Tr

Abu Na’im al-Isfahāni ۲:۳۷۲–۳۷۳ –۵

:works are as follows

They were written with sincerity, honesty, clarity and eloquence. Zuhri had met some of the companions who participated in battles with the Prophet (S) and he has narrated from them about the wars and the strategies of the Holy Prophet (S). The most important of them are: Abdullah bin 'Umar, Anas bin Mālik, Suhayl bin Sa'd and others⁽¹⁾. Similarly, in al-Musannaf (vol. 5, the chapter on expeditions), we find numerous traditions that Zuhri has narrated from 'Umar ibn Rāshid. He too, was truthful in narration and reliable in transmission.

Many of the scholars⁽²⁾ have praised and criticized the narrators of expedition accounts like Ibn Is'hāq and Wāqidi, however Zuhri has been praised by all⁽³⁾ and has been hailed as the most truthful and highly learned of his time. Therefore, we can rely upon what he has recorded or narrated about the battles of the Prophet (S).

Zuhri had a longstanding experience in recording expeditions⁽⁴⁾. He is the oldest writer to formulate a systematic and clear method in this field, therefore his recordings are well-grounded, clear and reliable and have been systematically categorized and are far off from the politics of authorship and other various discrepancies.

(.Abu 'Abdillah Muhammad Ibn Is'hāq Bin Yasār al-Mutallabi (151-185) A.H. 2

Ibn Is'hāq was born in Madina and was buried in Baghdād after his demise. There is a difference of opinion regarding the date of his death⁽⁵⁾. His most important works include: Kitāb al-Khulafā and al-Siyar wal-Maghāzi wal-Mubtadā⁽⁶⁾. He was trustworthy and knowledgeable about expeditions and history and was also a memorizer of prophetic traditions⁽⁷⁾.

p: 37

Khateeb Baghdadi, Tarikhu Baghdād 3:13-14; al-Dhahabi, Mizān al-I'tidāl fi Naqd al-

Rijāl 3:470; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās 1:7

Abu Na'im al-Isfahāni 3:361 onwards; Ibn Shihāb al-Zuhri: 27-28

Ibn Shihāb al-Zuhri: ٣٠ -٣

Abu Na'im al- Isfahāni ٣:٣٤٩ onwards -٤

Khateeb Baghdādi ١:٢٣٢; Ibn Khallikāk ٤:٢٧٧; Yāqut Humayri, Mu'jam al-Udabā' ١٨:٨ -٥

.Ibid -٦

Khateeb Baghdādi ١:٢١٥, Ibn Hajar 'Asqalāni, Tahdhib al-Tahdhib ٩:٤٣ onwards -٧

Great scholars have narrated from him and Ibn Shihāb al-Zuhri, Ibn Hanbal and others have praised him^(١). Mālik called him a Dajjāl^(٢) and accused him of following the Qādiriyya sect^(٣) and also deemed him to be one who narrates ahādith with ^(٤)improper and incomplete chains

The Seera of Ibn Is’hāq has only come down to us through the recorders of seera, the most important of whom were: Ibn Hishām, Tabari, Kalā’i, Ibn Sa’d and Ibn Atheer. All of these [people] have not presented the seera of Ibn Is’hāq in the same manner as the original, rather they have mentioned a summary of his statements and recordings. Ibn Hishām has himself acknowledged this in the introduction of his al-Seera al-Nabawiyya^(٥), so it would be correct to say that this work is actually a summary and a selection of Ibn Is’hāq’s narrations

He is one of the leaders of those who were involved in recording the seerah [of the Holy Prophet]^(٦) and is the first person to collect the accounts of the expeditions and record them^(٧). His works are a source of reference for researchers today. The great recorders of expeditions like ‘Aāsīm bin Umar Qatāda who wrote al-Siyar wal-Maghāzi gave the following testimony about him: ‘The knowledge that Ibn Is’hāq placed at the disposal of the people through his narrations will never disappear^(٨).’ When Zuhri was asked about Ibn Is’hāq’s accounts of expeditions, he said ‘he is the ^(٩)most learned of all people about the expeditions

Today, the narrations of Ibn Is’hāq that have

p: ٣٨

Al-Dhahabi ٣:٤٦٩ –١

Khateeb Baghdādi ١:٢٢٣ –٢

Khateeb Baghdādi ١:٢٢٥; al-Dhahabi ٣٠:٤٧٠ –٣

Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ١:٧ –٤

Ibn Hishām ١:٧ –٥

Al-Dhahabi, Tadhkirat al-Huffādh ١:١٧٣ –٦

Yāqut Humayri, Mu’jam al-Buldān ٥:١٨; Marghliyuth, Dirāsāt ‘an al-Muwarrikheen –٧

al-‘Arab: ٩٩٨

Khateeb Baghdādi ١:٢٢٠; Yāqut Himayari, Muʿjam al-Udabāʾ ٦:١٨; Ibn Khallikān ٤:٢٧٦ –٨

Khateeb Baghdādi ١:٢١٩ –٩

been passed on by many reliable recorders of the seera like ‘Aāsīm and Zuhri have reached us(1). It can be said that Ibn Is’hāq is from those scholars who recorded the accounts of the expeditions based on old methods. One day this point was raised in front of him, he said: ‘I am only a safe keeper and recorder of the knowledge of (expeditions(2

:The Merits of Ibn Is’hāq’s Seera

He is the only person who has narrated the expeditions of the Holy Prophet (S) in its totality(3), because the other Seera recorders have narrated the expeditions in an incomplete and disjointed fashion. Maybe their lifetimes were not enough for them to complete the work and their students did not expound on the details of their expedition accounts and sufficed with mentioning only a number of battles and wars

The Seera of Ibn Is’hāq is detailed and contains numerous long narrations and includes mention of dates(4). Shāfi’i says: ‘Anyone who wishes to gain expertise about the expeditions needs (to study) Ibn Is’hāq(5).’ Through lengthy odes, he has highlighted the narratives of what transpired on the battlefields(6). All this points to the vastness of the Seera of Ibn Is’hāq. These odes have immortalized the victories and give important information about works, situations and personalities. Even though it is not possible to give exact details about what takes place on the battlefield, all the military strategies and skills employed, some of the particulars about the battles of the Prophet (S) have been directly reported

(Abu Abdillah Muhammad Ibn Umar al-Wāqidi (130-207 A.H. 3

Wāqidi was

p: 39

Yāqut Himyari 6:18, Khateeb Baghdādi 1:225-1

Khateeb Baghdādi 1:223-2

Ibid. 1:214-3

Ibn Hajar ‘Asqalāni 9:46-4

Al-Dhahabi, Mizān al-I'tidāl ٣:٤٧٢; Khateeb Baghdādi ١:٢١٩; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ١:٩ -٥

Al-Jumhi, Tabaqāt Fuhul al-Shu'arā ١:٨; Marghliyuth: ٧٣ -٦

born in Madina and died in Baghdād(١). He is buried in the Khayzarān graveyard. He was an author and used to pay special attention in writing [about] the seerah and expeditions (of the Prophet (S)), to such an extent that he became one of the foremost authorities in this field. His most important works are: al-Maghāzi al-Nabawiyya, Fath Afriqiyya, al-Radda, Fath al-‘Ajam, Fath Misr wa Iskandariyya, Akhbār Makkah, Tabaqāt, Futuh al-Iraq, Seerat Abi Bakr, The Battle between the Aus and Khazraj and :others(٢). The merits of Wāqidi’s works can be outlined as follows

Precise Information: He has given detailed and precise information about those who participated in the battles, the route taken by the armies, the weapons and modes of transport used, provisions, descriptions of battlefields, the factors that helped in gaining victory or led to them facing difficulties in battle, the location of the .martyrdom of soldiers, and anything related to warfare

Extensive Information: He wrote and recorded everything that was related to the battles(٣), such that through his narrations, we learn many of the specifics regarding the military, because he has reported all the different aspects of issues pertaining to warfare and leadership. In this way, the information provided by Wāqidi in the areas of the circumstances of war, its location, the type of ground on which it was fought etc. is of great importance. If his writings about the battles were collected together, it would in itself have been a source for the principles of war and battle at

p: ٤٠

Ibn ‘Asākir ١٥:٣٩٥; al-Dhahabi, Tadhkirat al-Huffādh ١:٣٤٨ –١
Yāqut Himyari, Mu’jam al-Udabā’ ٨:٢٨١; Ibn Khallikān ٤:٣٤٨; Ibn al-Nadim, al-Firhist –٢
(١):١٤٤. Unfortunately most of Wāqidi’s works are non-extant today. (Tr

Khateeb Baghdādi ٣:٦ –٣

.(the time of the Prophet (S

Recording of Exact Times(١): In military management, for a commander, time and its determination is of the essence and can make all the difference in the result of the battle; whether it be victory or loss

Recording of Exact Locations(٢): Wāqidi also recorded the exact locations of the battles and through this he gave value to the battlefields where the Prophet (S) fought. Many like Ibn Sa'd, Tabari and Ibn Katheer have narrated from Wāqidi about the birth and Prophethood of the Holy Prophet (S) and also his battles and conquests(٣)

Ibn Sa'd's Tabaqāt al-Kubrā stands out in its military reporting because it has been written according to Wāqidi's style, meaning he has similarly paid a great deal of attention to the recording of exact times and locations and sometimes describes the locations in which the battles took place and adds on to the narrations of Wāqidi and then, in another place, he discusses the principles of warfare(٤). From his writings it can be deduced that he is truthful and his narrations are authentic(٥). Many of the important aspects of Wāqidi's narrations and works were revealed and expounded by his student Ibn Sa'd

Abu al-Rabi' Sulaymān Bin Musā Ibn Sālim al-Kalā'i al-Himyari .٤

Kalā'i was born in Balans and grew up there and he died in enemy territory (in battle)(٦). He has narrated from Ibn Qāsim Hubaysh, Ibn Zarqum, Ibn al-Waleed bin Abi al-Qāsim and others(٧). He was famous for his eloquent oratory and writings(٨) and gave great importance to recording and narrating ahadith. His most well known

p: ٤١

Marghliyuth: ١٨ -١

Ibn Sa'd ٥:٣١٥ -٢

Tabari, Tārikh al-Tabari ١:٩٤٢,٩٨٠ -٣

Ibn Sa'd ٢:١-١٣٧ -٤

Khateeb Baghdādi ٥:٣٢١, al-Dhahabi, Mizān al-I'tidāl ٣:٥٦٠. With regards to Ibn Sa'd's –٥
(reliability, there is a difference of opinion among the various sects of Islām. (Tr
Ibn 'Imād Hanbali, Shadharāt al-Dhahab fi Akhbār man Dhahab ٥:١٦٤; al-Katāni, al- –٦
Risāla al-Mustadhrafa: ١٩٨
Al-Nabāhi, Tārikh Qudhāt Andalus: ١١٩ –٧
.Ibn 'Imād Hanbali, Ibid –٨

works are: al-Iktifā bimā Tadhammanhu ‘an Maghāzi al-Rasul (S), Maghāzi al-Khulafā (٤ volumes), al-Musalsalāt ‘an al-Ahādith and al-Athār wal-Ishārāt. (١)

When his works were published and his message was spread, people came towards him and sought to benefit from him and many attended his teaching sessions. The most famous of these was Abdullah ibn al-Abārid who has eulogized him after his martyrdom (٢). With regards to the importance of his writing ‘al-Iktifā’ it must be said that its chain of transmission is strong and it describes the battles and their various aspects in detail, because Kalā’i himself was a military person and had tasted the hardships of war. So if he has recorded something in the seera, he has done so truthfully and with total regard of his responsibility and questionability. Furthermore, in his books one senses an enlightening spirituality that none of the previous writers displayed.

Kalā’i al-Balansi was a leader and a courageous commander who was steadfast in battle and in one of the battles he is said to have addressed one of the fleeing soldiers thus: ‘Do you flee from Paradise?’ (٣) He was martyred while he still held the standard in his hand (٤) and was encouraging and urging the soldiers to go forth against the enemy. Aside from this, Kalā’i was a great poet who would compose epics and rouse (the emotions of the people) (٥)

٥. ١٥٢ al-Nās Ibn Sayyid Muhammad Ibn Fath Muhammad al-Abu

He was popularly known as Ibn Sayyid al-Nās. There is a difference of opinion regarding his date of birth and death. He died in Cairo. He studied

p: ٤٢

(Al-Katāni, Ibid. He also wrote an important work called Futuh al-Radda (Tr –١

Al-Nabāhi: ١٢٠ –٢

Ibid. ١١٩ –٣

Ibid. Ibn Shākir al-Katbi, Fawāt al-Wafayāt ١:٣٦٦ –٤

Kalā’i was one of the great commanders in the war against the crusaders under –٥

(Salāh al-Deen Ayyubi. (Tr

under his father and a group of scholars, the most famous of whom was Ibn Daqiq al-‘Eid.^(١) This scholar tutored him in religion, Arabic grammar and poetry^(٢). He gained precedence over his contemporaries in the fields of Seera and history. His most important works include: ‘Uyun al-Athar fi Funun al-Maghāzi wa al-Shamāil wa al-Siyar, Nur al-‘Uyun, Bushrā al-Labib fi Dhikrā al-Habib and Tahsil al-Isāba fi Tafsil al-Sahāba^(٣).

Many scholars like Qādhi ‘Izz al-Deen Sharif, who has mentioned him in his Wafayāt and Ibn Katheer, Ibn Nāsir al-Deen, Suyuti and others have testified to his great knowledge^(٤). He compiled the seera in two volumes by narrating what the recorders of the seera before him had written. That which makes his accounts of the :expeditions stand out includes

Precision and Depth: He would select authentic narrations and leave aside the weak ones. He would take this matter very seriously and would do it very well^(٥). An example of this precision of his can be seen when he summarized his own book ‘Uyun al-Athār and named it Nur al-‘Uyun. In this way it became easy for him to refer to previous works and to present his writings on the seera in a well-documented manner. One of the great scholars has said: “Ibn Sayyid wrote, compiled and ”.corrected a lot in his beautiful handwriting and he created principles for this [also]^(٦)

Following the Method of Zuhri: Ibn Sayyid al-Nās in his book al-Siyar wal-Tārikh, has followed Zuhri’s method and has compiled all that which relates to the

p: ٤٣

Al-Dhahabi, Tadhkirat al-Huffādh ٤:١٤٨١ –١

Ibn ‘Imād Hanbali ٤:١٠٨; Ibn Ilyās, Tārikh Misr ١:١٧١ –٢

Al-Dhahabi ٤:١٤٥١ –٣

Ibid. Suyuti: ٥٢ –٤

Suyuti: ٥٢٠ –٥

Ibn ‘Imād Hanbali ٤:١٠٨ –٦

military. His ‘Uyun al-Athār is an example of the Maghāzi of Ibn Is’hāq which has shadowed the Seera of Ibn Hishām and is formed of a selection from the Maghāzi of Wāqidi and a selection from scholars of history such as Tabari and Ibn Khayyāt. That which assisted him in this was his great knowledge of the sources of the seera. Ibn Sayyid al-Nās was also a specialist in jurisprudence and would benefit from the scholars of his time and gain knowledge from them. Ibn Zubayr says: “He gained the (1) (permission [to narrate traditions] from four-hundred scholars or more.” (1)

Organization, Sequence and Reference: Ibn Katheer has described him thus: “He occupied himself in the pursuit of knowledge and was better in this than everyone else. After he learnt the seera and history, he compiled them in two volumes... grand poetry, well written prose, complete eloquence and proper writing is what he had and he was attributed with kindness and good morals. He was loyal to the principles and (2) (practices of the previous scholars that relied on the traditions of the Holy Prophet (S

The Arab Military Before Islām

point

The methods of war among the Arabs were different from that of all the other races. In their battles they relied on offence and attack (2) and their motivation was limited to: defending their idols, (3) bloodlust, (4) raiding and stealing cattle (5), and increasing the status and position of their own tribes (6). Their most important weapon was the (7) (sword (7)

The role of Islām was changing the implements and their employment in

p: 44

Al-Dhahabi 5:1451 -1

Ibn Khaldun, Muqaddimat al-‘Ibar 2:645 -2

Kalbi, al-Asnām: 100; Jawād ‘Ali, al-Mufassal fi Tārikh al-‘Arab qabl al-Islām 1:609 -3

Al-Azhari, al-Nafhat al-Mulukiyya: 85 -4

Refer to the event of Yawmu ‘Ayni Abāgh in Ibn Atheer, al-Kāmil, 11:540; Ibn ‘Abd -5

Rabbih, al-Iqd al-Fareed ٥:٢٤٠

Tabrizi, Sharh al-Qasā'id al-'Ashar: ١٢١ -٤

Ibn al-Shajari, Hamāsat al-Shajariyya ٢:٧٩٣ onwards; Tartusi, Tabsirat Arbāb al- -٧

Albāb: ١١

battles and making appropriate use of them. The principles and beliefs through which Islām was manifested caused an increase in the spiritual and emotional uplifting of the soldiers and encouraged them to participate. Previously, an Arab soldier would be motivated by courage(١), display of force(٢), a sense of loyalty(٣) and selfish motives(٤)

The most important mode of transport that were used was the camel(٥), as it was capable of going for long without water and was able to bear the dryness and sandstorms of the desert. The most important qualities of the ‘Arabian wars’ were as follows

The Objectives of War (١)

The Arab tribes were naturally linked to and reliant upon the economical and social status of their individual members. Because their land consisted of dry deserts lacking sufficient water, their objectives were

a) Gaining water and control over the pastures and cattle(٦): Often times, wars would be fought in order to gain control over watering holes or springs and one of the sides would gain control either through a peace treaty or by force. During times of drought and famine, intense battles took place. When wars were fought for water, inhabitants of the dry lands were forced to migrate to other places that had sufficient water(٧)

When one tribe was envious of the wealth and prosperity of another, they would engage them in battle in order to loot their wealth and cattle(٨). The strong tribe was one that was able to overpower the weaker tribes and take their wealth. They would take

p: ٤٥

Ibn Khaldun ٢:٢٨٦ onwards –١

Ibn Sa’d ٢:٧; Qalqashandi, Qalā’id al-Jummāl ٧:١٢٢ –٢

Ibn ‘Abd Rabbih ١:٢٤٤ ٢٥٢ –٣

Ibn Sa’d ١:١–١٥٧; Wāqidi ١:٤١ –٤

Ibn Qutayba, 'Uyun al-Akhbār ٢:١٦١ -٥

Refer to Yawm al-Baydā in Ibn Habib, al-Muhbir:٢٤٦ and Yawm al-Zuwayrin wa -٦

Yawm al-Shaytin in Ibn Atheer, al-Kāmil ١:٦٠٤-٦٥٤

This is due to the fact that most of the Arabian Peninsula is made up of dry desert -٧

(and many areas lack sufficient water. (Tr

Ibn 'Abd Rabbih ٥:٢٦٠, Ibn Atheer ١١:٥٤ -٨

all they wanted as booty. They would steal away their cattle and then return home victorious. Some of the Arab tribes even went so far as to march towards neighboring kingdoms^(١) and cities that had plenty of food stocks^(٢). During the age of Jāhiliyya, wars and raids were one of the primary source of sustenance, possession of livestock .and booty in times of drought and famine

b) Bloodlust and revenge: This was caused by social events like marriage and divorce^(٣), social interactions among the members of a tribe^(٤), jealousy, malice and competition^(٥), or because of the establishment of relations by the allies with other ^(tribes.)^(٦)

c) Increasing the status and power of the warring tribe: The fundamental principle was, ‘One who does not kill is killed and one who does not fight is fought’^(٧). Also, once one tribe loses a battle, their power will never be regained and they are destined to ^(destruction and annihilation and become incapable of defending themselves)^(٨)

d) Increasing the number of forces and soldiers in the army: The sources have not mentioned the size of the pagan Arab armies but they have noted that every tribe, with all its warriors, was considered one ‘army block’^(٩), and these were the people who would engage the other tribes in battle. When the tribes would join forces, a large army would be formed^(١٠). The number of tribes that came together in a battle against the Greeks numbered

p: ٤٦

Ibn ‘Abd Rabbih: ٢٤٤; Ibn Atheer ١:٦٢ –١

Jawād ‘Ali ٢:٦٠٢ –٢

Ibn Atheer ١:٥٤٤, ٥٦٦ –٣

Ibn ‘Abd Rabbih ٥:٣٤٥; al-Bakri, Mu’jam Mastu’jam ٢:٤٩٦ –٤

Ibn ‘Abd Rabbih ٥: ٢٢٤; Ibn Atheer ١:٦٢٠ –٥

Ibn ‘Abd Rabbih ٥:٢٤٨; Ibn Atheer ١:٥٧٨, ٦٧١ –٦

Maqrizi: ١٢١ –٧

Ibn Khaldun, Muqaddimah ٢:٤٥١ –٨

Ibn ‘Abd Rabbih ٥:٢٥٠ onwards –٩

Ibn Atheer ١:٤٨٢ –١٠

.and consisted of more than ten thousand soldiers ٢١٨

When we refer to the compendiums, lexicons and books of literature, we find that some Arabs paid much attention to the organization and creation of armies while some even independently^(١) joined their tribes and entered the battle. Nu'mān bin Mundhir had formed numerous organizations including the battalions called al-Shubhā', al-Dawwasar^(٢) and al-Radhā'i'^(٣)

The following names indicate the number of forces of the various groups of fighters and the types of weapons they used

.Al-Raht – ٣ to ١٠ people^(٤)

.Al-'Usbah – ١٠ to ٤٠ people^(٥)

.Al-Miqnab (al-Minsar) – ٣٠ or ٤٠ up to ٣٠٠ on horseback^(٦)

.Al-Jumrah (al-Qabilah) – ٣٠٠ to ١,٠٠٠ on horseback^(٧)

.Al-Sariyah – ٤٠ to ٥٠٠^(٨) and at the very least ٥ to ٣٠٠ people^(٩)

.Al-Kutayba – ١٠٠ to ١,٠٠٠ people or from ٤٠٠ to ١٠,٠٠٠ people^(١٠)

.Al-Jaysh (Faylaq or Juhfal) – ١٠٠ to ٤,٠٠٠ people^(١١)

.Al-Khamis – from ٤,٠٠٠ to ١٢,٠٠٠ people^(١٢)

All these groups or units would be strengthened by the backing of another group. In this case, it would be called Kutaybah wa Jarrajah^(١٣) or Jarradah, Jayshin Lujab and Khamisin 'Armum^(١٤). The person who commanded a force of more than a thousand would be known as Jarrarayn^(١٥)

The Kutayba (the group with between ١٠٠ and ١,٠٠٠ people) and Jumrah (٣٠٠ to ١,٠٠٠ riders) were two of the most important groups in the wars of the Arabs before Islām. However, during the time of the Holy Prophet (S) the Sariyah (consisting of between ٥٠ and ٤٠٠ people) became the only important group in battle and this name can

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- Jawād ‘Ali ۱:۵۷۵ and ۲:۲۱ –۱
- Ibn Sayyidah, al-Mukhassis ۶:۲۰۴; Ibn Hishām ۲:۲۵۴, ۳۴۷; Zubaydi, Tāj al-Arus ۱:۳۲۷, –۲
۳:۲۰۷
- .Ibid –۳
- Al-Sikkeet, Mukhtasar Tahdhib al-Alfādh: ۱۹; Ibn Mandhur, Lisān al-‘Arab [under Ra –۴
Ha Ta] ۶:۳۰۵
- .Al-Sikkeet, Ibid –۵
- Ibid. ۲۷–۲۸; Ibn Sayyidah ۶:۲۰۰ –۶
- Zubaydi [under Ja Ma Ra] ۳:۱۰۷ –۷
- Shaybāni ۱:۶۹; Tha’ālibi, Fiqh al-Lughah: ۲۲۹ –۸
- Ibn Sayyidah ۶:۱۹۹; Zubaydi [under Sa Ra Ya] ۱۰:۱۷۴ –۹
- Al-Sikkeet: ۲۷; Tha’ālibi: ۲۲۹ –۱۰
- Tha’ālibi: ۴۰ and ۲۲۹; Abu Dharr al-Khashni, Sharh Seera Ibn Hishām ۲:۲۷۳ ۳۴۷ –۱۱
- Al-Sikkeet Ibid. Tha’ālibi: ۲۲۹ –۱۲
- Al-Sikkeet: ۲۸ –۱۳
- Al-Sikkeet: ۳۰; Tha’ālibi: ۲۲۹; Nuwayri, Nihāyat al-Urub fi Funun al-Adab ۶:۱۹۰ –۱۴
- Al-Sikkeet: ۲۷; Ibn Habib: ۲۴۶–۵۵۲; Tha’ālibi: ۲۳۰ –۱۵

be found in many of the narrations from the companions(1) because this number was also employed before the Hijrah

The Sariyah was the smallest section of the army(2) and could be formed even by only ten people. For this reason, it was also called ‘Asharatu Rahtin (a group of ten)(3). The Prophet (S) would also send these groups with fewer or greater numbers. They have said: the best companions are four, the best Sirāya (pl. of Sariyah) is made up of four hundred, the best army consists of four thousand and at the most, not exceeding (twelve thousand soldiers(4

e) Weapons: By going through the narratives and poetry of the Age of Ignorance (Jāhiliyyah) we find that there is frequent mention of weapons, and especially the ‘sword(5)’. Other weapons like the arrow, dagger, spear, spearhead, club, bow and the sling(6) that were considered offensive weapons and were used in attacks are also found in their poetry. As for the defensive weapons, they included the armor, shield, helmet and the armor that was worn beneath the helmet(7). These weapons would come from Syria, Yemen and India and some were also made locally

The Arabs would also use some heavy weaponry like the catapult. The first person to use it was Judhayma al-Abrash(8). Another weapon known as al-Dabbābah(9) was first employed by ‘Abdullah ibn Ju’dah(10). Later the Muslim Arabs modified this (weapon and used its improved version in their wars(11

At that time, an Arab soldier would either fight on foot

p: ٤٨

Bukhāri (al-Adhān, al-Imān, al-Tayammum, al-Ahkām, al-Jihād); Muslim (al-Jihād, – 1 al-Siyar); Abu Dāwud (al-Jihād, al-Tahārah); Tirmidhi (al-Manāqib, al-Jihād, al-(Jumu’ah); al-Nasā’i (al-Jihād, al-Bay’ah, al-Sayd

Abu Dāwud ٣:٤٦ –٢

Bukhāri ٥:٢٦ –٣

Shaybāni ١:٦٧; al-Dārimi ٢:٢١٥; Abu Dāwud ٣:٣٦ –٤

Al-Bakhtari, al-Hamāsa: ٩-٤٢; Ibn Shajari, al-Hamāsa al-Shajariyya ٢:٢٨٦ ٧٩٩; – ٥

Tartusi, Tabsirat Arbāb al-Albāb: ١١

Ibn ‘Abd Rabbih ١:١٧٩ onwards; Suhayli ١:٩ ٢:٢١٢; Tartusi: ٩-١٥ -٩

Ibn Shajari ٢:٧٨٩ onwards; Ibn ‘Abd Rabbih ١:١٧٩ onwards -٧

Suhayli ٤:١٩٢; Tartusi: ١٩-٨

The Dabbābah was something like what is today known as a tank. All its sides were -٩

(.covered with metal and someone would sit inside and shoot arrows. (Tr

Abul Faraj Isfahāni, al-Aghāni ٥:٢٤; Tartusi: ١٨-١٠

Lord Monister, Risāla fi Fann al-Harb ‘indal ‘Arab: ٧٥,٧٧ -١١

or on horseback. The most important mode of transport at wartime were horses^(١), and the forces would ride on them. Horses had some distinct advantages in war, especially speed and agility

f) The Relationship between the Commander and the Soldiers: Affairs of war and military leadership of a tribe would be in the hands of the head of the tribe, a person who would have the qualities of forbearance, clemency, co-operation, patience, kindness etc^(٢). All the soldiers, be they freemen or slaves, volunteers or those who have been forced to participate, hired or otherwise, all have to respond to the call for war by the commander and none of them are allowed to disobey him, whether they like it or not, except those who are excused because of being too young or sick. Of course, at times some of the wealthy would disobey the command to participate in battle and would in return pay the fine and penalty for not joining the battle^(٣)

One of the commanders would draw up the plans for battle, allot commanders for each section, define the assignments, identify the goal and arm the forces. The responsibility for these tasks rested on his shoulders because of his superiority over the others and in the end he would take command over the forces^(٤). Many of the Arabs in the age of Jāhiliyya were known for their training in archery and their expertise in it. They were able to hit small targets^(٥) and would also

p: ٤٩

Mu'ammār bin al-Muthannā, Kitāb al-Khayl: ١٦ onwards; Ibn 'Abd Rabbih: ١٥٢ – ١٧٨ – ١

Ibn 'Abd Rabbih ٢:٢٨٦ ٣:١٠٤ – ٢

Zubaydi [under Ja 'A La] ٧:٢٥٧ – ٣

Ibid. [under Ha Ka Ma and Qa Dha Ma] ٨:٢٥٢, ١٠:٢٠٧ – ٤

Ibn 'Abd Rabbih ١:١٧٦ onwards – ٥

.train those who did not know archery

g) Mobilization of forces and Recruitment: It was incumbent and obligatory [to fight] when the tribe needed to be defended or a general command had been issued. So in times of danger, all the people were mobilized. The men, old and young, small children and women too, would prepare and participate in the battle as much as they were able to^(١). Here we should mention two groups of fighters: (i) A group that was hired for an agreed sum. (ii) Another group that consisted of slaves who had to fight in the battle without any compensation and would have to stay and serve till the end of the battle. Those who would fight with all their might in order to defend themselves fought with strong will and determination whereas those who were forced to fight and were not paid anything, especially in times of hardship, would flee from the battle

Conscription was not compulsory and would take place on an individual basis, not collectively. It would be carried out during attacks or in order to join the ^(٢)commander^(٣)

h) Dealing with Prisoners: Prisoners (of war) would be dealt with harshly and with cruelty^(٤). At times they would cut off their noses or tear out their ears from the roots ^(٥)or sever their limbs^(٦)

Because of this torture, some prisoners would die while others would remain in their service as slaves, or alternatively a ransom could be given to secure

p: ٥٠

Jawād ‘Ali ٥:٤٠٥. ٤١٨ –١

Amir bin Tufayl, Deewān, Riwāyat Ambāri: ١١, ٩٨, ١٠٠ –٢

Whoever took a prisoner would be consider his owner and would be able to treat –٣
him however he pleased. See Jawād ‘Ali ٥:٦٣١

Abu al-Faraj Isfahāni ١١:١١٤ ١٥:١٥٥ –٤

their freedom(۱) or they would be granted a favor for which they would remain .(obliged(۲)

They would also use hostages(۳) to exact revenge for the deaths of those taken as prisoners. Just as the ‘Aus did with the Khazraj – they killed three of the slaves who .(had been taken as hostages (in retaliation for three killed prisoners))(۴)

i) Material Support and Backup: This consisted of the collective measures that an army would put in place for its troops including weapons, provisions, food, water etc. The goal behind making these arrangements and providing munitions that were necessary for long drawn-out wars was gaining victory over the enemy and this was achieved by using different means. The most important factors that assisted in :sending support were

□Roads: The roads and paths that the pagan Arabs traversed in times of war have been not been clearly mentioned in historical records and some writings after the coming of Islām only give general indications about them. For example: in Ibn Kharadābih’s al-Masālik wal-Mamālik, Ibn Hawqal’s al-Masālik wal-Mamālik, Mas’udi’s al-Tanbih wal-Ashrāf, Qazwini’s al-Bilād wa Akhbār al-‘Ibād and all the .other books of battles and expeditions

Similarly, the roads that were traversed by the armies of Islām in their conquests and battles have not been mentioned in detailed except in very few sources. Most of the paths that were used by the Muslim armies were the well known main roads and the :most important among these were

i) Paths near the coasts)

p: ۵۱

Tabari, Tafseer Tabari ۶:۲۶۲; Abu al-Faraj Isfahāni ۱۱:۱۱۴ –۱

.Abu al-Faraj Isfahāni ۱۱:۱۵۸ onwards – this meant that they were set free –۲

Zubaydi [under ‘A Qa La] ۸:۲۷ and [Ra Ha Na] ۹:۲۲۹ –۳

Ibn Atheer ۱:۶۷۵ –۴

.and borders where water was plentiful and wells were many

.ii) Roads that ran parallel to the Euphrates River that flowed from Iraq to Syria)

.iii) The routes between Yathrib (Madina) and Makkah or between Makkah and Iraq)

.(iv) Roads that linked the cities and villages of the Arabian Peninsula(ا)

□Weapons of War: In the age of Jāhiliyya, weapons of war constituted the most important part of munitions. In the beginning, a soldier would get armed before he went out to war, because no help would reach him during the battle. If, during the heat of battle, his sword broke or his arrows ran out, if he had extras he would .exchange them, otherwise he would be unable to continue the fight

□Water and Food: The most important foods that were used in sending support to the fighting soldiers were dates and grapes that were grown in parts of Yemen and Tā'if. Fruits from the trees of Sidr and Miswāk, fish, barley bread and other foods were also sent. Dates were the staple food and Yathrib was known for its plentiful fresh dates. The Arabs were accustomed to eating less and would make to with a few dates for an entire day. When they were very hungry, they would eat animal hide, porcupines, .(lizards and meat of hunted animals(ز

However, water was considered of strategic importance, because the routes chosen and

p: ۵۲

Jawād 'Ali ۷:۳۳۱-۳۶۵ -۱

Zubaydi [under Fa Sa Da] ۲:۴۵۳; [Ba Ja] ۲:۵; [Ra Ma La] ۷:۳۵۰; ['A Qa Da] ۲:۴۲۵; [Ta Fa -۲
Fa] ۶:۲۶۰; Jawād 'Ali ۵:۵۸-۶۳

roads taken would be determined by it and efforts would be made to secure drinking water and prevent the enemy from having access to it. This liquid of life was of great importance for the army that wished to set camp in a specific location and they would need to be near a source of water at all times. For this reason, they would take all the necessary measures to store as much water as possible. Ten guards would be posted at wells and springs(١) and in front of man-made water storages large boulders would be placed(٢). These reservoirs would become even more important in times of war, .and especially defense, when besieged, or in the hot summer months

□Clothes and Military Uniforms: The Arab soldiers of Jāhiliyya wore different varieties of clothes(٣), so fighters were indistinguishable for non-combatants, and the soldiers would look alike because of their similar turbans, armor, swords and other military equipment(٤). Turbans or caps were worn on the heads and the Jubba or a hooded garment, a shirt or a two-tone robe, trousers, a woolen cloth and striped Yemeni cloth .would be worn and feet would be covered with shoes or sandals

□Tents: The tents were made of skin, wool, hair and fur (٥). The Arabs would only use tents at the start of battles, because their fighting style was that of ‘charge and attack’ and this was highly disorganized. For this reason, the army did not need to .remain outside its area for long periods of time

p: ٥٣

Zubaydi [under Qa Ru Ba] ١:٤٢٣ –١

Balādhuri, Futuh al-Buldān: ٢٣–٢٥; Zubaydi [under A Za Ba] ١:١٤٧; [Ba Ra Ka] ٧:١٠٦; [‘A –٢
Dha Ra] ٣:٤٤١

Al-Sikkeet: ٤٠٧ – ٤٠٨; Ibn ‘Abd Rabbih ٢:٢٢٥ –٣

Tha’ālibi, Thimār al-Qulub: ١٥٩; Lord Monister, Risāla fi Fann al-Harb ‘ind al-‘Arab: ٥٢ –٤

Zubaydi [under Bat a] ١:٥٢٩; [Bu Ni Ya] ١٠:٤٦; [Dha Ra Ba] ١:٣٤٠; [Qa Ba Ba] ١:٤١٩; [Dha –٥
La La] ٧:٤٢٥; [Fa Sa Ta] ٥:١٩٩

The Muslim armies during the time of the Prophet (S) also did not use tents frequently [\(1\)](#) for this very same reason.

□ Modes of Transportation: The most important modes of transport were the horse and camel [\(2\)](#). The horse was used because of its speed and control at all times and in different situations, be it during attacks, laying siege, face to face combat, ambush, night raids etc. Mares were especially used in night raids, attacks, chases, maneuvers and difficult tasks, and were more effective than stallions [\(3\)](#). Khālid bin Walid used to fight battles while riding on a mare [\(4\)](#). Similarly, mules were used in sieges and [\(5\)](#) ambushes.

Many of those who fought on horseback were well known [\(6\)](#), and they would observe the principles of combat to the letter. They did this by using the horses and concentrating their efforts on the weak points of the enemy's defenses or on the weak and timid people [\(7\)](#). As a result, they would be successful in opening up fissures in the line of defense, penetrating their ranks and creating terror and fright in their hearts [\(8\)](#). Camels were not useful for battle [\(9\)](#) but they could be used for transporting soldiers, weapons, munitions and provisions from place to place. This animal was known for its ability to bear hunger and thirst, move through the harsh desert and [\(10\)](#) carry heavy loads over long distances.

□ Booty: All that was taken over by the army or tribe after it was victorious over its enemy was known as booty [\(11\)](#). War booty became the property of

p: ۵۴

Wāqidi ۷:۸۲۵; Tabari ۲:۵۶۸ –۱

Tim Quraysh, Kitāb al-Khayl: ۱۶ onwards; Ibn ‘Abd Rabbih ۱:۱۵۲-۱۷۸ –۲

See: Yazbak, Jud al-‘Arabi: ۷۸-۸۱ –۳

Nuwairi ۹:۳۶۵ –۴

Ibn ‘Abd Rabbih ۱:۱۱۶; Zubaydi ۳:۳۳۵ –۵

Jawād ‘Ali ۵:۴۶۰ –۶

An example of how they did this can be seen in the battle of Uhud. See: Uhud in –۷

History in the Miqātu Hajj Magazine vol. ۷

Nuwayri ۱۰:۱۰۳ onwards; Zubaydi [under Ha Ma La] ۷:۲۶۳-۸

Zubaydi [under Gha Ni Ma] ۹:۷-۹

the overpowering forces who could use it as they wished(١). In the age of Jāhiliyya, one fourth of the booty(٢) was separated by the commander(٣). All that was acquired without war (al-Nashitah)(٤) and the booty that could not be divided (al-Fudhul) was .(reserved for the commander(٥)

:A poet has described the booty in this verse

Laka al-Rubā'u wal-Safāya

(Wa Hukmuka wal-Nashitah wal-Fudhul(٤)

In the same way, the killer would take possession of what the one who was killed had with him [on the battlefield]. With the advent of Islām, Khums was prescribed(٧). The law of Salab (that which was taken from one who was killed in battle) was left as it .was

Wars of Arabs against the Sassanids (٢)

The pagan Arabs fought wars with the great neighboring kingdoms and they would raid the bordering areas. These kingdoms would also use some tribes as a barrier .against the invaders so that they could hinder them as much as possible

During the advent of Islām, the Sassanids had control over some areas at the edge of the Arabian Peninsula, including the lands of Yemen, Bahrain and some areas to the east of the peninsula. Because they were neighbors with the Arabs(٨), they had no option but to deal with each other and each of them would take necessary measures .to prevent the incursions of the other, whether through peace pacts or war

Some of the steps taken by the Sassanids to this end included: pleasing members of some tribes(٩), making pacts(١٠) and treaties of friendship with them, strengthening the borders(١١), building fortresses, creating forts and

p: ٥٥

Zubaydi [under Kha Ma Sa] ٤:١٣٩ -٢

Ibid. [under Sa Faa] ١٠:٢١١ -٣

Ibid. ٥:٢٣١ -٤

Ibid. ٨:٦٣ -٥

Asma'i, al-Asma'iyāt, from the verses of the poet Abdullah ibn Ghunmah: ٣٧ -٦

Ibn Qayyim al-Jawzi, Zād al-Ma'ād fi Hudā Khayril 'Ibād ٢:١٧٢ -٧

Ibn Atheer ١:٢٢٣ onwards; Umar Farukh, Tārikh al-Jāhiliyya: ٦٤,٦٥ -٨

Jawād 'Ali ٢:٦٢٦ -٩

Al-'Adwi, al-Dawlah al-Islāmiyya wa Imperāturiyyat al-Rum: ١٤ -١٠

Jawād 'Ali ٢:٦٢٨ -١١

protective barriers around the cities, creating canals from rivers and seas and keeping patrol ships in order to prevent the incursion of the enemy, creating points of defense along the border and repelling the threats of attacking tribes. Aside from this, guard units were formed by the tribes in return for payment and compensation that was given to the heads of the tribes so that they would protect the borders. These tribes were used to protect some of the more remote areas and they would establish .their repositories for storing weapons and food in their land

It can be said that the Sassanids would utilize the Arabs in their wars. When the Arabs saw the oppression and cruelty of the Sassanids against their own people, they would break the pacts. Udhaynah⁽¹⁾ the king of Tadmār rose up against the Sassanids (under Shāpur the First), fought a war against him and was victorious. However, the kings that came after Shāpur the First were able to gain victory over the Arabs, especially during the reign of Shāpur Dhul Aktāf⁽²⁾ the person who later made a peace (treaty with the Arabs.⁽³⁾

By studying the wars of the Arabs against the Sassanids, we find that they were not united under the leadership of one commander⁽⁴⁾; because every tribe had its own head and it was not possible for him to give up his leadership. Disagreements among them was the norm and therefore they were not able to unite with other tribes. As a result, each one

p: ۵۶

Jawād ‘Ali ۲:۶۳۵ –۱

Mas’udi, Muruj al-Dhahab wa Ma’ādin al-Jawhar ۱:۲۱۵ –۲

Tabari, Tārikh Tabari ۲:۶۹ onwards –۳

Ibn Khaldun, Muqaddimah ۲:۴۵۶ –۴

of them would rise up to defend itself without the assistance of another. Jealousy, malice and hatred was rife among them⁽¹⁾; to such an extent that the Sassanids would incite some of the tribes to fight against others⁽²⁾. It is obvious that this had a tremendous impact in the wars that were fought against the enemies

The Sassanids were always afraid of fighting in the desert, and they were unable to stand the lack of water and harsh conditions of these lands. When the Arabs fought against their ally, they would arrange to transfer water, camels and all that was necessary for war in the desert, to the army⁽³⁾. The enemy was never able to defeat the Arabs in their own land, because they were fully aware about the conditions of their land. The Arabs would sometimes take recourse to guerilla warfare⁽⁴⁾ and would attack the supply routes, stores and armories

Civil Wars in the North (۳)

Intense battles between Arab tribes, and especially the ‘Adnānis⁽⁵⁾ – who were more inclined to combat and war⁽⁶⁾ – was commonplace; because they were nomads and were accustomed to the harshness of the desert and this made them rougher and more intrepid⁽⁷⁾. Many battles were fought between the Qahtānis⁽⁸⁾ and the ‘Adnānis⁽⁹⁾, between the Taghlub and Bani Hakr, and others ⁽¹⁰⁾ and also between the Arabs and the Iranians⁽¹¹⁾. The most important of these were

□Yawm al-Awārat al-Awwal⁽¹²⁾ that took place between Mundhir ibn Imra’ al-Qays and Bakr bin Wā’il

□Yawm al-Dahnā⁽¹³⁾ between the tribe of Bani Asad

□Yawm al-Kilāb al-Thāni⁽¹⁴⁾

□Yawm al-Baydhā’⁽¹⁵⁾

□And others like Yawm

Ibn ‘Abd Rabbih ٢:٣١٩-٣٢٦ -١

Jawād ‘Ali ٢:٦٤١ -٢

Ibn Qutaybah, ‘Unwān al-Akḥbār ٢:١٦١ -٣

Watt, Muhammad fi Makkah: ١٦; Sayyid Hanafi, al-Farusiyyat al-‘Arabiyyah fi - ٤
al-‘Asr al-Jāhiliyya: ٣٢

They were known as the ‘Adnānis because they were descendents of ‘Adnān, the -٥
ancestor of the Holy Prophet (S). They were natives of the Arabian Peninsula and
were from the lineage of Prophet Ismā’il (‘a). They were known traders and
(.merchants and were in charge of the Ka’ba (Tr

Ibn Khaldun ٢:٤٠٩-٤١٣ -٦

Ibid. ٢:٤١٤-٤١٨ onwards -٧

The Qahtānis are the descendents of Qahtān ibn Ya’rab. They were one of the -٨
native Arab tribes who were not originally from the Arabian Peninsula, rather they
were from Yemen and other Southern areas. The later migrated to the North and
settled in Yathrib and Ghassān. Unlike the ‘Adnānis, they came from an ancient
(.civilization and were more inclined to life in cities and villages. (Tr

Qalqashandi, Subh al-A’shā ١:٣٩٠ onwards -٩

Ibn Is’hāq, Harb Bakr wa Taghlub: ٨ onwards; Ibn ‘Abd Rabbih ٥:٢١٣, ٢٤٩; Nuwayri -١٠

١٥:٣٥٦, ٣١٦

Ibn Atheer ١:٤٨٢; Ibn ‘Abd Rabbih ٥:٢٢٤; Nuwayri ١٥:٤٠٧, ٤١٣ -١١

Ibn Atheer ١:٥٥٢ -١٢

Ibn Atheer ١:٦٢٦ -١٣

Ibn ‘Abd Rabbih ٥:٢٢٤; Nuwayri ١٥:٤٠٧ -١٤

Ibn Habib: ٢٤٦ -١٥

Bi'āth that took place between the Aws and the Khazraj⁽¹⁾

By studying the details of these wars and battles, we find that the Arabs never used to fight for goals and purposes that were sensible and that had resulted from careful thought and consideration, rather their wars would have other motives, including tribal ones⁽²⁾. These types of war were continuous and never-ending, and as such, they would always be practicing [and preparing] for war. It was as if they were habituated to war or that they liked it and were inclined to it. During the advent of Islām, some of the warriors joined the army that was formed after the migration [to Madina] with the intention of defeating the enemy, who were living under harsh conditions and were able to establish themselves in other places⁽³⁾

The distinguishing factor of the Arabs in their wars against the external enemies was that they would unite with other tribes in some battles, like in the battle of Dhi Qār⁽⁴⁾ that took place after the event of Yawm 'Ayn Abāgh and in which they were victorious. However, they would [then] separate and fight internal battles against each other and this made them weak and led to their defeat⁽⁵⁾

Leadership And Command

Etiquettes of Leadership

The Noble Prophet (S) was the commander in many battles⁽⁶⁾ and he sent forth numerous Sariyah missions. As far as good leadership, which necessitates certain conditions and characteristics such as good etiquette and lofty morals that are obviously required to be found in the individual, it is

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Abu al-Faraj Isfahāni 3:39, 154-156; Ibn Atheer 1:655 onwards; more about the wars – 1 between these two tribes of the Qahtānis can be seen here: Ibn Sa'd, Tabaqāt 3:604; Ya'qubi, Tārikh 2:27. We find that because of their internal strife and battles, these two tribes were never quite able to stand up against the 'Adnānis. Killings that took place between the Aus and Khazraj was something so common that it was like a daily

occurrence. With the advent of Islām, the Prophet (S) was able to bring peace among
(.these tribes and eventually end their bitter enmity. (Tr
Ibn Is'hāq, Harb Bakr wa Taghlub: ٨ onwards –٢
Mas'udi ١:١١٢; 'Umar Farukh: ٣٠ –٣
Ibn 'Abd Rabbih ٥:٢٢٤ –٤
Ibn Khaldun ٢:٤٥٣ onwards –٥
Wāqidi ١:٧; Ibn Sa'd ٢:١ onwards; Ibn Atheer ٢:٢٠٣ onwards –٦

undisputable that the Holy Prophet (S) had the greatest morals, such that he was praised by Allah thus: And indeed you possess a great character(١). His having such a character made him a successful commander who was able to attain the goals and gain momentous victories in many of his battles

:His most praiseworthy traits were

He was kind to everyone(٢) and was courteous with the soldiers and his people in all circumstances(٣). He was trustworthy and truthful(٤), loyal to his covenants and pacts(٥). When he got angry, he would swallow his anger and when he had the power (to exact revenge), he would turn a blind eye(٦). A prime example from the instances when this can be witnessed was the conquest of Makkah(٧) – when there was an opportunity to take revenge against those who persecuted him and his followers, he forgave them all

He was sincere in the actions he performed for God and in the service of the people. He brought peace between the people and established friendship between the opposing factions of the Aus and Khazraj, and even the Muhājirs and Ansārs. He removed malice, enmity, hatred and sedition from them and gave everyone their rightful position(٨)

He would enjoin people to do good and forbid them from evil through struggle and the expounding of its importance, [and through] patience in hardships, tribulations, hopelessness and persecution of the people [the disbelievers](٩). Indeed these lofty characteristics were a sign of his greatness as a leader

Patience became the cornerstone of his leadership

p: ٥٩

Al-Qalam: ٤ – ١

Q٩:١٢٨; Bukhāri (al-Janā'iz, al-Tawhid, al-Adab); Muslim (al-Janā'iz, al-Fadhā'il, al-Tawba, al-Nudhur); Sanā'i (al-Janā'iz, al-Tahārah, al-Hajj); Ibn Māja and Tirmidhi (al-Ahkām

Bukhāri (al-Adab, al-Nafaqāt, al-Istinābah); Muslim (al-Imāra, al-Birr, al-Jihād); – ۳
Tirmidhi (al-Ahkām
Bukhāri (al-‘Ilm, al-Adhāhi, al-Imān, al-Maghāzi); Muslim (al-Imān); Dāwud (al- – ۴
(Adab
Bukhāri (al-Jizya, al-Adab, al-Imān, al-Sayd, al-Maghāzi); Ibn Māja (al-Sadaqāt, al- – ۵
(Janā’iz, al-Jihād
(Q۳:۳۴; Bukhāri (al-Nikāhm Fadhā’il al-Sahābah); Muslim (Fadhā’il al-Sahābah – ۶
Bukhāri (al-Istindhān, al-Buyu’, Tafseer Surah ۵۹: ۶۵, al-Adab, Fadhā’il al-Sahābah); – ۷
Muslim (al-Jihād, al-Zakāh, al-Eimān); Abu Dāwud (al-Wasāyā, al-Hudud, al-Diyāt, al-
Ada); Tirmidhi (al-Libās, al-Birr, al-Manāqib); Nasā’i (al-Qadhā’, al-Qasāmah, al-
(Janā’iz
Aāl ‘Imrān: ۱۰۳, ۱۱۰; A’rāf: ۱۵۷, ۱۹۹; Tawba: ۱۱۲; Bukhāri (al-Fitan, Badw al-Khalq, al- – ۸
(Shurb); Muslim (al-Uqdhiyyah, al-Zuhd); Ibn Māja (al-Fitan
(Ibn Māja (al-Fitan – ۹

by which he would persevere against the enemies. Kindness and courtesy were the ornaments of his command and his respect, veneration, love and humility among the troops brought about a sense of brotherhood and love among them and gave them a feeling of closeness to their leader. His other qualities were forbearance and forgiveness. All these qualities of the Prophet (S) presented him as the light of guidance for all those who would be given the responsibility for leadership

A) Intellectual Traits

One: Reflection, Contemplation and Far-sightedness

point

When the Noble Prophet (S) was sent, the people were immersed in superstition, idol worship, magic and sorcery. Their values were materialistic and their thoughts were lowly. They would say: There is nothing but the life of this world; we live and we die^(۱). The Prophet forced them to apply their intellects in thought and contemplation, invited them to worship One God and purified them of the vileness of idol worship and depravity and got rid of it^(۲).

He then took them towards greatness and glory. The Almighty chose the Prophet (S) so that he could be a messenger and a teacher to them. Whenever the Creator of the Universe chooses someone to bring His message, He selects the person who has the greatest intellect of all people^(۳). Allah knows best where to place His Message^(۴). Therefore there is no doubt that the Prophet (S) had a perfect intellect by which he was able to lead an entire nation and take them to the highest level of religious and worldly achievement

By thinking and

p: ۶۰

Al-Mu'minun: ۳۷ -۱

Bukhāri ۳:۲ -۲

Dārimi, al-Muqaddimah: ۳۴, ۵۷; Bodyle, al-Rasul (The Life of Muhammad), - ۳

translated into Arabic by ‘Abd al-Hamid Judah: ٥٤

Al-An’ām: ١٢٤-٤

pondering about the situation of his community, we come to the conclusion that the Holy Prophet (S) was the wisest person in the world. This is because he was able to reform a community that was accustomed to harshness and violence and had ingrained [in themselves] the qualities of vainglory and callousness. He trained them and took their affairs in hand and led them out of ignorance into knowledge and guidance; in such a way that despite their past, they became his fervent supporters. They carried on his message and spread it throughout the world and stood up to fight [\(1\)](#) by his side.

The Noble Prophet (S), by his own acumen, devised new methods in the ‘art of warfare’, ‘government’, ‘administration’, ‘politics’, ‘economics’, ‘social order’ etc. On this basis, in the Battle of Badr [\(2\)](#), he initiated battle formations. In the Battle of Ahzāb [\(3\)](#) he dug a trench around the city. In the expedition of Hudaybiyyah [\(4\)](#) he negotiated with the Quraysh and made a pact with them, the great benefits of which were only seen later. In the same way, he would use new strategies in the battlefields that assisted him in gaining victory over the enemies and they were stunned and perplexed by the [new] tactics

The greatest and most important intellectual traits of the Holy Prophet (S) were: reflection, contemplation and far-sightedness. These attributes were deduced from his many feats in the battles, the most important of which was his choice and selection of the first soldiers from among the Quraysh

p: ٤١

Al-Nubhāni, al-Anwār al-Muhammadiyya min al-Mawāhib al-Daniyya: ٢٢; Jād al-Mawlā, Muhammad al-Mumathil al-Kāmil: ٢٠; Cobold, al-Bahth ‘an Allah: ٥١; Carlyle, Muhammad Rasul al-Hudā wa Shari’at al-Khālidah, translated into Arabic by Muhammad al-Sabā’i: ٤٩

Ibn Hishām ٢:٥٨; Ibn Sa’d ٢:٦-٢

Al-Zuhri: ٧٩; Wāqidi ٢:٤٤; Suhayli ٣:٢٧٦; and see also: Muhammad Rawās Qal’echi, –٣ (Dirāsāt al-Tahliliyyah li Shakhsiyyat al-Rasul Muhammad (S): ٢٢٦-٢٣٢ (Tr

Ibn Hazm: ٢٠٧; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٢:١٣; Kalā’i ١:١٢٧-٤

and the Muhājirin without the participation of the Ansār. The wisdom behind this was that the Ansār has made a vow in the Second Pledge of ‘Aqabah(۱) that they would help and support the Prophet in Madina and for this reason it was evident that the Muhājirs would have to play the main role in battles and wars

However, after some time, without making any reference to the pledge, the Holy Prophet (S) informed the Ansār and made it clear to them that their participation and assistance in the battles was required. From the other instances where the wisdom and prudence of the Prophet we can cite the treaties that he would make with neighboring tribes(۲); because through this he would gain access to various desert routes that were frequented by the caravans of the Quraysh on their way to Syria(۳)

In the Battle of Uhud he ordered a group of archers to position themselves on the mountain side(۴) and to remain there until they were allowed by him to leave their post and it was seen how those archers disobeyed the order of the Holy Prophet (S). When they thought that victory had been gained, they abandoned their post in order to take their share of the booty, thereby granting the enemy easy access and enabling them to overturn the outcome of the battle

The Holy Prophet (S) wanted the archers to remain in their positions on the mountain so that after the victory is achieved in this fight, the forces could

p: ۶۲

A group of people from Yathrib met with the Prophet (S) in Minā and made two – ۱ pacts with him (that later became known as the first and second pledge of ‘Aqaba) in which they promised to support and protect him. When the first battle between the Muslims and the polytheist took place, only the Muhājirs participated in it, meaning that the Prophet did not involve the Ansār in battle before the Battle of Badr, because they had agreed to protect the Prophet only in Madina. For this reason, in the Battle of (Badr, out of the ۳۱۳ fighters, more than ۲۴۰ were from the Ansār. (Tr

Ibn Khayyāt, Tārikh Khalifah ibn Khayyāt ۱:۱۵; Tabari ۲:۴۰۳, ۴۰۵ – ۲

The Quraysh would travel for trade twice a year. In the winter they would go to – ۳

Yemen and the southern areas of the Arabian Peninsula, and in the summer they would go towards the north. (See: Jawād ‘Ali, al-Mukhtasar fi Tārikh al-Islām, under (the section about Makkah) (Tr
This refers to the Mountain of ‘Aynayn. This was the same place where the Prophet -ﷺ (S) had ordered the Muslims to keep watch in the battle of Uhud. (Tr

increase in their strength through peaceful means and the awe and glory of the Muslim army may be elevated both within and outside the borders. About this Zuhri says: ‘There was no bigger victory that was gained in Islām before this

The Noble Prophet (S) would deal cautiously^(١) with the Jews and hypocrites who lived in the neighboring areas

A good commander also needs a creative and an innovative mind with superior intelligence and the Prophet (S) was distinguished with these very attributes. He manifested this in certain instances, the most important of which were

The creation and establishment of a state^(٢) and the selection of warriors who would be harsh against their enemies and merciful and kind with their friends^(٣). With these principles, the Holy Prophet (S) would fight battles against the Quraysh, the Jews and the hypocrites^(٤). He planned the stages of battle and begin studying the strategies of war with the Quraysh and the possibility of gaining control of Madina and its surrounding areas. He was the one who envisioned the war with the Romans^(٥) which was later realized by the army of Islām and this was another prime example of his far-sightedness and vision

The Prophet, with his vision and insight, foresaw that the Jews of Khaybar would soon rebel against the Muslim army just as the Jews of Bani Nadhir and Bani Quraydha has done, so he made all the necessary preparations for such an occurrence. In the meantime, he forbade the tribe of Bani Asad from helping the

p: ٤٣

Ibn Sa’d ٢:٤١ –١

See Haydarabādi, Majmu’ah al-Wathā’iq al-Siyāsiyyah lil ‘Ahd al-Nabawi wal – ٢
(.Khilāfa al-Rāshidah: ١٥–٢١ (Tr

Al-Fath: ٢٩ –٣

Ibn Sa’d ٢:١٣٦ –٤

Wāqidi ١:٤٠٢, ٢:٧٥٥, ٣:٩٨٩; Tabari ٣:١٠٠; Ibn Hazm: ٢٢٠.٢٤٩ –٥

Jews of Kahybar(1) in any way and prevented the pact of unity that was about to be made between them. As a result, he made it possible to weaken the Jewish forces and then send an army the likes of which they had never faced to fight them

During the Expedition of Bani Mustalaq(2), he married Juwayrah the daughter of Hārith. Not long thereafter, the tribe of Bani Mustalaq accepted Islām group by group. At the same time, the mission carried out by Usāma bin Zayd(3) was also successful and resulted in a great victory

Even though many of the commanders of the Muslim army lacked the vision and far-sightedness of their great leader, the Holy Prophet (S), they would nonetheless turn to themselves and accept these obvious and evident truths. The greatest reflections of the Prophet (S) and his superiority of intellect were manifested in the following matters

:Planning and Organization .1

Planning and organization are considered two of the primary elements in the establishment of a state, a society, an army and all affairs related to these(4). Before the Prophet created an army and groups and delegations turned to him, he formulated a plan to set up a new state in Madina. One of the manifestations of this planning was that he met with some people from Madina during the period of Hajj and made a ‘quasi-military’(5) pact with them and presented a new religion for them to accept and accepted the responsibility of ending the conflict between their two tribes of the Aus and

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Ibn Sayyid al-Nās 2:41 –1

Wāqidi 1:404; Ibn Hishām 3:302; Ibn Sa’d 2:45; Ibn Hazm: 203; Kalā’i 1:124; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās 2:91; Ibn Katheer 4:156

Wāqidi 3:112; Ibn Sa’d 2:137; Tabari 3:185; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās 2:281 –3

Ibn ‘Abd Rabbih 1:7, 11, 19, 22, 32, 43; Ibn Khaldun, Muqaddimah 2:711 onwards; M. –4 Watt, Muhammad fi al-Madina: 4; in this pact, five people from the Aus tribe gave

(allegiance to the Prophet (S). (Tr

Ibn Sa'd ١:١٤٧; Ibn Atheer ٢:٩٤-٥

He advised them to be the representatives for the propagation of Islām in Yathrib. The next year, before the commencement of the Hajj rituals, a group that was bigger than the first group, came to meet with the Prophet (S) and pledge allegiance to him, and this was the first official pledge of allegiance of the people of Madina⁽¹⁾. After the pact, the Prophet (S) send Mus'ab ibn 'Umayr⁽²⁾ to teach the people of this newly 'converted' city. He should therefore be considered the first emissary of the newly founded Islāmic state

Thirteen years after the appointment of the Prophet, a group comprised of ٧٣ men and women from the chiefs and nobles of the Aus and Khazraj came for Hajj and make a pact with the Holy Prophet (S) in which they vowed to defend him just as they would defend their honor and their children. This pact became known as the 'Second Pledge of 'Aqaba'⁽³⁾. From the outcomes and consequences of this planning was the spread of the Islāmic faith and the securing of the basic material and security needs of the Muslims in Madina and support for them against the persecution [of the enemies] and the formation of an army to face the threat of the Quraysh and their allies

The Prophet (S) organized an army comprising of the Muhājirin and the Ansār. The Ansārs were made up of the Aus and Khazraj while the Muhājirs consisted of all the different tribes and were considered among the foremost experts

p: ٤٥

Tabari ٢:٣٥٥; this pact is also known as Bay'at al-Harb. ١١ people from the Aus and ١١ Khazraj pledged allegiance to the Prophet (S). This pact laid the groundwork for the (migration of the Prophet to Madina. (Tr

Ibn 'Abd al-Birr ٤:١٤٧٣; Ibn Atheer, Usd al-Ghāba fi Ma'rifat al-Sahāba ٤:٣٧٠; Harawi, ٢-al-Hiyal al-Harbiyya: ٧٥

Ibn Sa'd ١:١٤٨; Tabari: ٣٥٤-٣

of warfare in the army. The Holy Prophet (S) appointed a commander for each tribe
.and also appointed one general commander over them all

In every battle(1), he would organize them according to the needs, natural resources, enmity, friendship and terrain. His soldiers were arranged and divided into the front-line, the rear, the right flank, the left flank and the heart of the army. The Prophet gave a lot of importance to military intelligence and information [about the enemy](2). In the same way, he would send some soldiers in martyrdom-seeking Sariya missions, like the Sariya of Muhammad ibn Maslamah that was given the mission of assassinating Ka'b ibn Ashraf(3) because of his insolence and malice against Islām, the leadership [of the Prophet] and all the Muslims. Or like the Sariya of 'Abdullah ibn 'Ateek(4) who was given the mission of killing Salām ibn Abi al-Huqayq, and other
.similar missions that were sent

Taking Decisions and Issuing Clear Orders .۲

The Prophet (S) never used to issue firm and clear orders except after he had got the complete information about the conditions of the battle and was able to make decisive judgments and issue the best orders accordingly while remaining steadfast in the face of the changing situations of battle(5). The most important qualities that
:distinguished the commands of the Holy Prophet (S) were

a) Studying the different aspects before making a decision and consequently issuing
.(the command(6)

.(b) Not reverting or turning back after the command has been issued(۷)

(c

p: ۶۶

Ibn Sa'd ۲:۱; Suhayli ۲:۲۵۲ -۱

Zuhri: ۶۳; Wāqidi ۱:۱۸۲, ۱۹۴, ۲۰۳, ۳۳۷, ۳۹۵, ۴۰۴ onwards; Ibn Hishām ۲:۲۶۸ -۲

Ka'b ibn Ashraf was one of the heads of the Jews and was a staunch enemy of the -۳

Muslims and especially of the Holy Prophet (S). He would compose poems mocking the Prophet and would encourage the disbelievers to rise up against the Muslims. The Prophet (S) asked his companions if anyone from among them would be willing to take up the mission of assassinating him. Muhammad ibn Maslamah took up the challenge. In order to accomplish the mission, he tricked Ka'b into leaving his companions and coming with him to a remote place and after talking with him for some time, he suddenly took out his sword and killed him. When the Prophet (S) heard the news he

(.was very happy and embraced Ibn Maslamah and praised him. (See Wāqidi ١:٩٠) (Tr Abdullah's mother used to live among the Jews and hid her faith from them. At –٤ night he and some others entered into Khaybar and took refuge at his mother's house. They hid their weapons and once they had found out where Abi al-Huqays's mansion was, they sought to meet with him on the pretext that they had brought him some gifts. Once inside, they killed him with their swords. In this way, in the month of Ramadān, in the year ٩ A.H. one of the greatest enemies of Islām was assassinated. However it should be noted that, contrary to what the author has mentioned, the Prophet (S) did not sent 'Abdullah ibn 'Ateeq on this mission, rather, when he heard how Abi al-Huqayq was insulting and mocking Islām and the Prophet, he felt a sense of responsibility and thus took the initiative himself to do away with him. (See Wāqidi

(١:٣٩١; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ١:١٢٠) (Tr

Ibn Sa'd ٢:٩, ٢٥, ٣٤, ٤٠, ٤٤, ٥٣ –٥

Wāqidi ١:٩٧, ٢:٤٤٠, ٣:٨٨٥ onwards; Ibn Hishām ٣:٦٤, ٢٢٤, ٤:٨٠; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٢٥, ٤٧, ١٠٨; also –٦ see Rawāw Qal'echi, Dirāsah Tahliliyyah lishakhsiyyat al-Rasul Muhammad (S): ٢٢٨–

٢٢٩

In the battle of Uhud, the Prophet wanted the Muslims to remain in Madina but –٧ because of the insistence of the young zealous fighters, he was forced to move out. After a short while, the same people came to the Prophet (S) and told him they were ready to remain in Madina and wait for the enemy. The Prophet replied that it was

(.inappropriate to change the decision as everything had already been prepared. (Tr

Changing the commands in accordance with the changing circumstances of the battle.

d) Maintaining the ability of making intellectual decisions and offer continuous guidance and leadership even during the most difficult times in the battlefield.

e) He would decide on the realization of victory

Two: Skill and Intellectual Brilliance in Executing the Duties of a Commander

With certainty, the sagacity and intellectual brilliance of the Holy Prophet (S) in commanding and controlling the army during war was clearly manifested. He would test people and then select the strongest and most capable person to give the command to. For example, he chose Hamza ibn ‘Abd al-Muttalib as the commander of one of the first Sariya missions. He appointed ‘Abdullah ibn Jahash to lead a Sariya mission to gather intelligence about the Quraysh. He made Abā Dujāna the head of the sword-fighters and selected Usama bin Zayd as the commander of an army that comprised of some of the great companions.

He put some of the Ansār and Muhājirin under the command of ‘Amr bin ‘Aās and send them to fight the tribe of Bani Qudhā’ah. All these examples show that all these people who were given the responsibility of leadership in important missions were more capable and skilled than others and had the vision and insight required to overcome the enemies they had to face.

Another example of the intellectual brilliance of the Prophet (S) in times of war was his focus, at the start of battle, on the points which would secure victory and attain

p: ۶۷

When the Muslims began losing in the battle of Uhud, the Prophet quickly transferred the command post of the army to the mountain and assumed a defensive position. (Rawās Qa’ehchi: ۲۹) (Tr

For example, when the Prophet (S) was injured in the battle of Uhud, this did not prevent him from playing his role as the leader of the army. (Tr

Al-Uqqād, al-‘Abqariyyat al-Islāmiyyah: ٢٢٠, ٢٥٠; M. Watt, Muhammad fi al-Madina: –٣

٥١١; Cobold: ١٢١

Wāqidi ١:١; Kalā’i ١:٥٧–٤

Wāqidi ١:١٣; Ibn Hazm: ١٠٥; Ibn ‘Abd al-Birr, al-Istee’āb ٣:٨٧٨; Ibn Katheer ٣:٢٤٨–٥

In the month of Rajab in the first year of Hijra, the Prophet (S) send ‘Abdullah ibn –٦ Jahash with seventeen men on a mission to Wādiyu al-Nakhlah. There he was to launch an attack on the caravan of the Quraysh. After some fighting, ‘Abdullah (.returned to Madina victorious (see: Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ١:٣٥٩) (Tr

Tabari ٢:٥١٢; Ibn Hazm: ١٦٠; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٢:٦; Kalā’i ١:١٠١, ١٠٢–٧

Usāma bin Zayd ibn Hāritha was a young man of about nineteen who was – ٨ appointed as the commander by the Prophet (S) because of his ability and leadership skills. He was given the authority above the older companions (like Abu Bakr). His appointment came in the last days of the Holy Prophet’s life. Many of the companions complained to the Prophet (S) because of his young age. The Prophet became angry and said that he was chosen because he was a capable commander like his father

(.was. (see Wāqidi ٢:٧٦٩; Ibn Hishām ٤:٢٧٢) (Tr

Wāqidi ١:١٢; Ibn Sa’d ٢:٤; Tabari ٢:٤٠٨–٩

It is worthy to note here that the author has unfortunately fallen prey to sectarian –١٠ bias as is evident in his selection of personalities. Though, it is a known and acknowledged fact that ‘Ali ibn Abi Tālib (‘a) was one of the most effective commanders in battle, he has neglected to even mention his name. Even though the author has made an effort to remain impartial, it is in instances such as these that the lack of impartiality becomes clear. When the main sources from both the sects are studied, it can be seen that ‘Ali (‘a) was the driving force in some of the major battles and without his participation in them, victory would not be forthcoming. He was among the first warriors to participate in the Battle of Badr and was the first to kill an enemy of Islām (see: Ibn ‘Abd Rabbih, al-Iqd al-Fareed ٥:٩٦). When the life of the Holy Prophet (S) was in danger, it was ‘Ali (‘a) who stood by him and courageously defended him in the Battle of Uhud (see: Usd al-Ghābah fi Ma’rifat al-Sahābah ١:١٥٤; Ibn Jawzi, Tadhkirat Khawās al-Ummah: ١٦). The historians are also in agreement that he played a primary role in the Battle of Khandaq wherein he killed the giant ‘Amr bin ‘Abd Wudd (see: Ba’lami, Tārikhnāme Tabari ١:٢٠٥). His victory over the Jews in

Khaybar was a feat that many other companions failed to accomplish and this is recorded in many sources such as Ibn Hishām ۲:۳۳۴; Balādhuri ۲:۹۳; Ibn Jawzi: ۱۶. In the Battle of Hunayn, where many of the ‘great’ companions fled from the battlefield, ‘Ali (‘a) stood next to the Prophet (S) and fought with valor (see: Ibn Sa’d ۲:۱۵۱; Ya’qubi, Tārikh al-Ya’qubi ۲:۴۷). In fact the instances of great courage and leadership displayed in battle are greater for ‘Ali ibn Abi Tālib (‘a) than for any other companion. (Unfortunately, we cannot elaborate on all of these here. (Tr

the desired goal. For instance, in the battles of ‘Dhi Amr’ and ‘Bani Salim’ (1) he put the focus on the right flank (2) and in all the other battles like Uhud, would identify the weaknesses in the enemy army and focus on it (3)

Transferring and moving the command post during battle was necessary in order to maintain a control over the forces and urge them to remain strong and move forward. In order to protect the forces and organize them in specific formations, the Holy Prophet (S) (4) would shift his command post depending on the changing circumstances during battle

In the Battle of Uhud, the Prophet (S) chose a juncture and a means of shifting (5) the command post to a new location. In the Battle of Khaybar, he set up four command posts (6). He positioned the central command post at the uppermost corner of the fortress al-Natāh and stationed the furthestmost post in Rajee’ (7) and later ordered that the central command post should be moved to a new location that was better suited strategically

One of the most important traits and strategic acumen of a commander is the ability to face new scenarios that may be encountered in battle. He needs to be creative and resourceful and should be well aware of the realities that would enable him to reach the road of liberation [from the enemy’s grasp] and victory. It is in this way that experiential knowledge in examination is a way which follows the intellect in order to arrive at correct decisions (8)

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Wāqidi 1:194; Ibn Sa’d 2:24; M. Watt: 130 –1

Wāqidi 1:195; Ibn Sa’d (Ibid.); Ibn Hishām 3:50 –2

Zuhri: 76; Ibn Sa’d 2:25; Tabari 3:9; Dhahabi, Tārikh al-Islām 1:183 –3

Ibn Hishām 2:58, 64, 199, 224, 633 –4

Wāqidi 1:220; Ibn Hishām 3:69; Kalā’i 1:102, 103; Ibn Qayyim Jawzi, Zād al-Ma’ād 2:241 –5

Wāqidi 2:649 –6

Ibid. 2:645 –7

Hakeem, Masā'il Manhajiyah 'Ilmiyyah fi Nadhariyyah al-Harb wa Tatbiqihā min –
Wihjat al-Nadhar al-Sufitiyyah: ١٢١ onwards

The Noble Prophet (S), with his far-sightedness, vision, skill and intellectual brilliance, understood this and applied it to solve all the problems and execute all the missions that the commander was responsible for

Three: Sagacity and Perspicacity

Sagacity and perspicacity actually refer to deep insight and discernment that are able to clear up ambiguities and discover the reality of hidden secrets and a means of reaching it^(١). It is evident that from the people, those who are distinguished for their perspicacity are the ones who have insight and ingenuity. Ostensibly, sagacity depends upon observing, listening, moving or all of these combined. The Noble Prophet (S) would take guidance from the Glorious Qur'ān^(٢) that was revealed to him, or from the intellectual ability and sagacity that God had bestowed upon him.^(٣) He has even spoken about the cleverness of a believer^(٤)

As for his perspicacity in matter of warfare, [this is seen in] the fact that he invited Suhayl ibn 'Amr^(٥), the spokesperson for the Quraysh, to accept Islām. He did great service to the community and foresaw the fall of the Roman and Persian empires^(٦) and the spread of Islām throughout the Arabian Peninsula^(٧). After the killing of Mundhir bin 'Amr al-Sā'idi's^(٨) forces in the Sariya that was sent to Bi'r al-Ma'unah^(٩), the Prophet (S) also hid his concern from the inhabitants of Najd^(١٠) and only after the Battle of Khandaq did he announce that the Muslim army would change to an attacking army^(١١). The sagacity of the Holy Prophet (S) was also witnessed in

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Ibn Saydah, al-Mukhassas ١٣:٢٥; Rāzi, Jumal Ahkām al-Firāsah: ٨; Carlyle, - ١

Muhammad Rasul al-Hudā wa...: ٢٩

Al-Hijr: ٧٥; al-'Ankabut: ٣٨; Qāf: ٢٢; Qasas: ٨٠ -٢

Al-An'ām: ١٢٤; See also: Abu Na'im al-Isfahāni ٤:٢٦ -٣

(Bukhāri (al-Ta'beer); Tirmidhi (al-Ru'yā -٤

Ibn 'Abd Rabbih ٢:٦٦٩; Ibn Atheer ٢:٣٧١; Suhayl ibn 'Amr was the representatives of -٥ the Quraysh in the Treaty of Hudaibiyya. During the Conquest of Makkah, the

Prophet invited him to accept Islām and he did so. In this way, the polytheists lost one
(.of their most valued people. (Tr

Ibn Mājah (al-Fitan); Abu Dāwud (al-Jihād); al-Dhahabi ١:٢٢٧ -٦

Al-Baqarah: ١٢٥; Qasas: ٥٧; Nur: ٥٥ -٧

Ibn ‘Abd al-Birr ٤:٤٤٩; Ibn Atheer ٤:٤١٨ -٨

In the ٤th year of Hijrah, Abu Barrā’ sought permission to take ٧٠ Qurrā’ (Qur’ān -٩
reciters) with him to propagate the religion among the people of Najd. The Prophet (S)
advised him against this move, but he was insistent. When they reached a place
known as Bi’r Ma’unah, they were surrounded by some members of the tribe of
(.Saleem and were all martyred. (Tr

Wāqidi ١: ٣٤٨; Ibn Hishām ٣:١٩٤; Ibn Sa’d ٢:٣٦; Ibn Khayyāt ١:٤٢ -١٠

Bukhāri (al-Maghāzi ٢٩); Ibn Hanbal ٢:٢٦٢; Ibn Hishām ٣:٢٤٣ -١١

.the Treaty of Hudaibiyya(1) which turned out to be a great victory for the Muslims

In the Battle of Muta, he informed of the impending martyrdom of three commanders in his speech(2). In the Expedition to Tabuk, he dismantled the borders of the Byzantine Empire(3) in order to open the way for the Muslim army to enter their lands(4). All these decisions were made by the far-sightedness and perspicacity that the Prophet (S) had in politics, economics, sociology, matters pertaining to warfare and his ability to gauge individuals and groups both within and without in issues of this .world and the hereafter

B) Practical Traits

Principles of Warfare .1

The principles of warfare that were instituted by the Noble Prophet (S) were the foundational principles [that were necessary] for ‘attaining victory’. Therefore his call :was clear(5) and his war was based on the following principles

- (i) recruiting forces(6)
- (ii) deploy them sparingly(7)
- (iii) using surprise attacks(8) at the appropriate time and place(9)
- iv) relying on speed(10) that would enable battle strikes)
- v) continued pressure(11) during continuous and consecutive battles against the enemies that take place without any break
- vi) implementing maneuvers(12) using the resources and forces that were at hand)
- (vii) giving importance to maintaining security for the forces(13)
- viii) reliance on acquisition of intelligence and information)
- (ix) organizing the forces(14)

x) Establishing a form of synchronization and a co-operation between the various fighters of the cavalry, infantry and all the other ranks as well as between the right and left flanks and the center of the army

xi) Not dispersing the forces^(۱۵) because it was not appropriate to do)

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Zuhri: ۵۲; Ibn Hishām ۳:۳۲۵; Ibn Sa'd ۲:۷۰; Kalā'i ۱:۱۲۷-۱
Wāqidi ۲:۷۵۶; Ibn Sa'd ۲:۳۹; Ibn Khayyāt ۱:۵۶; Suhayli ۴:۸۰; Kalā'i ۱:۱۷۶. In the year ۸-۲ A.H. the Prophet (S) dispatched a contingent to fight the Romans in the Battle of Muta. He made Zayd bin Haritha the commander saying that if he will martyred, the command would go Ja'far bin Abi Tālib and if he too was martyred then the command would go to 'Abdullah bin Rawāhah. This is exactly what happened. First Zayd was martyred, then Ja'far became the commander but after some time, he too was martyred, and finally 'Abdullah became the commander, but in the end he was also martyred. By this time the reinforcements had arrived under the command of Khālid (bin Walid who then took the remaining troops back to Madina (Tr

Wāqidi ۳:۹۹۶, ۹۹۰; Ibn Hishām ۴:۱۶۱, ۱۶۹; Ibn Sa'd ۲:۱۱۹, ۱۲۰; Ibn Atheer ۲:۲۸۰-۳
In the year ۹ A.H. the Prophet (S) was informed by the Nabtis that Roman forces-۴ had gathered in Syria, so he led an army of thirty thousand towards Tabuk. When they arrived in Tabuk there was no sign of the Romans. Either the information they had been given was false or the Romans had fled after hearing about the approaching Muslim army. So in the end, the Prophet (S) was forced to return to (Madina – for more details see Wāqidi, Futuh Shām (Tr

Zuhri: ۲۵۲; Wāqidi ۱:۳۴۴; Ibn Hanbal ۳:۳۵۱; Tabari ۲:۳۵۶; Kalā'i ۱:۱۲۷-۵

Wāqidi ۱:۱۹۳; Ibn Hishām ۳:۳۴۲; Ibn Sa'd ۲:۲۵; ۴۷, ۱۱۸; Ibn Hazm ۳:۲۷-۶

Wāqidi ۲:۶۷۰, ۶۷۳; Ibn Hishām ۳:۳۴۴, ۳۴۷; Ibn Sa'd ۲:۲, ۵, ۱۸, ۲۱, ۳۹, ۶۴-۷

Ibn Sa'd ۲:۶, ۲۵, ۴۴, ۴۵, ۵۳, ۵۶, ۷۷; Ibn Hazm: ۲:۱-۸

Zuhri: ۷۱, ۷۹, ۸۴; Kalā'i ۱:۱۲۲, ۱۳۴; Ibn Katheer ۴:۲۶۴, ۲۶۷, ۳۴۴-۹

Wāqidi ۱:۲-۸, ۲:۴۴۴; Ibn Hishām ۳:۷۰; Tabari ۲:۵۱۲; Kalā'i ۱:۱۰۱-۱۰

Zuhri: ۷۹; Wāqidi ۲:۹۷۴; Ibn Hishām ۴:۱۵۹; Ibn Sa'd ۲:۱۱۸; Qurtubi, al-Jāmi' al-Ahkām-۱۱

al-Qur'ān ١٤:١٣٣

Wāqidi ٢:٧٩٦; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٢, ٣; Kalā'i ١:١٣٨-١٢

Saff: ٤; Wāqidi ٢:٨٢٥-٨٢٨; Ibn Sa'd ٢:١, ٩, ٩٨; General Akram, Sayfullah Khālid bin - ١٣

Walid: ١١٤

Majmu'ah al-Ta'lif fi Akadimiyyah Frunza al-'Askariyya (al-Takteek): ١٠٣ onwards - ١٤

Ibn Sa'd ٢:٦, ٢٦, ٤٧, ٦٦, ٧٧, ٩٣, ١٣٦; Tabari ٢:٤٢١, ٤٩٩ - ١٥

so given the weapons and resources that were available, and this is [also] a practice of the new form of warfare

xii) Strengthening the morale of his own soldiers(1) in such a way that they would not fear death

xiii) Creating an atmosphere of security in all the various battlefields; and all of these) .(were from the great principles of warfare of the Holy Prophet (S

Just as the Noble Prophet (S) was aware of the principles of war, he was also skilled in the use of both defensive and offensive warfare. He would use defensive warfare when constrained and execute attacks when necessary. When the threat was averted, he would have no need for either

It is for certain that when the Prophet (S) had weak forces and few resources, he would take up defense(2). For this reason, in the beginning of his mission(3), his defensive stance was evident, because at this time he was prey to the persecution and harassment and was forced to migrate; an affair that brought nothing but good for him. In Madina, his intention and goal, except in a few cases when he had no choice but to take up defense(4), was to attack(5). When he had a strong and complete army, he turned to offensive warfare(6). This method is one of the more advanced styles of war – which he used when sending the Sariya missions and laying the groundwork for battle(7) before the great Battle of Badr, which was an offensive battle. The methods and means

p: ٧١

Zuhri: ٦٦; Wāqidi ١:٢٢, ٢٦, ٣٢, ٩٦, ١٠٠, ٢:٦٤٤, ٦٦٦, ٦٧٠, ٦٨٠, ٦٨٥, ٧٠٠; Ibn Hishām ٢:٢٧٦, ٣١٣, –١
٣٢٠, ٣:٣٤٤, ٣٤٧, ٣٥٨; Tabari ٢:٦٤٤, ٣:١٠ ١٦

Ibn Sa'd ١:١٣٣–١٥٠; Tabari ٢:٢٩٨–٣٨٧; Dhahabi ١:١٣٩, ١٤٦, ١٦٦, ١٦٨, ١٨٨ –٢

Hajj: ٣٩–٤١; al-Tawba: ١١, ١٩١, ١٩٣; al-Nisā: ٧٥; Ibn Hishām: ١٤٧, ١٥٠; Suhayli ٢:٢٥٢ –٣

Zuhri: ٧٦, ٧٩; Wāqidi ١:٩٧, ٢:٤٤٠; Ibn Hishām ٣:٦٤, ٢٢٤; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٢٥, ٤٧; Ibn Hazm: ١٥٦, –٤
١٥٨; Kalā'i ١:١٠٤, ١١٤; Tabari ٢:٩

Wāqidi ١:٢–٨; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ١:١٢٢, ٢٢٣ –٥

Wāqidi ١:٩-١٩; Ibn Hishām ٢:٢٤١, ٢٥٧; Ibn Sa'd ٢:١-٩; Ibn Khayyāt ١:١٥-١٩; Tabari ٢:٤٠٨- ٤٢١; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ١:٢٢٤-٢٤١
See Wāqidi ١:١٧٣, ١٤٧, ١٨٤; Ibn Hishām ٥:٥٤-٧

:by which this offensive warfare would be carried out were

.Killing(1) the people who were in the way of the Islāmic revolution .1

.Swift reprisal(2) for those who were always ready to oppress and tyrannize .2

.Making pacts of unity(3) with the neighboring tribes .3

Focusing the [army's] strength(4) on some of the more important fights against the .4
.enemies

When the Battle of Uhud took place, he was forced to temporarily take up a defensive position, but this defensive war was again changed back into an offensive war in the Battle of Hamrā al-Asad(5) and the Muslim army was able to retake the victory from the enemy with its attacking forces and overturn the outcome.(6) The Prophet (S) continued to face the enemy and conduct pre-emptive strikes(7) until the Battle of Khandaq took place in which he also came out victorious. After the Battle of Khandaq, he used offensive warfare continuously and endlessly. He would say: Now it is we that must take the initiative to fight the enemy while they cannot fight us, and we should
(take the initiative to go towards them.(8)

(Pre-emptive Warfare (Harb al-Wiqāyah .2

The Noble Prophet (S) founded the basis of pre-emptive warfare(9), which required fewer fighters and resources as was seen in the first Sariya mission which comprised of thirty fighters, but this number was increased to 313 plus two on horseback in the Battle of Badr. The Holy Prophet (S) would always

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Wāqidi 1:181, 363, 2:552; Ibn Sa'd 2:20, 40; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās 1:296, 2:48-1

Wāqidi 1:121; Ibn Hishām 2:241; Ibn Khayyāt 1:15; Ibn Hazm: 100-2

Wāqidi 1:9-19, 182, 193; Ibn Hishām 3:46, 49, 50; Yāqut Hamawī 1:152, 341-3

After the Battle of Uhud, in order to uplift the spirits of the Muslim army and to show -4
the enemy that they were prepared, the Prophet (S) immediately sent the same

soldiers who had participated in Uhud to pursue the enemy, and he even prevented the recruitment of new forces and also took along the injured and wounded. This was very effective in strengthening the morale of the forces and putting fear in the enemy.

(. (See: Ibn Hishām ۳:۱۲۸; Ibn Sa'd ۲:۳۴) (Tr

Wāqidi ۱:۳۳۵; Kalā'i ۱:۱۰۵-۵

Wāqidi ۱:۳۳۵; Kalā'i ۱:۱۰۵-۶

See: Zuhri: ۷۲ onwards; Wāqidi ۱:۳۴۲; Ibn Hishām ۳:۱۹۲; Ibn Sa'd ۲:۳۵-۴۷; Ibn Khayyāt -۷

۱:۱۳۹; Tabari ۲:۵۴۶; Ibn Hazm: ۱۷۸

Ibn Hanbal ۴:۹۱, ۲۶۲; Bukhāri (al-Maghāzi ۲۹); Ibn Mājah (al-Fitan ۳۵); Abu Dāwud -۸

((al-Jihād ۱۵۶

Wāqidi ۱:۱۸۲, ۱۹۴, ۱۹۵; Ibn Hishām ۳:۴۶; Ibn Sa'd ۲:۲۱, ۲۳, ۲۴; Ibn Khayyāt ۱:۲۷-۹

[\(attack the enemy before they could rise up \[and launch an attack on the Muslims. \(1\)](#)

The most important principles of this type of war that the Prophet (S) relied upon were: swiftness, stealth, surprise attacks, moving the war to the enemy's area at the right time and place, acquiring of precise information, increasing the morale of the attacking fighters, deploying the forces sparingly and minimizing loses. With these principles, he opened up the way of attaining greater victory over the enemy

The Prophet started pre-emptive war in the Battle of Bani Saleem⁽²⁾. He marched his forces towards the tribes of Ghatfān and Saleem who had gathered at the waters of Qarqarat al-Kadar⁽³⁾. He carried out a surprise attack on them which lead to a greater victory over them. This was the same strategy applied in the Battle of Dhi Amr against the Bani Tha'labah, Ghatfān and Muhārib tribes to overpower them.⁽⁴⁾ In this case, he obtained information⁽⁵⁾ and then carried out a perfect Sariya mission⁽⁶⁾ wherein he did not utilize all the forces he had, rather he only deployed those whom he needed in every battle, in accordance with the forces of the allies and enemies, and in this way, he put the principle of 'deploying the forces sparingly' into practice

In the aforementioned battle (of Dhi Amr), the number of soldiers were four hundred and fifty⁽⁷⁾ whereas in the next battle (the Battle of Bahrān) the number was reduced to three hundred⁽⁸⁾. The Prophet (S) appointed Salamah bin 'Abd al-Asad al-Makhzumi⁽⁹⁾ as

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Wāqidi ۱:۱۸۲; Ibn Hishām ۳:۴۶; Ibn Sa'd ۲:۲۱; Ibn Khayyāt ۱:۲۷; Ibn Hazm: ۱۵۲ –۱
Seven days after the Battle of Badr, the Holy Prophet (S) got the news that a – ۲
number of men from the Bani Saleem and the Ghatfān were gathering at the
watering hole of the Bani Saleem which was known as 'Kadar' with the aim of
launching an attack on the Muslims. He ordered a contingent to march there but when
they arrived they found no one. There was only a young shepherd who was taken
(captive and then released. (Tr

See: Wāqidi ۱:۱۹۳, ۲:۲۳; Suhayli ۳:۱۳۶; Yāqut Hamawi, Mu'jam al-Buldān ۱:۲۵۲ –۳

Wāqidi ١:١٨٢, ١٩٤, ٣٩٥, ٤٠٤-٤

Wāqidi ١:١٩٤, ٢:٥٦٣-٥

Wāqidi ١:١٩٤; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٢٤-٦

Ibid. The Sariya of Bahrān was conducted in ٣ A.H. but there was no combat - ٧
(involved. (Tr

Ibn 'Abd al-Birr ٤:١٤٨٢; Ibn Atheer ٥:٢١٩-٨

Wāqidi ١:٣٤٢; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٣٥; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٢:٣٩; Yāqut Hamawi ٤:٣٧٤-٩

the leader of the mission and ordered him to march quickly^(١), day and night, so that he can reach the Bani Asad before they could recruit their forces^(٢). In order to carry out the surprise attack, the commander would move stealthily, march by night^(٣) and use routes that were not common. He would take advantage of the time and place when the enemy is most vulnerable, just as was done in the Battle of Bani Mustalaq^(٤) where an attack was carried out while they were busy watering their animals^(٥) at a place known as al-Marisee' near the shore^(٦).

Lightning Strikes and Blitzes .٣

The Holy Prophet (S) would order the carrying out of lightning strikes and blitzes and for this he would rely on the following: (i) the psychological effect it would have on the enemy^(٧) (ii) swiftness^(٨) in movement and maneuvering (iii) training in advanced archery skills^(٩) (iv) competition (v) resistance (vi) carrying out surprise attacks^(١٠) (vii) establishing the morale of attack^(١١) in his own army^(١٢) (viii) Keeping the preparations for a surprise attack secret (ix) reducing the load of munitions and equipment that is carried by the troops

Here we can mention the battles of Badr and Uhud under defensive and the Conquest of Makkah, Hunayn and Tabuk under offensive battles. In each case the speed of the troops was in accordance to what was appropriate [for the type of battle]^(١٣). Lightning strikes and blitzes needed dominance and superiority^(١٤) and could be changed in relation to defense and offence^(١٥). It also reduced human and material

p: ٧٤

It was in the ١٢th year of Hijra when the Prophet (S) sent Abu Salamah al-Makhzumi –١ along with ١٢٥ men to the tribes of Bani Asad. They travelled by night and would hide during the day in order to conduct the surprise attack. Three men were taken as (captives, one was killed and the rest fled. (Tr

Wāqidi ١:٤٠٣; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٤٤ –٢

Wāqidi ١:٤٠٤; Ibn Hishām ٣:٣٠٢; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٤٥; Ibn Hazm: ٢٠٣; Kalā'ī ١:١٢٤; Ibn Sayyid –٣ al-Nās ٢:٩١; Ibn Qayyim al-Jawzi ٣:٢٧٨

Ibn Hazm: ٢٠٣-٢٠٤-٤

Ibn Hishām ٣:٣٠٢; Ibn Sa’d ٢:٤٥; al-Bakri, Mu’jam Masta’jam ٤:١٢٢٠; Yāqut Hamawi – ٥

٥:١١٨

The Bani al-Mustalaq had united with other tribes in order to fight against the Holy – ٦
Prophet (S). In Sha’bān, ٦ A.H. a fierce battle took place in which ten infidels were killed
and the rest were taken captive. A lot of booty was acquired by the Muslims, including
(two thousand camels and five thousand sheep. (Tr

Wāqidi ١:١٩٤, ٣٣٨, ٣٩١, ٤٠٢-٧

Wāqidi ١:٣٩٦; Ibn Sa’d ٢:٥٣; Kalā’i ١:١٢٣; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٢:١٠٦; Ibn Katheer ٤:٢٤٦; – ٨

‘Azmi: ٢٣٠; Miksha: ١١٨

Ibn Hishām ٣:٦٤; Ibn Sa’d ٢:٢٥; Tabari ٢:٢٦٨; Polātuf, al-Mufājāt al-Taktikiyya: ٥ – ٩

Ibn Hanbal ٤:٢٦٢; Bukhāri (al-Maghāzi ٢٩); Kalā’i ١:١١٤ – ١٠

Wāqidi ٢:٧٩٦; Ibn Sa’d ٢:٢٤; Tabari ٣:٧٥; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ١:٣٠٤; Ibn Qayyim al-Jawzi – ١١

٢:٢٩٩; ‘Azmi, Dirāsāt fi Harb al-Khātifah: ٢٣٤

Zuhri: ٦٢, ٧٦, ٩٢, ١٠٦, ١١١; Azraqi, Akhbār Makkah :٤, ١٩٨; Yāqut Hamawi, Mu’jam al- – ١٢

Buldān ٥:٨٣; Jawād ‘Ali ١:١٩٦, ٢٢١; Majmu’ah al-Ta’lif fi Akadimiyyah Frunza
al-‘Askariyya (al-Takteek): ٣٣٥; Miksha, al-Harb al-Khātifah: ١١٨

Mishān, Tārikh al-Jaysh al-Aālmāni: ٥٤٧; ‘Azmi: ٩, ٨٨ – ١٣

Miksha, al-Harb al-Khātifah: ٦٠, ٦٥, ٨٢ – ١٤

Liwā’ Hamawi, Matālib al-Harb al-Haditha: ٧٦ onwards; ‘Azmi: ٢٣٣ – ١٥

losses; because it terrified the enemy and made him continuously come under intense hardships and tribulations. In this state, in the face of lightning attacks, they would be forced to hesitate and end up surrendering without putting up any resistance. As a result, the number of martyrs and wounded [in this type of warfare] would be reduced.

In offensive battles, the Holy Prophet (S) would always try to have a greater number of forces [than the enemy]. In the Battle of Bani Quraydha, the number of forces in the Muslim army was three thousand compared to seven hundred and fifty from the Bani Quraydha. In the Battle of Khaybar ۱,۵۰۰ fighters were sent to face one thousand Jews of Kahybar, and in the Conquest of Makkah, ten thousand men faced the entire city of Makkah; and similarly this superiority was seen in most of the Sariya missions ...[\(۱\)](#) that were sent [\(۱\)](#)

In battles where it was not possible to gain superiority as far as the number of forces was concerned, like in the Battle of Hunayn [\(۲\)](#), he implemented lightning strikes. In this battle, the number of soldiers in the Muslim army was twelve thousand against the twenty thousand from the Hawāzin, the Watheeq and other tribes. This attack was commanded by people who were distinguished for caution, resistance [\(۳\)](#), utilizing the time and place [\(۴\)](#), swiftness that was greater [\(۵\)](#) than the speed of the enemy [\(۶\)](#), changing and adapting quickly in the face of changing circumstances and making choices [\(۷\)](#) based on them, focusing the attention on

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Zuhri: ۸۶; Wāqidi ۲:۵۱۰, ۵۲۲, ۵۷۴, ۶۳۷, ۶۴۲, ۶۵۰; Ibn Hishām ۴:۴۲, ۶۳ –۱

Wāqidi ۳:۸۸۹, ۸۹۳; Ibn Hishām ۴:۸۳ –۲

Dhahabi ۱:۲۶۷ –۳

Ibn Sa'd ۲:۱۰۹ –۴

Wāqidi ۳:۹۰۳ –۵

Ibn Katheer ۴:۲۳۷ –۶

Ibn Hishām ۴:۸۵ –۷

the enemy and obtaining strong intelligence(١) about them. All this factors made the Muslim army superior and enabled them to gain victory

Pursuing and Chasing After Fleeing Enemy Soldiers .٤

Chasing the enemy and pursuing him after carrying out a successful attack is known as ‘al-Mutāradah’ and the aim behind it is to annihilate and destroy the defeated forces of the enemy(٢). The Holy Prophet (S) never allowed this in any of the battles he fought and was victorious. He would [after gaining victory] set the enemy captives free and allow them to go wherever they wished. He also instructed the commanders of Sariya missions not to pursue the fleeing enemy because this was not helpful in realizing any of the military and political goals

When we look carefully at the Battle of Dhāt al-Suwayq(٣) we find that the Prophet (S) was not keen to pursue Abu Sufyān, because if he would have reached the Quraysh in Makkah while the Muslim army was pursuing him, the polytheists would quickly prepare and gather for war, and thus this would end in an outcome that was not favorable for the pursuing forces(٤)

In the Battle of Dhāt al-Ruqā’(٥), after the Noble Prophet (S) gained victory over the Bani Mahārib, the Bani Tha’labah and the Ghatfān, he never pursued their fleeing fighters, because it was possible for them to regroup with the Ghatfān and recruit more forces and in such a case it would be difficult to gain the upper hand over them.

In the Battle of al-Ghābah(٦) also, the Muslim army caught up

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Kalā’i ١:١٤٣-١

Majmu’ah al-Ta’lif fi Akadimiyyah Frunza al-‘Askariyya – al-Takteek: ٤٣٧; Mujmu’ah – ٢
Muhādharat alqayt fi al-Akadimiyyah al-‘Askariyyah al-‘Ulyā fi al-Jumhuriyyah
al-‘Arabiyyah al-Suriyyah, Mawri Bek; Ghāyat al-Aāmāl fi Fanni al-Harb wal-Qitāl ٢:٥٠

Wāqidi ١:١٨١; Ibn Khayyāt ١:١٢٨; Tabari ٢:٤٨٣; Suhayli ٣:١٣٦; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ١:٢٩٦-٣

These days pursuing the enemies is considered ‘taking advantage of the victory’ to – ٤
(finish off the enemy completely. (Tr

Wāqidi: ٣٩٥; Ibn Hishām ٣:٢٣١; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٤٣; Muslim ٢:١٤٢ (Ghazwat Dhāt al-Ruqā' – ٥
٥٠); Tabari ٢:٥٥٦; Ibn Hazm: ١٨٢; Kalā'i ١:١١٢; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٢:٥٢; Ibn Qayyim ٢:٢٧٥
Wāqidi ٢:٥٣٧; Ibn Hishām ٣:٢٩٣; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٥٨; Ibn Khayyāt ١:٤٣; Tabari ٢:٦٠١; Ibn – ٦
Hazm: ٢٠١; Kalā'i ١:١٢٣; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٢:٨٤; Ibn Qayyim ٢:٢٩٤

with the fleeing enemy army at Dhi Qirad^(١) but was forced to return back from the same route. After this, the Prophet (S) sent out many missions^(٢) to fight against the enemy, but he would always command them not to pursue the enemy if they were .victorious

When he sent Abi Salamah ibn ‘Abd al-Asad al-Makhzumi to fight the Bani Asad, he instructed him: Go towards the land of the Bani Asad and carry out an attack on them before they can gather together against you^(٣). Similarly, in the other missions like the Sariya of Usāmah ibn Zayd^(٤) that was sent to (fight) the Abnā, there was no effort to .pursue the defeated and fleeing soldiers

Attacks and Onslaughts .٥

The Prophet (S) was fully aware of this tactic, because it has been narrated that he would use offence and attacks whenever the situation called for it^(٥) in such a way that if it is used [in the present], by an elite commander – meaning someone who is courageous, brave, sound, intelligent and with a great personality who can execute attacks successfully – it would not match up to the way it was done at the time of the .(Prophet (S

The attacks and onslaughts that were carried out by the Prophet (S) had the following :distinguishing features

a) Camouflage and Stealth: Like what took place in the Battle of Bahrān^(٦) against the .tribe of Bani Saleem

b) Silence and Quietness: This was seen in all the offensive missions and

p: ٧٧

Wāqidi ٢:٥٤٦, ٥٤٧; Ibn Sa’d ٢:٥٨; Hamawi ٤:٣٢١; Elward (Monister), Risālah fi Fann al- – ١
Harb: ٧٤

Wāqidi ٢:٥٤٦; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٢:٣٩, ١٠٣; Ibn Sa’d ٢:٣٥ – ٢

Ibn Sa’d ٢:٣٥ – ٣

Zuhri: ١٥١; Wāqidi ٣:١١٧; Ibn Hishām ٤:١٩١; Ibn Sa’d ١:١٣٦; Tabari ٣:١٨٤; Ibn ‘Abd – ٤

Rabbih ١:٩٩; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٢:٢٨١

Wāqidi ٣:١١٧; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٥٦, ٦١, ٦٢, ٦٥, ٨٥; Ibn Katheer ٤:٦١ –٥

Wāqidi ١:١٩٥; Ibn Hishām ٣:٥٠; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٢٤; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ١:٣٠٤ –٦

battles, especially the Battle of Bani Saleem, Bani al-Mustalaq and Badr, as well as [other battles](#) (1)

c) 'Surprise' was a constituent of all the offensive battles and military missions, especially Badr, and was part of the foray. Just as seen in the Battle of Bani Quraydha, Khaybar, the Sariya of 'Ali ibn Abi Tālib (a) against the Banu Sa'd and the Sariya of [Usāma bin Zayd](#) (2)

d) Speed: as witnessed in the battle against the Bani Muhārib and the Bani Tha'labah [in the Battle of Dhāt al-Ruqā'](#) (3) and in other Sariya missions (4)

e) Deception in Time and Place: this was another distinguishing feature of the military operations conducted by the Muslim army that was used in the Battles of Khandaq [and Khaybar](#) (5)

The commander who was given the task of carrying out an attack was someone who was physically strong, had good hearing, strong sight and was free from any ailment or malady that could impede him during the operation. Similarly, the Prophet (S) would take into consideration the goal and the time [together] – like in the Battle of Khaybar (6), the place – as in the Battle of Khandaq (7), and all three i.e. time, place and the objective – as in the Sariya of Usāma bin Zayd to Abnā (8), so that the enemy could be attacked when they were least prepared for battle

The Noble Prophet (S) prevented the fighters from raising their voices or shouting and screaming, and in

p: ٧٨

Wāqidi ١:١٨٢, ٤٠٤; Ibn Hishām ٣:٤٤, ٣٠٢; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٢١, ٤٥; Ibn Hazm: ١٥٢; Kalā'i ١:١٢٤; – ١

Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ١:٩٤; Ibn Katheer ٣: ٢٧٨, ٣٤٤

Wāqidi ٢:٤٩٤, ٥٤٢, ٤٣٣, ٣:١١٧; Ibn Hishām ٣:٢٤٤, ٣٤٢, ٤:٢٩١; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٥٣, ٤٥, ٧٧, ٢٨١; – ٢

Muslim: ١٣٥٧; Tabari ٢:١٨١, ٣:٩; Ibn Hazm: ١٨; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٢:٤٨, ١٠٩, ١٣٠; Ibn Qayyim

al-Jawzi ٢:٢٩٩; Ibn Katheer ٣:٢٠٤, ٤:١١٤; Polātuf, al-Mufājāt al-Taktikiyyah: ١٣, ٢٧, ٣٧

In the ٤th year of Hijra, after the Battle of Bani Nadheer, the Prophet (S) was – ٣

informed that the Bani Muhārib and the Bani Tha'labah from the tribe of Ghatfān had started gathering in Dhāt al-Ruqā' and were preparing to launch and assault on the Muslims. The Prophet (S) made Abu Dharr his deputy in Madina and led the Muslim army until the Valley of Nakhla and it was here that he faced the large army from the tribe of Ghatfān, but no war took place. In this battle, the moment the Prophet got the information (about the enemy troops), he quickly proceeded towards them before they could get the opportunity to launch an attack. (See: Ibn Hishām ۳:۲۱۴; Ibn Sa'd

(۲:۶۱) (Tr

Wāqidi ۱:۳۹۵; Ibn Hishām ۳:۲۱۳; Tabari ۲:۵۵ -۴

Wāqidi ۲:۶۵۲; Ibn Hishām ۳:۳۴۴; Muslim ۳:۱۳۶۱; Ibn Qutayba, 'Uyun al-Akhhbār ۲:۱۱۴; -۵

Ibn 'Abd Rabbih ۱:۱۲۲; Ibn Qayyim al-Jawzi ۲:۲۹۲

Wāqidi ۲:۶۷۰; Nādhif, al-Tāj ۴:۴۲۲ -۶

Wāqidi ۲:۶۵۲; Ibn Hishām ۳:۳۴۴ -۷

Wāqidi ۳:۱۱۷; Muslim ۳:۱۳۵۷ -۸

the Battle of Badr he ordered that the bells of the camels should be removed from their necks^(١). He would always encourage his troops to use new ways and methods for carrying out attacks

Deception and Trickery .٦

Some of the military tactics that are necessary and important in the battlefield are deception and trickery. Deception is the art of hiding and concealing the truth and involves doing things that would mislead the mind of the enemy away from the fight, while at the same time being alert about the resources and operations [of one's own army]^(٢). The Holy Prophet (S) knew about the importance of deception and trickery in war and would plan it and then execute it perfectly. He counted deception as part of warfare and would say: War is deception^(٣). In the first battle that was fought against the enemy at Badr, he replied to the question of Habāb bin Mundhir about this tactic and reaffirmed that indeed, war is deception, cunning and trickery^(٤)

The Prophet (S) also gave Muhammad bin Maslamah^(٥), who had taken the responsibility of killing Ka'b ibn Ashraf, the permission to deceive the enemy^(٦) and say anything that will enable him to carry out his mission. Similarly, after his accepting Islām, Na'eem bin Mas'ud was ordered to trick the enemy in the battle of Khandaq in the same way. So he was told: You are from the tribe of Ghatfān. When you go to them, if you are forced to display hatred for us then do so for this

p: ٧٩

Wāqidi ٣:١١١٧, ١١٢٢; Ibn Katheer ٣:٢٦١ – ١

Shaybāni, Sharh Kitāb al-Sayr al-Kabir ١:١١٩ onwards; Ibn 'Abd Rabbih ١:١٢٢ – ٢ onwards; Majmu'ah Muhādharāt Alqaytu fi Akādimiyya al-'Ulyā fi al-Jumhuriyyah al-'Arabiyyah al-Suriyya

Shaybāni ١:١١٩; Nāsif, al-Tāj ٤:٣٧٢ – ٣

(Wāqidi ١:٥٣; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٩; Muslim (al-Birr); Tirmidhi (al-Birr) – ٤

Ibn 'Abd al-Birr ٣:١٣٧٧; Ibn Atheer ٤:٣٣٠; Ibn Hajar ٦:٦٣ – ٥

Ibn Is'hāq: ٣١٩; Ibn Katheer: ٧٠٤ – ٦

will be more beneficial for us than if you openly help us. So go forward, for war is deception and cunning(1). In this mission, he successfully dispersed the enemy and this resulted in a victory for the Muslims

In the war of Bani Lahyān, the supreme commander portrayed the type of battle, the time and the route taken in a different way [to what he actually intended](2). In the Battle of Khaybar, he used trickery and deception against the Ghatfān(3) and they were not able to join with the forces at Khaybar and thus returned to their homeland. In the Conquest of Makkah(4), the Prophet (S) misled the Quraysh by sending Abi Qatāda ibn Rabi' towards the direction of Najd, thus misdirecting and distracting them from his real target (which was Makkah), and by equivocation(5) and trickery, he cut off all the routes in and out of Makkah(6). In the Battle of Muta also, Khālid bin Walid used this tactic(7). And in this way, by increasing the movements of the army, the enemy was tricked into believing that a large number of reinforcements had come to the aid of the Muslim army, so they became frightened and turned back

Superiority in Battle .v

The Prophet (S) would always be careful about superiority over the enemy in battle, so he would gather all the needed forces and resources for the important battles. He sent Sariya missions towards the coastal regions and also to face the Quraysh, like the Sariya of Hamza and the later missions, or the

p: ۸۰

Bukhāri (al-Jihād); Muslim (al-Jihād); and see also the chapters on Jihād in Sunan – ۱
Abi Dāwud, Ibn Mājah and Tirmidhi, and the use of trickery and deception by Na'im
bin Mas'ud against the enemy tribes and bringing about divisions among them in the
Battle of Khandaq to such an extent that they were unable to attain their objectives

(and lost all hope, forcing them to turn back. (Tr

(Bukhāri (al-Jihād, Maghāzi); Muslim (Tawba – ۲

Wāqidi ۲:۶۵۱, ۶۵۲; Ibn Hishām ۳:۳۴۴ –۳

Wāqidi ۲:۷۹۶; Ibn Sa'd ۲:۹۶. When the Prophet set out for the Conquest of Makkah, –۴

he did not let anyone know that his intention was to conquer Makkah and even sent a contingent towards another place in order to deceive the enemy (see: Ibn Sa'd ٢:٢٩٤)

(Tr

Wāqidi ٢:٧٩٤; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٩٤; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٢:١٤١ –٥

Wāqidi ٢:٨١٥; Ibn Hishām ٤:٣٩ –٦

Wāqidi ٢:٧٤٤; Ibn Hishām ٤:٢١; Kalā'i ١:١٣٤ –٧

battles like Waddān, Bawāt and al-‘Asheera; and also towards the eastern regions after the battle of Badr(١). The Prophet (S) gained an upper hand in the following ways:

Inventing new ways of warfare: like in the Battle of Badr, the battle of the fortresses ...and the lightning strikes(٢)

Focusing the forces at the appropriate time and place(٣), as in the Battle of Uhud and Hunayn.

Being swift as was required by the conditions of battle(٤), like in many of the battles and Sariya missions.

Destruction of most of the enemy forces(٥), like in the Battle of Badr, Hunayn and Bani Quraydha.

Restricting the freedom of the enemy, like in the battles of Badr, Quraydha and Khaybar(٦).

Putting the enemy forces in hardship and difficulty(٧), just like cutting off any reinforcements from the Bani Quraydha and besieging them.

(Burning down the date palms of Bani Nadhir and the gardens of Tā’if(٨).

Gaining access to the backup forces of the enemy and restricting or destroying them(٩), such that the Prophet (S) would make his forces reach the enemy and take their horses as booty.

The Holy Prophet (S) did not always seek to have a larger army than the enemy(١٠). For instance, in the Sariya of Hamza, the number of soldiers was thirty as opposed to the three hundred Makkans. In the Battle of Badr, ٣١٣ [Muslim] fighters went up against one thousand polytheists. In the Battle of Uhud, seven hundred came to face three thousand polytheists, and in the Battle of Ahzāb, three thousand faced ten thousand infidels. However, he

Wāqidi ١:١١, ١٢, ٥٦; Ibn Hishām ٢:٢٤٥, ٢٤٨, ٢٥١; Ibn Sa'd ١:١; Tabari ٢:٢٥٩; Ibn Hazm ١٠٠ – ١
١٠٢; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ١:٢٢٦

Wāqidi ١:٥٦, ٢:٥٨٣; Ibn Hishām ٤:٨٥; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٢; Ibn Qutaybah ٢:١١٤; Tabari ٢:٨٥٣; – ٢
Kalā'i ١:١٤٣; al-Dhahabi, Tārikh al-Islām ١:١٦٧

Wāqidi ٣:٩٠٣; Ibn Hishām ٣:٦٩; Tabari ٢:٥٠٧ onwards; Ibn Hazm: ٢٣٩ – ٣

Wāqidi ١:٣٩٥; Ibn Hishām ٣:٢١٣; Ibn Sa'd ٣:٤٣; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٢:٧٩, ١٠٤, ١٤٧ – ٤

Wāqidi ١:٥٤; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ١:٢٥; Ibn Katheer ٤:٢٣٧ – ٥

Wāqidi ٢:٤٩٦, ٦٣٣; Ibn Hishām ٣:٢٤٤, ٣٤٢; Ibn Hazm: ١٨ – ٦

Wāqidi ٢:٤٩٩; Kalā'i ١:١١١; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٢:٢٠١ – ٧

(Unfortunately the author has not given any reference for this (Tr – ٨

Wāqidi ١:١٣, ٣٤٣, ٢:٣٥; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٤١; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٢:٥٠ – ٩

Wāqidi ١:٩; Ibn Hishām ٣:٦٨; Ibn Sa'd ١:٧, ٤٧ – ١٠

mostly sought to gain superiority as far as the excellence of the forces were concerned(١) just as in the battles of Hamrā al-Asad, Badr al-Aākhar and Bani al-Mustalaq.

In some of the battles, despite the greater number of enemy forces and weapons(٢), he would gain decisive victories over them for which the battles of Badr and Hunayn are perfect examples. Nonetheless, he would change the number of forces sent in every different situation. In the Battle of Bani Quraydha, there was a relatively large number of forces as compared to the enemy(٣) as was also the case in the War of (Bani Lahyān(٤).

The Prophet (S) would not attack one tribe or one group in a single strike(٥). Rather, he would divide the enemy in order to gain complete victory and dominance of them materially and spiritually. For example, he divided the Jewish forces into the following: Bani Qaynuqā, Bani Nadhir, Bani Quraydha and [the Jews of] Khaybar. He attacked each of these groups separately. For instance, in the Battle of Ahzāb, he attacked the Jews separately from the Quraysh(٦) and the Bani Ghatfān separately from them both(٧) and in the Battle of Hunayn, he also divided the enemy i.e. he separated the front-line from the soldiers who were behind and then launched an attack on them

Swiftiness and Speed in Battle .A

The Noble Prophet (S) was steadfast about the importance of speed in battle, because this tactic made it possible for him to carry out surprise attacks. The number of fallen soldiers would not be known [when

p: ٨٢

Wāqidi ١:٨١ onwards, ٣:٩٠١ onwards; Ibn Sa'd ١:١٠ onwards, ٢:١٠٩ onwards –١

Wāqidi ٢:٤٩٤, ٤٩٩; Ibn Hishām ٣:٢٤٤ onwards; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٥٣ onwards –٢

Ibn Hazm: ٢٠٠; Suhayli ٣:٣٠٥; Kalā'i ١:١٢٢; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٢:٨٣ –٣

Ibn Sa'd ٢:٣, ١٩, ٢٠, ٢٣, ٢٥, ٤٠, ٤٣, ٤٤, ٥٣, ٧٧; Tabari ٢:٤٠٨, ٤٨٧, ٥٨٣ onwards –٤

The Prophet (S) fought many battles against individual Jewish tribes and managed –٥ to defeat them and curtail their evil from Madina. The battles of Bani Nadhir, Bani

Qaynuqā', Khaybar and Bani Quraydha are examples of these. The Prophet would always try to keep these tribes divided and attack them separately, not allowing them

(.to come to the aid of one another (Tr

Ibn Sa'd ٢:١٩, ٤٠, ٥٣, ٧٧; Tabari ٢:٤٧٩, ٥٨١, ٣:٩, ٢٣٤; Ibn Hazm: ٢٣٩ onwards –٦

Majmu'ah al-Ta'lif fi Akadimiyyah Frunza al-'Askariyya – al-Takteek: ٤٠٠ onwards; –٧

Miksha, al-Harb al-Khātifah: ٢٣٧, ٢٣٩; 'Azmi, Dirāsāt fi Harb al-Khātifah: ٢٣٠ onwards;

General Fuller, Idārat al-Harb: ٧٠

the attacks were swift] and this would weaken the resolve of the enemy while strengthening the morale of the attacking army such that the enemy was unable to launch a counter attack(١). In order to achieve the desired swiftness, the Prophet embarked on training the forces(٢) and made them practice it in all the consecutive battles(٣) and missions(٤) that would be carried out to face the enemy. In this way, the soldiers became accustomed(٥) to move swiftly and fight in the battles without .making mistakes

The modes of transport used by the Prophet played an important role in attaining the desired speed. These consisted mainly of horses and camels. The Muslim army also relied on being quick in getting ready for war(٦) and in order to instantaneously face .the enemy and recruit forces, they needed material resources and manpower

:In order to achieve this, the Prophet (S) used the following methods

Swiftness in defense and attack(٧): In defense, like in the battles of Uhud and Khandaq and in attack, like in the battles and Sariya missions of Bani Saleem, Dhi Amr, Bahrān, Dhāt al-Ruqā', Dumat al-Jundal, the Sariya of Abi 'Ubayda ibn al-Jarrāh, Abi .(Salama and al-Khabt, this was clearly seen(٨

Speed in besieging(٩): Like in the battles of Bani Qaynuqā, Bani Quraydha and .Khaybar

Quickness in marching forward: In the battles and missions like Badr, when the enemies were heading towards al-Udwat al-Dunyā, they overtook them and also in the battles of Bani Saleem, Dhāt al-Ruqā', Bani Quraydha, Bani Lahyān, the Sariya of Muhammad

p: ٨٣

(Ibn Hanbal ٤:٢٣; Bukhāri ٥:٢٧, ٧١, ٧٤; Abu Dāwud ٣:٢٨; Tirmidhi (al-Adab ٧٨ -١

Zuhri: ٧١, ٧٩, ٨٤; Ibn Sa'd ١:٢, ٤:١٩, ٢٣, ٣٤, ٤٠, ٥٤, ٧٧, ١٠٨, ١١٨ -٢

Ibn Hishām ٢:٢٤٥, ٤:٢٦٠, ٢٩٠; Ibn Sa'd ١:٢, ١٩, ٣٥, ٥٤, ٨٥, ٩٤, ١١٧, ١٣٦ -٣

One of the most important facets of the military forces is their training and exercise -٤

which is one of the surest ways to achieve success in war. By continuously sending contingents to different battle zones, the Prophet (S) prepared and trained them in

(.new strategies and maneuvers. (Tr

Zuhri: ٧٩, ١٥١; Wāqidi ١:١٢١, ٢:٤٩٤, ٥٣٧, ٣:١١١٧, ١١٢٢; Ibn Hishām ٢:٢٥١, ٣:٢٢٤, ٤:٢٩١; Ibn Sa'd ٢:١, ٥٣, ٥٨, ١٨٤; Ibn Khayyāt ١:٤٣; Tabari ٢:١٨١, ٦٠١, ٣:١٨٤; Ibn Qayyim al-Jawzi ٢:٢٩١,

٢٩٤

Wāqidi ٢: ٤٤٥, ٤٤٤, ٤٩٣; Ibn Hishām ٢:٢٣٠, ٣٦٠; Tabari ١:٥١١, ٥٦٨; Ibn Hazm: ١٤; Kalā'i ١:١٥ –٦
Ibn Sa'd ٢:٢١, ٣٥, ٤٣, ٤٢, ٩٥; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ١:٢٩٤م ٢٠٣, ٢:٣٨, ٩١, ١٥٨, ١٠٥; Ibn Atheer: –٧

١٧٤, ١٩٢, ٢٣٢

Wāqidi ١:١٧٧, ٤٩٤, ٤٩٩; Ibn Qutayba ٢:١١١; Kalā'i ١:١١٤; Ibn Atheer ٢:٢١٧; Nāsif ٤:٤٢٢ –٨

Wāqidi ١:١٩٠, ١٩٤, ١٩٨; Ibn Hishām ١:٢٤٤, ٢٤٥, ٢٧١; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٧, ٩, ٢١, ٤٣; Ibn Sayyid al- –٩

Nās ١:٢٥١; Ibn Atheer ٢:١٨٨

ibn Maslamah to kill Ka'b ibn Ashraf, the Sariya of Zayd bin Hāritha to attack the caravan of the Quraysh and the Sariya of Abi Salamah where he journeyed by day and night in order to reach the enemy

Speed in acquiring information and intelligence: Like in the battles of Badr, Dhāt al-Ruqā', Bani al-Mustalaq, Khaybar, the Conquest of Makkah and the Sariya of Muhammad bin Maslamah to destroy the Bani Bakr, (the Sariya of) 'Akāsha bin Mahsan against the Bani Asad and Ghālib bin 'Abdillah al-Laythi against the Bani Murrah

Swiftness in counter attacks: Like in the Battle of Uhud and in lightning strikes like in the Battle of Hunayn

Speed in [carrying out] other missions: Including in the Sariya missions of 'Umayr ibn 'Uday to kill 'Asmā', of Sālim bin 'Umayr to kill Ibn Abi 'Ifk, of Muhammad bin Maslamah to kill Ka'b ibn Ashraf, Of 'Abdullah bin Anees to kill Sufyān ibn Khālid al-'Hadhali and of 'Abdullah ibn 'Ateek in order to kill Abi Rāfi

Swiftness in attack: In battles and Sariya missions like Dumat al-Jundal, Bani al-Mustalaq, Ibn Quraydha, Bani Lahyānm the Sariya of 'Ali ibn Abi Tālib ('a) [who was sent] towards the Bani Sa'd, Bashir ibn Sa'd Ansāri who was sent to the Bani Murrah and Usāma bin Zayd towards the Abnā

Speed in preventive war: Like in the battles and Sariya missions of Dhi Amr, Bahrān, Dhāt al-Ruqā', Dumat al-Jundal, Bani al-Mustalaq, the Sariya of Abi Salamah, Abi 'Ubaydah ibn Jarrāh for revenge from the Bani Tha'labah, and

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Zuhri: ۶۳; Wāqidi ۱:۱۹, ۲۹۵, ۴۰۶, ۲:۵۳۴, ۵۵۰, ۶۴۰, ۸۰۲, ۸۰۸; Ibn Hishām ۴:۲۷۱; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ۲:۱۶۷

Ibn Is'hāq: ۳۲۸; Ibn Hishām ۳:۷۱; Tabari ۲:۵۰۷-۲

Wāqidi ۳:۹۰۲, ۹۰۳; Ibn Hishām ۴:۸۵; Ibn Sa'd ۲:۱۰۹; Tabari ۳:۷۵; Ibn Hazm: ۲۳۹; Kalā'i -۳ ۱:۱۴۳; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ۲:۱۹۳

Wāqidi ١:١٧٣, ١٨٤, ٣٩١; Ibn Sa'd ١:١٨, ١٩, ٢٠ -٤

Wāqidi ٢:٤٤٥, ٤٩٢; Ibn Hishām ٢:٢٢٠, ٢٣١, ٢٤٥; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٤٤, ٥٤, ٦٤, ٨٤, ١٣٦; Tabari ٢:٥٦٦ -٥

Swiftness in Lightning Strikes(2): Like in the battles of Dhāt al-Ruqā', Bani Quraydha, Dhi Qirad and the Sariya of Zayd ibn Hāritha against the tribe of Judhām

.Quickness in raids(3): In the battle of Dhāt al-Ruqā' and other Sariya missions

Revolutionary and All-inclusive War .9

This type war was based on rising up against injustice and tyrannical forces with all the might and resources available and it relied on the power of the people who have been inspired and are driven by the force of spiritual, political or religious motivations, and is actually a first step in destroying the might and awe of the enemy and gaining [victory over him\(4\)](#)

In 'revolutionary and all-inclusive war', the Holy Prophet (S) would spiritually and mentally prepare the forces and the inhabitants of the city(5). In turn, they would be ready to sacrifice all their lives and property(6) for the cause, because they believed and trusted in the fairness, the instruction, the authority, the love and the command of the Prophet (S)(7). It is undeniable that the spiritual aspect(8) played an important role in strengthening the resolve of the revolutionary forces and weakening the enemy, and as such it was employed in all the battles and was also accompanied by material means(9) in order to strengthen it. The Holy Prophet (S) used this to the utmost in the weak points of the enemy so that he could make them internally and [externally weakened and perplexed\(10\)](#).

That which distinguished the Islāmic revolution of the Noble Prophet (S) and gave the Prophet (S) a

Wāqidi 1:342; Ibn Sa'd 2:21, 35, 43, 62, 95; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās 2:39 - 1

Wāqidi 1:396, Ibn Sa'd 2:53; Kalā'i 1:123; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās 2:39 - 2

Wāqidi 1:395; Ibn Hishām 3:213; Ibn Sa'd 2:43; Tabari 2:556; Kalā'i 1:113; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās 2:39, 79, 102, 145, 146 - 3

Majmu'ah min al-Mu'allifeen al-'Askariyyeen ١:٥٨١ onwards –٤

See Q٢:٧٤ and Q٢:١٥٤; Q٣:١٥٧; Q٤:٣٦, Q٤:٧٤; Q٩:١١١; Q٢٢:٣٩, Q٢٢:٥٨; Bukhāri (al-Jihād, –٥
al-Maghāzi); Muslim (al-Amārah, al-Eimān); Ibn Mājah (al-Jihād); Tirmidhi (al-Eimān);

and see al-Sa'eed, Fusul fi 'Ilm al-Nafs al-Askari: ٩٤ onwards

Q٨:٧٢, Q٨:٨٨; Q٩:٤١, Q٩:٧٩; Ibn Is'hāq: ٣٢٨; Muslim (al-Jihād, al-Maghāzi, al-Riqāq, al- –٦
(Amārah); Abu Dāwud (al-Jihād); Nasā'i (al-Zakāt

(Wāqidi ١:٢١١, ٣٦٠; Ibn Hishām ٣:١٨١); Muslim (al-Eimān ٨ –٧

Zuhri: ٨٧; Wāqidi ٢:٤٧٩, ٣:١١٢٣; Ibn Hishām ٤:٤٦; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٢٨, ٤٩, ٧٩, ٩٧, ١٣٧; al-Sa'eed: –٨

٢٦ onwards

Q٨:٦٠; Bukhāri (al-Jihād ٣٨); Ibn Mājah (al-Jihād: ٣, ٥, ٧١); Abu Dāwud (al-Jihād ١٧); –٩

Ibn Sa'd ٢:١١٩

Zuhri: ٨٦, ٨٧; Wāqidi ٢:٧٨٠ onwards; Ibn Hishām ٤:٣١, ٤٦; Ibn Qayyim al-Jawzi ٢:٣٨٦, –١٠

٣٩٠; al-Sa'eed, Shakhsiyyah al-'Askariyyah: ١٢ onwards

:special status as a knowledgeable and spiritual leader included

.(a) Selecting appropriate agents(۱)

...(b) The people were content with his fairness and justice(۲)

.(c) Preparing all the people completely(۳)

.(d) Establishing of affinity and affection between them(۴)

.(e) Guiding both armed and unarmed forces towards a common goal(۵)

.(f) Acquiring new friends and allies(۶)

.(g) Humiliating the tyrants and despots(۷)

h) Demonstrating how the Islāmic system is superior to polytheism and other
.(systems(۸)

.(i) Teaching and propagating the new ideology(۹)

.(j) Making others love faith and hate disbelief(۱۰)

.(k) Being the best role model as a leader(۱۱)

Psychological Warfare (۱۲)

This is a collection of actions that are undertaken to influence the enemy or the rival(۱۲) with the aim of weakening the enemy's determination, resolve and material and spiritual power. Psychological warfare was considered the most important type of war in the strategy and planning of the Noble Prophet (S) and he made it the focal point in his battle against the enemy. He would leave them stunned and gain control over their spirits and minds, and as a result, he would take away their ability to fight back and resist. The Prophet (S) has himself said about this: I have been assisted by
.(creating a fear in the hearts of the enemy(۱۳)

- Bukhāri (al-Jihād ۱۲۲); Muslim (al-Masājid ۳); Tirmidhi (al-Seerah); al-Sa'eed: ۹۹ – ۱
onwards
- Q۲:۱۹۰–۱۹۲, Q۲:۲۴۶; Q۴:۷۵, Q۴:۹۰; Q۲۲:۳۹; Suyuti al-Rahibāni, Matālib al-Nuhā fi Sharh – ۲
Ghāyat al-Muntahā ۲:۵۰ onwards
- Wāqidi ۳:۹۹۰–۹۹۶; Ibn Hishām ۴:۱۶۱; Tabari ۳:۱۰۱; Kalā'ī ۱:۱۵۵; Haydarābādi, Majmu'at – ۳
al-Wathā'iq al-Siyāsiyyah lil 'Ahd al-Nabawi wal-Khilāfat al-Rāshidah: ۱۵–۲۰
- Bukhāri (al-Adab ۱۲۷); Muslim (al-Eimān ۹۳, al-Amārah ۴۷, al-Jihād ۱۳۳, al-Birr ۶۸); – ۴
Nasā'I (al-Qisāmah ۱۰–۱۴); Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ۱:۱۹۷–۱۹۹
- Wāqidi ۱:۱۳, ۵۳۴, ۲:۷۵۷, ۸۶۸, ۳:۱۱۱۷; Muslim ۳:۱۳۵۷; Kalā'ī ۱:۱۶۱ – ۵
Zuhri: ۸۸; Ibn Hishām ۱:۲۰۵–۲۴۵; Tabari ۳:۶۱; Ibn Qayyim al-Jawzi ۱:۵۱ onwards – ۶
- Zuhri: ۵۲; Ibn Hishām ۳:۳۲۲; Ibn Sa'd ۲:۴۱, ۷۰; Tabari ۲:۵۵۲, ۵۷۳, ۵۷۵; Ibn Hazm: ۲۰۸; al- – ۷
Zahili, Athār al-Harb: ۱۴۹
- Q۳: ۱۹, ۸۳, ۸۵; Q۵:۳; Q۹:۳۳, ۳۶; Q۴۸:۲۸; Q۶۱:۹; Zuhri: ۵۵; Bukhāri (al-Diyāt ۶, al-'Ilm ۲۹); – ۸
Muslim (al-Amārah ۱۷۳); Tirmidhi (Tafseer Surah ۳۳; al-Manāqib ۳۲); Ibn Mājah (al-
(Rahun ۵, al-Fitan ۳۳, al-Talāq ۲۷); Abu Dāwud (al-Amārah ۲۶, al-Malāhim ۱۴
- Q۲:۱۱۵; Q۵:۶۷; Q۶:۱۹; Q۵۵:۲; Q۱۵:۹۴; Wāqidi ۱:۳۴۷; Ibn Hishām ۳:۱۷۸, ۱۹۴; Bukhāri – ۹
(al-'Ilm ۱:۲۳, ۲۴, ۳۴, ۴۰, ۴۲) Ibn Mājah (al-Zuhd, al-Muqaddimah); Tirmidhi (al-Zuhd
- Q۲:۱۲۱; Q۳:۱۷۳; Q۵:۵; Q۱۵:۵; Q۱۶: ۱۰۶; Q۲۳:۱; Q۴۹:۱۱; Wāqidi ۲:۲۱۵, ۲۱۶; Bukhāri – ۱۰
(Maghāzi ۴۶, al-Adab ۴۲); Muslim (Fadhā'il al-Sahāba ۱۶۱); Ibn Mājah (al-Fitan ۲۳);
(Nasāi (al-Talāq
- Q۹:۱۲۹; Q۳۳:۶, ۲۱; Q۴۸:۲۹; Q۶۸:۴; Zuhri: ۹۲; Wāqidi ۱:۷۴ onwards; Bukhāri (al-Kifāyah – ۱۱
۵); Muslim (al-Farāidh ۱۶); Tirmidhi (Tafseer Surah ۴۴); Nasāi (al-Eidayn ۲۲); Tabari ۳:۷۵
- Majmu'ah min al-Mu'allifeen al-'Askariyyeen ۱:۷۶۷; Harawi: ۱۱۱ onwards; al- – ۱۲
Sa'eed, Fusul fi 'Ilm al-Nafs al-Askari: ۲۶
(Bukhāri (al-Salāh ۴۳۸ – ۱۳

who is frightened begins imagining things that are far from reality. For example, in the Battle of Khaybar, the tribe of Ghatfān imagined that their lands were under attack by the Muslim army, so they turned back and returned out of fear^(١) but when they reached their land they found nothing of what they had imagined. The same thing that happened to the Ghatfān happened to the Jews of Khaybar also and this made them ready to surrender and seek peace and conciliation^(٢). An army that becomes frightened and scared is unable to benefit from their weapons and fight in battle, and even if they fight, they would be very weak and disorganized in battle and this would .result in nothing but [loss or] surrender to their enemy

Because of being overcome by fear, the commander of the army of the inhabitants of Khaybar was unable to shoot the arrows from his bow even after readying them for firing, and his forces had become weary and weak.^(٣)

The level of fear can be clearly seen in the words of one Jewish person who was granted amnesty by the Prophet (S): The inhabitants of this place have been .destroyed out of fear of you^(٤)

From the first time that the Holy Prophet (S) sent a Sariya mission^(٥) to fight against the enemy, he relied on psychological warfare. After the first battle, all this changed^(٦) and he began to use it against the Quraysh and ended it against the Romans. Through this practice, a number

p: ٨٧

Ibn Hishām ٣:٣٤٤ –١

Wāqidi ٢:٦٧٠ –٢

Wāqidi ٢:٦٦٦; Ibn Katheer ٤:١٩٨ –٣

Wāqidi ٢:٦٧٠ –٤

Wāqidi ١:٩; Ibn Hishām ٢:٢٤٥; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٢ –٥

Wāqidi ١:١١; Ibn Hishām ٢:٢٤١; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٣; Ibn Khayyāt, Tārikh ١:٧; Ibn Hazm: ١٠٠; –٦

Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ١:٢٢٤

of enemies would flee before coming face to face with the Muslim army^(١) just like
.what happened in the Battle of Bani Saleem and in other battles

Some of the enemies like the inhabitants of Akeedar, Jurbā' and Yuhannā would seek
[to make] peace pacts^(٢). Many groups from Arab tribes would frequently come to him
to sign peace treaties while others would fight with fear and weakness^(٣), like the
tribes of Hawāzin and Thaqeef in the Battle of Hunayn and the people of Makkah
during the Conquest of Makkah. Other groups would also be on the watch for this
[Muslim] army and would be frightened of it, like the fear of the Romans in the battles
.(of Dumat al-Jundal and Tabuk^(٤)

The Prophet (S) was able to put fear in the heart of the enemy even in the smallest of
battles, from a single mission to a large contingent, in such a way that they would fear
even coming face to face with him and would become unable to face any army, small
or big. The Jews of Bani Nadheer, because of the fear that had entered their hearts,
destroyed their houses by their own hands and the hands of the Muslim army^(٥), and
the Banu Lahyān^(٦) chose to flee and disperse when the army of the Prophet (S)
.approached them

However, the Sariya mission would create fear in the enemy as well. Just as the
Sariya of 'Ali ibn Abi Tālib (a)^(٧) with the Bani Sa'd had done - to such an

p: ٨٨

Wāqidi ١:١٨٢, ٣٩٥; Ibn Hishām ٣:٤٤, ٢١٣; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٢١, ٤٣; Ibn Khayyāt ١:٢٧; Tabari - ١
٢:٥٥٦; Ibn Hazm: ١٥٢, ١٨٢; Kalā'i ١:١١١

Ibn Hishām ٤:١٦٩, ٢٠٥-٢٤٥; Ibn Sa'd ٢:١٢٠ - ٢

Wāqidi ٢:٧٨٠, ٣:٨٨٥; Ibn Hishām ٤:٣١, ٨٠; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٩٦, ١٠٨; Ibn Hazm: ٢٢٣, ٢٣٦, ١٨٧; Ibn - ٣
Qayyim ٢:٣٨٤, ٤٣٨

Wāqidi ٣:١٠٩١; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٤٤; Suhayli ٤:١٩٦ - ٤

Q ٥٩:٢; Tabari ٢:٥٥٧; Ibn Katheer ٤:٧٦ - ٥

Wāqidi ٢:٥٣٥; Ibn Hishām ٣:٢٩٢; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٦٥; Ibn Hazm: ٢٠٠; Ibn Atheer ٢:١٨٨ - ٦

Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٢:١٠٩; Ibn Atheer ٤:١٦; Ibn Qayyim ٢:٢٩٩; Ibn Hajar ٤:٢٩٩; Wāqidi - ٧

٢:٥٦٢; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٦٥; Ibn 'Abd al-Birr ٣:١٠٨٩

extent that they loaded their belongings on their camels^(١) and fled along with their leader who said: The army of Muhammad is coming towards us and we are incapable of facing them^(٢)

A psychological war was also fought with the tribes of Ghatfān through the Sariya of Sa'eed ibn Sa'd al-Ansāri^(٣), and 'Uyayna ibn Mihsan^(٤) and his companions were routed in this battle. When Hārith ibn 'Auf al-Muriy, who had an allegiance with them called them to stand up and fight, he heard nothing but this response: How strong are the companions of Muhammad who are on our trail! Harith ibn 'Auf says: I went on the side of the route followed by the army of Muhammad (S) so that I could see them from a distance while they would not see me. I stayed from evening until late in the night but I saw nobody, it was as if nothing was following my allies but fear^(٥)

Similarly, the Quraysh got scared and took to their heels when they just came face to face with 'Utbah ibn Aseed (Abu Baseer) al-Thaqafi^(٦). Even the kings and emperors to whom the Prophet (S) sent emissaries^(٧) were fearful of the messengers and emissaries

The most important tools of psychological war that were used by the Prophet of God (S) were intelligence agents and spies whom he would send towards the enemy. These spies would spread rumours that would enervate the enemy and force them to flee. The Prophet (S) sent Ma'bad al-Khuzā'i towards the Quraysh in

p: ٨٩

Wāqidi ٢:٥٦٣; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٦٥ -١

Wāqidi ٢:٥٦٣ -٢

Wāqidi ٢:٧٢٧; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٨٧; Ibn 'Abd al-Birr ١:١٧١; Ibn Atheer ٢:٢٢٦; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās -٣

٢:١٤٧; Ibn Qayyim ٢:٣٦١

Ibn 'Abd al-Birr ٣:١٢٤٩; Ibn Atheer ٤:١٦٦ -٤

Wāqidi ٢:٧٢٩ -٥

Zuhri: ٥٧; Wāqidi ٢:٦٢٧, ٦٢٨; Ibn 'Abd al-Birr ٤:١٦١٢; Suhayli ٤:٣٧; Ibn Atheer ٣:٣٦٠; Ibn -٦

Qayyim ٢:٣٠٨

Ibn Hishām ٤:٢٥٤, ٢٥٥; Ibn Katheer ٢:٢٦٢ -٧

the Battle of Hamrā' al-Asad^(١). He began talking to them about the huge number of forces in the Muslim army and their intense urge for revenge and thirst for blood, thereby influencing the minds of the Quraysh and paralyzing them

In the Battle of Khandaq, he (S) send Na'im ibn Mas'ud^(٢) so that he could divide and disperse the confederates and weaken the enemy forces. The Holy Prophet (S) would send Sariya missions in order to fulfill the objectives of psychological war^(٣) and would at times, like in the expedition to Tabuk, send the entire army for this purpose^(٤) and at other times he sent only a section of the army^(٥) like in the Battle of Bani Lahyān where he sent Abu Bakr with a section of the army and ordered him to march towards the Quraysh

The Prophet (S) arranged all this in order to attain the goals of psychological war and would also in turn seek to destroy the information and intelligence of the enemy. He would achieve this through complete sagacity^(٦) and by arresting the enemy spies^(٧), like the shepherd who was arrested on the way to the Battle of Bani Saleem, or the arresting and imprisoning of a spy until the end of the Battle of Bahrān, as well as killing the spy of the Bani Mustalaq because of his not giving up the intelligence, and the interrogation of the spies of Khaybar where the Prophet (S) himself asked them questions

As for the second instrument [for attaining the

p: ٩٠

Wāqidi ١:٣٣٨; Ibn 'Abd al-Birr ٣:١٣١٤; Ibn Atheer ٤:٣٩٠ -١
Ibn 'Abd al-Birr: ١٥٠٨; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٣:٤٢; Ibn Atheer ٥:٣٣; ibn Qayyim ٢:٢٩٢. Na'im -٢
was successful in causing a rift between the Quraysh and the Jews and without the help of the Jews the siege of Madina lost its strength and the Quraysh were forced to
(.return to Makkah without accomplishing their objective (Tr

Wāqidi ١:٩-١٩; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٢-٥; Kalā'i :٥٨; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ١:٢٢٤, ٢٢٧-٣
Zuhri: ١٠٤; Wāqidi ٣:٩٨٩; Ibn Hishām ٤:١٥٩; Ibn Sa'd ٢:١١٨; Ibn Khayyāt ١:٤٤; Tabari -٤
٣:١٠; Ibn 'Asākir, Tārikh ١:١٠٧; Ibn Qayyim ٣:٣

Wāqidi ٢:٥٣٤; Ibn Hishām ٣:٢٩٣; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٥٧; Kalā'ī ١:١٢٢; ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٢:٨٣ –٥
Bukhāri (al-Jihād – al-Khawf, al-Adab, al-Dhabā'ih); Ibn Mājah (al-Jihād, al- – ٤
Iqāmah); Abu Dāwud (al-jihād, al-Safar, al-Sawm); Muslim (al-Imārah, al-Musāfirin,
(al-Siyām); al-Nasā'ī (al-Isti'ārah, al-Khawf, al-Jihād
(Wāqidi ١:١٨٢, ١٩٤, ٤٠٤, ٢:٤٤٠; Abu Dāwud (al-Jihād ١٠٠ –٧

objectives of psychological warfare], it was displaying the might of the forces that were under the command of the Prophet (S). The features of these forces included

a) Being invisible: Meaning the divine power that put fear into the hearts of the enemy like the battle of the angels [who participated] in the Battle of Badr(1) and the blowing of storms and [falling] hailstones in the battle of Khandaq(2), until even the commanders of the army of polytheists and their council of chiefs pointed to the invisible force and would say: The God of Muhammad will soon take revenge. And so they turned back

b) Being undefeatable: As the enemy themselves emphasized this saying: Standing up against him yields no results(3). This transpired with ‘Uyayna ibn Mihsan who had tried numerous times to rise up with his people against the Muslim army. After this happened, he became a Muslim and even led a Sariya mission against the Bani Tamim. In the same way, the Arab tribes who realized that there was nothing to be gained by their enmity with the Muslims saw it prudent to surrender and submit themselves to the Holy Prophet (S) and would thus come to him. As such, the Bani Qaynuqā’, Bani Nadheer, Bani Quraydha and the Jews of Khaybar, all gave a suggestion of peace when they lost hope in their rebellion

(c) They had the spirit [and zeal] of attack(4)

(d)

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Q3:123-1

Wāqidi 2:563, 666, 7:29; Ibn Hishām 2:285, 3:243; Ibn Sa’d 2:17-2

Wāqidi 2:563, 729; Ibn Katheer 4:198-3

Wāqidi 1:9, 99; Ibn Sa’d 2:1, 6; Tabari 2:546-565; ibn Hazm: 175; Kalā’i al-Balansi 1:104, -4

105; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās 1:296, 2:48, 105, 110, 207

.(They would invent new ways and methods of warfare(1)

It is undisputable that this [military] management took on a new form in the Battle of Hamrā al-Asad. During this battle, the Prophet (S) took the wounded and handicapped along with his army(2) and ordered that many fires be lighted(3) so that the enemy would think that the Muslim army was large and powerful(4). In the Battle of Hdaybiyya, he pulled his cloak and his garment to one side and left his right arm openly visible and ordered the Muslims to do the same, saying: May Allah bless the .(one who displays the strength of his arm(5)

C) Physical And Spiritual Traits

point

From the most evident spiritual traits of the Holy Prophet (S) was that he was never overcome by pride from his victories(6). This was clearly seen when he returned from the Battle of Badr and the Conquest of Makkah. He also never became disheartened by loss(7), just as the loss in the Battle of Uhud did not affect him, rather he quickly prepared for the Battle of Hamrā' al-Asad soon after. The breach of the treaty by the Bani Quraydha, who joined with the confederates [in the Battle of Ahzāb] also did not affect the Prophet (S) in the least, rather it strengthened his resolve and made him .steadfast

Another one of his traits was 'precaution and restraint', and he would assess the enemy in this way and would begin preparing and readying the resources and weaponry required to face them. Even during the time of

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Wāqidi 1:56, 177, 368, 2:499; Ibn Hishām 3:244; Ibn Sa'd 2:47, 48; Tabari 2:583, 3:9, 75; Ibn -1

Hazm: 239; Dhahabi, Tārikh al-Islām 1:267

Wāqidi 1:335 -2

Ibid. 1:338 -3

Ibn Hishām 3:107; Kalā'i 1:105; Ibn Katheer 4:49 -4

Ibn Hanbal ١:٢٢٩; Bukhāri (al-Hajj ٨٠). The Prophet (S) did this in order to frighten the –٥
(.enemy and show the strength of the Muslims (Tr
Zuhri: ٦٦; Wāqidi ١:٩٦; Ibn Hishām ٤:٥٦, ٦٩; Tabari ٢:٤٦٦, ٣:٦١; Kalā'ī ١:١٣٩ –٦
Wāqidi ١:١٩٩, ٣٣٤, ٤٦٤; Ibn Hishām ٢:٦٤, ١٢٨, ٣:٢٣٢; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٢٥, ٣٤; Tabari ٣:٩, ٢٩, ٢:٥٨٦; –٧
Ibn Hazm: ١٥٦; Kalā'ī ١:١٠٤ onwards

prayer he would not leave precaution, rather he was careful and cautious. Another trait of his was ‘softness accompanied with firmness’ which would be seen in the different circumstances of battle and because of the quickly changing conditions, he would issue new commands and orders

Speed in (issuing) command(S)⁽¹⁾ was considered important by him in order to tackle the new circumstances [that came up in battle] and was a necessary condition for the ‘centralization of command’⁽²⁾ which the Prophet (S) stressed upon and of which he was the protector in its essence and foundation. This was considered one of the loftiest personal traits of his command; because all of the struggles and military resources that were spent for attaining the goal would be recruited and organized by himself and in this way his renown as a commander spread both internally and externally and this was sufficient to cause the enemies to flee before having to march towards them

Physical Traits .1

In modern science it has been proven that parts of the body of an individual have specific features which show their ‘strength and courage’, ‘beauty and appeal’, ‘ethics and intentions’ and ‘habits’. For example, a round face⁽³⁾ shows wisdom and dignity; a wide mouth⁽⁴⁾ shows strength; big black eyes⁽⁵⁾ show beauty, intelligence, eloquence, humility, forbearance and dignity; arched and separated eyebrows⁽⁶⁾ indicate awe, courage and might; and plenty of hair⁽⁷⁾ on the body, chest, chin and head indicate might and intensity in combat. When we do a detailed and complete study we find that

p: ٩٣

Tabari ٣:٢٦, ٧٠; Suhayli ٣:١٦٨ – ١

Wāqidi ٢:٨٠٠, ٨١٩; Ibn Hishām ٤:٤٢; Ibn Sa’d ١:١٤٧; Ibn Atheer ٢:٣٠٣ – ٢

Abu Tālib Ansāri, al-Siyāsah fi ‘Ilm al-Firāsah: ٤١; Hakam, al-Firāsah: ١٦ – ٣

Rāzi: ٢٣; Abu Tālib Ansāri: ٣٠ – ٤

Rāzi: ٢ onwards; Ibn ‘Abd Rabbih ٢:١٠٤; Nuwayri, Nihāyat al-Urub ٢:١١١ – ٥

Ibn ‘Abd Rabbih ٤:١٠٨; Abu Tālib Ansāri: ٢١ – ٦

Rāzi: ۲; Nuwayri ۲:۱۰۲; Abu Tālib Ansāri: ۲۰ onwards –۷

the Holy Prophet's body had all these features that spoke of his ability and genius in leadership, and all this also agrees with what has been mentioned by the scholars of [\(modern science\)](#)

Spiritual Traits .۲

As the extent of the scope of a person's kindness gets larger and encompasses all human beings equally, it makes him a leader who is close to the hearts of the people and gives him greater control of different aspects of leadership and makes him more powerful as a commander

The life of the Holy Prophet (S) had a completely humanitarian face and approach [\(۲\)](#). He (S) grew up as an orphan [\(۳\)](#) and faced poverty and deprivation [\(۴\)](#), and had to bear patiently with the persecution and harassment of some of his relatives and community members [\(۵\)](#). The Prophet (S) addressed all the people and called them towards right guidance and urged them towards the advancement of humanity [\(۶\)](#). In this task, he began with his near relatives [\(۷\)](#) and then gave the message to others [\(۸\)](#) [\(and finally addressed it to the entire world\)](#) [\(۹\)](#)

He bestowed honor on the Children of Adam [\(۱۰\)](#) and his dealings with his friends and community members was based on affinity [\(۱۱\)](#) and reconciliation between them [\(۱۲\)](#). He strengthened the bond of trust and harmony among them [\(۱۳\)](#) and inculcated the feeling of mercy for all human beings in their hearts [\(۱۴\)](#). He would be merciful to the young [\(۱۵\)](#) and would show respect to the elderly [\(۱۶\)](#). He would take away some of their burdens and hardships [\(۱۷\)](#) and forbade their killing in wars [\(۱۸\)](#). He would please

p: ۹۴

Al-Balāyā, al-Mujaz fi Mabādi al-Tashrih wal-Gharā'iz al-Bashariyyah: ۱۶ onwards; –۱

Mahmud al-'Aqqād, 'Abqariyyat al-Islāmiyyah: ۴۸۳; Boudley, Hayātu Muhammad: ۵۳

Ibn Hishām ۱:۱۶۷; Ibn Sa'd ۱:۲۸۷ onwards; Ibn Qutaybah ۱:۱۵۰; Tabari ۱:۳۹; Dhahabi –۲

۱:۱۸ onwards

Q۹۳:۶; Ibn Hishām ۱:۱۶۶, ۱۷۷ –۳

Ibn Hishām ۱:۱۷۷; Ibn Sa'd ۱:۷۳; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ۱:۳۷; Dhahabi ۱:۳۵; Nuwayri, –۴

- Q١١:٤٩; Q٤٤:٣٥; Q٥٢:٤٨; Q٧٤:٢٤; Ibn Hishām ١:٣٨٠ onwards –٥
Ibn Hishām ٤:٥٤; Bukhāri (al-Jihād ١٠٢); Muslim (al-Amārah ١١٧); Ibn Mājah (al- – ٦
Iqāmah ٢٥, ١٤, al-Zuhd ٢٨); See also Q٢:٢١; Q٤:١٧٠; Q١٠:١٠٨; Q٣٥:٥
Q٢٤:٢١٤; Ibn Hishām ١:٢٨٠; Ibn Sa’d ١:١٣٢; Ibn Atheer ٢:٦٠ –٧
Ibn Hishām ٢:٦٣, ٧٣, ٨٤, ٤:٢٠٥ onwards; Ibn Sa’d ١:٤٥, ٢:٣٩; Ibn Atheer ٢:٩٤; Nuwayri –٨
١٦:٣٠٢ onwards
Q٤:١٩; Ibn Hanbal ٥:٢٥٧; Abu Dāwud (Sunan ١٠); Ibn Atheer: ٢١٠ –٩
(Q١٧:٧٠; Q٤٩:١٣; Ibn Hanbal ٢:٢٧٧; Abu Dāwud (al-Adab ١٠١ –١٠
Bukhāri (al-Fitan ١); Muslim (٣٢, ٤٠); Ibn Mājah (al-Akhām ٢٣); Tirmidhi (al-Qiyāmah –١١
٣); Tabari ٣:٤٩
Wāqidi ١:٧; Ibn Sa’d ٢:١١٦; Ibn ‘Abd al-Barr ٣:١٢٤٩ –١٢
Wāqidi ٢:٧٥٤; Ibn Katheer ٢:٢٣٨, ٤:٢٤٨, ٢٥٣ –١٣
Ibn Hanbal ٣:١١٢; Muslim (al-Fadhā’il ٦٣); Abu Dāwud (al-Adab ٥٨); Tirmidhi (al-Birr –١٤
(١٢, ١٥
(Muslim (al-Fadhā’il ٦٣); Abu Dāwud (al-Adab ٥٨); Tirmidhi (al-Birr ١٢, ١٥ –١٥
(Bukhāri (al-Adab ٨٩); Tirmidhi (al-Birr ٧٥ –١٦
Bukhāri (al-Adhān ٤٥); Ibn Mājah (al-Manāsik ٤٣); Abu Dāwud (al-Sawm ٣, ٣٥, ٥٨, al- –١٧
(Jihād ٣٠
(Ibn Hanbal ٤:٢٤, ٣:٤٢٥; Dārimi (al-Siyar ٢٥); Q٩٣:٩; Ibn Mājah (al-Adab ٦, ١٢ –١٨

the orphans and grant them refuge. He would show kindness to the poor and needy^(١) and instructed the people to be good to their servants^(٢). He even showed mercy to animals^(٣) and forbade the people from harming them^(٤).

The attention and consideration of the Noble Prophet (S) would also include (inanimate) things such that he named his sword 'Dhul Fiqār', his shield 'Dhāt al-Fudhul'^(٥), his spear 'Mathwā'^(٦), his bow 'al-Katum'^(٧), and his quiver 'Kāfur'^(٨).

One of the most important examples of his humanity was that when the Holy Prophet (S) sent forces to battle or for Sariya missions against the enemy, he would advise them to be friendly with the people^(٩) and not to carry out raids or night assaults on them. He always preferred to come to a compromise with the enemy instead of killing their menfolk and leave their women and children [without guardians]^(١٠). He (S) always instructed that the elderly, the children and the women^(١١) were not to be tortured and the bodies of the dead^(١٢) must not be disfigured^(١٣).

From his greatest humanitarian traits in war was that when the Quraysh had sought refuge with him, he ended the 'economic blockade'^(١٤) against them and accepted their request for importing grain from Yemen^(١٥). Despite what they had done to him, he freed the women and children prisoners of Bani Tamim^(١٦). The Noble Prophet (S) called for universal peace^(١٧) in the world and avoided war except in cases where there was no other option^(١٨). The letters that he sent to the

p: ٩٥

(Dārimi (al-Riqāq ١١٨); Tirmidhi (al-Manāqib ٤٤, al-Qiyāmah ٤٨); Sanā'i (al-Janā'iz ٤٣ – ١ Bukhāri (al-Itq ١٥, al-Kaffarāt ٤, al-Jihād ١٤٥); Muslim (al-Itq ٢٢, ٢٣); Ibn Mājah (al-Adab

(Bukhāri (al-Adab ٣٧, Bad' al-Khalq ١٤, al-Hanbalā' ٤٥, al-Madina ٤, al-Dhabā'ih ٤ – ٣ (Bukhāri (al-Adhān ٩٠, Bad' al-Khalq ١٤); Muslim (al-Birr ١٣٥); Ibn Mājah (al-Zuhd ٣٠ – ٤ .Ibid – ٥

Ibn Sa'd ١:١٧٤; Tabari ٣:١٧٤; Dhahabi ١:٢٩١ – ٤

Ibn Sa'd ١:١٧٤; Tabari ٣:١٧٤; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٢:٣١٨; Dhahabi ١:٢٩١ – ٧

Dhahabi ١:٢٩١ –٨

Wāqidi ١:٣٩١, ٢:٥٦٠; Ibn Hishām ٣:٢٨٧; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٥٦; Ibn Atheer ٢:٢٠٩ –٩

Shaybāni, Sharh al-Siyar al-Kabeer ١:٣٨, ٧٩; Bukhāri (al-Adhān ١٧, al-Adab ٢٧, ٣٨); – ١٠

Muslim (al-Qadr ٨); Abu Dāwud (al-Eimān ٢١, al-Salāh ١٦٧); Tirmidhi (al-Qiyāmah ٤٨);

(Sanā'i (al-Adhān ٨

Shaybāni ١:٤٢; Wāqidi ٢:٥٣٤, ٧٧٨; Ibn Hanbal ١:٢٢٤, ٢:٩١, ٣:٤٣٥, ٤:٢٤; Ibn Mājah (al- – ١١

(Jihād ٣٠); Abu Dāwud (al-Jihād ٨٢

(Ibn Hanbal ٣:٤٠٣; Muslim (al-Bill ١١٧); Abu Dāwud (al-Amārah ٣٣ – ١٢

Ibn Hanbal ٤:٢٦٤; Bukhāri (al-Madhālim ٣٠, al-Dhabā'ih ٢٥, al-Maghāzi ٣٦); Abu – ١٣

(Dāwud (al-Jihād ١١٠, al-Hudud ٣

Muslim ٣:١٣٨٦ – ١٤

Ibn Hishām ٤:٢٨٧ onwards; Ibn 'Abd al-Barr ١:٢١٥; Ibn Atheer ١:٢٤٧ – ١٥

Wāqidi ١:٧; Ibn Sa'd ٢:١١٦; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٢:٢٠٣ – ١٦

(Q٤:٩٤; Q٥:١٦; Q٦:٥٤; Q٨:٦١); Bukhāri (a; –Iqāmah ١, al-Salāh ٥٦); Muslim (al-‘Itq ١٦ – ١٧

Wāqidi ٣:١١١٧; Ibn Hishām ٢:٢٤١, ٢٤٥, ٢٥١; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٦; Ibn Hazm: ٢٣٥ – ١٨

neighboring kings and rulers were adorned and embellished with calls for peace and conciliation(١). And this is what he instituted as the start of conversation between the
.(Children of Adam(٢

The Holy Prophet (S) gave a new and specific meaning to leadership(٣). In some of the battles he appointed more than one commander(٤). He outlined the criteria for a befitting commander of the army and its strengthening and he established a bond between the principles of politics and the military(٥). He made obedience the secret of discipline, submission and compliance(٦). He laid the foundation of new planning, exemplary organization and better leadership(٧). He made the soldiers steadfast in [the quest for] good morals and knowledge(٨) and put in their hearts the love for
.(death and disinclination towards the life of this world(٩

He (S) would select the commanders and leaders based on their merit and ability(١٠). He brought the army and the people together equally under his leadership(١١) and would grant them as much of the resources as were available(١٢). In these matters, he included the young and old, the strong and weak, the men and women. He invited them to [follow his] leadership and the ideology of equality and made these two complementary counterparts to each other(١٣). He always tried to elaborate these
.(ideas and transform them so that he could arrive at his desired goal(١٤

Staff Headquarters

point

The [Army] Staff Headquarters was responsible for organizing the affairs pertaining to recruitment of soldiers and encouraging them [to join the army], as well

p: ٩٦

Ibn Hishām ٤:٤٥٤; Ibn Sa’d ١:١٥٢; Tabari: ٢:٦٤٤ onwards; Ibn Atheer ٤:٢١٠ onwards –١
Bukhārī (al-Isti’dhān ٩, al-Ashribah ٢٨); Muslim (al-Adab ٣٧, al-Libās ١٢); Ibn Mājah –٢
(al-Adab ١٣, ١٨); Abu Dāwud (al-Adab ٩١); Tirmidhi (al-Isti’dhān ٢, ١١); Sanā’i (al-Tatbiq

Shaybāni ١:٦٠, ١٥٦; Bukhāri (al-‘Itq ١٧, al-Nikāh ٩٠, al-Adhan ٥٤); Muslim (al-Amārah –٣ (٢٠); Abu Dāwud (al-Imārah ٥٠٤); Tirmidhi (al-Fitan ٧٧); Nasāi (al-Amārah ٣, ٥, ١١ Shaybāni ١:٦١; Zuhri: ١٥٠; Bukhāri (al-Ahkām ٢٢, al-Jihād ١٦٤, al-Maghāzi ٦٠); Muslim –٤ (al-Masājid ٢٧٩, ٢٩١); Q٢:٢٦١; Q٨:٢٨, ٦٠, ٦٥; Ibn Hanbal ١:٤٦, ٢٢٩, ٣:٤٧٥, ٤:٢٣; Dārimi (al-Jihād ١٤); Ibn Mājah (al-Jihād ١٩); Abu Dāwud (al-Jihād ١٤, ٢٣); Nasāi (al-Khāyl ٨); As (the Prophet (S) appointed three commanders in the Battle of Muta. (Tr Wāqidi ٢:٨٠٠, ٨٠١, ٨١٢, ٨١٩, ٨٢٠; Ibn Hishām ٢:٤٢; Haydarābādi: ١٥-٢١ –٥ Q٣:١٣٢; Q٤:١٣, ٥٩, ٦٩, ٨٠; Q٥:٩٢; Q٨:١, ٢٠, ٤٦; Q٢٤: ٥٤, ٥٦; Zuhri: ٥٤; Bukhāri (al-Ahkām ٤); –٦ Ibn Mājah (al-Muqaddimah ٦); Abu Dāwud (al-Imārah ٩, al-Yabu’ ٣١); Nasāi (al-Eimān (٤٥, al-Bay’ah ٢٧ Wāqidi ١:٧ onwards; Ibn Sa’d ١:١٤٧; Suhayli ٢:٥٢٥; Ibn Atheer ٣:٣٠٣; Haydarābadi :١٥– –٧ ٢١ Bukhāri (Manāqib al-Ansār ٣٣, Fadhā’il al-Sahāba ٢٧, al-Adab ٣٩); Ibn Mājah (al- –٨ (Jihād ١٩, ٢٥, al-Muqaddimah ١٧); Tirmidhi (al-‘Ilm ١٩, al-Birr ٧١); Nasā’I (al-Tatbiq ١٠٠ Bukhāri (al-Jihād ١١٠, al-Maghāzi ٣٥, al-Ahkām ٤٣); Muslim (al-Amārah ٨٠–٨١); – ٩ (Tirmidhi (al-Siyar ٣٤ Zuhri: ١٥٠; Wāqidi ٢:١٤٢; Ibn Hishām ٤:١٥; Ibn Sa’d ٢:٩٢; Tabari ٣:٣٦; Muslim ٤:١٨٨٤; – ١٠ Ibn ‘Asākir, Tārikh Dimishq ١:٩٢ Wāqidi ٢:٤٤٣; Ibn Sa’d ٢:٤٧, ٤٨; Bukhāri (al-Jihād ٦٨, al-Ahkām ٤٩, al-Janā’iz ٣٩); – ١١ (Muslim (al-Amārah ٨٩); Ibn Mājah (al-Jihād ٤٣ Q٩:٢٠, ٤١, ٨٨; Q٨:٧٤; Q٦١:١١); Bukhāri (al-Riqāq ٣٤, al-Jihād ١٣, ٣١, al-Adab ١٠٠, al- – ١٢ Maghāzi ٥٣); Muslim (al-Amārah ١١٦); Abu Dāwud (al-jihād ١٢); Tirmidhi (Fadhā’il al-Jihād ٢٢); Sanā’i: ٢٠, ٤٥ Zuhri: ١٥٠; Wāqidi ١:٢١, ٢:٤٣; Ibn Hishām ٤:٢٧٢; Ibn Sa’d ٢:٤٧, ٤٨ –١٣ See how the stance of the army changed from defensive to offensive (Ibn Hishām –١٤ ٣:٢٦٦) and how it transformed from internal battles to external wars, like the Battle of Tabuk (al-Zuhri: ١٠٦ onwards; Wāqidi ٣:٩٨٩ onwards). And see the transformation of the army after the passing away of the Holy Prophet (S) (Tārikh Ibn Khayyāt ١:١٠٣; Ibn (Atheer ٢:٣٤٢, ٣٤٩, ٣٧٢; Ibn Katheer ٦:٣١٦

as personal matters [of the individual soldiers] like strengthening the spirit of the combatants etc. The following departments fell under their command

:The Department Of Planning And Scheduling .1

point

:This is the department that is responsible for

- a) Planning the overall policy
- b) Drawing out maps for war
- (c) Finding out the number of combatants in the army (and
- d) Their weaponry
- e) Instituting regulations and rules of military service
- f) Preparing the senior commanders
- (g) Establishing the procedure of selection(1)

.Now we will explain each of the above in turn

a) Planning the policy for the participation of the Ansār in battle

The Ansār were obliged by their agreement in the Pledge of ‘Aqaba to protect the Holy Prophet (S) inside Madina(2). This had made the Quraysh angry and infuriated them so they began making preparations quickly to wage war on those who had granted refuge to and helped the Muhājirin(3). In the beginning, the Muhājirin took up the flag of charge and attack on their shoulders(4) and carried out the first military mission without the participation of a single person from the Ansār, under the command of Hamza ibn ‘Abd al-Muttalib, the Master of the Martyrs (‘a)(5), and in this way numerous consecutive missions and minor battles were fought by the Muhājirin (themselves until the Battle of Badr(6)

After the Prophet (S) informed the Ansār about the threat that they were all faced

with, he sought their view about participation in war and assisting him inside

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Wāqidi ١:٩٨; Ibn Hishām ٢:٢٦٦; Ibn Hazm: ٢٠٨; Haydarābadi: ١٥-٢١ -١
Ibn Sa'd ١:١١ Tabari ٢:٢٥٥; Because they had made a pact to protect the Holy Prophet -٢
(S) inside Madina, the Ansār did not participate in the first battle against the
(.disbelievers. (Tr

Q٨:٧٤ -٣

Wāqidi ١:١٠, Ibn Hishām ٢:٢٤١, Ibn Sa'd ٢:١-٥; Tabari ٢:٢٥٩ -٤

Ibn Hishām ٢:٢٤٥; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٢; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ١:٢٢٤ -٥

Wāqidi ١:٤٨; Ibn Hishām ٢:٢٦٦; Ibn 'Abd al-Barr, al-Durar fi Ikhtisār al-Maghāzi wal-

Siyar: ١٢١ onwards

and outside Madina. The Ansār were ready to cooperate and participate in battle and expressed their decision to fight alongside the Muhājirin with their own volition. In this way, they diverted from the Pledge of ‘Aqabah and the allegiance of Wādi Dhafarān(١) and participated in the Battle of Badr and other battles alongside the Muhājirin(٢).

.From this time onwards, the Muslim army consisted of these two groups

b) Methods of Negotiation

Negotiations with the enemy after the end of battle and the agreement that was reached between the two parties was, depending on the circumstances, conducted by the supreme commander (S) who would take full control(٣). When the Jews sought negotiations, he (S) dealt harshly with them, to such an extent that he banished some of them from their lands(٤) and after disarming them, he let their wives and children go(٥), however he ordered the killing of some others who has broken their covenant ... (and had cooperated with the enemy(٦)

The Prophet (S) displayed forbearance and leniency with the Quraysh in the Treaty of Hudaibiyya(٧). He accepted their conditions and even accepted some of the conditions that his companions and commanders deemed to be against the interest of the Muslims(٨), and went ahead to sign the treaty(٩). In this way and in order to attain the actual goals, the Prophet (S) would obtain victory through harsh measures at .(certain times and through leniency and tolerance in other situations(١٠.

c) Designing a Program in order to Know the Enemy

The Prophet (S) would, at the outset, study the enemy and ways of countering them.

The Quraysh were people

p: ٩٨

Wāqidi ١:٤٨; Ibn Hishām ٢:٢٤٤; Ibn Sa’d ٢:٨; Bakri, Mu’jam Mastu’jam ٢:٤١٣; Yāqut – ١

Hamawi, Mu’jam al-Buldān ٣:٤

Wāqidi ١:٢٣; Ibn Hishām ٢:٣٣٣; Ibn Sa’d ٢:١٣; Tabari ٢:٥٥٢; Kalā’i ١:١٣٤ – ٢

Wāqidi ١:١٧٧, ٢:٥٠١; Ibn Hishām ٣:٢٠١; Ibn Sa’d ٢:١٩; Tabari ٢:٥٥٢; Kalā’i ١:١٣٤ – ٣

Wāqidi ١:٣٧٤; Ibn Hishām ٣:٢٠٠; Ibn Sa'd ٢:١٩; Ibn Hazm: ١٥٤, ١٨٢. After the victory –٤
over the Bani Nadhir, the Prophet (S) left it to the Khazraj, who had a covenant with
them, to decide what should be done to them. The Khazraj decided that they should
(be banished from their land but their women and children should be released. (Tr

Wāqidi ١:٨٠; Ibn Hishām ٣:٢١٠; Ibn Sa'd ٢:١٩ –٥

Wāqidi ٢:٥١٧; Ibn Hishām ٣:٢٥١; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٥٤; Tabari ٢:٥٨٨. After defeating the Bani –٦
Quraydha, the Prophet (S) left it upon the Aus, who had a covenant with them, to
decide their punishment. The chief of the Aus, Sa'd ibn Ma'ādh, decided that their men
should be put to death for their treason and their families and wealth should be taken.

(Tr

Zuhri: ٥٤; Ibn Hishām ٣:٣٢٥; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٧٠; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٢:١١٤ –٧

Zuhri: ٥٥; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٧٤; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٢:١١٤. In the Treaty of Hudaibiyya where –٨
Suhayl ibn 'Amr was appointed as the representative of the Quraysh, there were
many conditions that were made which the Muslims found to be one-sided and unfair,
however, the Prophet (S) gave in to their demands because he knew that it was in the

(interest of the Muslims to do so. (Refer to Bihār al-Anwār ٢٠:٣٣٥

Zuhri: ٥٢; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٧٧; Kalā'i ١:١٣٠ –٩

Wāqidi ١:٧٤, ٢:٤٩٤; Ibn Hishām ٣:٥٠; Ibn Sa'd ٢:١٩; Tabari ٢:٤٧٩, ٣:٩; Kalā'i ١:١٣٠; Ibn –١٠

Sayyid al-Nās ١:٢٩٤

who had forced him to leave his home and were determined to fight against him uncompromisingly(1). The Prophet (S) also began preparing forces and weapons in order to counter them(2) and faced them in a number of battles(3), and in the end he eventually gained victory and they submitted to his wishes

However, with regards to the Jews, when they showed their enmity by breaking the covenant [they had made with him](4) and took up arms against him, he was forced to fight them or banish them from their lands(5). It was at this time [and for this reason] that the first battle against them took place

With regards to the other Arab tribes, however, he only entered into battle against them when they were the instigators(6) or when they attempted to wage war against Madina and invade it with their armies(7). Taking this into consideration, he only faced (the enemy tribes and dealt with them the way they deserved to be dealt with(8)

As for Rome, he (S) saw it as a grave threat in the way of the Islāmic Revolution, especially since they possessed vast resources and had a lot of political influence in the Arabian provinces(9). Despite this, the Prophet (S) delayed military action against them until an appropriate time and enough preparations had been made to come face to face with the Roman army. For this reason, he did not enter into intense and decisive battles with them as he had done with his previous enemies [i.e. the Quraysh

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Zuhri: 50; Wāqidi 2:571; Ibn Hishām 3:321; Ibn Sa'd 2:69; Ibn Khayyāt 1:48; Tabari 2:620; -1

Kalā'i 1:127; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās 2:113

Ibn Hishām 1:281; Ibn Sa'd 1:134; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās 1:102; Dhahabi 1:91, 168-2

Zuhri: 76; Tabari 2:259; Ibn Hazm: 104; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās 2:225, 2:106-3

Wāqidi 1:176, 2:510; Ibn Sa'd 2:77; Tabari 2:552; Suhayli 3:137; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās 2:48-4

Wāqidi 1:176; Ibn Hishām 3:50; Ibn Sa'd 2:19; Ibn Khayyāt 1:27; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās - 5

1:294; Atanin Dianna, Muhammad Rasulullah (S): 277

Wāqidi 1:404; Ibn Hishām 3:302; Ibn Sa'd 2:21, 62, 117; Razqāni, Sharh al-Mawāhib - 6

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Wāqidi ٢:٥٦٢; Ibn Hishām ٣:٢١٣; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٦٥; Kalā'i ١:١١٢; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٢:١٠٩ –٧

Wāqidi ١:٣٩٥; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٤٣; Tabari ٣:٢٧; Kalā'i ١:١١٢; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٢:٨٣ –٨

Tabari ٢:٦ onwards; Mas'udi, Muruj al-Dhahab ١:٢١٥; Jawād 'Ali, al-Mufassal fi – ٩

Tārikh al-'Arab qabl al-Islām ٢:٦٣٥

and the Jews], rather he launched minor assaults on them^(١) and, in order to develop the Muslim army and increase their military might, he embarked on small battles with them.

d) Creating a Plan to Gain Control of the Most Important Routes and Courses

The most important routes and courses that the Holy Prophet (S) studied and planned on controlling were the ‘coastal routes’^(٢) which would be a sure means of cutting off the primary reinforcements of the enemy, and he was successful in doing this^(٣). Then he turned his attention to the ‘eastern route’^(٤) that the Quraysh had begun using after the first route was blocked, and by taking control of this route also, he completed his siege of the enemy from all the directions. The Prophet (S) was victorious in all the battles that were subsequently fought in order to regain control of these routes^(٥).

In the same way, the supreme commander successfully planned and took control of the ‘northern route’ of Arabian Peninsula – in the border of Syria^(٦) – and of Dumat al-Jundal^(٧), because of their strategic locations militarily, politically and economically, (for the war with the Romans^(٨)

e) Appointing a Deputy in Madina

Whenever the Holy Prophet (S) went for any battle, he would always appoint a deputy and representative in Madina^(٩), and he would change the appointee from battle to battle^(١٠). Sometimes two representatives would be selected^(١١) and each one of them would be given specific tasks. The functions of the Prophet’s deputy would normally consist of leading the congregational prayers for those who remained behind and did not participate in battle for some valid excuse^(١٢), and

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See Wāqidi ١:٤٠٢, ٢:٧٥٥, ٣:٩٨٩; Ibn Hishām ٣:٢٤٤, ٤:١٥; Ibn Sa’d ٢:٤٤, ٩٢, ١١٨, ١٣٦; Ibn – ١
Hazm: ١٨٤

Wāqidi ١:١١; Ibn Hishām ٢:٢٤٥, ٢٥١; Ibn Sa’d ٢:١; Tabari ٢:٢٥٩; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ١:٢٢٦ – ٢

Wāqidi ١:١٠, ١٣; Ibn Hishām ٢:٢٤٥; Tabari ٢:٢٥٩; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ١:٢٢٥ –٣

Wāqidi ١:١٨٢, ١٩٧; Tabari ٢:٤٩٢; Suhayli ٣:١٤٢; Yāqut Hamawi ٤:٢١٢; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās –٤
١:٣٠٥

Wāqidi ١:١٩٩, ٣٨٤, ٤٤٠; Ibn Hishām ٣:٦٤, ٢٢٤; Ibn Khayyāt ١:٢٩; Tabari ٣:٩; Kalā'i ١:١٠٤, –٥
١١٣; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٢:٢, ٥٥, ٥٣

Wāqidi ٣:٩٩٠; Ibn Hishām ٤:١٦٩; Ibn Sa'd ٢:١١٩; Bakri ١:٢٠٣ –٦

The Battle of Dumat al-Jundal took place in Rabi' al-Awal, ٥ A.H. and the reason for –٧
this battle was the Christian ruler of the Dumat al-Jundal (an area near Syria) called
Akidar ibn 'Abd al-Malik Kindi, who was loyal to the emperor of Rome, Heracleus.
Because his land was in the center of the trade route that ran from Arabia to Syria, he
would create hindrances and obstacles and would harass the Muslim travelers. When
the Holy Prophet (S) heard about this, he sent a large contingent of a thousand men to
Dumat al-Jundal, but by the time they got there, the people had fled and they
returned without fighting. (See: Wāqidi ١:٤٠٢; Ibn Hishām ٣:٢٢٤; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٢:٥٤,

(.١٠٨) (Tr

Wāqidi ١:٤٠٤, ٣:١٠٢٦; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٤٤, ١٢٠; Suhayli ٤:١٩٦, ٢٠١ –٨

Wāqidi ١:١٢, ٢:٥٧٣, ٣:٩٩٥; Ibn Hishām ٢:٤٠١, ٣:٢٢٠, ٤:٣٢ –٩

Wāqidi ١:١٨٢; Ibn Hishām ٣:٢٢٠; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٢١, ٤٥; Ibn Hazm: ١٨٤ –١٠

In the Battle of Tabuk, 'Ali ibn Abi Tālib ('a) was initially appointed as the deputy of –١١
the Prophet (S) in Madina and later Muhammad ibn Maslamah was also chosen as a
(.representative. (See: Wāqidi ٣:١٠٤٧; Ibn Hishām ٤:١٦٢; Ibn Sa'd ٤:١١٢) (Tr

Wāqidi ١:٢٧٧; Ibn 'Abd al-Barr ٣:١١٩٨ –١٢

protecting and safeguarding the status and respect of the members of the household of the Holy Prophet (S)(1). After the Conquest of Makkah, the Prophet (S) also appointed a deputy to manage the important affairs of that city(2)

f) Reviewing of the Supreme Commander of the Army

The supreme commander would review the ‘mobilization and stationing’ of the army(3). He would inspect the army(4) and arrange it for marching or battle. He studied their capability for war(5), sent back the sick, young and weak(6), lifted the spirits of those who fought in battle(7) and gave the necessary orders and instructions to the commanders (of the army)(8). If he sent them for a Sariya or a mission, like the Sariya of ‘Abd al-Rahmān ibn ‘Auf to Dumat al-Jundal, and his sending of Zayd bin Haritha for war with the Romans [in the Battle of Muta], he would personally bid them farewell and pray for their success(9). When the army was getting organized, he would join them and take over the command himself(10).

The Prophet (S) would organize and arrange the forces for parades and processions, just as he had done before the Conquest of Makkah and during their entry into the city. In this organization, the ‘cavaliers’ would be in the fore and were made up of three groups. Then followed the units of the Muhājirin and Ansār and then came the units of the Ghaffār, Aslam, Bani ‘Umar, Bani Ka’b, Mazinah, Jahinah and Bani Hamzah. It was after this that the Green Column was positioned(11)

The manner of stationing of the forces

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Wāqidi 3:1047; Ibn Hishām 4:136; Tabari 3:104-1

Ibn ‘Abd al-Barr 3:1023-2

Wāqidi 1:20, 56, 2:642, 819; Ibn Hishām 2:257, 3:218, 4:46; Ibn Sa’d 2:25-3

Wāqidi 3:1117; Ibn Hishām 2:257; Ibn Sa’d 2:25; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās 2:121-4

Wāqidi 1:13, 56, 217; Ibn Sa’d 2:96; Tabari 3:75; Ibn Hazm: 239-5

Wāqidi 1:20, 87; Ibn Hishām 2:279; Ibn Sa’d 2:26; Ibn Hanbal 1:117-6

Ibn Hishām 3:70; Ibn Sa’d 2:6, 27; Tabari 2:505; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās 1:257-7

Wāqidi ١:١٣, ٢:٥٦٠, ٣:١١١٧; Ibn Hishām ٤:٤٩; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٣٥, ٩٨; Kalā'i ١:١٤٤ –٨
Wāqidi ٢:٥٦٠, ٧٥٥; Ibn Hishām ٤:١٥; Ibn 'Asākir ١:٩٢; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٢:١٠٨. In some –٩
locations in Madina, meaning near the Thaniyāt, the Prophet (S) would bid farewell to
the army, that is why these places would be known as Thaniyāt al-Wadā' and the
Prophet would come to these places in order to bid farewell to the army and welcome
(.them back. (Tr

Zuhri: ٨٦, ٩٢; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٩٦, ١٠٨; Ibn Khayyāt ١:٥٦ –١٠

Wāqidi ٢:٨١٩; Ibn Hishām ٤:٤٦ –١١

was in such a way that the Bani Saleem were in front, the Jahinah were in the middle and the Green Column was placed at the back(١). The course of the army's movement with this arrangement(٢) in front of Abu Sufyān and other observers and the station of the supreme commander – which was located in the Green Column – was determined (and the soldiers marched in front of them in this order(٣)

The carrying of flags(٤) was in such a way that in every contingent and unit, a number of flags were hoisted and the main banner was with 'Ali bin Abi Tālib ('a) at the central command post in the last unit. The parade and procession of the army was conducted in full military attire(٥) in such a way that from the Green Column, nothing but the pupil of their eyes could be seen. The vanguard and the cavaliers marched in front(٦). The Banu Saleem were in the front-line with one thousand horsemen and the commander of the paraded columns was selected by the supreme commander(٧). Khālid bin Walid :was chosen as the commander of three columns of the vanguard

First: The column under the command of 'Abbās bin Maradās al-Salami

Second: The column under the command of Khafāf ibn Nudbah

Third: The column under the command of Hajjāj ibn 'Alāt

Then Zubayr ibn 'Awām was appointed as the commander of the column of the Muhājirin and Ansār and Abu Dharr al-Ghaffāri was made in charge of the column of the tribe of

p: ١٠٢

Wāqidi ٢:٨١٩; Ibn Hishām ٤:٤٦ –١

Wāqidi ٢:٨٢٣ –٢

Wāqidi ٢:٨١٩; Ibn Hishām ٤:٤٦. One of the examples of the psychological war of the –٣ Prophet (S) was that he paraded his troops in front of Abu Sufyan and when the latter saw the strength of the Muslim army, he realized that they would not be able to fight them. Thus he was left with no choice but to submit and it was at this point that he (accepted Islām. (Tr

Wāqidi ٢:٨١٩ onwards -٤

Wāqidi ٢:٨٢١; Ibn Hishām ٤:٤٦; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٩٨; Tabari ٣:٥٤ -٥

Wāqidi ٢:٨١٩ -٦

Wāqidi ٢:٨١٩; Ibn Hishām ٤:٤٦, ٤٧ -٧

g) Placing the Capable Individuals in Appropriate Positions

Military skills and expertise in the Muslim army were numerous and varied^(١), like intelligence, combat on horseback, fighting on foot, archery etc. In order to assign posts for every responsibility conditions were placed that were different for every individual. The Holy Prophet (S) would assign the task of intelligence operations^(٢) to such an individual in whom the ability of protecting and hiding secrets was strong, who was well informed, trustworthy, patient and forbearing in [times of] pain, hunger and thirst, like ‘Abdullah ibn Jahash, Habbāb ibn Mundhir, Zubayr ibn ‘Awām, .Hudhayfa ibn al-Yamān and others

In the same way, he would appoint a commander of a contingent^(٣) who was aware about the topography of the land and the enemy that he would face, like Zayd ibn .Hāritha, ‘Amr ibn ‘Aās, Khālīd ibn Walīd and others

As for the flag-bearer^(٤), a steadfast and courageous person was chosen such as ‘Ali ibn Abi Tālib, Hamza ibn ‘Abd al-Muttalib and Mus’ab ibn ‘Umayr. From the archers^(٥) also, someone highly skilled like Sa’d ibn Abi Waqqās was selected. The [head] swordsman^(٦) was someone who used his sword well in the thick of war. The [head] horseman^(٧) was one who fought steadily and unfalteringly on the horse, like Khālīd .bin Walīd

These individuals and others would be given charge of these responsibilities without any regard for their relationship^(٨) [to the Prophet (S)]. The supreme commander chose Zayd ibn Hāritha as the first commander of the army, whereas he made Ja’far bin Abi Tālib, who was a

Wāqidi ١:٢١٨, ٢:٤٥٧; Ibn Hishām ٢:٢٧٨; Ibn Sa’d ٢:٤٥; Ibn Hanbal ٥:٤٢٠; Tabari ٢:٤٤٦ – ١

Wāqidi ١:١٣; Ibn Hishām ٢:٢٦٨, ٣:٢٤٣; Ibn Sa’d ١:٢٠٧; Ibn ‘Abd al-Barr ٣:٨٧٨ – ٢

Wāqidi ١:١٩٨, ٢:٥٥٣, ٥٦٤, ٧٦٩, ٣:٨٨٣; Ibn Hishām ٤:١٥, ٢٧٢; Ibn Sa’d ٢:٢٤, ٦٣, ٩٢; Tabari – ٣

٣:١٠٨, ١٢٤; Ibn ‘Abd al-Barr ٢:٤٢٧, ٣:١١٨٤; Harawi, al-Hiyal al-Harbiyya: ٩٠
Ibn Hishām ٢:٢٤١; Ibn Khayyāt ١:٢٩; Ibn ‘Abd al-Barr ٣:١٠٩٠, ٤:١٤٧٣-٤
Wāqidi ١:١٠, ٦٧; Ibn Hishām ٢:٢٧٨; Ibn al-Atheer, Usd al-Ghābah ٢:٢٩١-٥
Bukhāri (al-Jihād ٥٤, ٨٢, ١٦٥); Muslim (al-Fadhā’il ٤٨); Ibn Mājah (al-Jihād ٩); Tirmidhi -٦
(al-Jihād ١٥); Ibn ‘Abd al-Birr: ١٦٤٤; Kalā’i ١:١٠١
Wāqidi ٢:٥٤١; Ibn Hishām ٣:٢٩٤; Tabari ٢:٥٩٨; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٢:٨٤; Dhahabi, Tārikh -٧
al-Islām ١:٢٤٧
Wāqidi ٢:٧٥٧; Ibn Hishām ٤:١٥; Ibn Sa’d ٢:٩٢; Kalā’i ١:١٣٥-٨

close relative of his, second in command. Sometimes the selection was not based solely on his past [military] record^(١), because the Prophet (S) appointed Usāma bin Zayd, a young commander, as the leader of the army that was sent to Abnām and ^(٢)some of the other great commanders were placed under his command^(٢).

Similarly, one's previous record [with regards to accepting Islām] was not a consideration^(٣); because 'Amr ibn 'Aās was given the charge of a Sariya mission in which great companions like Abu 'Ubayda ibn Jarrāh and other great commanders participated, while it had only been a few months since 'Amr ibn 'Aās had accepted Islām^(٤). Similarly, the rank and status of a person^(٥) was not a criterion for being appointed a commander. The Holy Prophet (S) made Abu Salama ibn 'Abd al-Asad Makhzumi the commander of a Sariya mission wherein others who [according of their ^(٦)rank and status] were more deserving, were present^(٦).

h) Preserving the Unity and Integration of the Army

The supreme commander forbade disputes and quarrels among the members of the army. He established friendship and camaraderie among them and made them like a single body^(٧). The Prophet (S) prevented the killing of the known hypocrite 'Abdullah ibn Ubay and instructed that he should be dealt with kindly^(٨). In this way, he (S) was able to quell the disturbance that was about to obliterate the unity and harmony of the Muslim army after the Battle of Bani al-Mustalaq^(٩) because of a verbal ^(١٠)confrontation between the Muhājirin and Ansār^(١٠).

Similarly, the Holy Prophet (S), in another instance, forgave

p: ١٠٤

Zuhri: ١٥٠; Ibn Hishām ٤:٢٩١; Ibn Sa'd ٢:١٣٤; Ibn Atheer ١:٤٥. It should be noted that –١
Tabarsi has narrated from Imam al-Sādiq (a) that the Prophet (S) first appointed
Ja'far ibn Abi Tālib as the commander and then, if he was martyred, Zayd ibn Hāritha
(.and finally 'Abdullah ibn Rawāha (Refer to A'lām al-Warā: ٤٢) (Tr
In the month of Safar, ١١ A.H. (during the last days of the Prophet's life), the Holy –٢
Prophet (S) prepared an army in order to avenge the blood of the martyrs of the

Battle of Muta and appointed Usāma bin Zayd, whose father had been killed in the said battle, as the commander. Usama was a young man of ۱۸ or ۱۹ years and all the older and more experienced companions, aside from ‘Abbās (the uncle of the Prophet) and ‘Ali ibn Abi Tālib, were placed under his command. When the army was about to leave, some of the older companions voiced their discontentment about the fact that their commander was a young lad. ‘Umar ibn Khattāb took this message to the Prophet (S) who in turn expressed his intense displeasure. Despite his sickness, the Prophet (S) put one hand on ‘Ali’s shoulder and one hand on the shoulder of ‘Abbās and came to the Masjid where he delivered a fiery sermon in which he cursed those who opposed the army of Usāma. The army was stationed outside Madina when the news of the Prophet’s demise came and when Abu Bakr took over the Caliphate, he sent the army to fight against the Romans. (See: Wāqidi ۳:۱۱۱۷; Ibn Sa’d (۲:۱۹۰; Ibn Atheer ۲:۳۱۷) (Tr

Zuhri: ۱۵۰; Wāqidi ۲:۷۶۹; Ibn Hishām ۴:۲۷۲; Ibn Sa’d ۲:۹۴; Ibn ‘Abd al-Barr ۳:۱۱۸۴; Ibn –۳ Sayyid al-Nās ۲:۱۵۷

In the ۸th year of Hijra, the Prophet (S) received information that a group of –۴ disbelievers had gathered at Dhāt al-Salāsil behind Wādi al-Qurā with the intention of launching a night raid on the Muslims. The Prophet (S) initially sent ‘Amr ibn ‘Aās with an army to fight against them but he returned unsuccessful and expressed his fear to the Prophet (S). Immediately, the Prophet (S) sent ‘Ali (‘a) to the same place and after their rejection of his invitation to accept Islām, he fought against them and even took some booty back as he returned to Madina victorious (See: Shaykh Mufid, al-Irshād: (۵۱) (Tr

Wāqidi ۱:۳۴; Ibn Sa’d ۲:۳۵; Ibn ‘Abd al-Barr ۴:۱۶۸۲; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ۲:۳۹; Harawi: ۹۹ –۵ In Muharram of the fourth year of Hijra, the Holy Prophet (S) sent Abi Salamah ibn –۶ ‘Abd al-Asad in order to fight the tribe of Bani Asad. Great companions like Abi ‘Ubaydah ibn Jarrāh, Arqam ibn Abi Arqam and Abu Qatāda ibn Nu’mān were present (in his army. (Wāqidi ۱:۳۴۳–۳۴۵) (Tr

(Bukhāri (al-Adab ۲۷); Muslim (al-Birr ۶۶ –۷ Zuhri: ۷۷; Wāqidi ۱:۲۱۹; Ibn Hishām ۳:۶۸, ۳۰۵; Kalā’i ۱:۲۴; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ۲:۵۹ –۸ Wāqidi ۲:۴۱۵; Ibn Hishām ۳:۳۰۳; Ibn Sa’d ۲:۴۶; Tabari ۲:۶۰۵; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ۲:۹۵ –۹ Abdullah ibn Ubay was the leader of the Hypocrites of Yathrib. When the Prophet –۱۰

(S) migrated there, his plans to take over the leadership of the city were thwarted, and for this reason he held a deep rooted hatred for Islām and the Muhājirin, but because he had no other option, he openly professed his belief in Islām. He was always on the lookout for opportunities to weaken the Muslims and bring about differences among them. In the Battle of Uhud, he was instrumental in turning back three hundred soldiers. He never participated in any battles and when he did, he would weaken the spirits of the Muslims. In the Battle of Bani al-Mustalaq, when the Muslims returned victorious, a misunderstanding came about between a Muhājir and an Ansār. The servant of ‘Umar ibn Khattāb and a man from the Ansār were quarrelling about who should take water out of a well. The disagreement was about to turn violent. ‘Abdullah ibn Ubay took this opportunity to start spreading hatred for the Muhājirin among the Ansār. When the Prophet (S) heard about this, he called ‘Abdullah ibn Ubay but the latter denied what he had done. Some of the companions sought permission from the Prophet (S) to kill Ibn Ubay for what he had done but the

(.Prophet (S) did not allow them to do this. (Wāqidi ٢:٤١٥) (Tr

the lapse of Abu Lubāba when he took the wrong course in consultation with the Bani Quraydha.

He forgave Hātib bin Abi Balta'ah for his a mistake when sending letters to the enemy before the Conquest of Makkah and this was because of his illustrious track record in the Muslim army. He (S) also ordered Abu 'Ubayda ibn Jarrāh to cooperate with 'Amr ibn 'Aās [who as the commander of the army in Dhāt al-Salāsil] in order to preserve unity.

The Prophet (S) also took it upon himself to 'refine and purify the souls' of the Ansār, who constituted a large part of the army. He did this during the distribution of the booty of Hunayn when he saw anger and rage on their faces. In the same way, he instilled affection and brotherhood in their hearts and in the end he would be pleased with all the good qualities and merits of his armed forces. It is for this very reason that the politics of 'wisdom and planning', 'far-sightedness and judging the character of the army soldiers', 'giving greater importance to expediency', 'ending quarrels and arguments that lead to listlessness and defeat, before they spread through and pervade the army', were required.

i) Discipline

'Discipline' was the honest and sincere execution of the commands that were issued by the supreme commander in order to achieve the aimed objectives. Discipline in the Muslim army was centered around the belief in God, the Prophet, his evenhandedness, and unconditional loyalty to one commander. Among the most important

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Wāqidi ۲:۵۰۶; Ibn Hishām ۳:۲۴۷; Ibn Sa'd ۲:۵۴; Tabari ۲:۵۴۶; Kalā'i ۱:۱۱۷; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ۲:۷۰. In the Battle against the Bani Quraydha, the Prophet (S) sent a companion called Abu Lubāba to the Jews in order to get them to surrender, but when Abu Lubāba met the chiefs of the Jews, he was affected by the sounds of weeping from their women and children and thus made a sign with his hand towards his neck

meaning that ‘if you surrender you will be killed’. When Abu Lubāba left the Bani Quraydha, he realized his mistake and felt remorse for his treachery against the Prophet (S), so he made a vow and tied himself to one of the pillars of the Masjid of the Prophet (S) and began praying to Allāh for forgiveness. Early in the morning the Prophet (S) came to Abu Lubāba and untied him from the pillar saying that Allāh had (.forgiven him. Henceforth this pillar was known as the pillar of Abu Lubāba. (Tr Bukhāri (al-Maghāzi ٢:٤٦); Muslim (Fadhā’il al-Sahāba ١٦١). Hatab bin Abi Balta’ah – ٢ was one of the Muhājirs who, because the weakness of his faith, acted treacherously. Before the Conquest of Makkah, he secretly sent a letter to some of the heads of the Quraysh to inform them about the intention of the Holy Prophet (S) to conquer Makkah. No sooner had he sent the letter that Jibra’il descended to the Prophet (S) and informed him of this. The Prophet (S) sent Imam ‘Ali (‘a) to stop the messenger and take the letter. Then the Prophet (S) called Hatab and sought to know his reason for doing this. Ibn Abi Balta’ah said that he was still a Muslim and had not given up his faith, but it was only because of his fear for his family who were in Makkah that he did what he had done. When the companions heard this they sought permission from the (.Prophet (S) to kill him but the Prophet refused and spared his life. (Tr

Zuhri: ١٥٠; Ibn Hishām ٤:٢٧٢; Ibn ‘Asākir ١:١٠٤; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٢:١٥٧; Ibn Hajar ٥:٣ – ٣ The Holy Prophet (S) was sent to guide a people who were living in the depths of – ٤ ignorance. People would fight wars in order to gain booty and gain possession over the other’s property, as well as to show their valor or secure their ‘honor’. The Prophet (S) came to these people as an exemplary role model, with perfect morals and an infallible character. But some people were not able to do away with their old habits and we see, for example, in the Battle of Uhud, that the archers who were commanded not to leave their post disobeyed the direct order of the Prophet (S) just so that they could get a portion of the war booty. Another example is what took place after the Battle of Hunayn when the Ansār were given a lesser portion of the booty they began to protest. When the Prophet (S) got angry and explained the reason for this allotment, the Ansār began to cry and said that they do not wish for anything (.more than the Prophet’s pleasure with them. (Tr

Bukhāri (Maghāzi ٥٦); Muslim (al-Zakāh ١٣٩); Tirmidhi (al-Zakāh ٢٩); Nasā’i (al- – ٥ (Zakāh ٧٩

Zuhri: ٧٧; Wāqidi ٢:٤١٥; Ibn Hishām ٤:٤٧; Tabari ٣:٤١; Ibn Qayyim ٢:٤٤٤ –٤
Ibn Hanbal ٣:٤٧; Bukhāri (al-Ahkām ٤); Majmu’ah min al-Mu’allifeen – ٧
al-‘Askariyyeen, al-Mawsu’ah al-‘Askariyya ١:١٣١
Q٤:١٣٤; Q٢٤:٤٢; Q٤٨:٩,١٣; Q٤٩:١٥; Q٤١:١١; Bukhāri (al-Jihād ٤); Abu Dāwud (al-Ashribah –٨
(٧); Tirmidhi (Fadhā’il al-Jihād ٢٣٠
Zuhri: ٥٢; Wāqidi ٢:٧٤٠; Kalā’i ١:١٢٧ –٩
Q٧:١٥٧; Q٤٨:٩; Bukhāri (al-Eimān ٨, Maghāzi ٥٣); Muslim (al-Eimān ٤٩); Nasā’i (al- – ١٠
Jihād ١٤

foundations of discipline was the complete obedience in difficulty and ease, war and [\(peace, likes and dislikes\)](#)

The most evident signs of this were: ‘absolute obedience’[\(۲\)](#), ‘contentment’[\(۳\)](#), ‘acceptance of responsibility’[\(۴\)](#), ‘the strength to come face to face with dangers’[\(۵\)](#), ‘acting with one’s own volition’[\(۶\)](#), ‘innovation by the executors’[\(۷\)](#), ‘the profundity of the meaning of discipline and its practice by the commander himself (as well)’ and ‘his method and ability in action’, which he would strive in for the attainment of the [\(required goal\)](#)

Discipline in the Muslim army meant that following the commander and emulating him was compulsory for the executive officers[\(۹\)](#). It was never permitted, under any circumstances, for them to act on their whims, without thinking, with complete ignorance or rigidity[\(۱۰\)](#). Rather they were bound by the spirit of obedience and doing [\(that which was necessary and what they were able to in order to realize the goal\)](#)

The strength of discipline was clearly seen in the Battle of Hamrā al-Asad, when the order was given for the enemy to be pursued, before returning to Madina, [immediately] after the Battle of Uhud. At this time, despite the fact that the soldiers were tired and wounded as a result of war, and were mourning their martyrs, they still all obeyed the order and none of them contravened the command of facing the enemy[\(۱۲\)](#). Similarly, the affection for the commander and belief in him made the army submit to [what were perceived as] the harsh and unpalatable conditions of the [\(Treaty of Hdaybiyya\)](#)

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p: ۱۰۶

Q۲:۲۸۵; Q۳:۳۲, ۱۷۲; Q۴:۱۳, ۵۹, ۶۹, ۸۰; Q۵:۷; Q۸:۱; Q۲۴:۵۱, ۵۴; Q۶۴:۱۶; Bukhāri (al-Ahkām ۴, -۱ (al-Jihād ۱۰۹); Muslim ۳:۱۳۹۱; Nasā’i (al-Bay’ah ۵ Q۳:۱۷۲; Q۱۳:۱۸; Q۴۲:۳۸; Muslim ۳:۱۴۳۳ -۲ Q۹:۵۹; Ibn Hanbal ۲:۳۱۰; Muslim (al-Masājid ۲۷۹, al-Salāh ۱۳, al-Fadhā’il ۶۳); Ibn -۳ (Mājah (al-Iqāmah ۱۴۷); Abu Dāwud (al-Jihād ۱۱۸); Tirmidhi (al-Zuhd ۵۷

Ibn Sa'd 2:2-5, 24, 35, 56, 61 -4

Wāqidi 1:347, 355; Ibn Hishām 3:194; Ibn Sa'd 2:36, 39; Ibn 'Abd al-Barr 4:1449; Ibn -5
'Asākir 1:92; Ibn al-Atheer 4:344

See examples of this in Wāqidi 2:552, 506; Ibn Sa'd 2:62, 122; Tabari 3:126; Ibn Sayyid -6
al-Nās 2:105, 108; Ibn al-Hajar, al-Isābah 1L98, 4:11, 176
Wāqidi 1:10, 67; Ibn Hishām 4:21; Tabari 2:512; Kalā'i: 136-7
Zuhri: 52; Bukhāri (al-Jihād 82); Muslim 4:1804-8
Q2:153; Q3:31; Q33:21; Shaybāni 1:118; Tabari 3:75-9

See how the army took sensible measures to choose a new commander after the -10
martyrdom of three commanders in the Battle of Muta in al-Maghāzi 2:756, 763; Ibn
Hishām 4:21; Ibn Sa'd 2:94

Zuhri: 150; Wāqidi 2:769; Ibn Hishām 4:272; Ibn Sa'd 2:94; Tabari 3:31 -11
Q3:172; Wāqidi 1:335; Ibn Sa'd 2:34; Kalā'i 1:105-12

Zuhri: 55; Ibn Hishām 3:327; Ibn Sa'd 2:70; Ibn al-Atheer 2:204. In the Treaty of -13
Hudaybiyya there were numerous conditions that seemed unfair to the Muslims and
for this reason many companions voiced protests against the signing of this treaty but
at the same time, they submitted to the will of the supreme commander and had to
(accept the treaty in the end. (Tr

example of the belief in the evenhandedness of the commander in his orders was that he compelled ‘Abdullah ibn Rawāha to enforce discipline when he gave him instructions during the fight against the Romans in the Battle of Muta(١). The supreme commander would warn against lack of discipline which would lead to listlessness, (defeat and hardship in the battlefield(٢

j) Determining the Number of Soldiers in the Army

In the first Sariya that the Holy Prophet (S) sent to fight against the enemy, he started by sending thirty fighters(٣) and in the second Sariya, he increased the number to eighty(٤). With the passing of time and the sending of more groups and missions, this number increased, until the Battle of Badr where it reached three hundred and thirteen(٥) and in the last battle that was fought, there were over thirty thousand ([Muslim] soldiers(٦

In the beginning, the organization of the army was limited to the Muhājirin(٧), but after some time, the Ansār(٨) and eventually a number of other Arab tribes joined the army(٩). The most important of these were: Muzayna, Aslam, Juhayna, Banu Sulaym, Banu Ghifār, Kināna, Ashja’ and Banu Layth

Women also constituted a small part of the armed forces and would help in the treating the wounded and providing assistance to the soldiers(١٠). The supreme commander would endeavor to promote the growth and expansion of this army, and for this very reason, he would protect the soldiers – meaning that he would not send them towards their death or destruction – to such an extent that the total number

p: ١٠٧

Wāqidi ٢:٧٦٠; Ibn Hishām ٤:١٧; Tabari ٣:٣٧ –١

Ibn Hishām ٣:٧١; Tabari ٢:٥٠٧; Ibn Hazm: ١٦٠; Kalā’i ١:١٠٢, ١٠٣ –٢

Wāqidi ١:٩; Ibn Hishām ٢:٢٤٥; Ibn Sa’d ٢:٢; Tabari ٢:٤٠٢; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ١:٢٢٤ –٣

Ibn Hishām ٢:٢٤١; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ١:٢٢٤ –٤

Wāqidi ١:١٥٢; Ibn Sa’d ٢:٦; Tabari ٢:٤٣١; Ibn ‘Abd al-Barr: ١٢١ –٥

The first battle was the Battle of Waddān which took place in the month of Safar, ٢ –٦

A.H. against the Bani Khumra and Quraysh, after which a peace treaty was signed.

The last battle was the Battle of Tabuk against the Romans, where the forces

(.numbered thirty thousand and ten thousand on horseback. (Tr

Wāqidi ١:١٠ – ١٣; Ibn Hishām ٢:٢٤١, ٢٥١; Ibn Sa'd ٢:١-٥; Tabari: ٢٥٩ –٧

Wāqidi ١:٤٨; Ibn Hishām ٢:٢٦٦; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٨; Tabari ٢:٤٣٤; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ١:٢٤٧ –٨

Wāqidi ٢:٨٠٠, ٨١٢, ٨١٩ –٩

Wāqidi ١:٢١٨, ٢:٦٨٥; Tabari ٣:٧٧; Suhayli ٤:٣٧; Kalā'i ١:١٤٥ –١٠

of martyrs in all the nine years under his command did not exceed three hundred and :seventeen(1). This number is divided as follows

Badr – ۱۴ martyrs, Uhud – ۷۰ martyrs, Bi'r Ma'unah(۲) – ۷۰ martyrs, al-Rajee' – ۱۰ martyrs, Khandaq – ۶ martyrs, the Sariya of Muhammad ibn Maslama against the Bani Tha'laba – ۱۰ martyrs, Bani al-Mustalaq – one martyr, Khaybar – ۱۵ to ۱۹ martyrs, the Sariya of Bashir ibn Sa'd al-Ansāri towards the Bani Murrah – ۳۰ martyrs, the Sariya of Abi al-'Awjā' al-Sulami towards the Bani Saleem – ۵۰ martyrs, Ka'b ibn 'Umayr al-Ghifāri to the Bani Qudhā'ah – ۱۵ martyrs, the Battle of Muta – ۸ martyrs, the Conquest of Makkah – ۲ martyrs, Hunayn – ۴ martyrs and Tā'if – ۱۲ martyrs

The people, from the time they accepted Islām, displayed their courage in joining this army and would try to outdo each other(۳). The Prophet (S) would not send the entire army against the enemy, rather he selected an appropriate number to [send in] each battle depending on the available resources and the number of soldiers in the enemy's army(۴). For example, he entered the battle against the Bani Saleem with a section of the forces(۵) and the battle of Dhi Amr with a larger number of forces(۶). In the Battle of Tabuk and some other battles, he brought the entire army to fight (۷). Based on this, one of the most fundamental principles of war, meaning 'economizing with the forces', was always taken into

p: ۱۰۸

Wāqidi ۱:۴۵, ۳۰۰, ۲:۴۹۵, ۷۰۵, ۷۲۳, ۷۴۱, ۸۲۵, ۳:۹۲۲, ۹۳۸; Ibn Hishām ۳:۳۵۷, ۴:۱۲۹; Ibn Sa'd ۲:۳۶, –۱
۶۱, ۸۹, ۹۲

It should be noted that Bi'r Ma'unah and al-Rajee' were not battles or military – ۲ missions, rather they were unarmed missions sent for propagation of the faith who (.were attacked and killed by the enemies. (Tr

Ibn Hishām ۴:۲۰۵–۲۴۵; Ibn al-Atheer ۲:۲۸۳ onwards –۳

Wāqidi ۲:۶۷۰; Ibn Hishām ۳:۳۴۴, ۳۴۷; Ibn Sa'd ۲:۵۰۲ –۴

Ibn Sa'd ۲:۲۱ –۵

Wāqidi ۱:۱۹۴ –۶

Wāqidi ۲:۴۵۴, ۸۰۰; Ibn Hishām ۳:۲۳۱, ۴:۲۳, ۶۳; Ibn Sa'd ۲:۴۷; Tabari ۳:۱۰۰; Ibn Sayyid al- –۷

...consideration by the Prophet (S) (1)

k) Organization and arrangement of the troops

Organization included the division of the troops into units [and contingents], outlining the hierarchy of command, type of battle, where it will be fought, the army's military might, the enemy's strengths and weaponry, and the modes of transport used by both sides (2). The Prophet's goal from this organization was facilitating ease of command and control over the troops during the battle, motivation and ...stabilization (3)

It was for this reason that he put different units under the command of one person (4) and put different types of weapons at their disposal (5). This is precisely what he did in the Conquest of Makkah where he rearranged the tribes according to the prevailing ...conditions (6)

In the battle of the Conquest, he arranged the Muhājirs into three columns consisting of two hundred soldiers each, the Aus into six columns of ۳۵۰ soldiers and the tribe of Aslam into one column consisting of two hundred fighters, and he did the same with different groups and new contingents (7), just as he had arranged the column of archers in the Battle of Uhud

The Prophet (S) would at times arrange the army based on 'new battle equipment' (8), this is why the arrangement of the army in the Conquest of Makkah was very different from the arrangement of the army in the Battle of Hunayn. He (S) would bring together various distinct qualities and talents during the formation of each contingent in order to make them able to fight independently (9); like the groups of four who entered Makkah

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The issue of economizing on forces is something that is given importance and taken –۱
(into consideration even today (Tr

Wāqidi ۱:۲۲۰, ۲:۸۰۰ onwards; Dhahabi ۱:۲۶۷-۲

Ibn Hishām ۴:۸۵; Ibn Sa’d ۱:۴۴, ۷۷, ۱۰۹; Tabari ۳:۹; Yāqut Himyari ۲:۴۸۷; Ibn Sayyid al-
Nās ۲:۱۹۳
Zuhri: ۷۶, ۸۴; Wāqidi ۱:۱۹۹, ۲:۴۴۰, ۶۳۳; Ibn Hishām ۳:۶۴, ۲۲۴, ۳۴۲; Ibn Sa’d ۲:۲۵, ۴۷, ۷۷; Ibn -۴
Khayyāt ۱:۲۹; Kalā’i ۱:۱۰۴, ۱۱۴, ۱۳۰
Wāqidi ۲:۸۰۰, ۸۱۲, ۸۱۹; Ibn Hishām ۴:۴۲ -۵
Wāqidi ۲:۸۰۰ onwards; Ibn Hishām ۴:۴۲ -۶
Ibn Hishām ۳:۹۶ onwards; Tabari ۲:۵۰۷; Ibn Hazm: ۱۶۰; Kalā’i ۱:۱۰۲ -۷
Wāqidi ۳:۸۹۵ onwards; Ibn Sa’d ۲:۱۰۸; Suhayli ۴:۹۶ -۸
Wāqidi ۲:۸۰۲; Ibn Hishām ۴:۹۴; Ibn Sa’d ۲:۹۸; Ibn Hazm: ۲۳۱ -۹

The Prophet organized the troops in pyramidal forms in a single group and in groups of two, three and four depending on the number of tribes

The single pyramidal contingent was led by Abu Wāqid al-Laythi and was made up from the tribes of Kanānah, Bani Hamzah, Bani Layth and Sa'd bin Bakr. The group of twos were made up of troops from the tribe of Ashja' and the groups of three consisted of members from the tribe of Muzaynah while the groups of four were from the tribe of Juhaynah. This formation made it easier to attain the best speed and movement during battle⁽¹⁾. In the present day and age also, armed forces are organized into pyramidal groups of three and four⁽²⁾

The organization for battle was different from the arrangement of troops who were marched in front of Abu Sufyān before the Conquest of Makkah. The Holy Prophet (S) would try to give the command of an entire column to the leader of the tribe whose troops were present in that column⁽³⁾. Whenever the numbers of the tribe did not match with the column, he would include other groups in it and would select a commander from a tribe that was present in that column⁽⁴⁾

The Administrative Council .۲

The Administrative Council was a body whose responsibility was to advise the supreme commander about all affairs related to the military. This council consisted of military commanders from the Muhājirs, the Ansārs and other tribes⁽⁵⁾. The Holy Prophet (S) always consulted with this council about issues

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Wāqidi ۲:۸۰۰, ۸۱۲-۱

Majmu'ah al-Ta'leef fi Akadimiyya Farunzi al-Askariyya – al-Takteek: ۴۶۴-۲

Wāqidi ۲:۸۰۰, ۸۱۲ onwards-۳

Wāqidi ۲:۸۲۰; Ibn Hishām ۴:۴۱-۴

Zuhri: ۵۰; Wāqidi ۲:۶۴۳; Ibn Hishām ۲:۲۶۶, ۲۷۲; Qurtubi ۲:۱۴۹۳; Ibn Katheer ۳:۲۶۲, ۲۶۷-۵

related to war and he would take the opinion of its members about the following matters

- a) Declaring war on the enemy
- (b) Benefitting from the participation of the Ansār (in battle
- (c) Centralization of the troops like in the Battle of Badr (1)
- (d) Remaining in Madina or coming out to face the Quraysh in the Battle of Uhud (2)
- e) Digging the ditch in the Battle of Ahzāb
- (f) Creating a peace treaty with the Ghatfān for one third of the dates of Madina (3)
- (g) Whether to make peace or war in the expedition of Hudaibiyya (4)
- (h) The fixity and change of command in the Battle of Khaybar (5)
- i) Whether to remain steadfast or move and launch an attack on the Roman empire
- (j) Return to Madina (6)
- k) The battle between the Roman army and the troops of Zayd bin Hāritha where, when consulted, most of the commanders, and especially ‘Abdullah bin Rawāhah, the deputy commander, gave the opinion that they should fight against the Romans (7)

After studying the progress of the various battles it must be said that the situation would be different from place to place and in different military zones, and the study and deliberation about this issue can be considered clear evidence of the aptitude and

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Wāqidi 1:53; Ibn Hishām 2:272; Ibn Sa’d 2:9; Tabari 2:440; Ibn ‘Abd al-Barr 1:316-1

Wāqidi 1:209 onwards; Ibn Hishām 3:67; Ibn Sa’d 2:26; Tabari 2:503-2

Wāqidi 2:445, 478; Ibn Hishām 3:234; Ibn Sa’d 2:47, 53; Tabari 2:566, 573; Ibn ‘Abd al-

Barr 2:594, 601, 634; Ibn al-Atheer 2:283

(Wāqidi ٢:٥٨٠; Tirmidhi (al-Jihād ٣٤-٤

Wāqidi ٢:٦٤٤-٥

Wāqidi ٣:١٠١٩-٦

Wāqidi ٢:٧٦٠; Ibn Hishām ٤:١٧; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٩٣; Tabari ٣:٣٧; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٢:١٥٤; Ibn -٧

al-Qayyim ٢:٣٧٥

(1) soundness of opinion of the Holy Prophet (S) in these matters

In this council, the Prophet (S) had one vote just like the other members and he would listen carefully to the opinions and views of the other members. For the Battle of Uhud (2), due to the fact that the majority had given the opinion that they should come out of Madina, even though he himself thought it would be more prudent to remain in the city, he supported the view of the council (3). This was the beginning of ‘democracy’, something that most of the countries in today’s world are calling for

The Holy Prophet (S) would refrain from imposing his opinions and insisting on his views (4). Therefore, he would respect the commanders and sit with them and take their advice on various issues, just as he accepted the advice of Habāb bin Mundhir, Salmān al-Fārsi, Sa’d bin Mu’ādh, Sa’d bin ‘Ubādah and ‘Umar bin Khattāb in different situations in battle (5). He would always show tolerance and leniency to those who offered advice and would respect their views. He would never accuse them of being ignorant

With his kind words and clear statements (6), he would assist them to remain free of pretence and flattery (7) and to acquire good characters and remain truthful (8). In the end, after listening to the advice, he would issue his orders. Because he was determined to carry out the decision of the council (9), nobody would dare to oppose the orders he gave (10). Members of the council were attributed with

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Zuhri: ۵۰; Wāqidi ۲:۵۸۰, ۶۴۳, ۳:۱۰۱۹; Tabari ۳:۳۷; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ۲:۱۵۴; Ibn al-Qayyim –۱

۲:۳۷۵

Wāqidi ۱:۲۰۹; Ibn Hishām ۳:۶۷; Ibn Sa’d ۲:۲۶; Tabari ۲:۵۰۳; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ۲:۴ –۲
Ibn Hishām ۲:۶۷; Ibn Sa’d ۲:۲۶; Ibn al-Atheer ۲:۱۵۰; The youth were enthusiastic –۳
about leaving Madina and they felt that if they remained behind and fought
defensively, the enemy would become bolder and would take them as cowards. For
this reason they insisted that the army go out of Madina, and the Prophet (S) agreed
to this even though it was against his own opinion. In the end, the Muslims suffered a

(.defeat in this battle. (Tr

Ibn Hanbal ٢:٢٣١; Muslim (al-Jannah ٤٤); Ibn Mājah (al-At'imah ٤, ٣٠); Abu Dāwud –٤
(al-At'imah ١٧); Tirmidhi (al-Jumu'ah ٤٣); al-Nasā'i (al-Istisqā' ٣
(Dārimi (al-Muqaddima ٣٤); Ibn Mājah (al-Fitan ٧١); Abu Dāwud (al-Malāhim ١٧ –٥
Ibn 'Abd al-Barr ١:٣١٤; ٢:٥٩٤, ٤٣٤; Ibn al-Atheer ١:٣٦٤, ٢:٢٨٣, ٣٣٨ –٦
Ibn Hanbal ٥:٢٣٠; Dārimi (al-Ru'yā ١٣); Bukhāri (al-Munāfiqun ١٠); Abu Dāwud (al- –٧
(Aqdhiya ١١); Tirmidhi (al-Ahkām ٣); al-Nasā'i (al-Hajj ٤٩
Bukhāri (al-Jihād ١٩٥); Muslim (al-Fadhā'il ١٤٠, al-Salāh ١٧٨); Abu Dāwud (al-Sunnah –٨
(١٢) al-Nasā'i (al-Qudhāt ١١
(Dārimi (al-Ru'yā ١٣); Bukhāri (al-I'tisām ٢٨); Abu Dāwud (al-Jihād ٣٧ –٩
(Q٣٣:٣٦; Wāqidi ١:٥٣ onwards; Nasā'i (al-Ashriba ٣٦ –١٠

higher intelligence, prudent judgment and a greater awareness and understanding of military affairs, and were deemed trustworthy and reliable by the supreme [commander\(1\)](#)

One of the most important results of forming an administrative council was that the experience of war which was the cause of the Muslim army's victory were revealed, the morals and characters of the participants were improved and strong bonds of friendship between them were formed. At the same time the full responsibility and accountability fell on their shoulders[\(2\)](#) and any matter that was put before the administrative council was discussed and debated by its members, the pros and cons [\(were highlighted\(3\)\)](#) and an appropriate conclusion was drawn[\(4\)](#)

The Holy Prophet (S) would request the views of the council in matters such as warfare[\(5\)](#), selecting a representative[\(6\)](#) and deputy[\(7\)](#) and other matters, and he would stress on the important role played by its members in leadership, because if they were suitable then the commander would also be good[\(8\)](#) otherwise the leadership will be corrupted and they will lead the commander to destruction and will act as hindrances and impediments in his path. The commanders who came after the passing away of the Holy Prophet (S) would also seek advice from the trustworthy leaders of the army[\(9\)](#). 'Umar bin al-Khattāb gave more importance to this than [anyone else\(10\)](#), to such an extent that he would also listen to the advice of children

The Department Of Doctrinal Guidance .۳

This department was responsible for 'the spiritual and doctrinal development of the troops, its preservation and strengthening and at

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Q۳:۱۵۹; Ibn Hanbal ۱:۳۰, ۳:۱۰۵, ۴:۱۰; Bukhāri: ۷۹; Abu Dāwud (a;-Adab ۸۸); Harawi: ۷۳ -۱
Ibn Hanbal ۳:۷۲۹; Bukhāri (al-Hudud ۷۱, al-Muhāribun ۱۶); Abu Dāwud (al-Adab ۱۱۴); -۲
(al-Nasā'i (al-Jihād ۶
Wāqidi ۱:۵۳, ۲:۹, ۲:۴۴۵, ۴۷۸, ۷۶۰; Ibn Hishām ۲:۲۷۲, ۳:۶۷, ۴:۱۷; Abu Dāwud (al-Buyu' ۵); -۳
Harawi: ۷۴

Ibn Sa'd ٢:٩, ٢٤, ٤٧, ٥٣, ٩٣; Tabari ٢:٤٤٠, ٥٠٣, ٥٦٦, ٣:٣٧; Ibn 'Abd Rabbih ١:٦٣ onwards; –٤
 Harawi: ٧٤
 Wāqidi ١:٥٣; Ibn Hishām ٣:٢٣٤; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٢٤; Tabari ٢:٥٦٦, ٥٧٣ –٥
 Q٤٢:٣٨; Ibn Hanbal ١:٤٨; Muslim (al-Masājid ٧٨); Abu Dāwud (al-Adab ١١٤); Tirmidhi –٦
 ((al-Fitan ٧٨
 (Tirmidhi (al-Manāqib ٣٧); Bukhāri (al-'Ilm ٢); Muslim (al-Imārah ٢٢ –٧
 Bukhāri (al-Ahkām ٤٢, al-I'tisām ٢٨); Nasā'i (al-Bay'ah ٣٢); Ibn 'Abd Rabbih ١:٣٢ –٨
 onwards
 Ibn Hanbal ٥:٢٧٤; Bukhāri (al-I'tisām ٢٨); Abu Dāwud (al-Adab ١١٤); Tirmidhi (al-Zuhd –٩
 (٣٩, al-Adab ٥٧
 Umar ibn al-Khattāb would constantly seek advice from the close companions of –١٠
 the Holy Prophet (S) like 'Ali ibn Abi Tālib (a). In more than one occasion, the Muslim
 (army achieved victory because of this advice. (Tr

the same time, for weakening the morale of the enemy and destroying it', and was divided into various sections, each carrying out specific functions that were different from state to state, but overall it had a common spiritual goal that it tries to fulfill(1)

The Prophet (S) would continuously strengthen the morale of the army(2) using various means, the most important of which included: training and continuous guidance of the troops(3), putting the supreme commander (i.e. himself) at the same level as the soldiers(4), sharing in their sorrows(5) and happiness(6), defending the soldiers, steadfastness in battles(7), [fair] distribution of war booty(8), upgrading the weapons and equipment used by the troops in battle(9), caring for the families of those who were martyred(10), carrying out training for different battle strategies(11) so as to break down the wall of fear among the troops, and bringing them face to face with the different battle scenarios(12)

The Holy Prophet (S) also used various techniques to maintain this spirit, the most important among which were: expulsion of weak soldiers and those who have been defeated [spiritually] from among the troops(13), wiping out false rumours(14), hiding information that could weaken the spirit and resolve of the people(15), habituating the forces to adherence to strict discipline at all times(16) and creating a bond of mutual trust and friendship between the commander and his troops(17)

An example of the strength in spirit was the presence and participation of some fighters in the army to face the enemy without any weapons whatsoever(18), some

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(Q1:65; Bukhāri (al-Jihād 110); Nasā'i (al-Jihād 30-1 Q4:84; Bukhāri (al-Maghāzi 17); Muslim (al-Imārah 117); Nasā'i (al-Zakāh 85; al- - 2 (Buyu' 98 Q6:19, Q17:106, Q18:54, Q73:20, Q96:1; Wāqidi 1:347, 3:1057; Ibn Hishām 3:178; Ibn Sa'd - 3 2:36, 39

Examples of this was when the committee was discussing whether to leave Madina -4 in the Battle of Uhud and during the digging of the trench in the Battle of Khandaq

((see: Ibn Hishām ٢:٢٢٦

Dārimi (al-Jihād ١٨); Abu Dāwud (al-Jihād ٢٥); Tirmidhi (Fadhā'il al-Jihād ١٣); Nasā'i -٥

((al-Qisāmah ١٨

(Bukhāri (al-Nikāh ٧١, ٧٢); Muslim (al-Nikāh ٩٨, ١٠١, al-'Eid ١٩); Nasā'i (al-'Eidān ٣٦ -٦

(Bukhāri (al-Jihād ٨٢); Muslim ٣:١٤٠١, ٨٠٢; Tirmidhi (al-Jihād ١٥ -٧

Q٨:٤١; Zuhri: ٩٣; Wāqidi ١:٩٦, ٤٠٧, ٢:٥٣٥, ٣:٩٤٣; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٦١, ٩٥, ١٢٠ -٨

Wāqidi ١:٧٨, ٣٧٧, ٢:٥٤٠, ٦٤٨; Ibn Hishām ٤:١٢٢; Ibn Sa'd ٢:١٧٤; Tabari ٣:٧٣ -٩

(Muslim (al-Imārah ١٣٩); Ibn Mājah (al-Nikāh ٣٦, ٥٣); Nasā'i (al-Jihād ٤٧ -١٠

Shaybāni ١:٥٨; Ibn Hishām ٢:٢٤٥, ٢٧٨; Tabari ٢:١٨١ -١١

(Ibn Hishām ٣:٧١; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٦١; Bukhāri (al-Jihād ٨٠ -١٢

(Dārimi (al-Siyar ٥٣); Muslim (al-Jihād ١٥٠); Abu Dāwud (al-Jihād ١٤٢ -١٣

Wāqidi ١:٣٣٨, ٢:٧٢٩, ٨٠٣; Ibn Hishām ٣:٣٠٤; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٥٦; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٢: ١٦٧ -١٤

Look at how the Prophet (S) wanted to keep the information about the breaking of -١٥

the pact by the Bani Quraydha confidential and also told Habbāb ibn Mundhir not to let

(anyone know about the number of enemy forces in the Battle of Uhud (Wāqidi ١:٢٠٧

(Ibn Hanbal ٥:٣٢١; Bukhāri (al-Ahkām ٤); Nasā'i (al-Bay'ah ٥ -١٦

(Bukhāri (al-Eimān ٨, al-Maghāzi ٥٣); Muslim (al-Eimān ٦٩); Nasā'i (al-Jihād ١٤ -١٧

Wāqidi ١:٢٥٨; Ibn Hishām ٢:٢٨٠, ٣:٣٩; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ١:٢٥٧ -١٨

would come to fight despite being young in age(١), and another group would be ready to face hoards of enemy soldiers despite their few numbers(٢). Others would pull their horses behind them and would continue doing so throughout the battle(٣). Yet others would make it their mission to assassinate those who had said or done anything against the supreme commander and who had ill will against the Islāmic revolution(٤).

He (S) would instill faith and belief in the Muslim army in such a way that their spirit would never wane and would provide them the energy and strength to carry out all the missions that required self-sacrifice and struggle(٥). The distinguishing feature that impelled the soldiers to strong spirituality(٦) was the hope in the life hereafter and [the fact that] they were faced with two options which both led to success, either victory with honor or martyrdom and entrance into everlasting bliss(٧). In this way, the father and son would keep their relationship aside and would strive to surpass one another in the hope of paradise(٨).

In the Battle of Uhud, despite the rumour that the Prophet (S) had been killed, they continued to fight bravely. And this bravery was a testament to their strong faith and conviction(٩). Some of the forces would [try to] outdo each other in fighting for the supreme commander and would even kill their own relatives in defense of their faith(١٠). Khubayb bin. ‘Uday when forced to return to his previous faith preferred death(١١). Therefore the spirit

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Wāqidi ١:٢١, ٨٨; Ibn Hishām ٣:٧٠; Tabari ٢:٥٠٥; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٢:٦ – ١

Wāqidi ١:١٥٢, ٢:٤٥٧, ٧٥٥; Ibn Hishām ٣:٢٣١; Ibn Sa’d ٢:٤٧; Tabari ٢:٤٣١ – ٢

Ibn Hishām ٤:١٩–٢١; Tabari ٣:٣٧; Ibn Qayyim ٢:٣٧٥ – ٣

Wāqidi ١:١٧٣, ١٨٤, ٣٩١; Ibn Hishām ٣:٥٤, ٢٨٧; Ibn Sa’d ٢:٢١; Ibn Hazm: ١٨٤, ١٩٨ – ٤

Q٨:٦٥, Q٩:١٩, ٢٠, ٤١, ٨٩; Bukhāri (al-Maghāzi ٥٣, al-Jihād ١١٠); Tirmidhi (al-Eimān ٨, – ٥

(Fadhā’il al-Jihād ٢٢); Nasā’i (al-Jihād ١٨

Q٢:١٥٤, Q٣:١٦٩, Q٤:٧٣; Bukhāri (Fadhā’il al-Sahābah ٥); Nasā’i (al-Jihād ١٩, al-Bay’ah – ٦

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(Q٩:٥٢; Ibn Hanbal ٣:٤٨٣; Nasā’i (al-Jihād ١٩, al-Buyu’ ٩٨ – ٧

Ibn Is'hāq: ٣٠٩; Wāqidi ١:٢٠٨; Ibn Hishām ٣:٨٨; Tabari: ٥١٧; Ibn 'Abd al-Barr ١:١٠٨; Ibn –٩
Sayyid al-Nās ٢:١٢; the brother of Anas bin Mālik would cry out: life after the death of
(.the Holy Prophet (S) has no value for us (Tr

Wāqidi ١:٦٩, ١١٢, ٢٥٧; Ibn Hishām ٣:٣٠٥; Ibn Sa'd ٢:١٠, ٤٦ –١٠

Wāqidi ١:٣٦٠; Ibn Hishām ٣:١٨٥; Tabari ٢:٥٤١; Ibn 'Abd al-Barr ٢:٤٤٠; Khubayb was –١١
one of the teachers of the Qur'ān who was martyred in the tragedy of 'al-Rajee'. The
polytheists tried to force him to turn away from Islām before killing him when they
(.were unable to do so (Tr

in the Muslim army was aimed at protecting the faith and it was one of the most important goals of the Prophet (S) to strengthen this very spirit

The supreme commander would also, on the other side try to weaken the spirit and resolve of the enemy, causing them to waver, and instill fear and terror in their hearts(1) to such an extent that they were not capable of coming out to fight against him. The most important ways in which he accomplished this included: displaying their strength and might(2), using intelligence agents, taking precaution in employing counter-intelligence measures(3) and scrutinizing them(4), arresting enemy spies(5), carrying out attacks using offensive strategies(6) especially in the battles of Bani Quraydha and Khaybar and some of the Sariya missions like the Sariya of Muhammad bin Maslamah against the Bani Bakr, and that of ‘Amr bin ‘Aās against the Qudhā’ah, all of which were missions in which swift attacks were used. This was similarly the case, the attacks against the tribe of Bani Mahārib and Bani Tha’labah in the Battle of ‘Shāt al-Ruqā

Another way was by propagation of the renown and reputation of the leadership and bravery of Muslim army(7), especially in the battle against the Bani Nadhir which was the cause of the Jews destroying their homes and strongholds by their own hands. In the battle against the Bani Lihyān, when the enemy heard that the Holy Prophet (S) had set out [with his army] to wage war against them, they fled, as did

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Zuhri: 79; Wāqidi 2:353, 563, 729; Ibn Hishām 3:292; Tabari 2:554 – 1
Ibn Hishām 4:13; Ibn Hanbal 1:229; Tirmidhi (al-Hajj 30); Nasā’i (al-Manāsik 84); in – 2
today’s terminology this is known as ‘psychological warfare’ and it is carried out to
(weaken the spirits of the enemy’s army (Tr
Wāqidi 1:203, 338; Ibn ‘Abd al-Barr 3:1473 – 3
Wāqidi 1:99; Ibn Sa’d 2:70; Ibn ‘Abd al-Barr 4:1473 – 4
(Wāqidi 1:404, 2:550, 640, 802; Abu Dāwud (al-Jihād: Ba’th al-‘Uyun 84 – 5
Wāqidi 1:395, 2:496, 633; Ibn Hishām 3:244, 342; Ibn Sa’d 2:53, 77; Tabari 2:556; Ibn – 6
Sayyid al-Nās 2:39, 105 onwards

Wāqidi: ٥٣٥; Ibn Hishām ٣:٢٩٢; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٥٤; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٢:١٠٩ -٧

the Banu Sa'd when they got the information that 'Ali bin Abi Tālib (‘a) had started marching towards them. Similarly, being quick in defense and repulsion of any incursion by enemy forces(1), especially in the Battle of Badr al-Kubrā and al-Ghābah, .was another of the Prophet's tactics for weakening the resolve of the enemy

The Holy Prophet (S) would awaken and enliven the spirit of the troops before the commencement of battle in order to attain the highest level of commitment and zeal(2) and would always try to preserve this throughout the war while removing anything that could cause a weakening in their spirits(3). Whenever the soldiers started feeling disheartened, the Prophet (S) would strive to lift their spirits. This can be seen in the Battle of Ahzāb when the Bani Quraydha broke their covenant with the Muslims, where after the siege was taking its toll, he utilized clever trickery to cause disharmony in the ranks of the enemy's army thereby lifting the spirits of his own .(troops(4)

The spirit and zeal of the Muslim fighters would increase and decrease in accordance with the varying situations in every battle, but on the whole, the Muslim army would be in high spirits until the final stages of the battles, and in order to achieve victory, they would remain steadfast and ready to attack(5), even in situations where they had faced shocking events, the army would come out with their heads held high and would carry through till the end. The Battles of Uhud

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Wāqidi 1:12, 2:537; Ibn Hishām 2:315, 3:293; Ibn Asad 2:1, 58; Tabari 2:601; Kalā'i 1:123-1

(Ibn Hanbal 4:354; Bukhāri (al-Jihād 110); Abu Dāwud (al-Jihād 24-2

Shaybāni 1:118; Wāqidi 1:207; Tabari 3:75; Kalā'i 1:144-3

Zuhri: 79; Muslim 3:1361-4

Zuhri: 79; Wāqidi 1:337 onwards and 2:440; Ibn Hishām 3:129 onwards; Ibn Sa'd 2:36, -5

47; Tabari 3:29, 565; Kala'i 1:104, 114; Watt: 57

and Khandaq were two examples of this, because the Prophet (S) lifted the spirits of the army after the Battle of Uhud by initiating the Battle of Hamrā al-Asad and during the Battle of Khandaq by causing disharmony and division in the ranks of the enemy.

.As a result, the confederates lost the victory and had to turn back humiliated

The Department of Intelligence And Security

The Intelligence Department

point

The department of Intelligence is a department which is responsible for acquiring and collecting all the information in matters pertaining to the enemy. This information especially covers: intention [of war], amassing [of forces], land where the enemy will fight, a detailed study of the acquired information and ensuring its accuracy – and [different methods and tools of intelligence were employed to this end](#)⁽¹⁾

The Holy Prophet (S) would, more than anything else before the battle, try to acquire intelligence [about the enemy] because gaining intelligence and complete information about the enemy was a requirement for the issuance of appropriate orders and commands. In order to get intelligence about the Quraysh, he (S) send numerous Sariya missions⁽²⁾ to different places⁽³⁾. These missions were charged with acquiring information about the number of enemy tribes⁽⁴⁾, and also [in preparation for the battles with non-Arabs] the Roman forces⁽⁵⁾. The forces who were sent kept an eye [on the points of entry into and exit from Makkah](#)⁽⁶⁾

The supreme commander made various peace pacts with some of the tribes⁽⁷⁾ and sought their assistance against the enemy and at the same time commissioned them to keep watch

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Harawi, al-Hiyal al-Harbiyya: ٧٩; al-Mawsu'ah al-Askariyya ١:٢٢, ٧٠; Majmu'at al- Ta'leef fi Akādimiyyah Farunzi al-'Askariyyah – al-Takteek: ١٧٩ Wāqidi ١:١١; Ibn Hishām ٢:٢٥; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٢; Tabari ٢:٢٥٩ –٢

Wāqidi ١:٩, ١٩٧; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٢, ٢٣, ٣٥ -٣

Wāqidi ٢:٥٣٤, ٥٥٠; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٦١, ٨٥; Tabari ٣:٢٩; Suhayli ٤:٢٥٢; Kalā'i ١:١٥٨ -٤

Wāqidi ٢:٥٦٠, ٧٥٥; Ibn Hishām ٣:٢٢٤; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٦٤, ٩٢; Tabari ٣:٦٣; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās -٥

٢:١٠٨, ١٥٣; Ibn al-Qayyim ٢:٢٩٩

Wāqidi ١:١١, ١٩٦, ٢:٨١٥; Ibn Hishām ٣:٥٣; Ibn Sa'd ٣:٢٤; Tabari ٢:٤٩٢; Ibn Hazm: ١٠٢ -٦

Ibn Hishām ٢:٢٤١; Ibn Sa'd ١:٢, ٣٨, ٨٦; Tabari ٢:٤٠٨, ٣:١٣٠-١٤٦; Ibn Hazm: ١٠٠; Ibn -٧

Sayyid al-Nās ١:٢٢٤, ٢٢٦; Mu'jam Qabā'il al-'Arab ١:٢١٦, ٢:٦٦٧, ٣:١٠٦١

over the borders of the neighboring state (i.e. Rome)⁽¹⁾, just as he had done in the Battle of Dumat al-Jundal when he sent ‘Abd al-Rahmān ibn ‘Auf to that area to gain the friendship of the Bani Kalb – a tribe that lived in on the border area – and also in the case of the peace treaty with Akeedar and others

The Prophet (S) would send troops to the sensitive areas⁽²⁾ and would himself meet with the traders and travelers⁽³⁾ and would get information from them and from those who lived there⁽⁴⁾

Interrogating the prisoners⁽⁵⁾, settling intelligence gathering forces in enemy territory⁽⁶⁾, studying their movements and transferring them at the appropriate time, were all other methods for acquiring intelligence. The Prophet (S) would never be heedless of any means of obtaining information about the enemy, and at times he would personally undertake to find out the latest information about them⁽⁷⁾. The goal of this was to achieve victory and gain accurate information

One of the examples of success in the Holy Prophet’s information gathering was that he (S) would keep all the plans secret⁽⁸⁾ like in the case with the Sariya of ‘Abdullah bin Jahash⁽⁹⁾ and the Conquest of Makkah and more than this, even the intelligence officers and those charged with information gathering were unaware about some of these plans⁽¹⁰⁾. Just as in the Sariya of Abi Qatādah ibn Rabi’ al-Ansāri to the ‘Batn Adham’ he tried as much as possible to carry out this mission in total secret⁽¹¹⁾, so he

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Wāqidi 1:402; Ibn Hishām 3:224; Ibn Sa’d 2:44; Ibn Hazm: 253; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās 2:108; –1
Ibn Katheer 5:17

Wāqidi 1:218, 2:457, 461; Ibn Hishām 2:268; Ibn Sa’d 1:207; Tabari 2:436; Kalā’i 1:113; Ibn –2
al-Katheer 4:103

Wāqidi 1:395, 3:990; also see Ibn Sa’d 2:44, 119; Ibn Mandhur, Lisān al-‘Arab 7:344 –3

Wāqidi 2:805, 808; Ibn Hishām 2:268; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās 1:224 –4
.Ibid –5

Wāqidi 1:203; Kalā’i 1:139; Ibn ‘Abd al-Barr 2:810 onwards –6

Wāqidi ٢:٤٤٥; Ibn Hishām ٢:٢٦٧; Ibn Hazm: ٢٢٦ onwards –٧

Wāqidi ١:١١, ١٣, ٢:٧٩٦; Ibn Hishām ٢:٢٤٥, ٤:٣٩; Ibn Sa’d ٢:٥; Kalā’i ١:٥٧; Ibn Sayyid al- –٨

Nās ١:٢٢٦; Ibn al-Katheer ٢:٢٨٢, ٢٨٣; Harawi: ٧٩

Wāqidi ١:١٣-١٥; Ibn Hishām ١:٦٠٠-٦١٠ –٩

Wāqidi ٢:٧٦٩; Ibn Hishām ٣:٢٩٢; Ibn Sa’d ٢:٩٦; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٢:١٦١; Ibn Atheer –١٠

٤:٨١

Wāqidi ١:١٣, ٢:٥٣٥, ٣:١١٢٣; Ibn Hishām ٤:١٥; Ibn Sa’d ٢:٥٦, ٦٥, ١٣٦; Harawi: ٨٩; ‘Batn’ –١١

(.was the word used to describe a group that was smaller than a tribe. (Tr

made only a few of his topmost commanders privy to the detailed planning of the mission⁽¹⁾. In the Battle of Uhud, he kept the acquired information hidden from his own uncle ‘Abbās and he did the same thing during the Conquest of Makkah

The supreme commander prepared the intelligence outfit and personnel very well⁽²⁾ and chose the most suitable people for such missions⁽³⁾ as in the Battle of Badr where he sent Talha bin ‘Abdillah and Sa’eed ibn Zayd to gather information from the trading caravan of the Quraysh; Ibn ‘Amr al-Jahni and ‘Uday bin Abi al-Za’bā’ to gather information from the heart of the enemy’s camp; ‘Ali bin Abi Tālib (‘a) and Sa’d bin Abi Waqqās to find out about the number of enemy soldiers and Habbāb ibn Mundhir to get information about their movements and the number of reinforcements

The Prophet (S) was fully aware of all issues pertaining to the organization and strategies of the enemy, their goal, weapons, commanders and plans⁽⁴⁾. He obtained this detailed information by sending a Sariya mission under the command of ‘Abdullah bin Anees to assassinate Sufyān bin Khālid al-Hadhali⁽⁵⁾ and other leaders of the Quraysh in the Battle of Badr and also displayed them (i.e. what he had acquired from the enemy) in front of Abu Sufyān during the Conquest of Makkah

When intelligence information was sent to the Holy Prophet (S), he would study and scrutinize it very carefully and would coordinate it with the reality of the current situations in the battle⁽⁶⁾

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Wāqidi 1:203; Ibn Hishām 4:36; Kalā’i 1:138; Ibn al-Katheer 4:82 –1

Ibn Hishām 2:268; Ibn Sa’d 2:3, 24, 35; Ibn al-Atheer 4:16; Ibn Hajar 4:22 –2

Wāqidi 1:19, 2:457; Ibn Hishām 2:268, 3:243; Ibn Sa’d 1:207 –3

Wāqidi 1:53; Ibn Hishām 4:64; Ibn Sa’d 2:36; Ibn Hanbal 4:325 –4

Wāqidi 2:532 –5

Wāqidi 1:207, 2:457, 8:5; Ibn Hishām 2:268; Ibn Sa’d 2:25 onwards; Ibn Katheer 4:103 –6

He showed this in the Battles of Badr and Uhud and also in the Battle of Ahzāb when the Bani Quraydha broke their allegiance and in the Conquest of Makkah when he gave permission to acquire information about the capabilities of the enemy, especially [about] their weapons etc

He made a lot of effort to ensure that the intelligence division was highly active and dynamic and would always cooperate with the commander and those in charge^(١). For example in the Battle of Badr and the Conquest of Makkah, he used the intelligence to acquire every minor detail including the number of those animals slaughtered [for food]^(٢) and when he sent secret missions, like the Sariya of Hamzah ibn ‘Abd al-Muttalib, he did the exact same thing

The Noble Prophet (S) would always give importance to acquiring information at all times, whether before, during or after battle, like in the Conquest of Makkah, and in all situations, however difficult they may be^(٣), as in the Battle of Ahzāb where he ordered Hudhayfah bin al-Yamān to go and gather intelligence [about the enemy] in cold weather and harsh conditions

The Prophet (S) insisted that intelligence gathering be done from near and without keeping a distance from the enemy^(٤), like in the Battle of Uhud when he sent Anas and Munis^(٥) to Dhu Hulayfah, the place where the Quraysh had encamped and ordered them to join the enemy’s camp and remain with them. Then, when they arrived at Aqd, near Uhud, he sent Habbāb bin Mundhir

p: ١٢١

Wāqidi ١:١٩ onwards, ٢:٨٠٣; Ibn Hishām ٢:٢٤٨ ٤:٣٧ onwards; Tabari ٢:٤٣٤; Kalā’i: ٨٧ – ١ onwards; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٢:١٤٧

Wāqidi ١:١١, ١٩٤; Ibn Hishām ٤:١٤٠; Kalā’i ١:١٥١ – ٢

Zuhri: ٤٣; Wāqidi ١:١٩; Ibn Hishām ٢:٢٤٨, ٤:٣٧, ٤٢; Tabari ٢:٤٣٤; Kalā’i ١:٨٧ onwards – ٣

Wāqidi ١:٢٠٧; Ibn Sa’d ٢:٢٥; Tabari ٣:٣٧٨; Jawād ‘Ali, al-Mufassal fi Tārikh al-‘Arab – ٤ qabl al-Islām ١:٥٩٠

Wāqidi ١:٢٠٤ – ٥

and in this way he would use intelligence agents to transfer intelligence and information about the enemy and order them to penetrate within the enemy ranks and at the same time he would station guards and his intelligence agents at the northern borders of the enemy

The intelligence activities that were carried out by the Holy Prophet (S) were not only for obtaining information about the enemy, but also to negate any intelligence they may have acquired about him, and this was one of the most imperative steps he took which was most necessary and of the utmost importance⁽¹⁾. He (S) would do this in the following ways

Through ‘covert operations’⁽²⁾ while marching through routes that are filled with vegetation and trees in Madina; namely al-Manqā, al-Khubayth, Dhi Qasr, al-Kutayb and Dhi Amr, that took place in the Battle of Dhi Amr (also known as Ghatfān). In the two battles of Dhi al-‘Asheerah and Dumat al-Jundal the cover of darkness in the night was also benefitted from⁽³⁾. The Prophet (S) would advise the secret missions to take advantage of the darkness of night time, so they would mostly march at night, as is seen in the Sariya of Muhammad bin Maslamah against the Bani Bakr and that of Zayd ibn Hāritha against the tribe of Judhām and the mission of ‘Abd al-Rahmān bin ‘Auf against Dumat al-Jundal

⁽⁴⁾Speed and swiftness in movement, as was seen in the Battle of Dumat al-Jundal

Using shortcuts in order to arrive at the enemy’s camp faster as in

p: ۱۲۲

Wāqidi ۲:۷۹۲, ۸۰۳; Ibn Atheer ۲:۲۴۱; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ۲:۱۶۷ –۱

Wāqidi ۲:۶۳۶, Ibn Sa’d ۲:۴; Suhayli ۲:۱۴۲; Hamawi, Mu’jam al-Buldān ۱:۲۵۲, ۴:۴۲۸, ۵:۲۱۵ –۲
Ibn Hanbal ۵:۱۵۳; Bukhāri (al-Maghāzi ۲۸); Abu Dāwud (al-Jihād ۵۷); Wāqidi ۱:۴۰۳, –۳

۲:۵۵۷

Wāqidi ۱:۴۰۳, ۲:۵۳۶; Ibn Sa’d ۲:۶۱, ۱۱۷; Ibn Hishām ۳:۲۹۲; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ۲:۱۰۳ –۴

the Battle of Bani Lihyān and the commanders who were sent in the Sariya of ‘Akāshah bin Muhsin to fight against the Bani Asad, and (the mission of) Qutbah ibn ‘Aāmīr against the Khat’am

Ordering that bells should be removed from around the necks of camels⁽¹⁾ so that the forces could move unnoticed as in the example of the Battle of Muta and the .Conquest of Makkah⁽²⁾

Concealing the state of readiness and the initial mobilization of forces⁽³⁾, as was the case in the battles of Bani Saleem, Dhi Amr, Dhāt al-Ruqā’ and Bani Lihyān, and the .Sariya of Abi Qatāda bin Rab’i al-Ansāri towards the Batn Adham

Using secret codes and identification⁽⁴⁾ as was employed in the Battle of Badr and the .Sariya of Usāma bin Zayd from the commander of the group

Instructions to ensure that no noise was to be made that could alert the enemy of the approaching army⁽⁵⁾, like in the Battle of Khaybar where one of the soldiers was .prevented from going ahead of the army and advancing alone

Preventing the shining of weapons during the march and not passing in front of the inhabitants of the area⁽⁶⁾, just as he did in the Battle of Badr, Bani Saleem and the .Sariya missions of ‘Abdullah bin Jahash and ‘Ali ibn Abi Tālib (‘a) against the Bani Sa’d

Ordering the army to march through uninhabited areas⁽⁷⁾ like the desert routes which were taken by the supreme commander in the battles of Bani Saleem and Bahrān and [the Sariya of] ‘Amr ibn

p: ۱۲۳

Ibn Hanbal ۶:۱۵۰; Ibn Katheer ۳:۲۶۱ –۱

Wāqidi ۲:۷۵۵; Ibn Hishām ۴:۳۹; Kalā’i ۱:۱۳۸; Ibn Katheer ۴:۲۸۲ –۲

Wāqidi ۲:۷۹۶; Ibn Sa’d ۲:۳۳, ۴۳, ۵۶; Tabari ۲:۵۵۵, ۳:۳۸; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ۲:۱۶۱ –۳

Wāqidi ۱:۷۱, ۲:۴۶۶; Ibn Hishām ۲:۲۸۷, ۳:۲۳۷; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ۲:۲۸۲ –۴

Wāqidi ۱:۵۶, ۲:۶۳۶; Ibn Katheer ۳:۲۱۶ –۵

Wāqidi ١:١٣, ١٩٤; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٢١; Ibn Hazm: ١٠٨; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٢:١٠٩; Ibn Qayyim, -٤
Zād al-Ma'ād ٢:٢٩٩
Wāqidi ٢:٧٧١, ١:١٩٥; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٢١ -٧

Issuing the command that secrets should be safeguarded and information about the battle-plan should be kept hidden^(١), like in the Conquest of Makkah and the Sariya .missions of 'Abdullah ibn Jahash, Abi Qatāda and others

Diverting the enemy from the targets of attacks. This was carried out in various ways which would put the enemy in doubt and misguidance until they would assume that the Holy Prophet (S) is not marching against them^(٢). This is precisely what happened in the battles of Bani Lihyān and Dumat al-Jundal and also took the inhabitants on Makkah and their leaders by surprise in the Conquest of Makkah as they were unsure if Muhammad (S) was marching towards Najd, Hawāzin or another region, therefore .they were completely baffled and the matter was unclear to them

Arresting the spies and intelligence agents of the enemy and preventing them from sending information^(٣) as can be pointed out in the battles of Badr, Dumat al-Jundal and Bani al-Mustalaq. During the Conquest of Makkah, one of the spies of the Hawāzin was arrested before entry into Makkah and in the Battle of Khaybar, one of .the bold spies of the enemy who had acquired a lot of intelligence was captured^(٤)

The goals and objectives in terms of what the Holy Prophet (S) sought to learn about :and concentrated on were

First: Intention and Objective

He (S) would try to find out the goals and objectives of the enemy either through his intelligence agents who were always present among the

p: ١٢٤

Wāqidi ١:١٢, ٢:٧٩٦, ٨١٥; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٩٦; Kalā'i ١:١٣٨ -١

Wāqidi ١:٤٠٣, ٢:٥٣٦, ٢:٧٩٩-٨٠٥; Ibn Hishām ٣:٢٩٢; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٤٤; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٢:٥٤ -٢

Wāqidi ١:٤٠٤, ٢:٦٤٠, ٨٠٨; Ibn Hishām ٣:٢٦٨; Harawi, al-Hiyal al-Harbiyya: ٧٧ -٣

It should be noted that the enumeration of these points in such a manner has been -٤ undertaken by the translator for ease of understanding. In the original text the points

(.were not numbered. (Tr

enemies, like ‘Abbās ibn ‘Abd al-Muttalib(1), or by means of trickery(2) and deception(3). In the battles of Badr and Bani Lihyān, he kept the battle-plan, the time and the place secret and in the Battle of Khaybar, he deceived the tribe of Ghatfān in such a way that they returned back from whence they had come. In the battles of Uhud, Dhāt al-Ruqā’ and Khandaq, he learnt of the enemy’s goals by eavesdropping on the conversations of the [enemy] commanders and soldiers(4). Sometimes information was gotten from the way the enemy conducted its exercises and the activities that is carried out openly(5), or through allied tribes such as the Bani Dhumrah and Bani Mudlij. In the Battle of Dhāt al-Ruqā’ he got information from members of the Najd tribe and in the Battle of Tabuk he got information from the .Mudhar tribe

(Second: Assembly (of enemy troops

In this matter, the Prophet (S) would acquire his information from allied tribes(6) or by means of his intelligence division(7). Just like in the Battle of Uhud, he gave the responsibility to Habbāb ibn Mundhir to obtain information about the assembly and mobilization of the forces of the Quraysh. In the Battle of Khandaq, he used Zubayr ibn ‘Awām to get detailed information about the assembly of the confederates, their headquarters, the places where they were stationed and their level of intelligence(8). In the same way he got information from the intelligence gathering groups of Habbāb ibn Mundhir in the Battle of Uhud, Buraydah ibn Haseeb in the Battle

p: ۱۲۵

Ibn Sa’d ۴:۱ onwards; Ibn ‘Abd al-Barr ۲:۸۱۰; Ibn Atheer ۳:۱۰۹ –۱

Trickery here is not used in the negative sense, rather it means keeping the truth –۲
(.hidden and mentioning something else which is neither true nor false. (Tr

Wāqidi ۲:۵۳۶, ۶۵۱; Ibn Hishām ۲:۲۶۸, ۳:۲۹۲; Ibn Atheer ۲:۱۸۸ –۳

Ibn Hishām ۳:۲۴۳; Kalā’i ۱:۱۱۳ –۴

Wāqidi ۱:۲۰۷, ۳۹۵, ۲:۴۶۴ –۵

Wāqidi ۱:۳۹۵, ۳:۱۰۱۱; Ibn Hishām ۲:۲۴۱; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ۱:۲۲۶ –۶

Wāqidi ۱:۲۰۷; ۲:۴۵۷ –۷

.of Bani al-Mustalaq and Busr ibn Sufyān in the Battle of Hdaybiyya

Third: Terrain and the points of advancement

The Holy Prophet (S) would use the following ways to gain complete and detailed information:

Through the vanguard of the army (1) like the action taken by the front-line of the contingent of ‘Abbād ibn Basheer in the Battle of Khaybar and of Khālid bin Walid in the Battle of Hunayn and others.

By using guides (2) like the employment of Jabbār the guide in the Battle of Dhi Amr, Abi Khuthaymah al-Hārithi in the Battle of Uhud, Madhkur from the tribe of Bani Udhrāh in the Battle of Dumat al-Jundal and Haseel bin Mudhirah in the Battle of Hdaybiyya.

The supreme commander would instruct the commanders to make use of guides, especially on routes and in areas that were not well known to them and also in routes that were outside the regular paths; or to use the prisoners (3) who had valuable information as was done in the battles of Dumat al-Jundal, Bani al-Mustalaq, Khaybar etc. and in the various Sariya missions.

From the inhabitants of the area (4). They would send people to them and by asking them questions, they would establish the movement patterns of the enemy and other issues, as was carried out in the battles of Badr and Khaybar. In the Battle of Tabuk too, they benefitted from the intelligence that the tribes who lived near the area where the enemy was marching had to share.

(By sending patrols to far off areas to gather information (5).

Fourth: Identifying the area of operations

’The supreme commander would complete his ‘identification

Zuhri: ٩٢; Wāqidi ٢:٦٤٠, ٣:٩٩٦, ١١٢٣; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٦٩, ١٠٩ -١

Wāqidi ١:١٩٤, ٢١٨, ٤٠٤, ٢:٦٣٩, ٣:١١١٧ -٢

(Wāqidi ١:٤٠٤-٤٠٦, ٥٥٠, ٦٤٠; Abu Dāwud (al-Jihād ٨٤ -٣

Wāqidi ٢:٦٦٦, ٣:١٠١١; Ibn Hishām ٢: ٢٦٨ -٤

Wāqidi ١:١٩; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٢٥ -٥

using various intelligence apparatuses(1) and would also personally get involved in this(2) like in the battles of Badr, Uhud, Khaybar and Khandaq. The most important ways that the Holy Prophet (S) used to obtain this information was using watchmen and eavesdroppers

Watchmen: The lookout would be appointed in the intelligence gathering missions(3). During this, they would keep watch over the enemy's movements inside and outside the points of interest(4) as well as possible areas in two tactical and strategic levels. Some of the sentries(5) or watchmen would keep an eye on the routes taken by the enemy's caravans(6), just as was the case when one of the troops was posted at Nakhbār in order to keep an eye over the activities and movements of the enemy, or in the Sariya of Zayd bin Hāritha where they performed the duty of a lookout when he was encamped at 'Ayyis(7). These forces would stand in a place from where they could carry out their duties as watchmen and spies in an effective manner(8)

In every situation, one sentry or spy was posted in a secret location, hidden from the eyes of the enemy(9) and would take advantage of his senses of sight and hearing(10). No amount of hardship, tribulation or affliction would prevent him from carrying out his duties(11). Anees ibn Abi Murthad al-Ghanawi who was the sentry appointed in the Battle of Hunayn, remained steadfast despite all the hardships that he had to face. He also remained

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- Ibn Hishām 2:271, 3:69; Ibn Sa'd 2:9; Tabari 3:9 –1
Wāqidi 2:445; Ibn Hishām 2:271; Tabari 2:507; Kalā'i 1:30; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās 2:131 –2
Ibn Sa'd 2:2, 56, 63, 85, 95; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās 1:224, 2:103–112, 145 –3
Wāqidi 1:11, 195, 443; Ibn Sa'd 2:63; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās 2:106 –4
Wāqidi 1:217, 2:602 –5
Wāqidi 1:19 onward; Ibn Sa'd 2:63; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās 2:106 –6
Wāqidi 2:564, 3:894; Ibn Hishām 4:265; Ibn Sa'd 2:65; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās 2:110 –7
Wāqidi 1:217, 3:894; Ibn Hishām 2:265; Ibn Sa'd 1:63; Ibn Katheer 4:222 –8

Wāqidi ٢:٧٥٠, ٣:٨٩٤; Jawād ‘Ali ٥:٤٣٦ –٩

Ibn ‘Abd al-Barr ٢:٧٦٤; Ibn Atheer ٣:٩ –١٠

Wāqidi ٣:٧٥١, ٨٩٤; Ibn Sa’d ٢:٩٠; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٢:١٥٠ –١١

firm in the Sariya of Ghālib ibn ‘Abdullah al-Laythi despite having been shot and injured by an arrow

Eavesdroppers: This was a method that the Holy Prophet (S) used during the night or in situations where visibility was low or when the weather was bad. In such cases, the intelligence agents and eavesdroppers would move in complete secret until they arrived at the enemy’s camp. They would eavesdrop on their conversations and then return and inform the Muslim army of what they had heard^(١). This is exactly what one of the members of a Sariya mission did for the Bani al-Maluh. Hudhayfa ibn al-Yamān also used eavesdropping against Abu Sufyān, the commander of the army of confederates

What can be seen is that the responsibility of information gathering and eavesdropping needed to be given to men who had certain attributes and qualities, from bodily strength and courage to freedom from certain sicknesses such as coughing, being hard of hearing etc. that could prevent in their successfully carrying out the missions^(٢)

:The types of information that the Prophet (S) sought to obtain were

General information, for which he would employ normal troops to gather the information such as the vanguard^(٣), patrols^(٤), guides^(٥), locals^(٦) etc

Urgent information, for which the special military patrols would be brought in^(٧). Just as in the battles of Badr, Dumat al-Jundal, Bani al-Mustalaq and the Conquest of Makkah, and the Sariya of ‘Akashah ibn

p: ١٢٨

Wāqidi ٢:٧٥٠; Ibn Hishām ٣:٢٤٣; Ibn Sa’d ٢:٨٩; Tabari ٣:٢٧; Kalā’i ١:١١٣-١

Ibn ‘Abd al-Barr ١:١١٣, ٣٣٤; Ibn Atheer ١:٣٩٠-٢

Wāqidi ١:١٩, ٢٠٧; Ibn Sa’d ٢:٢٥, ٤٥-٣

Wāqidi ٢:١٩٤, ٢١٨, ٤٠٤, ٢:٤٣٩, ٣:١١١٧-٤

Wāqidi ٢:٤٤٤, ٣:١٠١١; Ibn Hishām ٢:٢٤٨-٥

Wāqidi ٢:٤٠٦, ٥٥٠, ٨٠٥; Ibn Hishām ٢:٢٦٨; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٤٤, ٦٢-٦

Wāqidi ١:٢٠٣; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٢٥-٧

.Muhsin against the Bani Asad, that of Zayd bin Hāritha and other similar missions

Sometimes this action would be carried out by those who were behind enemy lines as in the Battle of Uhud. The commander would turn to this when he did not have enough information about the enemy^(١), so he would capture some prisoners and would obtain the information from them^(٢)

Reconnaissance would be carried out according to the different stages, meaning the Prophet (S) would conduct reconnaissance at the tactical level to make preparations for battle and during battle^(٣) when the field of operation for the intelligence agents was limited to the front lines of the enemy, however reconnaissance at the strategic level was carried out by his forces deep within the enemy territory and among the enemies

Additionally, in order to protect the troops during movement and encampment, he would post his intelligence patrols for reconnaissance in front and on the sides of the army^(٤), as he had done when marching from Madina to Badr and from Madina towards Uhud and from Makkah towards the valley of Hunayn

In the same way, he (S) would carry out reconnaissance of the territories and areas where the troops could camp with relative ease and their surrounding areas^(٥), like in the battles of Badr, Uhud and Khaybar and would select those people to keep watch whose duties among other things, was to prevent the enemy from finding out their numbers, to protect their base from the approaching enemy, protecting the commander and the

p: ١٢٩

Wāqidi ١:٤٠٤, ٢:٥٥٠, ٨٠٥; Ibn Hishām ٢:٢٦٨ –١

Wāqidi ١:١٩, ١٩٤, ٤٠٤, ٢:٦٤٠, ٣:٩٩٦, ١١٢٣; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٢٥, ٤٥, ٦٩, ١٠٩ –٢

Wāqidi ١:٢٠٤ onwards; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٢٥ onwards –٣

Zuhri: ٩٢; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٦١, ١٠٩; Ibn Hazm: ١٠٨, ١٠٩ –٤

Ibn Hishām ٢:٢٧١ onwards, ٣:٦٩; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٩; Tabari ٣:٩; Kalā'i ١:١٣٠; Ibn Sayyid al- –٥

Nās ٢:٢٣٢

troops from being taken by surprise and giving warning about the nearing enemy (while at the same time not giving any opportunity to enemy spies and saboteurs)

This guarding and protection was either stationary, which would protect in sensitive and dangerous areas, or mobile, which would offer protection in some areas that were considered to be of special importance militarily and during battle; and normally the former type would require fewer numbers of troops

Operations Personnel

point

Operations personnel were all the units responsible for planning, command, training, upgrading weapons, equipment and war strategies and all matters related to these.

We shall now proceed to give details about each one of these

First: Department of Operations

point

The Department of Operations was a division that was responsible for planning, military command and securing backup from the military and administrative standpoint

a) Orders of operations: Before or during battle, the Holy Prophet (who was also the supreme commander) issued orders to the army either verbally or in writing, as he had done with ‘Abdullah ibn Jahash and Abi Salamah ibn ‘Abd al-Asad al-Makhzumi when sending them to the tribes of Bani Asad, or to the commander of the groups during the Battle of Hunayn and during their entry into Makkah

These orders included the following

Objective: In all the orders of all the battles and military missions, the objective was specified

The necessary measures to be taken during war: as in the Battle of Badr, digging

the trench in the Battle of Ahzāb, or

p: ۱۳۰

Wāqidi ۱:۲۱۷, ۲:۶۰۲ –۱

Wāqidi ۲:۴۶۲, ۷۳۴; Ibn Sa'd ۲:۴۸; Tabari ۲:۵۶۸; Suhayli ۳:۲۷۰ –۲

Wāqidi ۲:۴۴۴, ۴۶۴, ۸۱۵ –۳

Wāqidi ۱:۲۲۰, ۳۷۱; Ibn Sa'd ۲:۴۸ –۴

Wāqidi ۱:۱۳; Ibn Sa'd ۲:۳۵; Ibn Hazm: ۱۰۵; Kalā'i ۱:۱۴۴ –۵

Ibn Sa'd ۲:۲ onwards –۶

Shaybāni, al-Kabir ۱:۵۸; Wāqidi ۱:۶۷, ۳:۹۹۶; Ibn Hishām ۲:۲۷۸, ۳:۲۶۰, ۴:۱۶۱; Ibn Sayyid al- –۷

Nās ۲:۲۱۶

.before the start of the war like in the Battle of Tabuk

Choosing the specific location(١): For each operation, the area where the forces .٣ would remain and from which they would not cross would be specified, as in the Sariya of ‘Abdullah ibn Jahash towards Nakhlah and like the Battle of Dhi Amr towards .the place where this tribe had settled and also in the ‘conquest’, towards Makkah

Ways of reaching the goal(٢): It was necessary for the army to cross over certain .٤ points, lands and known areas, like in the battles of Badr, Saleem, Hodaybiyya and .Khaybar

Direction(٣): The Muslim army would march towards the places where the enemy .٥ had been mobilized or towards the areas where the supreme commander had specified for them, like in the Sariya of Hamza ibn ‘Abd al-Muttalib towards the land of the Juhaynah, Abi Qatāda ibn Rab’i al-Ansāri towards Batn Adham and Kurz ibn Jābir Fahri towards the area where he could join the group of ‘Ikl and ‘Urayna, and also in .the Battle of Bani Quraydha to the place where the Jews were living

Locating the most appropriate place to set camp(٤): The most appropriate place for .٦ the army to set camp and create a base, where the required amenities were close by and from where administration and medical care could be given, was ascertained. Like in the battles of Badr, Uhud

p: ١٣١

Zuhri: ٨٩; Wāqidi ١:١٣, ١٩٣; Ibn Sa’d ٢:٥, ٢٤; Tabari ٣:٤٢; Ibn Hazm: ١٠٥ –١

Wāqidi ١:١١; Ibn Hishām ٣:٢٤٤; Ibn Sa’d ٢:٥, ٢٤; Tabari ٣:٦; Kalā’i ١:١٦٢ –٢

Ibn Hishām ٣:٦٩; Ibn Sa’d ٢:٩; Tabari ٣:٦; Kalā’i ١:١٣٠; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٢:١٣١ –٣

.Ibid –٤

Guarding and protection(١): The number of guards, their commander, their orders, .٧
.their position and all related issues were specified

Secret code and identification(٢): In order to identify the forces of the (Muslim) .٨
army, secret codes were used, which were changed from battle to battle and from
mission to mission, as was done in the battles of Badr and Khandaq and the Sariya
.missions of Abu Bakr against the Bani Kilāb and of Usāma bin Zayd towards the Abnā

Changing the flag-bearer(٣): The flag-bearer would be appointed by the supreme .٩
commander and would be changed from battle to battle. The responsibility of carrying
the flag was given to one of the soldiers who was known for his trustworthiness and
.reliability

Commanding the rear(٤): For the rear of the army, a specific commander was .١٠
appointed who was in charge of all the administrative matters [of that portion of the
army]. Some of these commanders would always be given this responsibility [in every
.[battle

Command of Sariya missions(٥): For separate and independent intelligence .١١
.gathering or military missions, a leader was chosen over a group of forces

Special conditions(٦): These special conditions called for special measures, like .١٢
giving an immediate response to the enemy in the Battle of Dhāt al-Suwayq and other
battles, carrying out attacks and assaults like in the battles of Bahrān and Bani Lihyān,
the conducting of suicide missions by ‘Umayr

Wāqidi ٢:٤٤٥, ٤٦٢, ٧٣٤, ٨١٥ –١

Wāqidi ١:٧٢, ٢:٤٦٦, ٧٢٢; Ibn Hishām ٢:٢٨٧; Ibn Sa’d ٢:٨٥; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٢:١٤٦ –٢

Wāqidi ١:١٢; Ibn Hishām ٢:٢٤٨; Ibn Khayyāt, al-Tārikh ١:٢٩; Ibn Hazm: ١٠٠ –٣

Wāqidi ١:٢٦, ٣٠٠, ٣٧٨; Ibn Hishām ٢:٢٦٤; Kalā’i ١:١٤٤ –٤

Ibn Sa'd ٢:٢, ٥٤, ٤١, ٨٥, ٩٥; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ١:٢٢٤, ٢:١٠٣, ١٤٥, ١٥٠, ١٤٢-٥
Wāqidi ١:١٧٤, ١٨٤, ٣٤٣; Ibn Hishām ٣:٢٩٢; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٥٤; Ibn Hazm: ١٥٥-٤

ibn ‘Uday bin Kharshah in order to assassinate ‘Asmā’, by Sālim ibn ‘Umayr in order to kill Abi ‘Akf, by Muhammad ibn Maslamah in order to kill Abi Ashraf and by ‘Abdullah .ibn ‘Ateek to assassinate Salām ibn Abi al-Haqeeq

Securing different requirements in the battlefield(1): like securing intelligence . ۱۳ information and administrative requirements in the battles of Badr, Khandaq and .Tabuk

Increasing the zeal(۲): When the orders would be issued, effort would be made to .۱۴ ensure that the spirit and zeal of the soldiers should be lifted while at the same time disheartening the enemy. Like the orders that were issued in the battles of Badr and .Uhud

Insisting on the steadfastness of the troops(۳): This can be clearly seen from the .۱۵ words of the supreme commander in all the battles

Seek recourse in patience(۴): Patience is the prerequisite of victory and many a .۱۶ group consisting of few individuals has been led to victory over a large army of .soldiers through patience

Sacrificing one’s wealth and life(۵): These are the two prime ingredients of .۱۷ volitional warfare and for this reason, the Holy Prophet (S) put a lot of importance on .these two factors in all his orders to the troops

This was the summary of the orders given and we will now proceed to explain each :one in detail

Objective .1

.Every war has ‘objectives’. The objectives of the Holy Prophet (S) in the battles were

.(Acquiring information(۶)

.(Invading the enemy caravans(۷)

.(Weakening the economic strength and cutting the lines of reinforcements(۸)

- Zuhri: ۶۳; Wāqidi ۱:۱۹, ۲۰۷, ۲:۲۴۵, ۴۵۰; Ibn Hishām ۲:۲۶۸; Ibn Sa'd ۲:۲۵ –۱
- Zuhri: ۸۷; Wāqidi ۱:۸۸, ۹۱; Ibn Hishām ۴:۶۴; Ibn Qayyim ۲:۳۸۶ –۲
- (Bukhāri (al-Jihād ۳۴, al-Maghāzi ۲۹); Muslim (al-Jihād ۱۲۳); Nasā'i (al-Jihād ۲۹ –۳
- (Ibn Hanbal ۲:۳۴۰, ۴:۳۵۴; Bukhāri (al-Jihād ۳۲); Abu Dāwud (al-Jihād ۴۹, ۱۳۰ –۴
- (Q۸:۷۴, Q۹:۲۰, ۴۱, ۸۸; Bukhāri (al-Riqāq ۳۴, al-Jihād ۲, ۳۱), al-Adab ۱ –۵
- Wāqidi ۲:۵۳۴, ۵۵۰; Ibn Sa'd ۲:۲, ۳۵; Tabari ۲:۴۱۰, ۳:۳۶; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ۲:۱۰۸ –۶
- Ibn Sa'd ۲:۲-۵, ۲۴; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ۱:۲۲۴, ۳۰۴ –۷
- Wāqidi ۱:۱۰-۱۳, ۱۹۷; Ibn Sa'd ۲:۲; Tabari ۳:۱۲۶; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ۱:۲۲۴ –۸

.from the west and east for the Quraysh and the Jews of Khaybar

Securing freedom for the propagation and spread of Islām(١) as was the case in the Sariya of Hamza ibn ‘Abd al-Muttalib and Khālīd ibn Walīd against the Bani Hārīth and also that of ‘Alī ibn Abī Tālib (‘a) against the Bani Mudhjah

Displaying the strength and might of the Muslim army(٢) as in the battles of Hamrā al-Asad, Hudaybiyya and Muta and that which was done against the Romans

Instilling fear and terror in the hearts of those who allied themselves with the enemies of Islām or were preparing to do so(٣)

Enacting peace treaties with neighboring tribes(٤): like the Bani Dhumrah, Bani Juhaynah and Bani Mudlij as well as the treaty with Bani Kalb; meaning those who had come to fight in Dumat al-Jundal, Tabir and the outskirts of Shām. This was done in order to secure the success of the military operations

Concentrating on the points and areas of tactical and strategic importance(٥) like the areas around the coast and towards the east after the Battle of Badr against the Bani Saleem who were a threat to the revolution and also towards the north in order to survey the area of Dumat al-Jundal and invading upon the enemy who were waiting for opportunity or had already begun working against the Muslim army(٦), like the Jews and the Romans

Assassinating those who had evil intentions against the supreme commander, the army troops, the caretakers of the towns or the Islāmīc revolution in

p: ١٣٤

Wāqidi ١:١١; Ibn Hishām ٣:٢٤٩; Ibn Sa’d ٢:٢; Tabari ٣:١٢٤; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ١:٢٢٤ –١

Wāqidi ١:٣٣٤; Ibn Hishām ٣:١٢٨, ٣٢١; Ibn Sa’d ٢:٩٢; Ibn Hazm: ٢٠٧, ٢٢٠ –٢

Wāqidi ٢:٤٤٤, ٤٧٠; Ibn Hishām ٣:٢٤٥, ٣٤٤; Ibn Sa’d ٢:٢; Ibn Hazm: ١٠٠ –٣

Ibn Sa’d ٢:٤٤; Tabari ٢:٤٠٨; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ١:٢٢٤; Kahālah, Mu’jam Qabā’il al-‘Arab –٤

Wāqidi ١:١٨٢, ٤٠٣, ٣:٩٩٢; Ibn Hishām ٣:٥٠; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٢-٥; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ١:٣٠٤-٥

Ibn Sa'd ٢:٢-٥; Tabari ٢:٥٦٤, ٣:٣٦, ١٠٠ -٦

Punishing the Jews of Bani Qaynuqā' (2) because they broke their allegiance and their covenant for their own benefit, and similarly the Bani Nadhir (3), Bani Quraydha (4) and the inhabitants of Khaybar (5). The Prophet (S) destroyed the pact of these four (groups) (6) with each other as well as their pact with the enemy Arab tribes (7)

Giving a strong reaction against Abu Sufyān and his forces: this was when they had (the intention to invade Madina and ransack it in the Battle of Dhāt al-Suwayq (8)

Dealing with the two tribes of Bani Saleem and Bani Ghatfān because they had (declared their open enmity against Islām (9)

Preventing other tribes from attacking Madina, such as the tribes of Bani Tha'labah (and Muhārib and others (10)

Teaching and training the children of the Ummah and purifying their hearts from filth, (doubts and falsehoods (11)

Creating fear against Rome and Persia (12): The Prophet (S) made it his general policy in dealing with these two states and preparing for war with them before they (launched an attack on the Muslim lands (13) or gain control over the northern borders

Taking the battle to the enemy territory (14): The Prophet (S) would only fight against the enemy outside Madina and the moment he received information that the enemy intended to attack Madina, he would launch a pre-emptive strike on them before they could start marching from their own lands. This happened in many of the battles like Bani Saleem, Dhi Amr and Bahrān against the Arab tribes and in Muta and Tabuk (against the Romans

Taking revenge and punishing those

Wāqidi ۱:۷۶; Ibn Hishām ۳:۵۰; Ibn Sa'd ۲:۱۹; Ibn Khayyāt ۱:۲۷; Tabari ۲:۴۷۹; Ibn Hazm: -۲

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Zuhri: ۷۱; Wāqidi ۱:۳۶۳; Bukhārī ۵:۸۸; Tabari ۲:۵۵۲ -۳

Zuhri: ۷۹; Wāqidi ۲:۴۹۶; Ibn Hishām ۳:۲۴۴; Ibn Sa'd ۲:۵۳; Tabari ۲:۷۱ -۴

Zuhri: ۸۴; Wāqidi ۲:۶۳۳; Ibn Sa'd ۲:۷۷; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ۲:۱۳۰ -۵

Wāqidi ۱:۷۶, ۲:۳۶۳, ۴۹۶, ۶۳۳ -۶

Wāqidi ۲:۶۵۱; Ibn Hishām ۳:۳۴۴; Ibn Qayyim ۲:۲۹۲ -۷

Wāqidi ۱:۱۸۱; Ibn Hishām ۳:۴۷; Ibn Sa'd ۲:۲۰; Ibn Khayyāt ۱:۲۸; Tabari ۲:۴۸۳ -۸

Wāqidi ۱:۱۸۲, ۱۹۳, ۲:۵۵۱, ۵۵۵; Ibn Hishām ۳:۴۶; Ibn Sa'd ۲:۲۱, ۲۴; Ibn Khayyāt ۱:۲۷; Ibn -۹

Hazm: ۱۵۲; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ۱:۲۹۲, ۳۰۴

Wāqidi ۱:۱۹۳, ۳۹۵, ۵۵۰; Ibn Hishām ۳:۲۱۳; Ibn Sa'd ۲:۴۳, ۵۸, ۶۱, ۸۵; Tabari ۲:۵۵۶; Ibn -۱۰

Sayyid al-Nās ۲:۵۲, ۷۹, ۱۴۶

Wāqidi ۱:۳۴۷, ۳۵۵; Ibn Hishām ۳:۱۹۴; Ibn Sa'd ۲:۳۶; Tabari ۲:۵۸۳; Ibn Hazm: ۱۷۸ -۱۱

Wāqidi ۱:۴۰۲, ۲:۵۶۰, ۳:۹۹۲; Ibn Hishām ۴:۱۵; Ibn Sa'd ۲:۴۴, ۹۲, ۱۱۸; Tabari ۳:۱۰۰; Ibn -۱۲

Hazm: ۱۸۴; Ibn 'Asākir, al-Tārikh al-Kabir ۱:۱۰۷; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ۲:۵۴

Zuhri: ۱۰۶ onwards; Wāqidi ۳:۹۹۲; Ibn Hishām ۳:۱۵۹; Ibn Sa'd ۲:۱۱۸; Suhayli ۴:۱۹۵; Ibn -۱۳

Sayyid al-Nās ۲:۲۱۵

Wāqidi ۱:۱۸۲; Ibn Hishām ۳:۵۰; Tabari ۳:۶۳, ۱۰۰; Suhayli ۳:۱۶۳; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ۲:۱۵۳, -۱۴

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who killed innocents(1): As was the case in the Sariya of Kurz ibn Jābir Fahri in order to teach the ‘Ikl and ‘Urayna a lesson. Or in order to punish those who were acting against the rules and regulations of the leader and ruler(2), like the opposition of the Jews of Bani Quraydha to the agreements and conditions of the homeland pact

Realizing peace(3): This was another objective. An example of this was the Battle of Hdaybiyya against the Quraysh and the Sariya of ‘Abd al-Rahmān ibn ‘Auf against the Bani Kalb

Coming to the aid of the oppressed(4): as was the case in the Battle of Dumat al-Jundal which took place on the orders and instructions of the supreme commander

Belief in oneness and unity(5): This was done by destroying the idols that were adorned and worshipped by the Arabs. An example was the Sariya of Khālid bin Walid in order to destroy the idol ‘Uzzā’, that of ‘Amr bin ‘Aās to destroy the idol Siwā’, of Sa’d ibn Zayd al-Ashal to destroy the idol Manāt, Tufayl ibn ‘Amr to destroy the idol Dhil Kiflayn and ‘Ali ibn Abi Tālib (‘a) to destroy the idol al-Filis and all the idols of the Ka’bah

(6)Collecting taxes from the tribes that had accepted Islām(6)

Sending military missions and commanding the army in battle .7

The Holy Prophet (S) arranged a number of military missions(7) and battles(8) or personally took on the responsibility of commanding them. On the tactical and strategic level he did the planning and expounded the short and long term goals(9) and the primary

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Wāqidi ۲:۵۶۸; Ibn Hishām ۴:۲۹۰; Muslim ۳:۱۲۹۶; Kalā’i ۱:۱۶۲ –۱

Wāqidi ۱:۷۶, ۳۶۳, ۴۹۶, ۶۳۳; Ibn Atheer ۲:۱۸۶ –۲

Zuhri: ۵۲, ۵۵; Wāqidi ۱:۳۴۷, ۲:۵۶۰, ۵۷۳; Ibn Sa’d ۲:۳۶; Ibn Hazm: ۲۰۸; Kalā’i ۱:۱۶۱ –۳

Ibn Hanbal ۳:۴۷۵; Khabbāri (al-Diyāt ۲۲, al-Madhālim ۶۰۵); Abu Dāwud (al-Malāhim –۴

(۱۷); Tirmidhi (al-Fitan ۸, al-Isti'dhān ۳۰

Ibn Sa'd ۲:۱۰۵, ۳:۱۱, ۱۱۸; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ۲:۱۸۴, ۲۰۰, ۲۰۷-۵

Wāqidi ۳:۹۷۳, ۹۸۰; Ibn Hishām ۴:۲۲۶; Ibn Sa'd ۲:۱۱۵; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ۲:۲۰۲, ۲۰۳; Ibn - ۶

Qayyim ۲:۴۷۱

Wāqidi ۱:۱-۸; Ibn Hishām ۴:۲۵۷; Ibn Sa'd ۲:۱; Tabari ۳:۱۵۵ onwards; Ibn Atheer ۲:۳۰۱; -۷

Kalā'i ۱:۵۷; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ۱:۲۲۳

Wāqidi ۱:۱۱ onwards; Ibn Hishām ۳:۲۲۴, ۴:۱۵, ۲۷۹; Ibn Sa'd ۲:۲-۶, ۱۹, ۲۴, ۶۱, ۸۶; Ibn - ۸

Hazm: ۱۸۴, ۲۲۰; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ۲:۵۴, ۱۰۸, ۱۵۳

Wāqidi ۱:۴۰۳; Ibn Hishām ۳:۳۴۲; Ibn Sa'd ۲:۴۴; Suhayli ۴:۵۶; Kalā'i ۱:۱۳۰ -۹

and secondary objectives(1), just as the primary objective of the Battle of Dumat al-Jundal was crushing the tribes of that area who were forcing the traders and travelers to pay a toll and the secondary objective was to instill fear in the hearts of the Romans.

The primary objective in the Battle of Khaybar was also to bring down Khaybar and deal with its inhabitants while the secondary objective was to prevent the Arab tribes from allying themselves to the Jews and preparation for war against the Quraysh in Makkah and those enemies who were deemed more dangerous(2).

He (S) also planned 'offensive' and 'defensive' operations(3) and would always use assaults and offense in every battle(4). He made this something that was ingrained in the minds and hearts of the soldiers(5). He would specify different stages of battle(6), meaning he would not just attack the enemy at one go, rather he would launch assaults on them at different times. If the enemy did not launch an all-out attack against him(7), he would launch successive and consecutive attacks on them and would fight each one independently while at the same time preventing others from joining forces with the enemy.

This is precisely what he did in his battle with the Jews. He started with the Bani Qaynuqā' and ended with Khaybar. He employed the same tactic against the Arab tribes of Bani Tha'labah and Ghatfān in the Battle of Dhi Amr, Bani Saleem in the Battle of Bahrān and Bani al-Mustalaq in the Battle

p: ۱۳۷

Wāqidi ۱:۱-۸; Ibn Hishām ۴:۲۵۷; Ibn Sa'd ۲:۱; Tabari ۳:۱۵۲ onwards; Ibn Atheer ۲:۳۰۳; -۱

Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ۱:۲۲۳

Wāqidi ۱:۷۶, ۲:۳۶۳, ۴۹۶, ۶۳۳; Ibn Sa'd ۲:۲, ۱۹, ۳۹, ۹۶ -۲

(Ibn Hishām ۲:۲۵۷, ۳:۴۶, ۶۴, ۲۱۳, ۲۲۴; Ibn Hanbal ۴:۲۶۲; Bukhāri (al-Maghāzi ۲۹ -۳

Wāqidi ۱:۳۲۴, ۲:۴۴۰; Ibn Hishām ۳:۱۹۲, ۲۲۴; Ibn Sa'd ۲:۳۵-۴۷; Tabari ۲:۵۴۶, ۵۶۵ -۴

Bukhāri (al-'Itq ۱۳); Muslim ۲:۱۳۵۷; Abu Dāwud (al-Jihād ۸۳); al-Nasā'i (al-Mawāqeet -۵

Tabari ٢:٤٠٨, ٤٠٤, ٣:٩-٣٨; Ibn Atheer ١:١٣٧, ١٧٣, ١٨٥, ٢١٤-٤

.Ibid -٧

.of Bani al-Mustalaq and others

The Prophet (S) would command the troops using ‘new techniques’^(١) of warfare, including centralization of command, organizing the ranks, laying siege, mobile defense, pre-emptive, offensive and psychological warfare

Studying what was important and necessary .٢

The Holy Prophet (S) would define the primary and secondary objectives for his commanders^(٢) and would stress on the importance of achieving the primary objective^(٣). His commanders would also adhere to this and issues of secondary importance would not deter them from their priorities. For example, when the supreme commander sent ‘Umar ibn al-Khattāb^(٤) to fight the ‘Ajz Hawāzin^(٥), after doing this he refrained from invading the other related tribes saying, “The Prophet (S) only commanded me to fight against the Hawāzin^(٦)”.

Tufayl ibn ‘Amr^(٧) also accomplished his primary objective^(٨) which was to join with the army that was sent towards Tā’if as well as his secondary objective^(٩) which was to break and destroy the idol Dhil Kiflayn and he never crossed over the limit that was determined for him. In the same way, he (S) specified the missions during the entry into Makkah by selecting the commanders of the different groups^(١٠), and in defining the priorities, he considered the personality of the commander, the type of enemy, the ordinances and the route to be taken

Preserving the goal .٤

The goals of the Holy Prophet (S) were numerous and various^(١١) and all of them were geared towards the complete annihilation of the enemy both materially and spiritually and the spread of the message of Islām, which he accomplished with complete freedom and total success^(١٢)

p: ١٣٨

Wāqidi ٢:٧٢٢, ٣:٩٢٣; Ibn Sa'd ١:٨٥, ١١٣; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٢:١٤٥, ٢٠٠ –٢

Wāqidi ١:٤٠٣; Ibn Hishām ٣:٣٤٢ –٣

Wāqidi ٢:٧٢٢; Ibn 'Abd al-Barr ٣:١١٤٤; Ibn Atheer ٢:٢٢٦; Ibn Hajar al-Isābah ٣:٢٧٩ –٤

For details about the tribe of 'Ajz Hawāzin see: al-Bakri, Mu'jam Masta'jam ١:٣٠٨; –٥

Hamawi, Mu'jab al-Buldān ٢:٢١

Wāqidi ٢:٧٢٢; Ibn Qayyim ٢:٣٥٨ –٦

Wāqidi ٣:٩٢٣; Ibn Sa'd ٢:١٣٣; Ibn 'Abd al-Barr ٢:٧٥٧; Ibn Atheer ٣:٥٤; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās –٧

٢:٢٠٠; Ibn Hajar ٣:٢٨٦

Ibn Sa'd ٢:١١٣ –٨

Wāqidi ٢:٩٢٣; Ibn Sa'd ٢:١١٣ –٩

Wāqidi ٢:٨٢٢; Ibn Hishām ٤:٤٧, ٤٩; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٩٨; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٢:١٧٢, ١٧٤ –١٠

Wāqidi ٢:٥٣٤, ٥٥٠; Ibn Hishām ٣:٢٤٩; Tabari ٣:١٢٦; Ibn Katheer ٣:٢٤٦ –١١

Zuhri: ٧١; Ibn Hanbal ١:٤٩, ٨٧, ٢٠٧; Bukhāri (al-Jihād ١٢٢); Abu Dāwud (al-Jihād ٢٢); –١٢

(Dārimi (al-Siyar ٢٩

The Prophet's enemies would always try to prevent him from attaining his goals, but they were not successful and he (S) was steadfast in guarding his goal(1). The .supreme commander would also require this from his commanders

For example, he sent 'Ali ibn Abi Tālib (a)(2) to destroy the idol of the tribe of Tā'i(3) and also sent him in the second phase to spread Islām among the tribes of Yemen(4). 'Ali (a) arrived in their land. The tribes rose up in opposition to him, but he fought them and continued his important mission until he was able to secure his goal(5). However, Khālid bin Walid(6) did not remain steadfast in his mission to invite the Bani Judhayma to Islām(7) and diverted from his goal. Despite not having been ordered to kill them, .(he slaughtered some of the men of the said tribe(8)

Exhortation to fight .Δ

The Prophet (S) would exhort the soldiers and fighters towards dedication and self-sacrifice, to the extent of their ability, and would try to strengthen their spirits, resolve and readiness before they entered into battle(9). He would call on them to be just and fair in their dealing with those whom they were fighting. He would also encourage his soldiers and urge them to be brave(10) and would recall the reward of those who were .(patient in the battlefield(11)

This yielded many results, because the soldiers would jump into the heat of battle and in order to combat the enemy, would try to overtake death(12). Many of them came to the

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Zuhri: 52; Ibn Hishām 3:107; Tabari 2:326; Ibn Hazm: 175; Kalā'i -1
Wāqidi 3:948; Ibn Sa'd 2:118; Ibn 'Abd al-Barr 3:1098; Ibn Atheer 4:16; Ibn Sayyid al- -2
Nās 2:207; Ibn al-Qayyim 3:948
Suhayli 1:107; Yāqut Himyari, Majma' al-Buldān 4:2273; Jawād 'Ali 6:278 -3
Yāqut Himyari 1:536; Ibn Mandhur, Lisān al-'Arab 2:278 -4
Wāqidi 3:1080 -5
Wāqidi 3:875; Ibn Hishām 4:70, 73; Ibn Sa'd 2:196; Tabari 3:66; Ibn Hazm: 235; Kalā'i -6

١:١٤٣; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٢:١٨٥; Ibn Hajar ٢:٩٨

Wāqidi ٣:٨٧٥; Ibn Sa'd ٢:١٠٦-٧

This event only affirms the fact that Khālid bin Walid, who became a Muslim a little –٨ while before the Conquest of Makkah, still had a tendency to act as the Arabs of the Age of Jāhiliyya used to act. His killing of Mālik ibn Nuwayra and forcefully fornicating with his wife on the same night is recorded in history (see: Ibn Hajar ‘Asqalāni, al-

(Isābah fi Tamyiz al-Sahāba ٣:٣٣٧ and Dhahabi, Tārikh al-Islām ١:٣٥٣

Q٤:٨٤; Q٨:٦٥; Ibn Hishām ٢:٢٧٩; Ibn Hanbal ١:١١٧; Tabari ٢:٤٤٨-٩

Ibn Hanbal ٤:٣٥٤; Bukhāri (al-Anbiyā' ٥٤, al-Adab ١٠); Abu Dāwud (al-Jihād ٢٤); -١٠

(Nasā'i (al-Zakāh ٨٥, al-Buyu' ٩٨

(Bukhāri (al-Maghāzi ١٧); Muslim (al-Imārah ١١٧) | Tirmidhi (al-Zuhd ٤٨-١١

(Ibn Hanbal ٥:٣٢٤, ٤٠٦; Muslim (al-Musāfirun ٣٠٥); Abu Dāwud (al-Jihād ٢٢-١٢

battlefield with complete courage. In one of the battles, a soldier who had a date in his mouth spit it out(١), another threw away his armor and fought courageously(٢). The youth would keenly prepare for battle(٣) and as a result, with a small force they were able to gain victory over large hoards

The flag and banner .٦

The Liwā' (٤) was one sign that was carried by the most courageous and strong soldier in the Muslim army under the command of the supreme commander(٥). The flag-bearers, who were personally selected by the Holy Prophet (S)(٦), would be changed in every battle(٧). The color of the flag was white(٨) and its shape was quadrangular(٩).

As for the Rāyah(١٠), it too was held by the bravest and strongest soldier of each tribe(١١) and depending on the number of tribes present at the time of organizing the army, it had various shapes and colors(١٢). The Rāyah was normally smaller than the Liwā'. The flag was a means of strengthening the spirits of the forces, and as long as it was hoisted, the forces would continue fighting(١٣). If the flag fell, the troops would be faced with defeat(١٤), so the commander would insist on guarding the flag and self-sacrifice until death in order to safeguard it(١٥).

The flag-bearer would strive to keep the flag hoisted even if it meant having his hand chopped off or giving up his life(١٦). If one of the brave-hearted soldiers saw in himself the ability to rescue the army from defeat, he would raise the flag again

p: ١٤٠

Ibn Hishām ٢:١٧٩; Ibn Hanbal ٣:١٣٧; Ibn Atheer, Usd al-Ghābah ٢:١٤٣ –١

Ibn Hishām ٢:٢٠٨; Suhayli ٣:٤٨; Ibn Atheer ٢:٢٤; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ١:٢٥٧ –٢

Wāqidi ١:٢١, ٨٨; Ibn Hishām ٣:٧٠; Tabari ٢:٥٠٥; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٢:٦ –٣

(A large flag (Tr –٤

Wāqidi ١:١٢; Ibn Hishām ٢:٢٥١, ٣:٣٤٢; Ibn Hazm: ١٠٢, ١٠٨; Ibn Sayyidah, al-Mukhassis –٥

٦:٢٠٤; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ١:٢٤٤; Ibn Katheer ٣:٢٤٤, ٢٤٠

Wāqidi ١:٣٨٨, ٤٠٨; Ibn Hishām ٣:٣٤٢; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٤٥, ٤٨; Ibn Hazm: ٢١٢ –٦

Wāqidi ١:٢٢, ٢:٨٢٢; Suhayli ٤:٩٦; Ibn Katheer ٣:٢٤٥-٢٤٧ -٧

Wāqidi ٢:٦٤٩, ٨٢٤; Ibn Hishām ٢:٢٦٤; Ibn Mājah (al-Jihād ٢٠); Abu Dāwud (al-Jihād ٦٩); -٨
. (Nasā'i (al-Hajj ١٠٦

(Ibn Hanbal ٤:٢٩٧; Abu Dāwud (al-Jihād ٦٩); Tirmidhi (al-Jihād ١٠ -٩

(A banner (Tr -١٠

Wāqidi ٢:٨٠٠, ٨١٢, ٨١٩ -١١

.Ibid -١٢

Ibn Hishām ٣:٣٤٢; Ibn Hanbal ١:٣١; Bukhāri (al-Maghāzi ٤٤, ٤٨; al-Jihād ١٠); Abu -١٣

Dāwud (al-Jihād ٦٩); Suhayli ٣:٣٢

Wāqidi ١:٢٣٩; Ibn Hishām ٤:١٩-٢١; Ibn Khayyāt, Tārikh ١:٢٩; Tabari ٣:٣٧; Ibn al- -١٤

Qayyim ٢:٣٧٥

Wāqidi ١:٢٢٠, ٢:٤٩٩; Kalā'i ١:١٠١ -١٥

Wāqidi ١:٢٢٥; Ibn Hishām ٤:١٩ onwards; Tabari ٣:٢٣٧; Suhayli ٤:٨١ -١٦

after it had fallen(١), and it would not be long before the dispersed army would again assemble and prepare to fight

Code words and identification .Y

These were words by which the soldiers would recognize each other when battling against the enemy. This code word was changed from battle to battle(٢). In the Battle of Badr, the code was ‘Ahad... Ahad’ (one... one). The code word of the Khazraj was ‘O Bani ‘Abdillah’ and the code word of the Aus was ‘Bani ‘Ubaydillah’. In the Battle of Khandaq, the code word of the army was ‘Hum La Yunsarun’ and the code of the Muhājirs was ‘Ya Khaylullah’. In the Conquest of Makkah, Hunayn and Tā’if it was ‘O .’Bani ‘Abdul-Rahmān

The code word was used when the forces would communicate with each other and was especially necessary during the night, because the clothes were similar and there was the possibility of mistaking enemy patrols for friendly patrols(٣). Even today, code words are still used(٤). These secret codes are always different in each war, and when they are found out by the enemy, they are immediately changed. The mentioned codes were not limited to battles, rather the commander of Sariya missions would also give his troops different codes when sending them out on missions(٥). Just like what happened in the Sariya of Abu Bakr against the Bani Kilāb and that of Usāma against the Abnā

Being prepared for war .A

This took the form of giving a quick response to the incursions of the enemy and not giving them an opportunity to accomplish their

p: ١٤١

Wāqidi ١:٢٠٣, ٢:٧٦٣; Ibn Hishām ٤:٢١; Tabari ٢:٥١٣, ٣:٤٠; Kalā’i ١:١٣٦ –١

Wāqidi ١:٧١, ٧٢, ٢:٤٦٦; Ibn Hishām ٣:٢٣٧, ٤:٥١ –٢

Wāqidi ١:٥٤, ٢:٤٦٠, ٥٠٤; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ١:٢٤٦; Ibn Katheer ٤:١٢١ –٣

Ammād Talās, al-Rasul al-‘Arabi: ١٧٤; al-Lawā Khattāb, al-Rasul al-Qā’id: ١٢٣; –٤

Wāqidi ١:٨

Wāqidi ١:٧٢٢, ٣:١١١٧; Ibn Hishām ٤:٢٩١; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٨٥, ١٣٦; Tabari ٣:١٨٤; Ibn Sayyid al-
Nās ٢:١٤٦, ٢٨١; Ibn al-Qayyim ٢:٣٥٨

intended goals^(١). It was required of the soldiers that they should quickly assemble at the call (of the supreme commander) with their weapons, armor and means of transport ready to launch counter-attacks^(٢). It is obvious that the Muslim army was prepared for battle with Kurz ibn Jābir Fahri when Madina was attacked and the strong response of the army when the supreme commander declared war against the Bani Quraydha^(٣), therefore they were able to get prepared for battle within a short .period of time

The preparation included wearing armor, sharpening swords, carrying spears and getting the means of transport ready. After assembly, all the columns would move towards the enemy and would in the end come together. The Holy Prophet (S) was the .(first person who prepared for battle in this war (against the Bani Quraydha)^(٤)

In the Battle of al-Ghābah^(٥), the soldiers quickly became ready with their battle gear, weapons and mounted their horses and joined ‘Ayniyah ibn al-Hisn^(٦). The Muslim army displayed its mobilization and readiness in the Sariya of Usāma ibn Zayd^(٧). At this time three thousand troops who were fully equipped^(٨) came together on the orders of mobilization and assembled in one day^(٩), something that is not seen even in today’s armies, because mobilizing such a large force cannot be done in less than three days. In reality, the zeal for war and martyrdom, discipline, sufficient training and constant preparedness for battle were the necessary pre-requisites for this .higher level of readiness

General mobilization .٩

The general mobilization is the creation of

p: ١٤٢

Zuhri: ٧٩, ١٥١; Wāqidi ٢:٢٩٤, ٣:١١١٧; Ibn Hishām ٢:٢٥١, ٣:٢٢٤, ٢٩٣, ٤:٢٩١; Ibn Sa’d ٢:١, ٥٣, -١
٥٨; Ibn Hazm: ١٠٣, ١٩١, ٢٠١; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ١:٢٢٧, ٢:٤٨
Wāqidi ٢:٥٣٩, ٥٤٥, ٣:١٠٥٧; Ibn Sa’d ٢:١; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ١:٢٢٧ -٢
Wāqidi ١:٥١٢; Ibn Hishām ٢:٢٥١; Ibn Sa’d ٢:١; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ١:٢٢٧ -٣
Zuhri: ٧٩; Wāqidi ٢:٢٩٤; Ibn Hishām ٣:٢٤٤; Ibn Sa’d ٢:٥٣; Ibn Hazm: ١٩١; Tabari ٢:١٨١; -٤

Suhayli ٣:٢٨٠; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٢:٩٨

Wāqidi ٢:٤٨٩; Ibn Hishām ٣:٢٤٤; Muslim ٣:١٣٩٢ –٥

Wāqidi ٢:٣٥٧; Ibn Hishām ٢:٢٩٣; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٥٨; Tabari ٢:٦٠١; Ibn Hazm: ٢٠١; Kalā'i ١:١٢٣; –٦

Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٢:٨٤

Wāqidi ٢:٥٣٩; Ibn Sa' ٢:٥٨; Muslim ٣:١٤٣٣; Tabari ٢:٦٠٢; Kalā'i ١:١٢٣ –٧

Zuhri: ١٥١; Wāqidi ٣:١١١٧; Ibn Hishām ٤:٢٩١; Ibn Sa'd ٢:١٣٦; Tabari ٣:١٨٤; Ibn Atheer –٨

٢:٣٣; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٢:٢٨١

Wāqidi ٣:١١٢٢ –٩

a battle-plan and making the necessary preparations for the armed forces, mobilizing the human, material, psychological and spiritual resources for battle while at the same time being economically and materially prepared for it(1). The Noble Prophet (S) would mobilize the people in groups or all together(2) depending on the available resources and the type of enemy

This is why he conducted a general mobilization(3) during the battles of the conquest and Tabuk, while in the Battle of Badr, he only ordered a partial mobilization(4). In most of the wars and battles, this would take place in secret(5) but sometimes, as in the case of the Battle of Tabuk, it was conducted openly

The armed forces would thus be prepared. When the order of mobilization reached the other Muslim tribes, they would all be called to prepare for battle(6). Once the troops were organized, they would be ready for a new mission(7); as had happened in the Conquest of Makkah and the Battle of Hunayn. The battle gear and weapons(8) were taken on loan from Safwān ibn Umayya before the battle and some more was bought to make it more complete, and the people would also assist in the preparation out of their fervor by contributing what was required, and they would be encouraged (to do so(9)

The spirit among them would be strengthened(10) and the faith in the righteousness of the battle that they are fighting would be ignited in them(11), the love for battle and combat(12) became intensified(13), and when it was

p: ۱۴۳

Wāqidi ۳:۱۱۱۷; Ibn Sa'd ۱:۱۳۶-۱

Majmu'ah min al-Mu'allifeen al-'Askariyyeen, al-Mawsu'ah al-'Askariyya ۱:۲۸۶-۲

Wāqidi ۱:۱۹, ۱۵۹, ۲:۷۸۰, ۳:۹۹۲; Ibn Hishām ۲:۲۵۷, ۳:۵۰, ۴:۳۱, ۱۵۹-۳

Zuhri: ۸۶, ۱۰۶; Wāqidi ۲:۷۸۰, ۳:۹۸۹; Ibn Hishām ۴:۳۱, ۱۵۹; Ibn Sa'd ۲:۹۶; Tabari ۳:۴۲, ۱۰۰; -۴

Ibn Hazm: ۲۳۳, ۲۴۹; Kalā'i ۱:۱۳۷, ۱۵۱; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ۲:۱۶۳, ۲۱۵; Ibn Qayyim ۲:۳۸۵, ۳:۳

Wāqidi ۱:۱۹, ۱۸۱, ۲۵۲; Ibn Hishām ۲:۲۵۷, ۳:۵۰; ۲۱۳; Ibn Sa'd ۲:۹, ۲۴; Ibn Khayyāt, Tārikh -۵

۱:۱۶, ۲۸; Tabari ۲:۲۶۷; Ibn Atheer ۲:۱۸۸; Kalā'i ۱:۸۵, ۱۲۴; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ۱:۲۴۱, ۲:۵۲

Wāqidi ١:١٩٣, ١٩٥; Ibn Hishām ٣:٣٠٢, ٤:٣٩; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٢٤; Ibn Hazm: ١٨٢; Kalā'i ١:١٣٨ –٦

Wāqidi ٣:٩٩٠ –٧

Wāqidi ٣:١٠٥٧; Ibn Hishām ٣:٢٤٤; Muslim ٣:١٣٩١; Ibn Atheer ٢:١٨٥; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās –٨

٢:٢١٦

Wāqidi ٢:٨٠٠, ٨١٢, ٨١٩, ٨٢٣, ٣:٨٩٥, ٩١٦; Ibn Hishām ٤:٤٢, ٤٦–٤٩; Ibn Sa'd ٢:١٠٨; Suhayli ٤:٩٦ –٩

Wāqidi ٣:٩٢٧; Ibn Sa'd ٢:١١٩; Tabari ٣:٧٣; Suhayli ٤:١٦٣ –١٠

(Q٨:٧٤; Wāqidi ١:٢٠; Ibn Hishām ٢:٢٧٩, ٤:٢٤١; Bukhāri (al-Jihād ٢, ٣١) –١١

Wāqidi ١:٢٠; Ibn Hishām ٢:٢٧٩; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٢٦; Bukhāri (al-Anbiyā' ٥٤, al-Jihād ١١٠); –١٢

(Muslim (al-Imārah ١١٧); Abu Dāwud (al-Jihād ٢٠

Ibn Hanbal ١:١١٧; Tabari ٢:٤٤٨ –١٣

announced that certain equipment was required, it would be collected and sent to fight the battle against the enemy^(١). It was certain that the people would all answer the call to mobilize and none of them ever turned away^(٢), and they would wear their battle armor in the quickest time possible^(٣). In some of the battles, the speed of mobilization and preparation of the army was such that it was done in less than ٢٤ hours^(٤). The distinguishing feature of the mobilization of the Muslim army was that the forces would try to outdo each other in obedience (to the Prophet) and would act ^(٥)with complete love and devotion.

Taking the appropriate counter-measures .1-

The Holy Prophet (S) would retaliate against the enemy in various ways, among them :were

Preventive counter-measures^(٦) which would be taken when information about an impending enemy attack on Madina was underway. This was seen in the battles and missions such as Bani Saleem, Dhi Amr, Bahrān, Dhāt al-Ruqā', Dumat al-Jundal and .Bani al-Mustalaq

Disciplinary counter-measures^(٧): These operations were conducted as a result of the breaking of pacts, heedlessness and impudence of the enemy against the rules and regulations of the Islāmic state. Of course it was normally the case that first warnings would be given, as in the case of the battles against the Bani Qaynuqā', Bani Nadhir, .Bani Quraydha and Khaybar

Decisive and conclusive counter-measures^(٨): This was a more serious and firm response to the enemy's incursions, to such an extent that they should never again even think of carrying out similar attacks

p: ١٤٤

(Ibn Hanbal ٣:٣٥٤; Tirmidhi (al-Zuhd ٤٨ -١)

Wāqidi ٣:٩٩٠; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٧٠; Ibn 'Abd al-Barr, al-Isti'āb ٤:١٤٧٣; Ibn al-Qayyim ٢:٣٠٣ -٢

Wāqidi ١:٣٣٥; Ibn Hishām ٣:٢٢٦; Ibn Hazm: ١٨٦, ٢٥١; Kalā'i ١:١٠٥; Ibn Qayyim ٣:٤, ٧, ٩, -٣

۱۶; Ibn Katheer ۴:۱۲

Zuhri: ۷۹۴; Wāqidi ۲:۴۹۶; Ibn Hishām ۳:۲۴۴; Ibn Sa'd ۲:۵۳, ۵۸; Muslim ۳:۱۴۳۳; Ibn Hazm: -۴

۱۹۱; Suhayli ۳:۲۸۰; Tabari ۲:۵۳۹, ۶۰۲; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ۲:۶۸

Wāqidi ۱:۱۸۱, ۲:۱۱۱۷; Ibn Hishām ۲:۲۵۱; Ibn Sa'd ۲:۱; Tabari ۲:۴۸۳; Ibn Hazm: ۱۵۵; Ibn -۵

Sayyid al-Nās ۱:۲۹۶

Wāqidi ۳:۹۹۱, ۹۹۴; Ibn Hishām ۴:۱۶۱; Ibn Katheer ۵:۴-۶

Zuhri: ۷۱, ۷۹, ۸۴; Wāqidi ۱:۱۷۶, ۳۶۳; Ibn Hishām ۳:۵۰, ۱۹۹, ۲۴۴, ۳۴۲; Ibn Sa'd ۲:۱۹, ۴۰, ۵۳, ۷۷; -۷

Tabari ۲:۴۷۹, ۵۵۲; Ibn Hazm: ۱۵۴, ۱۸۱, ۱۹۱, ۲۱۱; Kalā'i ۱:۱۱۱, ۱۳۰; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ۱:۲۹۴,

۲:۴۸, ۶۸

Wāqidi ۲:۴۵۷, ۴۵۸; Ibn Hishām ۳:۲۴۴, ۲۳۲; Ibn Atheer ۲:۱۸۶; Ibn al-Qayyim, Zād al- -۸

Ma'ād ۲:۲۹۲; Heiderābādi, Majmu'ah al-Wathā'iq al-Siyāsiyya lil-'Ahd al-Nabawi wal-

Khilāfah al-Rāshidah: ۲۵, ۲۶

in the future. Like what was done to the Bani Quraydha after they broke their pact and mobilized themselves to fight against the Muslims in the Battle of Ahzāb, and as a result they were all killed, and also what transpired against Abu Sufyān, the commander of the enemy forces, when he tried to threaten the Muslims and the response to his threat was much stronger and more forceful

Immediate counter-measures⁽¹⁾: This would take place immediately and swiftly after the enemy's incursion and would be forceful and strong, to such an extent that it would weaken the enemy's base and inflict severe loss and casualties on them; like in the battles of Badr al-Awwal and al-Ghābah

The routes taken by the forces .11

The Holy Prophet (S) would study and specify the routes (to be taken) from Madina to the enemy⁽²⁾, just as he had done in the Battle of Badr, Hdaybiyya and Khaybar, and he would also define the arrangement in which the forces would march⁽³⁾, and would also keep an eye over the main focal points⁽⁴⁾ like the movement of the forces from Madina towards Tabuk and from Madina towards Makkah, and would also select the places where 'military parades' would be held in the areas of settlement and assembly⁽⁵⁾.

In the Battle of Badr, the parade and review of the army in the area where it was assembled and camped was carried out in al-Buq'a. In the Battle of Uhud, the Muslim army was reviewed in Shaykhayn and in the Sariya of Usāma bin Zayd it was

p: ۱۴۵

Wāqidi ۱:۱۲, ۲:۳۵۷; Ibn Hishām ۲:۲۵۱, ۳:۲۹۳; Ibn Sa'd ۲:۱, ۵۸; Tabari ۲:۶۰۱; Ibn Hazm: ۱۰۳, -۱
۲۰۱; Kalā'i ۱:۱۲۳; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ۱:۲۲۷

Wāqidi ۲:۶۱۶, ۶۴۰; Ibn Sa'd ۲:۷, ۶۹; Ibn Hazm: ۱۰۸ onwards; Hamawī, Mu'jam al- - ۲
Buldān ۱:۴۸۰

Wāqidi ۱:۲۲۰, ۲:۶۴۲; Ibn Hishām ۲:۲۵۷, ۳:۳۲۳ onwards; Hamawī ۳:۳۸۰ - ۳

Wāqidi ۲:۸۰۰, ۸۰۲-۸۰۴; Bakri ۱:۳۰۳; Hamawī ۲:۱۴ - ۴

Wāqidi ۱:۲۰, ۳:۱۱۱۷, ۱۱۲۳; Ibn Hishām ۲:۵۷ onwards; Ibn Sa'd ۲:۲۵; Ibn Hazm: ۱۵۶; - ۵

carried out in Jaraf. The places of rest for the forces in the daytime and nighttime (١) and the places where the army should concentrate were also considered by him (S) as in the battles of Badr and Tabuk (٢). He (S) would select the shortest route to arrive at the goal and would keep it hidden from the view of the enemy (٣). At the same time, he would try as much as possible to choose routes that had wells and plenty of water (supply throughout) (٤).

The supreme commander would give the following instructions to the army when they set out:

To be careful not to make noise and avoid anything that would draw the attention of the enemy, like the bells worn around the necks of camels

.Not to use shiny and glittery tools

.Staying behind or moving ahead of the forces (٥)

.Moving during the night in order to remain hidden from the enemy (٦)

Taking routes that would not bring them directly face to face with the enemy (٧), like in the Sariya of ‘Abdullah ibn Jahash and the Conquest of Makkah

Moving swiftly (٨) in order to remain one step ahead of the enemy and arriving at the place of battle at the appropriate time

At the same time, the movement of the forces would be such that a group of information gathering patrols would be kept at a distance in order to keep watch. (٩)

.During this march, the forces were either on foot or on riding on camels (١٠).

The area of assembly and mobilization .١٢

This was a place which the Prophet (S) had chosen to conduct

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Nās ۱:۲۴۱ onwards

Ibn Hishām ۳:۶۹; Ibn Sa'd ۲:۵۹; Tabari ۳:۹; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ۲:۱۳۱ –۲

Wāqidi ۱:۱۳, ۲:۶۳۲; Ibn Sa'd ۲:۹۶; Hamawi ۱:۲۱۴; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ۲:۵۴; Ibn Katheer –۳
۳:۲۶۱

Ibn Hishām ۲:۲۶۸ onwards, ۳:۶۹, ۹۰; Ibn Sa'd ۲:۹۶; Bakri ۳:۷۴۲ –۴

Wāqidi ۱:۵۶, ۲:۵۳۵; Ibn Katheer ۳:۲۶۱ –۵

Wāqidi ۱:۴۰۳, ۲:۵۳۴, ۵۵۷; Ibn Hishām ۳:۲۷۹; Ibn Sa'd ۲:۴۴, ۵۶; Kalā'i ۱:۵۸; Ibn Sayyid al- –۶
Nās ۲:۵۴, ۷۹

Wāqidi ۱:۱۳, ۲:۲۵۲, ۸۰۰; Ibn Hishām ۲:۲۵۲; Ibn Hazm: ۸۰۲ –۷

Wāqidi ۱:۴۰۳, ۲:۵۳۶; Ibn Hishām ۳:۲۹۲; Ibn Sa'd ۲:۶۱, ۱۱۷; Ibn Atheer ۲:۱۸۸; Ibn Sayyid –۸
al-Nās ۲:۱۰۳

Wāqidi ۱:۲۱۷, ۲, ۶۰۲ –۹

Ibn Hishām ۲:۲۶۴; Ibn Sa'd ۲:۱۲; Ibn Hazm: ۱۰۸; Qurtubi, al-Jāmi' li Ahkām al-Qur'ān –۱۰
۴:۳۰۶; Ibn Katheer ۳:۲۶۰, ۵:۹

the following matters: assemble the forces(١), organize them(٢), review them(٣), carry out a selection of some soldiers and ask others to return(٤), prepare the battle gear, weapons(٥), conduct a final check(٦), arrange the necessary food and water provisions(٧), prepare (the soldiers) physically and mentally(٨), make the battle-plan by taking all the possibilities and different battle scenarios into consideration(٩), select and announcing his deputy in Madina(١٠), review the flags and banners and select those who will carry them(١١), determine the tribes who will participate in the (battle(١٢) and review the means of transport to be used by the forces(١٣

The area of encampment and setting up base .١٣

This was a place selected by the Prophet (S) for the army to set camp(١٤). In the Battle of Badr it was in al-‘Adwat al-Dunyā, in the Battle of Uhud it was in front of the Mountain of Uhud(١٥) and in the Battle of Khandaq it was near the Sala’ Mountain. The camping of the troops in a suitable place(١٦), like an area which is fortified in three directions and keeps the enemies at bay; as in the Battle of Khandaq where only the northern area was accessible, and also selecting suitable places in battle, such that this place is in accordance with all the required conditions of a base camp. For example in the Battle of Khaybar, the said places were chosen by the inspection of the commanders(١٧) and the decision was based on the following criteria

Securing the ease of access and movement for friendly forces while at the same time making

p: ١٤٧

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- Wāqidi ١:٢٠, ٣٣٥, ٣:١١١٧; Ibn Hishām ٢:٢٥٧; Ibn Sa’d ٢:٢٥, ١٣٦ –١
- Wāqidi ٢:٨٠٠, ٨١٢, ٨٢٠, ٣:٨٩٥, ٩٩٥, ١٠٣٤; Ibn Hishām ٤:٢٤, ٤٩; Ibn Sa’d ٢:١٠٨; Ibn Hazm: –٢
٢٣١; Ibn ‘Asākir, Tārikh Dimishq ١:١١١
- Wāqidi ١:٢٠; Ibn Hishām ٢:٢٥٧; Ibn Sa’d ٢:٢٥, ٩٢; Kalā’i ١:١٣٥; Ibn Katheer ٤:٢٤٠ –٣
- Wāqidi ١:٢٠, ٢١; Ibn Hishām ٣:٧٠; Ibn Hazm: ١٥٩ –٤
- Wāqidi ٣:٩٢٧; Ibn Sa’d ٢:١١٩; Tabari ٣:٧٣; Suhayli ٤:١٦٣ –٥
- Wāqidi ٣:١١١٧; Ibn Hishām ٢:٢٥٧; Ibn Sa’d ٢:٢٥ –٦

Wāqidi ١:١٤٥, ١٩٨, ٥٠٠; Ibn Hishām ٢:٣٢٠; Kalā'i ١:١١٢; Ibn Katheer ٤:٢٨٢ –٧

(Ibn Hanbal ١:٣٠٧; Bukhāri (al-Jihād ١١٠); Abu Dāwud (al-Jihād ٢٤ –٨

Wāqidi ١:١٣, ٥٦, ٢١٧; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٩٦; Ibn Katheer ٣:٢١٦ –٩

Wāqidi ١:١٢ onwards, ٢:٥٧٣, ٣:٩٩٥; Ibn Hishām ٢:٢٤١, ٢٥١, ٣:٢٠٢, ٣٢١, ٣٤٢; Ibn Sa'd ٢:١١٩; –١٠

Ibn Khayyāt ١:٧١; Ibn 'Abd al-Barr ٣:١٠٢٣; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٢:١٦٧

Wāqidi ١:٢١٥, ٣٨٨, ٢:٨٢٢, ٣:٩٩٥; Ibn Hishām ٣:٣٤٢, ٤:٤٢; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٣٤, ٤٥; Ibn Khayyāt –١١

١:٢٩; Ibn Hazm: ٢١٢; Ibn Atheer ٤:١٦ onwards

Wāqidi ١:١٠–١٣, ٤٨, ٢:٨٠٠, ٨١٩, ٨٢٠; Ibn Hishām ٢:٢٤١, ٢٥١, ٤:٤٢; Ibn Sa'd ٢:١, ٤; Ibn Hazm: –١٢

١٠٠; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ١:٢٢٦

Wāqidi ١:٣٩٦; Ibn Hishām ٢:٢٦٤; Tabari ٣:١٠٢; Muslim ٣:١٤٢٩ –١٣

Q٨:٤٢; Wāqidi ١:٥٣; ٢:٤٤٥; Ibn Hishām ٣:٦٩, ٢٣١ –١٤

Mount Uhud is was used like a strong fort that was positioned behind the Muslim –١٥

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Wāqidi ٢:٤٤٥; Ibn Hazm: ١٨٦, ١٨٧; Tabari ٣:٩; Kalā'i ١:١٣٠; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٢:٢٣١ –١٦

Wāqidi ١:٥٣, ٢:٦٤٣; Ibn Hishām ٣:٢٣٤; Ibn Hazm: ١٨٦ –١٧

(11) it hard to reach for enemy troops

Facing the direction which would cause the sun to be behind their own forces (12); like in
the Battle of Badr and other battles

For the troops to be in front of a mountain or any other natural fortress (13); as in the
Battle of Uhud

(14) Keeping the base camp near sources of water and some major highways

(15) Plentitude of grass and grazing ground in the area

(16) Making sure the area is suitable medically and hygienically

(17) Ensuring the ground is hard and with areas where the battle can be fought

Being far away from the reach of enemy arrows (18); as in the battles of Bani Nadhir,
Bani Quraydha and Khaybar

(19) Having the possibility of moving away in case there are no reinforcements

The ability to cut off the enemy supply routes and stopping them from obtaining it
(20) (supplies)

(21) The possibility of securing the necessary cover and camouflage

(22) Being able to fully control their own forces

(23) Ease of movement in order to keep watch over the enemy and spy on them

In this area, the Prophet (S) placed the command post at an elevated position, so that
it would be possible for him to have complete control and ability to supervise the
war (24). He (S) would arrange the forces in ranks (25) according to their battle
instructions (26); like the cavalry, the infantry, the special forces, the vanguard, the
archers, the rear and others

The measures that were taken in the area when the base camp was set up included:

review and assessment(17); inspection of the troops(18); assembling the troops and
their

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Wāqidi 1:54; Ibn Hishām 3:344; Kalā'i 1:130; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās 1:251, 2:231 –1

Wāqidi 1:56, 220; Harawi, al-Hiyal al-Harbiyya: 97 –2

Wāqidi 1:199, 220; Ibn Hishām 1:53 –3

Wāqidi 1:56, 220; Harawi: 97 –4

Ibn Hishām 3:302; Muslim (al-Imārah 178); Ibn Hanbal 2:327; Tabari 507; Bakri 2:229, –5

1220; Hamawi 5:118

Wāqidi 2:644, 646 –6

Wāqidi 1:54; Ibn Hishām 3:344; Kalā'i 1:130; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās 1:251, 2:131 –7

Wāqidi 1:176, 363, 496, 2:633 onward, 992; Ibn Hishām 3:50, 199, 244 onwards 4:121; Ibn –8

Sa'd 2:19, 40, 53, 114; Ibn Hazm: 181, 191; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās 2:68, 130, 201

Wāqidi 1:177, 368, 449; Ibn Hishām 3:199; Kalā'i 1:111 –9

Wāqidi 2:651, 652, 804; Ibn Hishām 3:344; Kalā'i 1:130; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās 2:131 –10

Wāqidi 1:53, 2:445; Ibn Hishām 3:69; Kalā'i 1:130; 'Imād Talās, al-Rasul al-'Arabi: 310 – 11

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Wāqidi 1:53, 54, 220; Tabari 3:9; Kalā'i 1:130 –12

Wāqidi 2:462, 464; Ibn Hishām 4:85; Tabari 2:568 –13

Wāqidi 1:55, 220, 2:644; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās 1:131; Ibn Katheer 4:199; Harawi: 87 –14

Wāqidi 1:56, 224, 2:649; Ibn Hishām 3:231; Ibn Sa'd 2:48; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās 2:48 –15

Wāqidi 1:19, 27, 225, 2:645, 3:1002; Ibn Hishām 2:264; Muslim 3:1430 –16

Wāqidi 1:56, 2:445; Ibn Hishām 3:69, 231; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās 2:131 –17

Wāqidi 1:56, 219, 2:819–823; Ibn Hishām 3:218, 4:46 –18

accouterments(1); organizing the ranks(2); specifying the battle instructions(3), and the necessary guarding and protection especially of the command post(4); appointing the commanders of the ranks and contingents(5) including those responsible for the command post and its protection; preparing the troops psychologically and spiritually(6); encouraging them to fight(7); specifying the secret code words for identification(8); issuing the command to start the war(9); the mode of co-operation(10) between the forces as was done in the Battle of Badr – between the units like in the Sariya of Tufayl ibn ‘Amr, between the commanders who marched towards Tā’if after the Battle of Hunayn and between the units and contingents, as in the troops who entered Makkah during the Conquest of Makkah; conducting training exercises on the principles of archery(11), attack or the techniques that the soldiers should use when they come face to face with the enemy(12); specifying the time and place for war(13) which would be before the enemy was well prepared and in the hours of twilight. Aside from these issues, in the command post the battle with the enemy would also be supervised(14)

Keeping the operations secret and covert .14

The Holy Prophet (S) would try very hard to conduct the military operations in a covert and clandestine manner. Therefore he would take extra measures to attain this goal. For this reason, the mobilization and preparation for war would take place in secret; like in the Sariya of ‘Abdullah ibn Jahash and the Conquest of Makkah etc. and aside from a select few who were known for their

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Zuhri: 86; Wāqidi 1:219 onwards, 4:5, 2:522, 8:1, 1122; Ibn Hishām 3:23 – 1

Wāqidi 1:56, 219; Tabari 6:573; Ibn Hazm: 239 – 2

Wāqidi 1:219, 224; Ibn Hishām 3:243, 4:49; Ibn Sa’d 2:2 onwards; Suhayli 4:96; Kalā’i – 3

1:113

Wāqidi 1:217, 2:504; Ibn Sa’d 2:48; Tabari 2:567 – 4

Wāqidi 1:217, 2:504, 8:1, 820; Ibn Hishām 4:42, 46-49; Suhayli 4:60 – 5

Ibn Hishām 2:279; Ibn Hanbal 1:117; Bukhārī (al-Anbiyā’ 54, al-Jihād 110); Tabari 2:448 – 6

(Wāqidi ١:٥٨ onwards; Ibn Hishām ٤:١٤١; Ibn Hanbal ٣:١٣٧; Bukhāri (al-Maghāzi ١٧ –٧
Wāqidi ١:٧١, ٢:٤٤٤, ٣:١١١٧; Ibn Hishām ٣:٢٣٧, ٤:٢٩١; Ibn Sa’d ٣:٨٥; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٢:١٤٤ –٨
Shaybāni ١:٥٨; Wāqidi ١:٢٢٠, ٢:٧٧٨; Tabari ٢:٥٠٧ –٩
Wāqidi ١:٤٨, ٣:٩٢٣; Ibn Hishām ٤:٤٩; Ibn Sa’d ٢:١١٣; Colonel Akram, Sayfullah Khālid: –١٠
١١٤
Shaybāni ١:٥٨; Wāqidi ١:٤٧, ٤٨; Ibn Hishām ٢:٢٧٨; Muslim ٣:١٣٤٢; Ibn Qutayba ‘Uyun –١١
al-Akhbār ٢:١٠٧
Wāqidi ١:٣٤٣, ٣:١١١٧; Ibn Hishām ٢:٢٨١; Ibn Sa’d ٢:٣٥; Tabari ٣:١٨٤; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās –١٢
٢:٣٩
Wāqidi ١:١٣, ٣:٨٩٧; Ibn Sa’d ٢:٤٤, ٢٨١ –١٣
Wāqidi ١:١٧٧; Ibn Hishām ٢:٣٢٥–٣٢٧; Ibn Sa’d ٢:٧٠; Ibn Hazm: ٢٨; Kalā’i ١:١٣٤ –١٤

trustworthiness and their ability to keep secrets, nobody was aware what the intention and goal of the Holy Prophet (S) was

The Holy Prophet (S) would then issue brief instructions for the commander of the operations and would complete his orders to the commanders either by letter or verbally. He (S) would also specify the time it should take for the mission to be conducted and the direction and ways by which they should divert the enemy. He would keep the missions and preparations for some of the battles hidden and would not do them openly Aside from this, he would give instructions that the secrets should be kept hidden and the goal should not be announced until the appropriate time

He would disperse spies and intelligence agents , arrest enemy spies in order to prevent them from sending information to the enemy, blockade the routes used by the enemy spies so that they could not take information back to the enemy base , and would actually not permit any of these forces from entering or exiting the said area. In order that the intelligence apparatus may function even better, the Holy Prophet (S) would personally oversee these operations and would stress on their importance

Specification and assessment of the battle ground .۱۵

The assessment and specification of the battle grounds was linked to the military, economic and political prowess of the commanders and personnel. Strategically, a more prudent and complete, and from the tactical viewpoint, the enemy, the land and the battle strategy a firm position was selected

The Holy Prophet (S) would

p: ۱۵۰

Wāqidi ۱:۱۳, ۲:۳, ۲:۵۳۵, ۳:۱۱۲۳; Ibn Hishām ۴:۱۵, ۳۹; Ibn Sa'd ۲:۵۶, ۶۵; Kalā'i ۱:۱۳۸ – ۱
Wāqidi ۱:۱۳, ۲:۷۹۶; Ibn Hishām ۲:۲۵۲; Ibn Sa'd ۲:۵, ۹۶; Ibn Hazm: ۱:۴; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās – ۲

Wāqidi ١:١٣, ٣٤٣; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٣٥; Ibn Hazm: ١٠٥; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٢:٣٩; Ibn al-Qayyim –٣

٢:٣٥٨

Wāqidi ١:١٣, ٣٤٣; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٤٠; Suhayli ٣:١٣٦; Kalā'i ١:١٢١, ١٢٢; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٢:١٠٩ –٤

Wāqidi ١:١٣, ٢:٤٣٦; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٩٦; Ibn Atheer ٢:١٨٨; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٢:٥٤ –٥

Wāqidi ٢:٧٩٦, ٨٠٢–٨٠٥; Ibn Hishām ٤:٣٩; Ibn Hanbal ٣:٤٥٦; Bukhāri (al-Jihād ١٠٣, al- –٦

(Maghāzi ٧٩); Muslim (al-Tawba ٢٥٤); Abu Dāwud (al-Jihād ٩٢

Wāqidi ١:١٩٥; Ibn Hishām ٣:٥٠, ٤:٣٩; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٢٤, ٩٢; Ibn Atheer ٢:١٨٨ –٧

Wāqidi ١:٢٠٣, ٢٠٤; Ibn Hishām ٢:٢٦٨, ٤:٣٩; Ibn Sa'd ١:٢٠٧; Tabari ٢:٤٣٦; Kalā'i ١:١١٣ –٨

Wāqidi ١:٤٠٤, ٤٠٦; Ibn Hishām ٢:٢٦٨; Suhayli ٣:٤٣ –٩

Wāqidi ١:١١, ١٣, ١٩٦, ١٩٨, ٢:٨١٥; Ibn Hishām ٣:٥٣; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٢٤; Tabari ٢:٤٩٤; Ibn Hazm: –١٠

١٠٢

Wāqidi ٢:٨١٥ –١١

al-Mawsu'ah al-'Askariyya ١:٢٦١ –١٢

assess the battle readiness in all the ranks and would constantly seek information and updates about the enemy and his own forces in the battlefield(١١) and was completely aware of all the other military and political conditions(١٢). As a result, his orders would only be issued after being supported by strong intelligence and various other means
of affirming their prudence and correctness(١٣)

:Other matters that were examined and looked into by the Holy Prophet (S) included

With regards to the enemy: their strength, assembly, preparation and weaponry(١٤)

With regards to the friend: Furnishing complete battle gear and military equipment
(and making them equally trained and motivated(١٥)

With regards to the land: ensuring that it is suitable for setting up camp and carrying
out military operations(١٦)

Co-operation .١٦

The Holy Prophet (S) would encourage his forces to co-operate with each other when he was readying them for battle(١٧). He asked the soldiers and all the people to assist the army materially(١٨). In the same way, he would instruct the commanders to work with those who were under them, the soldiers to co-operate with each other, the units to collaborate with one another, the cavalry to support the infantry, the rear to work with the vanguard and the contingents to work with the army. In the same way he would himself, as the supreme commander, work with the soldiers(١٩) and in order to strengthen this bond(٢٠), he instituted a pact of brotherhood between the Muhājirs
(and the Ansārs(٢١) and placed all the believers as one entity and one body(٢٢)

Invasion and attack .١٧

Invasion‘

p: ١٥١

Shaybāni ١:١١٨; Wāqidi ٢:٤٤٥-٤٥٢, ٤٤٩; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٧٠; Ibn Hazm: ٢٠٨; Kalā'i ١:١٤٤; Ibn al-
Qayyim ٢:٣٠٣

Wāqidi ١:١٠, ١٩٧, ٢:٥٥٠, ٧٥٥, ٣:١٠١١; Ibn Hishām ٢:٢٤٥, ٣:٥٣, ٢٢٤, ٢٤٨, ٢٤٩; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٢-٥, ٤١, -٣
٨٥, ٨٩, ٢٠٩; Ibn Hazm: ١٠٢, ٢٢٤, ٢٢٧; Ibn Atheer ٢:٢٠٩, ٢٢٤, ٣٠٣; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ١:٢٢٤, ٢:٣٩

Wāqidi ١:٢٠٧, ٢١٨, ٤٤٥, ٤٤١; Ibn Hishām ٣:٢٤٣; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٢٥; Kalā'i ١:١١٣; Ibn Katheer -٤
٤:١٠٣

Wāqidi ١:٢٠٧, ٢١٨, ٣:٩٩٤; Ibn Hishām ٣:٢٣٢; Ibn Sa'd ٢:١١٩ -٥

Wāqidi ١:٥٤, ٢٢٠, ٢:٤٥١, ٩٢٢; Ibn Hishām ٣:٥٠, ٤٩, ٢٤٤; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٤٥; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās -٤
٢:٤٨

Ibn Hanbal ٢:٤٧١, ٣:٤٨٧; Bukhāri (al-Jihād ١٨٤); ibn Mājah (al-Jihād ٣); Tirmidhi -٧
(Fadhā'il al-Jihād ٢٠

(Wāqidi ٣:٩٩١); Ibn Hishām ٤:٢٤١; Bukhāri (al-Jihād ٢, ٣١) -٨

Wāqidi ١:٤٨ onwards; Ibn Hishām ٤:٤٩; Ibn Sa'd ٢:١١٣ -٩

Wāqidi ٢:٤٤٥; Ibn Hishām ٢:٢٤٤; Ibn Sa'd ٢:١٢; Tabari ٢:٥٤٨ -١٠

Ibn Hishām ٢:١٥٠; Ibn Sa'd ٢:١; Suhayli ٢:٢٥٢ -١١

(Q٤٩:١٠; Bukhāri (al-Adab ٢٧); Muslim (al-Birr ٤٤) -١٢

and attack' was one of the military strategies of the Holy Prophet (S) that he would implement against the enemy. He (S) employed a state of constant offense and would attack the enemy continuously, and as a result he left them with no choice but to do things that would make their goals and intentions clear^(١). The Prophet's goal in invading and attacking was displaying the strength and might of the Muslim army^(٢), gaining the upper hand over the enemy^(٣) and continuously encountering them (and ^(٤)countering their intended attacks).

The Sariya and military missions that he (S) would send was not for anything but invasion and attack^(٥), the Battle of Hamrā' al-Asad^(٦) was only a show of strength and the Battle of Dumat al-Jundal^(٧) was only fought to get information, learn about and test the strength and capability of the Roman army. The Muslim army fought Badr al-Aākhar^(٨) only in order to gain the upper hand over the enemy and it was then that Abu Sufyān turned back on his promise of war and tried to give excuses (for not fighting)^(٩). However, the Prophet (S) had decided to launch an attack and said: 'I swear by He in whose hand my life is, even if nobody accompanies me, I will come out ^(١٠)to fight'.

Display of strength and might .18

One of the manifestations of attack is 'psychological warfare' which is actually an indirect type of warfare^(١١) whose goal is instilling fear in the enemy^(١٢), weakening his spirits^(١٣) and preventing him from many of his aggressive plans^(١٤). The

p: ١٥٢

Wāqidi ١:٣٣٤, ٣٨٤; Ibn Hishām ٣:١٢٨, ٢٢٠; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٣٤, ٤٢; Ibn Hazm: ١٧٥, ١٨٤; Kalā'i - ١
١:١٠٤; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٢:٣٧, ٥٢; Ibn Katheer ٤:٨٤, ٨٧

Wāqidi ١:٣٢٤, ٣٨٤; Ibn Hishām ٣:١٢٨, ٣٢١; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٣٤, ٤٢; Ibn Hazm: ١٧٥ - ٢

Wāqidi ١:٣٣٥, ٣:٩٩٠, ١٠٩١; Ibn Sa'd ٢:١١٩; Suhayli ٤:١٩٦ - ٣

Wāqidi ١:٣٣٤; Ibn Hishām ٣:٢٢٠; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٤٢, ٤٥; Tabari ٢:٥٦٤ - ٤

Wāqidi ١:١١, ١٣, ٣٤٠, ٥٥٠; Ibn Hishām ٢:٢٤٥, ٢٥١; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٥٦, ٦١, ٦٥; Ibn Atheer ٢:٢٠٧; - ٥

Kalā'i ١:٥٨

Wāqidi ١:٣٣٤; Ibn Hishām ٣:١٢٨; Ibn Sa'd ٣:٣٤; Ibn Khayyāt ١:٣٨; Tabari ٣:٢٩; Ibn – ٤
Hazm: ١٧٥; Kalā'i ١:١٠٤; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٢:٣٧; Ibn Katheer ٤:٤٨
Wāqidi ١:٤٠٢; Ibn Hishām ٣:٢٢٤; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٤٤; Ibn Hazm: ١٨٤; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٢:٥٤ –٧
Wāqidi ١:٣٨٥, ٢٨٧ –٨
Wāqidi ١:٣٨٧ –٩
Wāqidi ١:٣٢٤ –١٠
Wāqidi ١:٣٣٤, ٣٨٤, ٢:٨٢٢; Ibn Hishām ٤:٤٤, ٤٧; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٣٤, ٤٢, ٧٠, ٩٢; Ibn Hazm: ٢٠٩; –١١
Ibn Qayyim ٢:٣٠٤
Zuhri: ٥; Ibn Hanbal ١:٢٢٩; Bukhāri (al-Hajj ٨٠); Kalā'i ١:١٠٥; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٢:١١٤ –١٢
Zuhri: ٥٨; Wāqidi ١:٣٣٨, ٣:٩٩٠, ١١٢٤; Ibn Sa'd ٢:١١٩; Suhayl ٤:١٩٤ –١٣
Wāqidi ١:٣٣٨; Ibn Hishām ٤:١٩, ٢١, ٤٧; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٩٨; Ibn Atheer ٢:٢٣٤, ٢٤٤; Kalā'i ١:١٠٥ –١٤

Noble Prophet (S) used various methods to gain information in order to create fear in the enemy(1). In the battles of Hamrā' al-Asad, Khandaq and the Conquest, by burning the dry date palms and plantations of the enemy(2), he created a large fire(3) and paraded the large number of troops and weapons(4) he had in front of the enemy commander i.e. Abu Sufyān, before entering Makkah

Before the Battle of Badr, while performing the Hajj al-Tamatu', he slaughtered the camel that was linked to Abu Jahl(5). During the Conquest, he performed the Sa'ee between Safā and Marwa quickly(6), with his followers carrying sheathed swords(7), he performed the circumambulation while riding on a camel(8). Then he turned his cloak on the side and left his right arm open(9), ordering the whole army to do just as he had done(10). He praised those of them who displayed their strength to the enemy(11). These tactics were quite successful and assisted in destroying the resistance of the enemy, to such an extent that he had made them certain that they would by no means be capable to come face to face with the Muslim army(12)

Forewarning prior to battle .19

:(The supreme commander would commence war in the following manner(13)

In a direct manner(14) i.e. he would normally remain in a condition of continual war with the enemy, and would use it as a preventative measure(15)

Giving the enemy an choice between accepting Islām and war(16). He would send this type of warning through a messenger, and if he did not get a

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Zuhri: 79; Wāqidi 1:337, 338; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās 2:64, 170; Ibn al-Qayyim 2:390 -1

Wāqidi 3:928; Ibn Hishām 4:122; Suhayli 3:250; Kalā'i 1:111; Ibn Katheer 4:77, 346 -2

Ibn Hishām 4:44; Ibn Sa'd 2:97; Tabari 3:52; Ibn Atheer 2:144; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās 2:168 -3

Wāqidi 2:819, 820, 822; Ibn Hishām 4:46, 47 -4

(Wāqidi 2:614; Abu Dāwud (al-Manāsik 12 -5

Wāqidi 2:736; Ibn Hishām 4:13; Tabari 3:24; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās 2:148 -6

Wāqidi ٢:٧٣٤, ٧٣٥; Tabari ٣:٢٤-٧

(Wāqidi ٢:٧٣٥; Abu Dāwud (al-Tawāf ٣, al-Raml ١-٨

Wāqidi ٢:٧٣٥; Ibn Hishām ٤:١٣; Tabari ٣:٢٤-٩

(.Through this he (S) displayed the strength and might of his army to the enemy (Tr -١٠

(Ibn Hishām ٤:١٣; Ibn Hanbal ١:٢٢٩; Tirmidhi (al-Hajj ٣٩); Nasā'i (al-Manāsik ١٧٦-١١

Wāqidi ١:٨٢١, ١٩٥; Ibn Hishām ٣:٤٦, ٢١٣, ٢٩٢; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٢١, ٤٣, ٥٦; Ibn Hazm: ١٥٢, ١٨٢, -١٢

٢٠٠; Kalā'i ١:١٢٢; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ١:٢٩٤

Wāqidi ١:٣٣٥, ٣٧١, ٢:٧٩٩; Ibn Hishām ٣:٢٢٤; Tabari ٣:١٠١; Ibn Hazm: ٢٠٢; Ibn Katheer -١٣

٤:١٢

Ibn Sa'd ٢:٤, ١٩, ٢٤, ٤٣, ٥٦, ١٠٨; Ibn Atheer ٢:١٧٣, ١٨٨, ١٩٢-١٤

Wāqidi ١:١٨٢, ١٩٥; Ibn Hishām ٣:٤٦; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٢١, ٢٤, ٣٥, ٤٣-٤٥, ٦٢, ٩٥; Ibn Hazm: ١٥٢; -١٥

Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ١:٢٩٤

Wāqidi ٢:٥٦٠, ٣:١١٢٥; Ibn Hishām ٤:١٦٩, ٢٣٩; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٦٤, ١١٩, ١٢٢; Ibn Atheer ٢:٢٠٩, -١٦

٢٩٣; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٢:١٠٨, ٢٢٠; Ibn al-Qayyim ٢:٢٩٩, ٣:١١

response he would commence the war; like in the Sariya of ‘Abd al-Rahmān ibn ‘Awf .and Khālīd bin Walīd to Dumat al-Jundal and against the Bani al-Hārith

Nullification and breaking of pacts(1): When the enemies would break their peace pacts, the Prophet (S) would send some people to warn them and remind them of their treachery and betrayal; just as he had done in the ‘four battles’ against the Jews

The Holy Prophet (S) would fight three types of battles. One was the battle fought without any warning or notice(2), like the battles that he fought against the hostile Arab tribes or the Quraysh and external foes. In these cases, he would launch surprise attacks on these groups in their own territories. Another type was preceded by forewarning(3), so he would mostly give the enemy an option and try to reason .with them kindly as he wanted all the people to accept Islām

However, nullifying the pact(4) was dealt with in a different way when it came to the Jews who lived in Madina and its outskirts. The Prophet (S) created a pact of defense with them as ‘citizens’ and had acknowledged them as fellow compatriots. Despite this they broke their pact and turned into a center for plotting and ambush (against the Muslims). He (S) also sent a representative(5) to the Bani Qaynuqā’ (6) and the Bani Nadhir(7) and gave them a notice that they should leave their lands in ten days(8), but they did not pay any attention to the warning reacted

p: ۱۵۴

Zuhri: ۷۱, ۸۴, ۸۹; Wāqidi ۱:۱۷۶, ۳۶۳, ۲:۴۹۶, ۶۳۳; Ibn Hishām ۳:۵۰, ۱۹۹, ۲۴۴, ۳۴۲; Ibn Sa’d ۲:۱۹, -۱ ۴۰, ۵۳, ۷۷; Ibn Hazm: ۱۵۴, ۱۸۱, ۱۹۱, ۲۱۱; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ۱:۲۹۴, ۲:۴۸, ۶۴, ۱۳۰

Wāqidi ۱:۱۸۲, ۱۹۳, ۱۹۵; Ibn Hishām ۳:۴۶; Ibn Sa’d ۲:۲۱, ۲۴, ۳۵, ۴۳-۴۵; Ibn Hazm: ۱۵۲, ۱۸۲; -۲ Ibn Atheer ۲:۲۰۷; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ۱:۲۹۴, ۳۰۴, ۲:۵۲, ۵۴

Ibn Sa’d ۲:۱۲۲; Bukhārī (al-Jihād ۱۴۳); Muslim (al-Jihād ۲, Fadhā’il al-Sahābah ۳۵); Ibn -۳ (Mājah (al-Jihād ۳۸); Abu Dāwud (al-Jihād ۸۲

Wāqidi ۱:۱۷۶, ۳۶۳, ۲:۴۹۶; Zuhri: ۷۱, ۸۹; Ibn Hishām ۳:۵۰, ۱۹۹; Ibn Sa’d ۲:۱۹, ۴۰; Ibn Hazm: -۴ ۱۵۴, ۱۸۱; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ۱:۲۹۴, ۲:۴۸

Wāqidi ١:١٧٤, Suhayli ٣:١٣٧, Ibn Atheer ٢:١٣٧; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٢:٢٩٤ -٥

Wāqidi ١:٣٤٥; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٤١; Tabari ٢:٥٥٢; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٢:٤٩ -٦

Ibn Sa'd ٢:٤١; Tabari ٢:٥٥٢; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٢:٤٩; Ibn Katheer ٤:٧٥ -٧

.Ibid -٨

.with disdain(١). The Prophet (S) was left with no option but to wage war against them

The order to commence the war .٢٠

The order to start the war was issued by the supreme commander(٢) or by the commander of any independent unit(٣) and would usually be marked by the sounding of “Allahu Akbar”(٤) which would be repeated loudly so that all the soldiers could hear(٥). In the Battle of Hunayn, the Holy Prophet (S) took advantage of the loud voice of his uncle ‘Abbas for this(٦). The soldiers would be asked to remain silent (after the battle had begun). No loud sound was heard from any soldier, except the movement (of their lips and whisperings of ‘Takbir’ and ‘Dhikr’(٧

In the Battle of Badr, during the heat of battle, someone (from among the enemy) said: Don’t you see them? It is as if they are all mutes; they don’t say anything but (they are alive and are benefitting from life(٨

In the new battles, the command to commence the war was issued by sounds that were made from behind trenches or fortified areas or by fires that were thrown up in (the air or by other means of communication(٩

The command to begin the battle with Takbir and other similar slogans would heighten the bravery and courage of the troops and would remove the fear of battle (from their hearts(١٠

Combat .٢١

Battle and combat between the two sides would start in such a way that first one or a few brave soldiers from the Muslim army, and from the enemy’s army, would

p: ١٥٥

Ibn Sa’d ٢:٤١; Ibn Hazm: ١٨٢; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٢:٤٩; Ibn Katheer ٤:٧٥ –١

Shaybāni ١:٥٨; Wāqidi ١:٦٧, ٢:٦٤٩; Bukhāri (al-Jihād ١٣٠); Tabari ٢:٥٠٢ –٢

Zuhri: ١٥١; Wāqidi ٢:٧٧٨; Ibn Hishām ٤:٢٩١; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٢:١٦١ –٣

Wāqidi ٢:٧٧٨; Ibn Hanbal ٦:١١; Bukhāri (al-Jihād ١٣٠); Ibn Qutaybah, ‘Uyun al-Akhhbār –٤

Wāqidi ٢:٧٧٨, ٣:١١١٧; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٢:٢٨١ –٥

Tabari ٣:٧٥; Ibn ‘Abd al-Barr, al-Isti‘āb ٢:٨١٠; Kalā’i ١:١٤٤ –٦

Ibn Mājah (al-Jihād ٨); Abu Dāwud (al-Jihād ١٠٢); Dārimi (al-Siyar ٩, al-Riqāq ٥); –٧

Harawi: ٩٨

Wāqidi ١:٩٢; Ibn Sa’d ٢:١٠; Ibn Qutaybah ١:١٠٨ –٨

Majmu’at Muhādharāt Alqaytu fi al-Akādimiyya al-‘Askariyya al-‘Ulyā al-Suriyyah –٩

There are many examples of this during the eight years of war between Iran and –١٠

(‘Iraq (Tr

come forward(١). These combatants would use various weapons including swords. They would either be on foot or horseback and would be in full armor and would move to fight each other in single one-on-one combat(٢). Each one of them would kill one or more of his opponents(٣). It is then that the other soldiers rush in and the full scale battle starts with complete intensity(٤).

In the Battle of Badr, three fighters from the Muslim army stood to face three soldiers from the polytheists and ended up (successfully) killing their opponents.(٥) In the Battle of Uhud, one person from the Muslims went to face one person (from the polytheists) and caused him to fall to the ground by one strike of the sword(٦). This (one-on-one) combat would be observed by the supreme commander and the soldiers of both sides(٧). So if they would kill their opponents, the spirit and courage of the troops would be strengthened while weakness and a sense of defeat would prevail over the enemy

Organization of the battle .٢٢

The Assembly of the troops and arrangement of their encampment was done in spaced out columns which would be organized in one line or more. The arrangement of the soldiers in form and depth, was dependent on the type of war, enemy forces, military facilities, the number of forces, battle gear and equipment available, the type of weapons used and the terrain. The aim of this organization was creating a readiness for launching the main strike on the enemy, gaining freedom to maneuver, co-operation

p: ١٥٦

Wāqidi ١:٦٨, ٢٢٥; Ibn Hishām ٢:٢٧٧, ٣:٧٢; Ibn Sa'd ٢:١٠, ٢٧; Tabari ٢:٤٤٥; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ١:٢٥٤, ٢:١٠

Wāqidi ١: ٦٨, ٢٢٥, ٢:٤٧٢; Ibn Hishām ٢:٢٧٧, ٣:٢٣٥; Ibn Sa'd ٢:١٠, ٤٩; Tabari ٢:٤٤٥, ٥٧٤; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ١:٢٥٤, ٢:٦١
.Ibid -٣

Wāqidi ١:٦٨, ٢٢٥; Ibn Hishām ٢:٢٧٧, ٣:٧٢; Ibn Sa'd ٢:١٠, ٢٧; Tabari ٢:٤٤٥ -٤

Zuhri: ٤٣ onwards; Wāqidi ١:٤٨; Ibn Hishām ٢:٢٧٧; Ibn Sa'd ٢:١٠; Tabari ٢:٤٤٥; Kalā'i –٥
١:٨٨; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ١:٢٥٤
Wāqidi ١:٢٢٥; Ibn Hishām ٣:٧٢; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٢٨; Tabari ٢:٥١٣; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٢:١٠ –٦
Wāqidi ١:٤٨, ٢٢٥, ٢:٤٧١; Ibn Hishām ٢:٢٧٧, ٣:٧٢, ٣٣٥; Ibn Sa'd ٢:١٠, ٢٨, ٤٩; Tabari ٢:٢٤٥, ٥٧٤; –٧
Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ١:٢٥٤

(1) and assistance, preventing the strikes of the enemy and reducing losses(1)

The Arabs of the Age of Ignorance would employ the ‘Karr wa Farr’ (strike and flee) tactic in their wars(2). But the Holy Prophet (S) invented a new form of arrangement and organization of the ranks(3) with a specific order, and this technique has also been used in more recent wars and especially in World War II. The arrangement of ranks was either in the form of a single column or many columns

In the Battle of Badr, the Holy Prophet (S) arranged the troops in two columns(4), in such a way that he placed the archers in the first column(5) and in the second column he positioned the spearers and the infantry(6), and behind this column he put the rear (7) of the army(7)

Later, he changed this arrangement and organization and transferred the first column to the heart of the army and reorganized the right flank, the left flank and also the infantry(8). When the soldiers would be arranged into two columns, a section of the cavalry would remain behind the second column and in the rear i.e. behind the infantry and the second column

The women, munitions, preserves, the commander’s camp, the place for prayer, food and other provisions were placed at the rear of the army(9). The place of the commander was in the heart and the first column of the army(10), the lookout post ,was at an elevation(11) from where he could get an overview and control the battle

p: ۱۵۷

Majmu’ah al-Ta’leef fi Akādimiyya Ferunzi al-‘Askariyya – Takteek: ۳۷۶ onwards; – ۱

Majmu’at Muhādharāt Alqaytu fi al-Akādimiyya al-‘Askariyya al-‘Ulyā al-Suriyyah

Ibn Sayyidah, al-Mukhassis ۶:۸۱; Ibn Khaldun, al-Muqaddimah ۲:۶۵۷ – ۲

Bukhāri (al-Maghāzi ۳۱, ۳۷); Muslim (al-Zakāh ۱۳۶, al-Jihād ۴۲); Abu Dāwud (al-Jihād – ۳

(۱۰۷

Muslim (al-Jihād ۷۸); Tabari ۲:۴۴۵ onwards; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ۱:۲۵۲ – ۴

Shaybāni ۱:۵۸; Ibn Hanbal ۳:۴۵۶, ۴۹۸; Tabari ۱:۴۴۶ – ۵

Shaybāni ۱:۵۸; Wāqidi ۱:۶۷; Ibn Hishām ۲:۲۷۸; Ibn Hanbal ۳:۴۵۶, ۴۹۸; Tabari ۲:۴۴۶ – ۶

Wāqidi ١:٢٢٣; Ibn Hishām ٢:٢٦٤; Ibn Hanbal ٥:٤٢٠ –٧
(Wāqidi ١:٢١٩ onwards, ٢:٨٠٠, ٨١٢, ٨١٩; Muslim (al-Zakāh ١٣٦); Abu Dāwud (al-Jihād ١٠٧ –٨
Wāqidi ١:٢٢٥, ٢٣٠, ٢:٦٤٥; Ibn Atheer ٢:١٨٥, ١٩٢, ٢٣٩ –٩
Wāqidi ٢:٦٥٣; Ibn Hishām ٢:٣٤٤, ٤:٤٩; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٩٨ –١٠
Wāqidi ١:٥٥, ٢٢٥, ٢:٤٥٧; Ibn Hishām ٢:٢٧٢, ٣:٦٩; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٩, ٢٧; Tabari ١:٤٢٦, ٤٤٠, ٥٠٧ –١١

just as the Holy Prophet (S) had done in when commanding the battles of Badr and
.Uhud

Organization and arrangement of the troops in battle

First scenario

Second scenario

Third scenario

Fourth scenario

The situation on the ground in the Battle of Uhud and its results

KEY

The place where Hamza the uncle of the Prophet (S), 'Abdullah ibn Jahash and Mus'ab
.ibn 'Umayr have been buried

.The place where the martyrs of Uhud have been buried

.The area where there Muslim army fought with the army of the polytheists

.The last borders of the battle in the east and west

.The place where Hamza ibn 'Abd al-Muttalib ® was martyred

The place where archers from the Muslim were positioned to guard the pass on the
.small Mountain of al-Rummāh

The place where the Holy Prophet (S) was hidden after he had been injured – it was
.inside a fissure in the side of Mount Uhud

.Masjid al-Fasah

Masjid al-Mustarāh (where the Holy Prophet (S) rested with his army before entering
.into Uhud

(Masjid al-Dir' (where the Prophet (S) stopped briefly when returning from Uhud

(Battles fought in order to capture forts (Harb al-Husun .۲۳

The Holy Prophet (S) employed the tactic of 'siege' in order to capture forts^(۱) and aside from Khaybar and Tā'if, he never used 'direct attack and assault'^(۲), because this type of warfare led to many casualties. Using heavy weaponry on a wide scale as ^(۳)in the Battle of Tā'if was not common practice for the Muslim army^(۴)

Many military operations would be carried out while laying siege on the fortresses, the most important among which included: completely cutting off any aid and support to

p: ۱۵۸

Wāqidi ۱:۱۷۷, ۳۶۳, ۲:۴۹۶, ۶۷۰; Ibn Hishām ۳:۲۴۵, ۳۴۴, ۳۴۷; Ibn Sa'd ۲:۴۰; Tabari ۲:۵۷۳; Ibn -۱
Sayyid al-Nās ۱:۲۹۵

Wāqidi ۲:۶۵۳, ۷۰۰, ۲:۹۲۷; Ibn Hishām ۳:۳۴۴, ۳۵۷, ۴:۱۲۹; Tabari ۳:۹ -۲

Wāqidi ۲:۶۵۸, ۳:۹۲۷; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ۲:۲۰۱ -۳

the enemies who were besieged inside the fortresses^(١), distancing one's own forces from the reach of the enemy's arrows^(٢), deceiving the besieged enemy using different means^(٣) in order to get them to come out of their fortress

The Bani Qaynuqā' surrendered after fifteen nights of siege^(٤) and the Bani Nadhir had also been besieged for fifteen days after which they lowered their heads in surrender on the command of the Prophet (S)^(٥). The Bani Quraydha were also dealt with in the same manner^(٦). After this, the inhabitants of Khaybar came to the Prophet (S) and agreed to obey his commands, thus they were exiled to Syria^(٧). The Holy Prophet (S) also besieged Tā'if and after a while he caused them to come out of the ^(٨) siege

The Noble Prophet (S), in his orders, limited the attack on the Fortress of Khaybar to the eastern direction, just as the present day armies do. He made the priority of the mission was to gain control over the primary fortress^(٩) and then he gained control over all their forts one after another^(١٠). Once their fall and defeat was complete, he gave the order for them to attack the secondary fortress^(١١). They gained control over that too and captured (the forts) one after the other^(١٢) until they achieved their goal completely and then proceeded to conquer the main defense fortress^(١٣) which was another of the orders the army had been given

The Muslim army turned its focus on the first defensive fort^(١٤), and especially on the Fort

p: ١٥٩

Wāqidi ١:١٧٧ onwards, ٣٦٣, ٣٧١, ٢:٤٦٦, ٤٩٩; Ibn Hishām ٣:٢٠٠ onwards; Ibn Sa'd ٢:١١٤; -١

Ibn Qayyim ٢:٣٣٠; Harawi: ١٠٣

Wāqidi ١:٣٧, ٢:٤٩٦, ٦٤٣; Ibn Katheer ٤:١٩٩ -٢

Wāqidi ٢:٤٩٩, ٦٦٦, ٣:٩٢٨; Ibn Hishām ٣:٢٠٠, ٣٤٤, ٤:١٣٢; Tabari ٢:٥٥٤; Kalā'i ١:١١١ -٣

Wāqidi ١:١٧٧; Ibn Sa'd ٢:١٩; Ibn Khayyāt ١:٢٧; Tabari ٢:٤٨٠; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ١:٢٩٥ -٤

Wāqidi ١:٣٦٣; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٤٠; Ibn Hazm: ١٨٢; Ibn Katheer ٤:٧٦; Dianna, Muhammad -٥

Rasulullah: ٢٧٨

Wāqidi ٢:٤٩٦, ٥٠١; Ibn Hishām ٣:٢٤٥; Tabari ٢:٥٨٣; Ibn Hazm: ١٩٣ –٦

Wāqidi ٢:٦٦٦; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٧٧; Tabari ٣:١٦; Suhayli ٤:٥٩; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٢:١٤٣, ١٤٥; Ibn –٧

Katheer ٤:١٩٨; Nāsif, al-Tāj ٤:٤٢٢

Wāqidi ٣:٩٢٧; Ibn Sa'd ٢:١١٤; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٢:٢٠١ –٨

Wāqidi ٢:٦٤٧ onwards; Ibn Hishām ٣:٣٤٤; Tabari ٣:٩; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٢:١٣٢ –٩

Wāqidi ٢:٦٥٢, ٦٥٨, ٦٦٤; Tabari ٣:٩; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٢:١٣٢, ١٣٤ –١٠

Wāqidi ٢:٦٧٧; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٢:١٣٣; Ibn Katheer ٤:١٩٨ –١١

Wāqidi ٢:٦٦٧, ٦٦٩; Ibn Atheer ٢:٢١٧; Ibn Katheer ٤:١٩٨ –١٢

Wāqidi ٢:٦٨٠; Tabari ٣:١٠, ١٤; Ibn Atheer ٢:٢١٨; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٢:١٣٤ –١٣

Wāqidi ٢:٦٥٢ onwards; Ibn Atheer ٢:٢١٧ –١٤

of Nā'im(1) and once that had fallen, they moved towards the other forts. Before carrying out any attack on these forts, he (S) obtained the required information(2) and surveillance on them(3), then he positioned his forces in the area of al-Rajee'(4) thereby separating the Ghatfān(5) (who were allies and helpers of the enemy) with the inhabitants of Khaybar and through this tactic he gave the advantage to the Muslim army, because he was able to prevent these tribes from working with the Jews of Khaybar thereby making it easy to attack the forts from all sides(6) and conquer them(7) while also being free to maneuver(8) and divide the enemy(9). The supreme commander started with the Fort of Nā'im(10) and conquered it. Then he attacked the other forts(11) and in this way he conquered the forts gradually, one by one.

(Battles with barriers (and impediments) .۲۴

Using barriers in battle has been an age-old practice that started with the very first battles(12). For example, the Romans and Persians would use trenches in their battles(13). However, we do not have any evidence that the Arabs used such barriers before the advent of Islām(14). The Holy Prophet (S) ordered that a trench be dug in order to prevent the army of confederates from gaining access into Madina from the north and west(15), and selected the suitable ground for this purpose(16), and personally specified its dimensions for the army i.e. the length of the battlefront which (was from Mudhād up to Dhubāb Rātij(17) was dug by the Muslim army(18).

In order to

p: ۱۶۰

Wāqidi ۲:۶۵۲; Ibn Hishām ۳:۳۴۴; Tabari ۱۳:۹; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ۲:۱۳۱ –۱

Wāqidi ۲:۶۴۴; Ibn Hishām ۳:۳۴۷; Ibn Sa'd ۲:۷۷; Ibn Katheer ۴:۱۹۴ –۲

Wāqidi ۲:۶۴۰; Tabari ۳:۱۷; Suhayli ۴:۶۵ –۳

Wāqidi ۲:۶۴۴; Ibn Hishām ۳:۳۴۴; Tabari ۳:۹; Kalā'i ۱:۱۳۰; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ۲:۱۳۱ –۴

The Ghatfān were a large tribe that was made up of many clans and lived near – ۵

Khaybar. Ibn Sa'd ۲:۷۷; Suhayli ۲:۱۸۱; Hamawi ۲:۴۰۹

Wāqidi ٢:٦٥٢, ٦٧٠; Ibn Hishām ٣:٣٤٤; Ibn Atheer ٢:٢١٧ –٦

Wāqidi ٢:٦٧١; Tabari ٢:١٦; Suhayli ٤:٦٠; Ibn Hazm: ٢١٢; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٢:١٣٦, ١٤٥ –٧

Ibn Hishām ٣:٣٤٤; Tabari ٣:٩; Ibn Atheer ٢:٢١٦; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٢:١٣١ –٨

Wāqidi ٢:٦٥٢ onwards and ٦٦٧ onwards –٩

Wāqidi ٢:٦٥٢; Ibn Hishām ٣:٣٤٤; Tabari ٣:٩; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٢:١٣١ –١٠

Wāqidi ٢:٦٥٨–٦٦٢, ٦٦٨–٦٧٠ –١١

Ibn Katheer ٤:٩٥; al-‘Umayd al-Shā’ir, al-Malāji wal-Tahsilāt: ٢٢–٣٧ –١٢

Wāqidi ٢:٤٤٥; Tabari ٢:٥٦٦; Ibn Khaldun, Muqaddimah ٢:٦٥٧ onwards –١٣

Wāqidi ٢:٤٧٠, ٤٩٢; Tabari ٢:٥٧٤; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٢:٦١ –١٤

Wāqidi ٢:٤٤٥, ٤٤٦; Tabari ٢:٥٧٠; Ibn Hazm: ١٨٦; Hamawi ١:٢٥٦, ٢٦٢; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās –١٥

٢:٥٨

Wāqidi ٢:٤٤٦; Ibn Hishām ٣:٢٣١; Ibn Sa’d ٢:٤٧; Tabari ٢:٥٦٦ –١٦

Wāqidi ٢:٤٤٥; Ibn Sa’d ٢:٤٨; Tabari ٢:٥٦٧, ٥٦٨ –١٧

Wāqidi ٢:٤٤٨; Ibn Hishām ٣:٢٢٦, ٢٢٧; Ibn Sa’d ٢:٤٧, ٥٠; Tabari ٢:٥٦٦; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās –١٨

٢:٥٥

remove the gravel, they used metal tools, pickaxes and large buckets(١) and the removed gravel was poured outside to hide the front-line that would counter the enemy(٢) and the remaining areas were concealed using rocks that were brought from Mount Sala'(٣). Then passageways from which their own troops could pass from the trench were made(٤). In order to dig through hard ground and rock, water was first poured over it and then it was struck with the pickaxe continuously until it eventually broke up(٥)

(The Battle of Bani Qaynuqā' (fig. ١

(The Battle of Bani Nadhir (fig. ٢

(KEY (fig. ١ ٢

The route from Basra to Damascus .١

Mount Uhud .٢

Volcanic rock .٣

(Route taken by the Muslim army (fig. ١) Mount Sala' (fig. ٢ .٤

The city of Madina .٥

'The Jews of Bani Qaynuqā' .٦

The Jews of Bani Quraydha .٧

The Jews of Bani Nadhir .٨

Mount 'Aseer .٩

The length of the ditch was five thousand cubits, which is equivalent to two kilometers and its width was nine cubits, which is equal to four meters, while its depth was between five and seven cubits which comes up to about three meters(٦). Digging the trench took between six to ten days(٧). The Muslim army spread out along the border of the

Wāqidi ٢:٤٤٥; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٤٨ –١

Wāqidi ٢:٤٤٦ –٢

.Ibid –٣

Wāqidi ٢:٤٥٢ –٤

Wāqidi ٢:٤٥٠; Ibn Hishām ٣:٢٦٠; Tabari ٢:٥٦٩; Kalā'i ١:١١٤; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٢:٥٧ –٥

Wāqidi ٢:٤٤٥; Tabari ٢:٥٦٨; Ibn Mandhur, Lisān al-'Arab ٨:٩٣ –٦

Wāqidi ٢:٤٤٥; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٤٨; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٢:٥٧ –٧

trench to face the enemy. They carried with them the weapons that were required and stood right behind the trench(١). They would remain on constant watch and guard the areas where there was a possibility that the enemy could pass through(٢)

When the soldiers of the two armies came face to face, they began shooting long arrows towards each other(٣). If the enemy came near the trench and crossed over it, they would use their swords(٤), and when this was happening to some of the enemy soldiers, and in the process ‘Amr ibn ‘Abd Wudd(٥) was killed, the other soldiers retreated and rejoined their forces behind the trench. In this battle, the Muslim forces used stones abundantly(٦) and had gathered them along the line of the trench

The trench that was dug was quite helpful to the Muslim army and acted as a barrier between them and the enemy. In the end it must be said that the Battle of Khandaq is not much different from the present-day battles, and aside from different weaponry, there is very little else that is dissimilar

(Battles in cities and towns (Harb al-Mudun .٢٥

After he had concealed all his might and strength and military prowess from the inhabitants of Makkah, the Holy Prophet (S) conquered this city(٧). In this battle, he also: used psychological warfare(٨); entered the city from all four directions(٩); divided the operations according to the arrangement and formation of the troops(١٠); explained the route, direction, goal, force and other matters(١١); asked them to be careful to refrain from bloodshed(١٢)

The Battle of

p: ١٤٢

Wāqidi ٢:٤٤٥; Ibn Hishām ٣:٢٣١; Ibn Sa’d ٢:٤٧; Ibn Hazm: ١٨٦ – ١

Wāqidi ٢:٤٦٤; Ibn Sa’d ٢:٤٨; Tabari ٢:٥٦٨ – ٢

Wāqidi ٢:٤٦٠; Ibn Sa’d ٢:٤٨; Suhayli ٣:٢٧٩; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٢:٥٨ – ٣

Ibn Hishām ٣:٢٣٣; Ibn Sa’d ٢:٤٨; Tabari ٢:٥٧٢; Ibn Atheer ٢:١٨٠; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٢:٦٠ – ٤

Wāqidi ٢:٤٧١; Ibn Hishām ٣:٢٣٥; Ibn Sa’d ٢:٤٩; Tabari ٢:٥٧٤; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٢:٦٢; – ٥

‘Amr ibn ‘Abd Wudd was one of the bravest soldiers among the Arabs and his strength was legendary. He was among the few who were successful in crossing over the trench. After crossing over, he began to recite poems of valor and boast that none from the Muslim army would be ready to meet him in one-on-one combat. Sure enough, none from the Muslim army showed any willingness to face him and when the Prophet (S) asked who would go, only the young ‘Ali ibn Abi Tālib (‘a) stood up. As ‘Ali (‘a) walked into battle to face the giant Ibn ‘Abd Wudd, the Prophet (S) remarked:

(.Today the whole of Eimān is going to fight against the whole of Kufr (Tr

Wāqidi ٢:٤٤٦ –٦

Wāqidi ٢:٧٩٦, ٨٠٢–٨٠٥; Ibn Sa’d ٢:٩٦; Ibn Hazm: ٢٢٦, ٢٣٠; Suhayli ٣:٢٨, ٢٩; Kalā’i ١:١٣٨; –٧

Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٢:١٦١, ١٦٧, ١٧٠; Ibn al-Qayyim ٢:٣٨٦; Ibn Katheer ٤:٢٨٠

Wāqidi ٢:٧٩٢, ٨٠٣, ٨٢٢, ٨٢٣; Ibn Hishām ٤:٤٤; Ibn Sa’d ١:٩٨; Ibn Hazm: ٢٣٠; Tabari ٣:٥٢, –٨

٥٤; Ibn Atheer ٢:٢٤١; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٢:١٧٠; Ibn Qayyim ٢١:٣٨٩

Wāqidi ٢:٨٢٥, ٨٧٥; Ibn Hishām ٤:٤٩; Ibn Sa’d ٢:٩٨, ١٠١; Tabari ٣:٥٦; Ibn Atheer ٢:٢٢٦; –٩

Kalā’i ١:١٣٩; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٢:١٧٢

Wāqidi ٢:٢٥, ٧٢٨, ٨٧٥; Ibn Atheer ٢:٢٤٦; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٢:١٧٣ –١٠

Wāqidi ٢:٨١٨, ٨٢٥; Ibn Hishām ٤:٤٩; Ibn Sa’d ٢:٩٨; Tabari ٣:٥٦; Ibn Atheer ٢:٢٤٦; Ibn –١١

Katheer ٤:٢٩٦

Wāqidi ٢:٨٢٥; Ibn Hishām ٤:٥١, ٧٥; Ibn Sa’d ٢:٩٨, ٩٩ –١٢

(Bani Quraydha (Ref. KEY ٢.١)

KEY ٢.١: Battle of Bani Quraydha

The route from Basra to Damascus .١

Mount Uhud .٢

'Mount Sala .٣

The Muslim army .٤

The city of Madina .٥

The Jews of Bani Quraydha .٦

The Jews of Bani Nadhir .٧

Mount 'Aseer .٨

(The Battle of Khaybar (Ref. KEY ٢.٢

KEY ٢.٢: Battle of Khaybar

Khaybar .١

Fadak .٢

The Muslim army .٣

(The route traversed by the army (in eight days .٤

The city of Madina .٥

Mount 'Aseer .٦

'Mount Sala .٧

Mount Uhud .٨

The route to Madā'in .٩

(The Battle of Khandaq (Ref. KEY ٢.٣

KEY ٢.٣: Battle of Khandaq

Mount Uhud .١

Volcanic rocks .٢

(The confederate army (Ahzāb .٣

The place where the enemy was blocked .٤

(The defensive trench (٢ km long .٥

Permanent guard-posts .٦

Current map of Madina with the place where the Battle of Khandaq took place and the
(location of the al-Masājid al-Sab'ah or 'seven mosques' (Ref. KEY ٢.٤

KEY ٢.٤: Present-day Madina

'The graveyard of al-Baqee .١

Abu Dharr al-Ghaffāri Street .٢

.٣

p: ١٤٣

The area of Uhud

Sayyid al-Shuhadā Street .٤

⟨Path of the trench ⟨that was dug in the Battle of Khandaq .٥

Abu Bakr Street .٤

'Mount Sala .٧

Masjid al-Fath .٨

Masjid Salmān al-Fārsi .٩

Masjid 'Umar ibn al-Khattāb .١٠

Masjid Abu Bakr .١١

⟨Masjid 'Ali ibn Abi Tālib ⟨'a .١٢

Masjid Dhul Qiblatayn .١٣

⟨Masjid Fātimah bint Muhammad ⟨S .١٤

⟨The Conquest of Makkah ⟨Ref. KEY ٢.٥

KEY ٢.٥: Conquest of Makkah

The Muslim army – ١٠,٠٠٠ strong .١

The forces of Abi 'Ubaydah ibn Jarrāh .٢

The forces of Qays ibn Sa'd ibn 'Ubādah .٣

The forces of Zayd ibn 'Awām .٤

The place where the Muslim army encamped .٥

The city of Makkah al-Mukarramah .٤

Entrance into Makkah .v

The forces of Khālid bin Walid .^

Mountainous areas .9

He instructed the inhabitants of Makkah to throw down their weapons, close their door and windows⁽¹⁾, and show no resistance whatsoever⁽²⁾. It was after these orders and instructions that he set up camp for the army in Hajun⁽³⁾, and after conquering Makkah, he again prepared them for the next important mission

Indeed, the supreme commander was highly capable in carrying out all these measures. Among other things, he made it clear to the people of Makkah that they were incapable of

p: ١٤٤

Ibn Hishām ٤:٤٦,٤٧; Ibn Sa’d ٢:٩٨; Tabari ٣:٥٦; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٢:١٦٩ onwards –١

Ibn Hishām ٤:٤٧; Ibn Sa’d ٢:٩٨; Tabari ٣:٥٦; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٢:١٧٠ –٢

Wāqidi ٢:٨٢٢, ٨٧٨; Ibn Hishām ٤:٥٣; Tabari ٣:٥٧ –٣

resisting the mighty Muslim army(١), and in this way he entered Makkah peacefully
(and enacted a peace treaty without any bloodshed or war(٢

Daily reports .٢٦

These reports contained details about the state of the battle, the munitions, the spirit and zeal of the forces, the requirements and the objectives, and would usually be compiled and sent to the supreme commander daily(٣). The Holy Prophet (S) told all his commanders to chronicle the objectives and important developments of the battles and send them to him,(٤) so that he was fully aware of what was going on at their end. This was something that was not done verbally(٥) and it was not necessary to send it in the day, as the military do these days, rather, depending on the need, it would be sent after the mission or battle was over(٦) by means of a messenger on
(horseback or on foot(٧

The most important issues that were contained in these reports were: the missions of the units(٨) and especially the sentinels, intelligence information(٩), the method of attack on the enemy(١٠), the results that were seen from that battle(١١) – especially the losses, booty(١٢) and the measures that needed to be taken to strengthen the
(troops(١٣

An analysis of the battles on the various front–lines

point

The Holy Prophet (S) would simultaneously battle on many front–lines, against the Quraysh, the Arab tribes, the Jews and the Romans. Therefore, he would prepare for numerous wars and in the end, he achieved victory in all of them. These front–lines
:included

a) The front–line against the Quraysh

Before preparing for any war. the Holy Prophet (S) would send

Wāqidi ٢:٨٢٣; Ibn Hishām ٤:٤٤; Tabari ٣:٥٤; Ibn Atheer ٢:٢٤٤; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٢:١٧٠; –١
Ibn al-Qayyim ٢:٣٩٠

The way that the Holy Prophet (S) planned the Conquest of Makkah was so perfect –٢
that the city was taken without any bloodshed or fighting. Once Makkah was taken,
(.the Prophet (S) proceeded to the Ka’bah and broke all the idols in it. (Tr

Majmu’at Muhādharāt Alqaytu fi al-Akādimiyya al-‘Askariyya al-‘Ulyā al-Suriyyah –٣

Wāqidi ١:١٣, ٣٤٣, ٢:٧٢٣, ٧٢٤; Ibn Hishām ٢:٢٤٥, ٤:١٤٥; Ibn Sa’d ٢:٥٤, ٤١, ٤٤; Suhayli ٤:٢٥٢; –٤
Ibn Atheer ٢:٢٠٧; Kalā’i ١:١٥٨, ١٤٢; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٢:١٠٥; Ibn al-Qayyim ٢:٢٩٧; Ibn
Katheer ٤:٢٢٠–٢٢٣

Wāqidi ١:٣٤٣, ٢:٧٢٣; Ibn Hishām ٤:٢٤٥; Ibn Sa’d ٢:٤١, ٤٥; Suhayli ٤:٢٥٢; Ibn Atheer ٢:٢٠٧ –٥

Wāqidi ١:١٣, ٢:٥٥١; Ibn Hishām ٢:٢٥٢; Ibn Sa’d ٢:٤١; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٢:١٠٤, ١٠٥; Ibn –٦
Qayyim ٢:١٩٧, ٢٩٧

Zuhri: ١٥٠; Wāqidi ٢:٧٤٩; Ibn Hishām ٤:٢٧٢; Ibn Sa’d ٢:٩٤; Tabari ٣:٣١; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās –٧
٢:١٥٧

Wāqidi ٢:٣٩١; Ibn Hishām ٣:٢٧٨; Ibn Hazm: ٢٠٠; Kalā’i ١:١٢١; Ibn Katheer ٤:١٣٩ –٨

Wāqidi ١:١١; Ibn Hishām ٢:٢٤٥; Ibn Hazm: ١٠٣, ١٠٥; Tabari ٢:٢٩٥ –٩

Wāqidi ٢:٥٣٤, ٥٥٠, ٥٤٢; Ibn Sa’d ١:٥٤, ٤١–٤٥; Ibn Atheer ١:٢٠٧, ٢٠٩; Kalā’i ١:١٥٨; Ibn –١٠
Sayyid al-Nās ٢:٧٩, ١٠٣, ١٠٥, ١٠٩

Wāqidi ٢:٧٢٤; Ibn Hishām ٤:٢٤٥; Ibn Sa’d ٢:٤٤; Ibn Atheer ٢:٢٠٧; Kalā’i ١:١٥٨ –١١

Wāqidi ٢:٥٣٥; Ibn Atheer ٢:٢٢٤; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٢:١٠٥, ٢٠٤; Ibn Katheer ٤:٢٢٠ –١٢

Wāqidi ٢:٧٧٠; Ibn Sa’d ٢:٩٥; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٢:١٥٧ –١٣

Sariya missions or numerous military missions(١) to gather intelligence from the enemy forces and also to dishearten them or he would send them to attack their trading caravans – in order to display the might of the Muslim army. In this way, he established a somewhat new base of command in Madina. When the Quraysh came to learn of this change and technique, they decided that to destroy this army and were searching for an opportunity to annihilate the Muslim army before it could grow and develop into and unstoppable power, and this is why they prepared for the Battle (of Badr(٢

Badr was the first full-fledged battle where the Muslim army displayed its readiness and capability for war(٣) especially by choosing the appropriate place for setting up camp(٤), innovation, organizing the battle-formation into columns in depth(٥), training(٦), zeal(٧), faith and a new belief(٨), discipline and following orders(٩), the necessary organization and hierarchy of command(١٠) and by these military tactics, they strengthened their soldiers

As for the Quraysh, they were stronger in terms of numbers and battle gear(١١), and just as we will demonstrate, the victory is for the side that is better in terms of quality, not quantity; that is why the Prophet (S) astounded the enemy by his victory in Badr. After their defeat, the Quraysh became worried about the loss of their profits and trade and responded with a weak blow to this victory(١٢), and this was when Abu Sufyān launched an incursion into Madina and killed two civilians

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Wāqidi ١:١١, ١٣, ٢:٧٦٩; Ibn Hishām ٢:٢٤٥, ٢٥٢; Ibn Sa'd ٢:١, ٩٥; Tabari ٢:٢٥٩; Ibn Hazm: – ١
٠٤; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ١:٢٢٥; Ibn Katheer ٣:٢٤٨

Wāqidi ١:١٩; Ibn Hishām ٢:٢٥٧; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٢٩; Ibn Khayyāt ١:١٦; Tabari ٢:٢٦٧; Ibn – ٢
Hazm: ١:٧; Kalā'i ١:٥٨; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ١:٢٤١; Ibn Katheer ٢:٢٦١

Q: ٤٢; Wāqidi ١:٥٣; Ibn Hishām ٢:٢٦٦, ٢٧٢ – ٣

Wāqidi ١:٥٦ onwards; Ibn Hishām ٢:٢٧٨; Ibn Hanbal ٣:١٥٧; Muslim (al-Jihād ٤٢); Abu – ٤
(Dāwud (al-Jihād ١٠٧

Wāqidi ١:١١ onwards; Ibn Hishām ٢:٢٥٤; Ibn Sa'd ٢:١٠ onwards; Tabari ٢:٢٥٩; Ibn – ٥

Hazm: ١٠٤

Wāqidi ١:٢٠, ٨٧, ٩١; Ibn Hazm: ١٠٨-٩

Wāqidi ١:٢٠; Suhayli ٣:٥١-٧

Wāqidi ١:٤٨ onwards; Ibn Hishām ٢:٢٦٢; Ibn Katheer ٣:٢٦٢, ٢٦٧-٨

Shaybāni ١:١١٨; Wāqidi ١:٦٧; Ibn Hishām ٣:٦٩; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٨; Tabari ٢:٤٢٦; Ibn Sayyid al-

Nās ٢:١٨٨

(Q:٨٤; Ibn Hishām ٢:٢٧٩; Ibn Hanbal ١:٣٠٧; Bukhārī (al-Jihād ١١٠-١٠

Wāqidi ١:٢٣, ٢٧, ٣٩; Ibn Hishām ٢:٢٦٩; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٧; Tabari ٢:٤٢٣, ٤٣١ onwards; Ibn - ١١

Atheer ٢:١١٨; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ١:٢٤٤

Wāqidi ١:١٨١; Ibn Khayyāt ١:٢٨; Tabari ٢:٤٨٣; Ibn Hazm: ١٥٥; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ١:٢٩٦-١٢

and then quickly returned towards Makkah. At this point, the Holy Prophet (S) sent [\(1\)](#) soldiers to follow him as he was fleeing, but they did not catch up to him.

The supreme commander of the Muslim army would use economic sanctions and other means to put pressure on the Quraysh [\(2\)](#). For instance, he sent Zayd ibn Hāritha to al-Qurdah in order to attack the trading caravan of the Quraysh and he too was successful in overpowering it [\(3\)](#). In order to take revenge and gain freedom from sanctions and other pressures, the enemy assembled a large army and prepared for the Battle of Uhud [\(4\)](#). In the first phase, the Muslim army was victorious [\(5\)](#), but in the second phase [\(6\)](#), because of the disobedience of the archers to the orders of the supreme commander and their abandonment of their positions in order to take the [\(7\)](#) spoils of war, the result turned in favor of the Quraysh.

In the end, however, the final result was in favor of the Muslim army [\(8\)](#) i.e. when the Holy Prophet (S) was able to gather a large number of troops [\(9\)](#), and remain steadfast [\(10\)](#) despite his injuries and losses, was able to launch a counter-attack in the Battle of Hamrā' al-Asad [\(11\)](#). In this way, by being a prudent [\(12\)](#), determined and courageous [\(13\)](#) commander, and by using psychological warfare [\(14\)](#) through which he [\(15\)](#) instilled fear in the hearts of the enemy, he caused their forces to fall down helplessly.

The string of consecutive victories that were achieved by the Prophet (S) [\(15\)](#) against the Quraysh, the

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Ibn Is'hāq: 310; Wāqidi 1:181; Tabari 2:483; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās 1:296 –1

Wāqidi 1:197m 198; Tabari 2:492 –2

Wāqidi 1:197; Ibn Hishām 3:53; Ibn Sa'd 2:24; Tabari 2:492; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās 1:305 –3

Zuhri: 76; ; Wāqidi 1:199; Ibn Hishām 3:64; Ibn Sa'd 2:25; Khayyāt 1:29; Tabari 3:9; Ibn –4

Hazm: 956; Kalā'i 1:104; Dhahabi, Tārikh al-Islām 1:183

Wāqidi 1:221–229; Ibn Hishām 3:82; Ibn Sa'd 2:28; Tabari 2:517 onwards; Ibn Sayyid al- –5

Nās 2:11

Wāqidi 1:229 onwards; Ibn Hishām 3:82; Ibn Sa'd 2:29; Tabari 2:515 onwards; Ibn –6

Sayyid al-Nās ۲:۱۱

Wāqidi ۱:۲۴۹; Ibn Sa'd ۲:۲۹; Tabari ۲:۵۱۰; Ibn Atheer ۲:۵۴; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ۲:۱۱ –۷

Wāqidi ۱:۲۴۱; Ibn Hishām ۳:۸۹; Tabari ۲:۵۱۸; Ibn Atheer ۲:۱۵۷; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ۲:۱۴ –۸
onwards

.Ibid –۹

Wāqidi ۱:۲۴۱ onwards; Ibn Hishām ۳:۸۲, ۹۱; Tabari ۲:۵۲۱; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ۲:۱۵ –۱۰

Wāqidi ۱:۳۳۴; Ibn Hishām ۳:۱۲۸; Ibn Sa'd ۳:۳۴; Ibn Khayyāt ۱:۳۸; Tabari ۳:۲۹; Ibn – ۱۱

Hazm: ۱۷۵; Kalā'i ۱:۱۰۴; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ۲:۳۷; Ibn Katheer ۴:۴۸

Wāqidi ۱:۳۳۵; Ibn Hishām ۳:۱۰۷; Ibn Sa'd ۲:۳۴; Tabari ۲:۵۳۴; Kalā'i ۱:۱۰۵ –۱۲

Wāqidi ۱:۳۳۵ onwards; Ibn Hishām ۳:۱۰۷; Ibn Sa'd ۲:۳۴; Tabari ۲:۵۳۴; Ibn Sayyid al- –۱۳
Nās ۲:۳۷

Wāqidi ۱:۳۳۸; Ibn Hishām ۳:۱۰۸; Ibn Sa'd ۲:۳۵; Tabari ۲:۵۳۵; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ۲:۳۷ –۱۴

Wāqidi ۱:۳۴۰, ۳۶۲, ۳۹۱, ۴۰۴; Ibn Hishām ۳:۱۹۹; Ibn Sa'd ۲:۷۵ –۱۵

Jews and the enemy Arab tribes, made it evident that there was a serious threat that was forming against them⁽¹⁾ and they had no choice but to annihilate this Muslim army. For this purpose, they came together, joined hands and made covenants with each other so that they could assemble a united army to fight against the Muslims. As a result, some Arab tribes and Jews joined with the Quraysh and launched what was ⁽²⁾to be known as the Battle of Confederates (Ahzāb)⁽²⁾

The confederates came into the field with a large force, numbering almost ten thousand strong⁽³⁾, and proceeded towards Madina. However, they were stopped in their tracks by the large trench⁽⁴⁾ that was dug by the Muslim army⁽⁵⁾. Although they made many attempts to cross over it, but all in vain⁽⁶⁾ and because of the differences that arose between them, they returned without having realized their military objective⁽⁷⁾. From the ingenuity and innovation of a new strategy in warfare i.e. digging the trench⁽⁸⁾ and also due to the leadership of a continent⁽⁹⁾, steadfast commander⁽¹⁰⁾, using deception⁽¹¹⁾ and having high spiritual values⁽¹²⁾, the Muslim army gained victory over the Quraysh and their allies

The consequence of this was that the reverence that the Arab tribes felt for the Quraysh was greatly reduced⁽¹³⁾ and they lost their position as central political and military figures⁽¹⁴⁾. The respect of Abu Sufyān was lost because of this⁽¹⁵⁾, he failed as a commander and his pivotal role was demeaned in the eyes of his allies. This

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Ibn Hishām ٣:٢٢٤; Ibn Sa’d ٢:٤٧; Ibn Hazm: ١٨٦ –١
Zuhri: ٧٩; Wāqidi ٢:٤٤٠; Ibn Hishām ٢:٢٤٤; Ibn Sa’d ٢:٤٧; Tabari ٢:٥٦٥; Ibn Hazm: ١٨٥; –٢
Suhayli ٣:٢٧٤; Kalā’i ١:١١٤; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٢:٥٥; Ibn Qayyim ٢:٢٨٨
Wāqidi ٢:٤٥٧; Ibn Hishām ٣:٢٣١; Ibn Sa’d ٢:٤٧ –٣
Wāqidi ٢:٤٩٢; Ibn Hishām ٢:٢٣٠; Ibn Hazm: ١٨٦, ١٨٧ –٤
Wāqidi ٢:٤٤٥, ٤٤٩, ٤٥٣; Ibn Hishām ٣:٢٦٢ –٥
Wāqidi ٢:٤٦٢, ٤٦٤, ٤٧١; Ibn Hishām ٢:٢٣٥; Ibn Sa’d ٢:٤٨; Tabari ٢:٥٨٦; Suhayli ٣:٢٧٩; Ibn –٦
Atheer ٢:١٨٠; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٢:٦١
Wāqidi ١:٤٩٢; Ibn Hishām ٣:٢٤٣; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٢:٦٥ –٧

Wāqidi ٢:٤٤٥; Ibn Hishām ٢:٢٣١; Tabari ٢:٥٧٠; Ibn Hazm: ١٨٦; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٢:٥٨ –٨
Wāqidi ٢:٤٤٣; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٤٨, ٤٨; Ibn Qayyim ٢:٢٨٩; Watt, Muhammad fi al-Madina: ٥٨ –٩
Wāqidi ٢:٤٤٣; Ibn Hishām ٣:٢٦٠; Muslim ٣:١٣٦٢; Kalā'i ١:١١٤; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٢:٦٥ –١٠
Zuhri: ٧٩; Wāqidi ٢:٤٧٩; Muslim ٣:١٣٦١; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٢:٦٤; Ibn Qayyim ٢:١٩٢ –١١
(Zuhri: ٧٩; Ibn Hishām ٢:٢٣٢, ٢٦٢; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٤٧; Bukhāri (al-Maghāzi ٢٩ –١٢
Ibn Hishām ٣:٢٤١; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٥٠; Tabari ٢:٥٧٨; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٢:٦٥ –١٣
Ibn Hishām ٣:٢٤٣; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٥١; Ibn Atheer ٢:١٨٤; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٢:٦٥ –١٤
Ibn Hishām ٣:٢٤٣; Ibn Atheer ٢:١٨٤; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٢:٦٥ –١٥

was because the severe loss he faced was caused by a trench^(١) and by the fleeing of the tribes of Ghatfān and their partners, the Quraysh were put to shame^(٢) and it became established that they are totally incapable of gaining a victory over this ^{(Muslim) army}^(٣).

After this battle, the Jews got worried and became sure that they would be annihilated because they broke their pledges and pacts with the Muslims^(٤). The Prophet (S) immediately besieged the Bani Quraydha and was successful in removing them from Madina^(٥). It must be said that this battle was the point of change for the ^(Muslim army, from a defensive state to an offensive one)^(٦).

News of the pressure and hardships that came upon the Quraysh because of their loss in this battle reached the Holy Prophet (S), so he sent Zayd ibn Hāritha^(٧) with a mission to cut off their supply routes and prevent their caravans from travelling ^(outside, and he successfully carried out this mission)^(٨).

This victory was followed soon after by the Treaty of Hudaibiyya^(٩) which was to tantamount to another victory for the Muslim army, however the Quraysh reneged on the agreement^(١٠), and were looking for an opportunity to come out of it and stand up against to the Muslim army. As a result, the Prophet (S) hastened his preparation for the Conquest (of Makkah)^(١١) and marched against their city and homes. In order to enter Makkah, he made a secret plan^(١٢) and this plan was to carry out a surprise ^(invasion)^(١٣).

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Wāqidi ٢:٤٩٢; Ibn Katheer ٤:١١٣ –١
Zuhri: ٧٩; Wāqidi ٢:٤٧٩; Ibn Hishām ٣:٢٣٤, ٢٤٢; Qurtubi, al-Jāmi li Ahkām al-Qur’ān – ٢
١٤:١٣٣
Ibn Sa’d ٢:٥٣; Tabari ٢:٥٧٩; Ibn Atheer ٢:١٨٤ –٣
Ibn Sa’d ٢:٥٤; Ibn Hazm: ١٨٨; Ibn Katheer ٤:١٠٣ –٤
Wāqidi ٢:٤٩٦; Ibn Hishām ٣:١٤٥; Ibn Sa’d ٢:٥٣; Tabari ٢:٥٨٣; Ibn Hazm: ١٩٣ –٥
(Ibn Hishām ٣:٢٤٦; Ibn Hanbal ٤:٢٤٢; Bukhāri (al-Maghāzi ٢٩ –٦

Ibn ‘Abd al-Barr ٢:٥٤٢; Ibn Atheer ٢:٢٢٤; Ibn Hajar, al-Isābah ٣:٢٤ –٧
Wāqidi ٢:٥٥٣; Ibn Sa’d ٢:٦٣; Ibn Atheer ٢:٢٠٧; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٢:١٠٦; Ibn Qayyim –٨
٢:٢٩٧
Ibn Hishām ٣:٣٢٥, ٣٢٧; Ibn Sa’d ٢:٧٠; Ibn Hazm: ٢٠٨; Ibn Katheer ٤:١٧٠ –٩
Ibn Hishām ٣:٢٣٢; Tabari ٢:٦٣٥; Ibn Atheer ٢:٢٠٤; Kalā’i ١:١٣٠, ١٣٧ –١٠
Zuhri: ٨٦, ٨٧; Wāqidi ٢:٧٨٠; Ibn Hishām ٤:٣١; Ibn Sa’d ٢:٩٦; Ibn Khayyāt ١:٥٦ –١١
Wāqidi ٢:٧٩٦, ٧٩٩, ٨٩٢; Ibn Hishām ٤:٣٩; Ibn Sa’d ٢:٩٦; Ibn Hazm: ٢٢٦, ٢٢٨, ٢٣٠; Suhayli –١٢
٤:٩٧; Kalā’i ١:٣٨; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٢:١٦١, ١٦٧; Ibn Qayyim ٢:٣٠٩
Wāqidi ٢:٨٠٠, ٨١٨, ٨٢٥; Ibn Sa’d ٢:٩٨; Kalā’i ١:١٣٧; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٢:١٧٢, ١٧٤; Ibn –١٣
Katheer ٤:٢٨٨

After he had bewildered the Quraysh and left them with no choice but to surrender to this army^(١), he entered Makkah and gained victory over his enemies^(٢). After this victory, the Quraysh also acknowledged the Holy Prophet (S) as their leader and accepted the religion of Islām^(٣).

b) The front–line against the other Arab tribes

The Holy Prophet (S) fought many battles against these tribes, either commanding them personally^(٤) or sending contingents and Sariya missions to fight against them^(٥). Aside from this, he would send individuals and small groups^(٦) to assassinate the leaders of these tribes and those who were opposed to the Islāmic revolution and had evil intentions against its leader or had plans to carry out invasions (against them).

The tribes that were fought by the supreme commander were: Bani Saleem^(٧), Kadar^(٨), Bahrān^(٩), al-Jumūm^(١٠), the tribes of Bani Tha’labah^(١١), Ghatfān and Mahārib in Dhi Amr^(١٢), the tribes of Sirār^(١٣), Bani al-Mustalaq^(١٤) in al-Muraisiya’^(١٥), the tribe of Bani Lihyān^(١٦) in Gharrān^(١٧), Bani Hawāzin^(١٨) and the Thaqeef in Hunayn^(١٩).

The Holy Prophet (S) also carried out Sariya and other military missions against the following tribes: Bani Asad^(٢٠) in Qatan^(٢١), al-Ghamr^(٢٢) and Bani Bakr ibn Kilāb^(٢٣), Dhiryah^(٢٤), Bani Tha’labah^(٢٥) and ‘Awāl in Dhi al-Qassah^(٢٦), al-Tarāf^(٢٧) and Bani Judhām^(٢٨) in Husmā^(٢٩), Bani Fuzārah^(٣٠) in Wādi al-Qurā^(٣١), Bani Sa’d^(٣٢) in Fadak^(٣٣), ‘Ajz wa Hawāzin^(٣٤) in Turbah^(٣٥), Bani Kilāb^(٣٦) in Najd^(٣٧), al-Zajj^(٣٨) and Bani Murrah^(٣٩) in Fadak^(٤٠), Bani ‘Abd ibn Tha’labah^(٤١) in al-Mayfa’ah^(٤٢), Bani Ghatfān^(٤٣) in Yemen and Jabbār^(٤٤), Khadhrah^(٤٥) and Bani al-Malūh^(٤٦) in al-Kuryah^(٤٧), Bani Qudhā’ah^(٤٨) in Dhat Ittilā’^(٤٩), Bani Hawāzin^(٥٠) in al-Sayy^(٥١), Bani

Wāqidi ٢:٨٢٢, ٨٢٣; Ibn Hishām ٤:٤٧; Ibn Sa’d ٢:٩٨; Ibn Atheer ٢:٢٤٦ –١

Wāqidi ٢:٨٢٥; Ibn Hishām ٤:٤٩; Ibn Sa’d ٢:٩٨; Tabari ٣:٦١; Ibn Atheer ٢:٢٤٦; Kalā’i ١:١٣٩ –٢

Wāqidi ٣:٨٧٣; Ibn Hishām ٤:٥٦; Ibn Sa’d ٢:١٠٥; Ibn Hazm: ٢٣٥; Ibn Qayyim ٢:٣٩٨ –٣

Wāqidi ١:١-٨; Ibn Hishām ٤:٢٥٦; Ibn Sa'd ٢:١; Tabari ٣:١٥٢; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٣:٢٢٣ -٤
 Wāqidi ١:١-٨; Ibn Hishām ٤:٢٥٧; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٥١; Tabari ٣:١٥٥; Kalā'i ١:٥٧; Ibn Sayyid al-
 Nās ١:٢٢٣
 Wāqidi ١:١٧٣, ١٨٤; Ibn Hishām ٣:٥٤, ٢٨٧; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٢١; Ibn Hazm: ١٨٤, ١٩٨ -٦
 For more details about this tribe see: Kahālah, Mu'jam Qabā'il al-'Arab ٢:٥٤٣ -٧
 Ibn Sa'd ٢:٢١ -٨
 Bahrān was a place between Makkah and Madina; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٢٤ -٩
 Ibn Sa'd ٢:٦٢; Bakri ٢:٣٩٤ -١٠
 Suhayli ٣:١٣٦; Kahālah ١:١٤٤, ٣:٨٨٨ -١١
 Wāqidi ١:١٩٣; Hamawi ١:٢٥٢ -١٢
 Ibn Sa'd ٢:٤٤; Hamawi ٢:٣٩٨ -١٣
 Wāqidi ١:٤٠٤; Ibn Hishām ٣:٣٠٢; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٤٥; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٢:٩١ -١٤
 Ibn Sa'd ٢:٤٥; Bakri ٤:١٢٤٠ -١٥
 Kahālah ٣:١٩٠ -١٦
 Ibn Hishām ٣:٢٩٢ -١٧
 Bakri ١:٧٧; Kahālah ١:١٤٧ -١٨
 Ibn Sa'd ٢:١٠٨; Suhayli ٤:١٣٨; Bakri ٢:٤٧١ -١٩
 Kahālah ١:٢١, ٢٢ -٢٠
 Wāqidi ١:٣٤٢; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٣٥ -٢١
 Ibn Sa'd ١:٦١; Bakri ٣:١٠٠٢ -٢٢
 Ibn Sa'd ٢:٥٦; Zarqāni, Sharh al-Mawāhib ٢:١٦٦; Kahālah ١:٩٢ -٢٣
 Ibn Sa'd ٢:٥٦; Bakri ١:٢٦٩, ٣:٨٥٩; Hamawi ٣:٤٥٧ -٢٤
 Zarqāni ٢:١٧٨ -٢٥
 Ibn Sa'd ٢:١٦١; Hamawi ٤:٣٦٦ -٢٦
 Ibn Sa'd ٢:٣٦ -٢٧
 Ibn Sa'd ٢:٦٣; Kahālah ١:١٧٤ -٢٨
 Ibn Sa'd ٢:٦٣; Bakri ٢:٤٤٦; Hamawi ٢:٢٥٨ -٢٩
 Hamawi ٤:٣٣٨; Kahālah ٣:٩١٨ -٣٠
 Hamawi ٤:٣٣٨ -٣١
 Kahālah ٢:٥١٣ -٣٢
 Ibn Sa'd ٢:٦٥; Bakri ٣:١٠١٥ -٣٣
 Bakri ١:٣٠٨, Hamawi ٢:٢١ -٣٤

Ibn Sa'd ٢:٨٥; Bakri ١:٣٠٨; Hamawi ٢:٢١; Ibn Katheer ٤:٢٢١ -٢٥
Kahālah ٣:٩١٨, ٩٩٠ -٣٦
Majma' al-Buldān ٥:٢٦١; Kahālah ٣:١٢٣١ -٣٧
Ibn Sa'd ٢:١١٧; Hamawi ٣:١٣٣, ٤٥٧ -٣٨
Kahālah ٣:١٠٧٢ -٣٩
Hamawi ٤:٢٣٨ -٤٠
Kahālah ١:١٤٣ -٤١
Ibn Sa'd ٢:١٨٦; Bakri ٤:١٢٨٤ -٤٢
Kahālah ٣:٨٨٨ -٤٣
Ibn Sa'd ٢:٨٧; Bakri ٢:٣٩٥, ٤:١٤٠٠; Hamawi ٢:٩٨, ١٦٤, ٥:٤٤٩ -٤٤
Ibn Sa'd ٢:٩٥; Hamawi ٢:٣٨٨ -٤٥
Kahālah ٣:١١٧٣ -٤٦
Bakri ٣:٩٢٥, ٤:١١١٩; Hamawi ٤:٤٤٢ -٤٧
Ibn 'Abd al-Barr ٣:١٣٢٣; Bakri ١:١٧ -٤٨
Ibn Sa'd ٢:٩٢; Hamawi ١:٢١٨ -٤٩
Kahālah ٢:١٢٣١, ٢:٧٠٨ -٥٠
Ibn Sa'd ٢:٩٢; Bakri ٣:٧٧٢ -٥١

[\(1\)](#) Tamim in al-Suqyā [\(2\)](#) and Bani Khath'am [\(3\)](#) in Batn Musjā' [\(4\)](#)

The Holy Prophet (S) would carry out pre-emptive wars [\(5\)](#) against these tribes, meaning that he would launch an attack on them first before they could march towards Madina [\(6\)](#). More often than not, the enemy would flee in fear the moment they heard that the Muslim army was on its way [\(7\)](#); to such an extent that they would [\(8\)](#) also leave their animals behind as war booty (for the Muslim army to take) [\(9\)](#)

The number of troops in these military missions would vary from battle to battle [\(10\)](#). In the Battle of Bawāt, the number of soldiers reached two hundred strong whereas in the Battle of Badr, they numbered three hundred and a few. Similarly, the numbers would change from Sariya mission to Sariya mission [\(11\)](#). For example, in the Sariya of Muhammad ibn Maslamah against the Bani Bakr, the soldiers numbered thirty, whereas in the Sariya of Zayd ibn Hāritha against the tribe of Judhām, there were fifty. In the Sariya of Usāma bin Zayd to fight against the Romans, the number of forces reached three thousand. In this way, the supreme commander would send the appropriate number of forces depending on the number of enemy soldiers and the type of mission

Because of the fact that the enemy tribes that have been mentioned were spread out throughout the Arabian peninsula [\(12\)](#), from far and near they were affected by the Muslim army [\(13\)](#) and were never able to launch raids, invasions or attacks on Madina [\(14\)](#). The attacks of

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Wāqidi 1:7; Ibn Sa'd 2:116; Kahālah 1:126-1

Suqyā is the name of a well and Masjid near Madina from which the Holy Prophet –2 (S) drank water or performed ablution when he passed by it in some of the battles.

(Tr

Wāqidi 2:754; Ibn Sa'd 2:117; Bakri 1:301-3

Wāqidi 3:981; Hamawi 5:125-4

Wāqidi 1:182, 193; Ibn Hishām 3:46, 50; Ibn Sa'd 2:21; 43; Ibn Hazm: 152, 182-5

Wāqidi ١:١٨٢, ١٩٣, ٤٠٤; Ibn Hishām ٣:٢١٣, ٤:٢٧٢; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٢١, ٤٣; Ibn Hazm: ١٥٢ –٦

Wāqidi ١:١٨٣, ٥٣٥; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٦١; Ibn Atheer ٢:٢٢٦; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٢:٩٣, ١٠٥ –٧

Wāqidi ١:٢٣, ٢٧; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٢١; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ١:٢٢٦ –٨

Wāqidi ١:٢٣, ٢٧, ٣٩; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٢١; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ١:٢٢٦ –٩

Wāqidi ٢:٥٣٤, ٥٥٢, ٣:١٠٢٢; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٥٦ –١٠

Ibn Sa'd ٢:١٢, ٣٥, ٤٥, ٥٦, ٦٣, ١٠٨; Bakri ١:١٧, ٣٠١, ٣٠٨, ٣:٤٤٦, ٣:١٠١٥, ٤:١٢٧٤, ١٤٠٠; Hamawi –١١

١:٣٠٨, ٢:٢١, ٣:١٣٣, ٤:٢٣٨

Wāqidi ١:١٩٣, Ibn Hishām ٣:٣٠٢; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٤٤, ٤٥, ٥٦, ٦١; Suhayli ٣:١٣٦ –١٢

Wāqidi ١:١٢, ٢:٥٣٧; hi ٢:٢٥١, ٣:٢٩٣; Ibn Sa'd ٢:١, ٥٨; Tabari ٢:٦٠١; Ibn Hazm: ٢٠١; Ibn –١٣

Atheer ٢:١٨٨; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ١:٢٢٧, ٢:٨٤

the Muslim army on these tribes were based on swiftness(1), surprise attack(2), marching at night(3), secret missions(4), gathering new and important intelligence(5); and this is why they would always attain victory

The priorities in dealing with these tribes and making them submissive were specified in such a way(6) that they would first concentrate their efforts on gaining control over the tribes in the coastal regions(7), then they would move on to those in the east (of the Arab peninsula)(8) and finally the other tribes would be attacked(9). In the same way, they would start with tribes that were nearer and then proceed towards those that were further(10). They were also precautionous of the threat posed by the tribes of ...(Bani Saleem, Ghatfān and Tamim(11

c) The front–line against the Jews

After the Holy Prophet’s migration to Madina, he (S) created a ‘civil pact’ with those who lived in that city(12). However, not long after this pact was created, the Jews of Bani Qaynuqā’ (13) were waiting for an opportunity to break away from the conditions of the pact they had made and bring defeat to the Muslim army, which had since developed and grown after the many battles it had fought. For this reason, they broke their pact and manifested their enmity for the Muslims, and continued to do so despite (the warning given to them by the Holy Prophet (S)(14

In response, the Prophet (S) besieged them in their fortress and gained victory over them(15). From that day, all the Jews were waiting for the same thing to happen

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Wāqidi 1:342; Ibn Hishām 3:203; Ibn Sa’d 2:21, 35, 43–45, 62, 95; Ibn Hazm: 203; Ibn – 1
Sayyid al-Nās 2:39

Wāqidi 1:193; Ibn Sa’d 2:21, 23; Suhayli 3:136, 142; Ibn Atheer 2:142 – 2

Wāqidi 1:342, 403; Ibn Sa’d 2:35, 44; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās 2:39; Ibn Katheer 4:61; Nāsif, al– 3
Tāj 4:347

Wāqidi 1:69, 5:563; Ibn Sa’d 2:24; Tabari 3:75; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās 1:304; Ibn Qayyim 2:299 – 4

Wāqidi 1:182, 194, 395, 406; Ibn Sa’d 2:61, 63–65, 85, 89; Tabari 3:29; Suhayli 4:252; Ibn – 5

- Wāqidi ۱:۱۸۲; Ibn Hishām ۳:۴۶; Ibn Sa'd ۲:۲۱; Ibn Khayyāt ۱:۲۷; Ibn Hazm: ۱۵۲ –۶
- Wāqidi ۱:۱۰, ۱۲; Ibn Hishām ۲:۲۴۱; Ibn Sa'd ۲:۱–۴; Tabari ۲:۲۵۹; Ibn Hazm: ۱۰۰; Suhayli –۷
۳:۱۷; Hamawi ۱:۹۲, ۳:۳۵۰, ۴:۱۳۶
- Wāqidi ۱:۱۸۲; Ibn Hishām ۳:۴۶, ۵۰; Ibn Sa'd ۲:۲۱, ۲۴; Ibn Hazm: ۱۵۲; Hamawi ۱:۱۹۳, ۳۴۱; –۸
Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ۱:۲۶۴, ۳۰۴
- Wāqidi ۱:۴۰۴, ۲:۵۳۵, ۷۵۲; Ibn Hishām ۳:۳۰۲; Ibn Sa'd ۲:۴۵, ۵۶, ۹۵; Tabari ۳:۲۹; Ibn Hazm: –۹
۲۰۰; Kalā'i ۱:۱۲۴; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ۲:۸۳, ۹۱, ۱۵۲; Ibn Qayyim ۲:۲۷۸, ۲۹۳
- Wāqidi ۱:۱۲, ۲:۵۶۰, ۳:۱۰۷۹; Ibn Hishām ۳:۳:۲۴۹; Ibn Sa'd ۲:۶۴, ۱۲۲; Tabari ۳:۱۳۱; Bakri –۱۰
۲:۵۶۴; Hamawi ۱:۵۰۳, ۵۳۶; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ۱:۲۲۴, ۲۷۱; Ibn Mandhur ۱:۲۷۸
- Wāqidi ۱:۱۸۲, ۱۹۵, ۲:۵۶۰, ۳:۱۰۲۵; Ibn Hishām ۳:۴۶, ۵۰; Ibn Sa'd ۲:۲۱, ۲۴, ۶۲, ۸۶; Ibn Sayyid –۱۱
al-Nās ۱:۲۹۴, ۳۰۴; Ibn Sa'd ۲:۸۳, ۹۵; Suhayli ۳:۱۳۶
- Ibn Hishām ۲:۲۴۱; Suhayli ۲:۲۵۲; Haiderābādi: ۱۵–۲۱; this pact had forty conditions –۱۲
(.that were to be abided by both the Arab Muslims and Jews residents of Madina. (Tr
Wāqidi ۱:۱۷۶; Ibn Hishām ۳:۵۰; Ibn Sa'd ۲:۱۹; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ۱:۲۹۴ –۱۳
Wāqidi ۱:۱۷۶; Suhayli ۳:۱۳۷; Ibn Atheer ۲:۱۳۷; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ۲:۲۹۴ –۱۴
Wāqidi ۱:۱۷۷; Ibn Hishām ۳:۴۵; Ibn Hazm: ۱۹۳; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ۲:۲۹۵ –۱۵

to them that had happened to the other Jews. Ka'b ibn Ashraf, Salām bin Abi al-Haqiq and other Jewish leaders⁽¹⁾ who had gone against and fermented opposition to the supreme commander and the Muslims⁽²⁾, had seen their end and were killed in suicide missions⁽³⁾.

The Jews of Bani Nadhir⁽⁴⁾ also did not hesitate to betray the Prophet (S) after the Muslims lost the Battle of Uhud, and even made plans to assassinate him⁽⁵⁾. This was when the Holy Prophet (S) sought to take the blood-money for the two Muslims killed by 'Amr ibn Umayyah al-Dhumri and had gone to their land for this purpose⁽⁶⁾. Because of this treachery, the Prophet (S) besieged them and took over their lands⁽⁷⁾.

The Jews of Bani Quraydha also joined hands with the Quraysh to work against the Muslim army in the Battle of Khandaq⁽⁸⁾. Their attempts and struggles were to no avail and because they broke their allegiance to the Muslims, they returned back afraid and worried⁽⁹⁾. That which they had thought of did not transpire and now they saw themselves under threat of being besieged

After the Battle of Khandaq, the Holy Prophet (S) himself led the army⁽¹⁰⁾, marching towards the area of the Bani Quraydha⁽¹¹⁾. He fought a battle with them and put them all to death⁽¹²⁾. Despite this, the Jews continued in their enmity with the Muslims and again began inciting and encouraging the Arab tribes to fight against the army of the Prophet (S). This is why the Battle of Khaybar took place⁽¹³⁾

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Wāqidi ۱:۱۸۴, ۳۹۱; Ibn Hishām ۳:۵۴, ۲۸۶; Ibn Hazm: ۱۵۴, ۱۹۸-۱

Wāqidi ۱:۳۹۱; Ibn Hishām ۳:۵۵; Ibn Sa'd ۲:۲۱; Ibn Hazm: ۱۵۴, ۱۹۸-۲

Wāqidi ۱:۳۹۱; Ibn Hishām ۳:۵۲, ۲۸۶; Ibn Sa'd ۲:۲۱; Ibn 'Abd al-Barr ۳:۹۴۶, ۱۳۷۷; Ibn -۳
Atheer ۳:۳۰۴, ۴:۳۳۰

Zuhri: ۷۱; Wāqidi ۱:۳۶۳; Ibn Hishām ۳:۱۹۹; Bukhārī ۵:۸۸-۴

Wāqidi ۱:۳۶۵; Ibn Hishām ۳:۱۹۹; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ۲:۴۸-۵

Wāqidi ۱:۳۶۳ onwards; Ibn Hishām ۳:۱۹۹; Ibn Sa'd ۲:۴۰; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ۲:۴۸-۶

Zuhri: ۷۱; Wāqidi ۱:۳۶۳; Ibn Hishām ۳:۲۰۰; Ibn Sa'd ۲:۴۰; Ibn Hazm: ۱۸۱, ۱۸۲-۷

Wāqidi ٢:٤٤٣, ٤٤٥, ٤٥٧; Ibn Hishām ٣:٢٢٥, ٢٣٢; Suhayli ٣:٢٧٨; Ibn Qayyim ٢:٢٨٩, ٢٩٢ –٨

Wāqidi ٢:٤٩٧; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٥٤; Ibn Hazm: ١٨٨; Ibn Katheer ٤:١٠٣ –٩

Zuhri: ٧٩; Wāqidi ٢:٤٩٦; Ibn Hishām ٣:٢٤٤; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٥٣; Tabari ٢:١٨١; Ibn Hazm: ١٩١; –١٠

Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٢:٦٨; Ibn Qayyim ٢:٢٩٢

Wāqidi ٢:٤٩٧, ٤٩٨, ٥١٠; Ibn Hishām ٣:٢٤٤; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٥٣; Muslim ٢:١٣٩١ –١١

Wāqidi ٢:٤٩٦, ٥٠١; Ibn Hishām ٣:٢٤٥; Ibn Qutaybah, 'Uyun al-Akḥbār ٢:١١٤; Tabari –١٢

٢:٥٨٣; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٢:٧٢; It mentioned that the Prophet (S) gave authority to Sa'd

ibn Mu'ādh who was in allegiance with them to make the decision about their

punishment. He (S) also ensured that their punishment was in accordance to the

Jewish holy scriptures and the command of God. It is then that he ordered that they

be put to death and their families be taken as prisoners. However, there are many

doubts that can be raised about this account: (١) the number of killed is put at ٩٠٠ but

there could not have been that many fighters of the Bani Quraydha at the time (٢)

these reports have been narrated by persons who had just accepted Islām and it is

possible that they wanted to express a feeling of oppression against the Jews [as

even today, while it is clear that it is they who are the oppressors, they still portray

themselves as the oppressed] (٣) it is said that two people were given the task of

killing these men yet the short span of time mentioned makes it impossible for two

men to kill ٩٠٠; and many other questions that make this narration suspicious and not

(easy to accept outright. (Tr

Zuhri: ٨٤; Wāqidi ٢:٦٣٣; Ibn Hishām ٣:٣٤٢; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٧٧; Ibn Khayyāt ١:٥٠; Tabari ٣:٩; –١٣

Ibn Hazm: ٢١١; Ibn Atheer: ٢١٦; Kalā'ī ١:١٣٠; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٢:١٣٠; Ibn Qayyim ٢:٣٢٤

In this war also, the victory belonged to the Muslim army⁽¹⁾ and as a result the greatest opposing force and enemy was done away with, and all the Jews surrendered⁽²⁾.

The battles against the Jews were different from other battles because they were in fortresses⁽³⁾ and secure shelters and were able to store the needed supplies and weapons for a long period of time⁽⁴⁾. They used to construct their buildings in elevated locations so as to prevent the archers and lookouts, keep the enemies at bay by the strength and fortification of their fortresses⁽⁵⁾, dig moats just outside the and filling them with water⁽⁶⁾.

The Jews would store a lot of other weapons and armaments in the fortress and would use them when needed⁽⁷⁾. At the same time, they would be well trained and would possess all the battle gear that was required⁽⁸⁾. The number of Jews was many times more than the soldiers in the Muslim army⁽⁹⁾. In the Battle of Bani Qaynuqā' they numbered seven hundred as opposed to the four hundred in the Muslim army. In the Battle of Bani Quraydha, three thousand Jews fought against only seven hundred Muslims and in the Battle of Khaybar, there were ten thousand strong against an army of ۱,۵۰۰ fighters. Aside from this, they had a lot of wealth^(۱۰) and wielded a lot of economic, political and military influence^(۱۱); but despite all this, they were still divided^(۱۲) and each group would fight on its own without the help of the others. In

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Wāqidi ۲:۶۶۶, ۶۸۵, ۷۰۰; Ibn Hishām ۳:۳۵۷; Ibn Katheer ۴:۱۹۸, ۱۹۹ –۱

Wāqidi ۲:۷۰۶, ۷۰۹; Tabari ۳:۱۰۶; Hamawi ۲:۳۷, ۴۲, ۲۳۸, ۳۳۸; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ۲:۱۴۳, ۱۴۵ –۲

Wāqidi ۱:۱۷۶, ۲:۶۳۳; Ibn Hishām ۳:۵۰, ۳۴۲; Ibn Sa'd ۲:۱۹, ۵۳, ۷۷; Tabari ۲:۴۷۹, ۵۵۲; Ibn –۳

Hazm: ۱۵۴, ۱۸۱, ۲۱۱; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ۲:۴۸, ۶۸, ۱۳۰

Wāqidi ۱:۳۶۸, ۲:۴۹۶, ۶۴۷, ۶۷۱ onwards; Ibn Hazm: ۱۹۲; Suhayli ۶:۶۵; Ibn Katheer ۴:۱۸۵, –۴

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Wāqidi ۱:۳۶۸, ۲:۶۳۷, ۶۴۰, ۶۴۳ –۵

Wāqidi ۱:۳۶۸, ۲:۶۳۷, ۶۶۴, ۶۷۰; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ۱:۱۳۴; Ibn Qayyim ۲:۳۳۰, ۳۳۱ –۶

Wāqidi ۱:۱۷۷, ۳۷۷, ۲:۵۱۰, ۶۶۷; Ibn Sa'd ۲:۴۱; Suhayli ۴:۶۵; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ۴:۷۲ –۷

Wāqidi ١:١٧٤, ٢:٤٤٠ -٨

Wāqidi ١:١٧٧, ٢:٤٥٤, ٥١٠, ٥٧٤, ٤٤٢, ٤٥٠ -٩

Wāqidi ١:١٧٩, ٣٧٤, ٤٣٤, Kalā'i ١:١٣٠ -١٠

Wāqidi ١:١٧٩, ٢:٤٣٤, ٤٣٧; Ibn Atheer ١:٤٥٤ -١١

Wāqidi ١:٣٧٠; Ibn Hishām ٣:٥٠, ١٩٩, ٢٤٤, ٣٤٢; Ibn Sa'd ٢:١٩, ٤٠, ٥٣, ٧٧; Tabari ٢:٤٧٩, ٥٥٢, -١٢

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the Battle of Qaynuqā', nobody joined forces with them and this was the case with the other battles against the Jews also

In the battles against the Jews, the Muslim army had the following distinct characteristics:

Laying siege⁽¹⁾: this was a technique where all the aide and military assistance was completely blocked from reaching the enemy⁽²⁾

Remaining far away from the reach of enemy arrows⁽³⁾

Carrying out frontal and side attacks on their fortress⁽⁴⁾, as they did at Khaybar

Using psychological warfare⁽⁵⁾

Heightening the spirits of their own forces⁽⁶⁾

Selecting a suitable place to set camp⁽⁷⁾

Creating a split between the Jewish forces⁽⁸⁾. This was done using the superior battle strategy of the Muslims. Once this was achieved, the Prophet (S) was able to gain separate victories over the Bani Qaynuqā'⁽⁹⁾, Bani Nadhir⁽¹⁰⁾, Bani Quraydha⁽¹¹⁾ and the residents of Khaybar⁽¹²⁾. Aside from this, the Muslim army was distinguished by its unity of command, concentration, obedience, persistence and swiftness⁽¹³⁾; all of which made it possible to attain victory and overpower the Jews

d) The front–line against the Rome

The Holy Prophet (S) fought the first battle at the border with Rome (Dumat al-Jundal)⁽¹⁴⁾, and this was because of the importance of this location⁽¹⁵⁾, because this place was the gateway for the future invasions of the Muslim army on Rome⁽¹⁶⁾ and the base of security⁽¹⁷⁾ and also was considered a secure barrier between Rome and the Muslims⁽¹⁸⁾. By sending 'Abd al-Rahmān ibn 'Awf on a Sariya mission⁽¹⁹⁾, the supreme commander completed his gathering of intelligence and information from the tribes who lived near the area⁽²⁰⁾ in order

- Wāqidi 1:177, 363, 2:499, 503; Ibn Hishām 2:245; Ibn Sa'd 2:40; Tabari 357 –1
- Wāqidi 1:177 onwards, 363, 2:499, 666; Ibn Hishām 3:200, 344; Ibn Sa'd 2:114; Ibn 'Abd –2
al-Barr: 181; Ibn Qayyim 2:330
- Wāqidi 1:371, 2:496; Ibn Katheer 4:199 –3
- Wāqidi 2:671, 683; Ibn Hishām 3:344; Tabari 3:9; Ibn Atheer 2:217 –4
- Wāqidi 1:378, 2:496, 670; Tabari 2:552; Ibn Hazm: 182 –5
- Wāqidi 2:496 onwards; Ibn Hishām 3:200, 344; Ibn Atheer 2:217; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās 1:295 –6
- Wāqidi 1:371, 2:501; Tabari 3:9; Kalā'i 1:130; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās 2:131 –7
- Wāqidi 1:176, 2:496, 652 onwards; Ibn Hishām 3:50, 244; Ibn Sa'd 2:19, 40, 77; Ibn Hazm: –8
154, 181, 191, 211
- Wāqidi 1:176; Ibn Hishām 3:50; Ibn Sa'd 2:19; Ibn Hazm: 59; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās 1:294 –9
- Wāqidi 1:363; Ibn Hishām 3:199; Ibn Sa'd 2:40; Tabari 2:479; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās 2:48 –10
- Wāqidi 2:496; Ibn Hishām 3:244; Ibn Sa'd 2:53; Tabari 2:552; Ibn Hazm: 191 –11
- Wāqidi 2:633; Ibn Hishām 3:342; Ibn Sa'd 2:77; Tabari 3:9; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās 2:130 –12
- Wāqidi 1:177, 2:497, 670; Ibn Hishām 3:200; Tabari 1:116, 117; Ibn Qayyim 4:330 –13
- Wāqidi 1:420; Ibn Hishām 3:224; Ibn Sa'd 2:44; Ibn Hazm: 184; Suhayli 3:276; Ibn –14
Sayyid al-Nās 2:54; Ibn Katheer 4:92
- Tabari 3:378; Hamawi 2:487; Jawād 'Ali 1:590, 611, 624, 3:106 –15
- Ibn Hishām 3:224; Ibn Atheer 2:395 onwards; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās 2:220 –16
- Wāqidi 2:560, 3:1025; Ibn Hishām 3:169; Ibn Sa'd 2:119; Kahālah 3:991; Watt, –17
Muhammad fi al-Madina: 157
- Ibn Sa'd 2:64, 119; Bakri 2:564; Hamawi 2:15, 487 –18
- Wāqidi 2:560; Ibn Sa'd 2:64; Ibn Atheer 2:209; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās 2:108; Ibn Qayyim 299 –19
- Wāqidi 2:560; Ibn Sa'd 2:64; Ibn Qayyim 2:300 –20

[to learn about the Roman forces and how to invade them](#)⁽¹⁾

The Battle of Muta was the first full-fledged battle between the Muslim army and the Roman troops⁽²⁾. It can be said that the goals of this battle were to display the might of the Muslim army⁽³⁾ and test the capability of the enemy⁽⁴⁾. However the vast [difference between the forces of the two sides made this war one-sided](#)⁽⁵⁾

The supreme commander came face to face with the Romans for a second time in the Battle of Tabuk⁽⁶⁾. One of the goals of this battle was the avenging of the Martyrs of Muta⁽⁷⁾ and launching an attack on the enemy and their allies⁽⁸⁾. In this battle, no combat was seen, however a large part of its objectives were fulfilled. The pressure against the Romans continued and in the end, an army under the command of Usāma bin Zayd was send against them⁽⁹⁾. He attained victory in this battle and in this way the first victory over the Romans was established. After this the Muslims continued in [their war against them](#)⁽¹⁰⁾.

The Romans had become worried from the time when the first battle against them was fought near their borders⁽¹¹⁾ and they turned their attention towards this growing Muslim army whom they expected to face again. However, the Holy Prophet (S) dispelled the fear of this enemy from his forces⁽¹²⁾ and he put the idea in their minds that conquering the lands of Shām is not difficult or impossible⁽¹³⁾. He (S) would train his

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Wāqidi ٢:٥٦٠, ٥٦١; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٦٤; Hamawi ٢:٤٨٧; Jawād 'Ali ١:٥٩٠, ٥٩٢, ٦٢٤ -١

Wāqidi ٢:٧٥٥; Ibn Hishām ٤:١٥; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٩٢; Ibn Khayyāt ١:٥٦; Tabari ٢:٣٦; Ibn 'Asākir -٢
١:٩٢; Ibn Hazm: ٢٢٠; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٢:١٥٣

Ibn Hishām ٤:٣٠; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٩٢; Ibn Hazm: ٢٢٠, ٢٢١; Kalā'i ١:١٧٦; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٢:١٥٤ -٣

Wāqidi ٢:٧٥٥; Kalā'i ١:١٣٦; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٢:٢١٥ -٤

Wāqidi ٢:٧٦٠, ٧٦١; Suhayli ٤:٨١; Ibn Hazm: ٢٢٠; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٢:١٥٤ -٥

Zuhri: ١٠٦; Ibn Hishām ٤:١٥٩; Ibn Sa'd ٢:١١٨; Ibn Khayyāt ١:٦٤; Tabari ٣:١٠٠; Ibn Hazm: -٦
٢٤٩; Ibn 'Asākir ١:١٠٧; Kalā'i ١:١٥١; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٢:٢١٥

Wāqidi ٢:٧٦٥; Ibn Hishām ٤:١٩-٢١; Ibn Sa'd ٢:١١٩; Ibn Atheer ٢:٣٦; Ibn Qayyim ٢:٣٧٥-٧

Wāqidi ٢:٩٩٠; Ibn Sa'd ٢:١١٩-٨

Zuhri: ١٥١; Wāqidi ٣:١١٧; Ibn Hishām ٤:٢٩١; Ibn Sa'd ٢:١٣٦; Tabari ٣:١٨٤; Ibn 'Abd al-

Barr ١:٧٥; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٢:٢٨١; Ibn Hajar ١:٢٩

Zuhri: ٥٨; Wāqidi ٣:١٠٩١, ١١٢٤; Ibn Khayyāt ١:١٠٣; Ibn Katheer ٦:٣١٦; Watt, - ١٠

Muhammad fi al-Madina: ١٥٨, ١٧٧; Initially this mission was delayed because of the objections raised by some companions about the young age of the appointed

(commander Usāma bin Zayd. (Tr

Wāqidi ٣:٩٩٠; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٢:٤٤, ١١٩-١١

Wāqidi ١:٢, ٤, ٢:٥٦٠, ٣:٩٨٩, ١١١٧; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٤٤, ٦٤, ١١٩, ١٣٦-١٢

Zuhri: ٥٨; Wāqidi ٣:١٠٣٥; Ibn Hishām ٣:٢٤٤, ٤:٢٩١; Tabari ٣:١٠٠; Ibn Hazm: ٢٥٣; Bakri - ١٣

٢:٥٣٨; Ibn 'Asākir ١:١١١, ١١٢; Hamawi ١:٤٨٩

troops to bear the hardships of travelling the long and arduous routes, and endure the difficulties and tribulations of the desert^(١). Having subjugated some of the neighboring tribes^(٢), he made several pacts with them^(٣) so that they could act as a refuge and a leading force in this army against the Romans and open up the way for the Battle of Muta^(٤)

The Roman soldiers were known for their military outfits and great adornments^(٥). Their forces, weapons, equipment and armaments were plenty^(٦) for this reason they became heavy and their maneuvers became sluggish and slow^(٧). The Roman foot-soldiers would use bows in situations where they had not been trained for battle^(٨). Aside from this, the Roman forces and the Arabs (who were in their service) had no co-operation with each other, and because they were all mixed together^(٩), they did not have an opportunity to conduct well planned maneuvers together. Aside from this, they had a weak system of command which greatly reduced their efficiency and speed in battle^(١٠)

As for the Muslim army, it was distinguished by its continuous attacks on the enemy^(١١), psychological warfare^(١٢), securing of the northern borders and strategic locations^(١٣), taking the battle away from its own land^(١٤), remaining steadfast against an enemy that was stronger^(١٥), and employing the principles of war in different ways^(١٦). This was accompanied by practice, maneuvering^(١٧) and ease of movement^(١٨). When a soldier would shoot arrows while moving, his stability and poise would increase. It was as if he was not carrying any

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Wāqidi ٣:١٠١٨, ١٠٣٩; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٤٤; Bakri ٢:٥٦٤; Hamawi ٢:١٤; Ibn Katheer ٥:٩ – ١

Wāqidi ١:٤٠٣; Ibn Hishām ٤:١٦٩; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٦٤, ١١٩; Kahālah ٢:٩٩١ – ٢

Wāqidi ٢:٥٦٠; Ibn Hishām ٤:١٦٩; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٦٤; Ibn Atheer ٢:٢٨٠; Ibn Qayyim ٣:٢١٠ – ٣

Wāqidi ٢:٧٥٩; Ibn Hishām ٤:٣٠; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٢٩٣; Ibn Hazm: ٢٢٢; Kalā'i ١:١٣٦; Watt: ١٥٨, – ٤

١٥٩. ١٧٧

Wāqidi ٢:٧٦٠, ٣:٩٩٠; Ibn Sa'd ٢:١١٩; Hindi, al-Jaysh al-'Arabi fi 'Asr al-Futuhāt: ٢٦ – ٥

Wāqidi ٢:٧٥٥, ٧٥٦, ٧٦٠; Ibn Hishām ٤:١٦, ١٩; Ibn Hazm: ٢٢; Suhayli ٤:٨١; Ibn Sayyid al- – ٦

Nās ۲:۱۵۳

Wāqidi ۳:۱۱۱۷, ۱۱۲۳; Ibn Hazm: ۲۲۰ onwards; Kalā'ī ۱:۱۳۶; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ۲:۲۸۱ –۷

Wāqidi ۳:۱۱۷, ۱۱۲۲, ۱۱۲۳; Ibn Hishām ۴:۲۹۱; Ibn Sa'd ۲:۲۸۱; Kalā'ī ۱:۱۳۶; Ibn Sayyid al- –۸

Nās ۲:۱۵۳

Wāqidi ۲:۷۶۰; Ibn Hishām ۴:۱۶, ۱۷; Tabari ۳:۳۷; Ibn Atheer ۲:۲۳۵; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās –۹

۲:۱۵۳

Wāqidi ۲:۱۲۰, ۳:۱۰۱۹, ۱۱۲۴; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ۳:۲۲۰, ۳۸۳ –۱۰

Wāqidi ۲:۵۶۰, ۷۵۵, ۳:۹۹۰; Ibn Sa'd ۲:۶۴, ۱۱۰; Hamawi ۲:۴۸۷; Kalā'ī ۱:۱۳۶; Jawād 'Alī ۱:۵۲۹, –۱۱

۶۱۱, ۲:۳۸

Wāqidi ۱:۴۰۴, ۳:۹۹۰, ۱۰۹۱; Ibn Hishām ۴:۲۷۹; Ibn Sa'd ۲:۴۴, ۱۹۹; Suhayli ۴:۱۹۶; Kalā'ī ۱:۱۳۶ –۱۲

Wāqidi ۱:۴۰۳, ۲:۵۶۰; Ibn Hishām ۴:۱۶۹; Ibn Sa'd ۲:۶۴, ۱۱۹; Ibn Atheer ۲:۲۸۰ –۱۳

Wāqidi ۱:۴۰۲; Ibn Hishām ۴:۱۵, ۱۹۱; Kalā'ī ۱:۱۵۲; Tabari ۳:۱۰۰; Ibn Hazm: ۱۸۴; Ibn –۱۴

'Asākir ۱:۱۰۷; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ۲:۱۰۸

Ibn Sa'd ۲:۹۲; Ibn Hazm: ۲۲۰, ۲۲۱; Suhayli ۴:۸۱; Kalā'ī ۱:۱۳۶; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ۲:۱۵۴ –۱۵

Wāqidi ۳:۷۶۳; Ibn Hishām ۴:۱۹; Ibn Sa'd ۲:۹۴; Ibn Hazm: ۲۲۱; Ibn 'Abd al-Barr ۲:۴۲۷; –۱۶

Ibn Atheer ۲:۱۰۱; Kalā'ī ۱:۱۳۶; Ibn Katheer ۴:۲۴۹

Wāqidi ۲:۷۶۴; Ibn Hishām ۴:۲۱; Dianna, Muhammad Rasulullah: ۲۹۶ –۱۷

Wāqidi ۲:۷۶۳, ۱۰۲۵; Ibn Sa'd ۲:۹۴ –۱۸

weapon or battle gear such as would impede on his swiftness or cause him to remain
behind and become weary(1)

Second: Department of Training

This was the department that was responsible for preparing the armed forces and their various units in order to carry out battle operations(2). In the Muslim army, training was common to all and included individuals(3), communities(4), groups(5), large organizations(6) and all the armed forces(7) and would be conducted in all the situations that arise in battle. This included: recognition(8), archery(9), combat(10), fighting when being attacked(11), running(12), carrying out surprise attacks(13), onslaught(14), moving covertly and camouflage(15), conducting ambushes and patrols(16), marching at night(17), covering long distances on foot(18), the principle of concentration(19), assistance and co-operation(20), pre-emptive warfare(21), taking advantage of the enemy's negligence(22), mass attacks(23), psychological warfare(24), remaining patient(25) and steadfast against the enemy(26), bearing all the hardships of securing resources and reinforcements(27), battling to overcome fortresses(28), war using trenches(29) and fighting battles in the cities(30).

The supreme commander paid special attention to training the cavalry(31). That which separated the training of this army from those of other armies was that training took place in real-life situations and in the battlefield, during battle(32). One of its distinguishing features was that it gave skills to individuals, groups and contingents, preparing and polishing them for every different battle scenario and taught them about all the intricate details. It did away with mistakes and error or greatly reduced them. It made the troops precautious when facing the enemy, to the extent of necessity, just as the

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Wāqidi ٢:٧٦٠; Ibn Hishām ٤:١٧; Suhayli ٤:٨٠ -١

Wāqidi ١:٤٠٣, ٢:٥٣٥; Ibn Hishām ٢:٢٣٠; Qurtubi ٤:٣٠٦; al-Mawsu'ah al-‘Askariyya ١:٢٦٤ -٢

Wāqidi ١:١٧٤; Ibn Sa’d ٢:٦١; Ibn ‘Abd al-Barr ٣:١٢١٨; Ibn Atheer ٢:٢٤٨ -٣

Wāqidi ٢:٥٣٤; Ibn Hishām ٤:٢٤٥; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٤١; Ibn Atheer ٢:٢٠٧; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās – ٤
٢:١٠٤; Ibn Qayyim ٢:٢٩٧

Wāqidi ٢:٧٥٥; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٤٣٢; Kalā'i ١:١٥٨; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٢:١٠٦ – ٥

Wāqidi ٢:٧٥٥; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٩٢, ٩٨; Ibn Hishām ٤:١٥, ٤٩ – ٦

Zuhri: ٧٦; Wāqidi ١:١٩٩; Ibn Hishām ٢:٢٥٧; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٤٧; Tabari ٢:٢٤٧; Ibn Hazm: ٢٢٣; – ٧
Ibn Atheer ٢:٢٧٦

Zuhri: ٩٢; Wāqidi ١:٢٠٧, ٢:٤٥٧; Ibn Hishām ٢:٢٤٥; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٤٥; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ١:٢٢٤ – ٨

Ibn Is'hāq: ٣٠٧; Shaybāni ٢:٥٨; Wāqidi ١:١٠, ٦٧; Ibn Hishām ٢:٢٧٨ – ٩

Wāqidi ١:٦٨, ٢٢٥; Ibn Hishām ٢:٢٧٧; Ibn Sa'd ٢:١٠, ٢٨; Tabari ٢:٤٤٥; Ibn Atheer ٢:١٥٢; – ١٠
Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٢:١٠; Ibn Katheer ٤:١٥

Wāqidi ١:٦٧; Muslim ٣:١٣٦٢; Abu Dāwud (al-Jihād ١٠٢); Ibn Qutayba, 'Uyun al-Akhbār – ١١
Ibn Sa'd ٢:٤١; Muslim ٣:١٤٣٣; Kalā'i ١:١٢٣ – ١٢

Wāqidi ٢:٤٩٤, ٤٣٣; Ibn Hishām ٣:٢١٣, ٢٤٤, ٣٤٢; Ibn Hazm: ١٨, ١٩١, ٢١١; Tabari ٢:١٨١, ٥٥٦ – ١٣

Wāqidi ٣:١١١٧; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٥٤, ٦١, ٨٥; Ibn Katheer ٤:٦١ – ١٤

Wāqidi ١:١٣, ٢:٦٣٦; Ibn Hishām ٤:٢٤٥; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٩٦; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٢:٥٤; Ibn – ١٥
Katheer ٣:٢٤١

Wāqidi ١:١٩; Ibn Hishām ٤:٢٤٥; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٦٣; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٢:١٠٦, ١١٠; Ibn – ١٦
Katheer ٤:٢٢٢

(Wāqidi ١:٤٠٣, ٢:٥٣٤; Bukhāri (al-Maghāzi ٢٨); Abu Dāwud (al-Jihād ٥٧ – ١٧

Wāqidi ١:١٣, ٢:٧٧٤; Ibn Hishām ٢:٢٤٤; Ibn Sa'd ٢:١٢, ١٠٨; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٢:٢٠٦; Ibn – ١٨
Katheer ٥:٩

Wāqidi ١:٥٣, ٢:٤٤٥; Ibn Hishām ٣:٦٩, ٢٣١, ٣٤٤; Tabari ٣:٩; Ibn Hazm: ١٨٦; Kalā'i ١:١٣٠ – ١٩

Wāqidi ٣:٩٩١; Ibn Hishām ٤:١٦١; Bukhāri (al-Jihād ٣٨, ١٨٤); Ibn 'Asākir ١:١٠٤ – ٢٠

Wāqidi ١:١٨٢, ١٩٤; Ibn Hishām ٣:٤٦; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٢١, ٣٥, ٤٣, ٦٢, ٩٥; Ibn Hazm: ٢٠٣; Ibn – ٢١
Atheer ٢:١٤٢

Wāqidi ١:٣٩٦; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٢١; Tabari ٢:٢٤٨; Suhayli ٣:٢٨; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ١:٣٠٤ – ٢٢

Wāqidi ١:٢٠, ٨٨; Muslim (al-Eimān ٨); Tabari ٢:٥١٣ – ٢٣

Wāqidi ٢:٥٦٢, ٧٢٩; Tabari ٢:٥٥٤ – ٢٤

Wāqidi ١:٥٨; Bukhāri (al-Maghāzi ١٧); Muslim (al-Imārah ١١٧); Abu Dāwud (al-Jihād – ٢٥
(١٢٠, ١٤٩

Wāqidi ١:٨١, ٢٤٠, ٣:٨٩٧; Ibn Hishām ٢:٢٧٩; Ibn Sa'd ٢:١٥, ٣٩, ١٠٩; Tabari ٣:٧٥, ١٨١; Kalā'i – ٢٦
١:١٤٤; Ibn Qayyim ٢:٤٤٠

Wāqidi ٢:٦٣٤, ٣:١٠٣٩; Ibn Sa'd ٢:١٢٠; Suhayli ٤:٨٠٥; Kalā'i ١:١٣١; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٢:٢١٨-٢٧
Wāqidi ١:١٧٧, ٣٦٣, ٢:٤٩٦, ٦٧٠; Ibn Hishām ٣:٢٠٠, ٣٤٤; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٤٠; Tabari ٥٨٣; Ibn - ٢٨
Hazm: ١٥٤

Wāqidi ٢:٤٤٦; Ibn Hishām ٣:٢٣١; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٤٧; Tabari ٢:٥٨٣-٢٩

Wāqidi ٢:٧٩٦, ٨٢٥, ٨٧٥; Ibn Hishām ٣:٣٩, ٤٤, ٤٩; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٩٦, ١٠١; Ibn Hazm: ٢٢٦, ٢٣٠; -٣٠

Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٢:١٦١, ١٦٩, ١٧٣; Ibn Qayyim ٢:٣٨٦, ٣٩٠; Ibn Katheer ٤:٢٨٢, ٢٨٩

Bukhāri (al-Salāh ٤١, al-Jihād ٥٦-٥٨, al-I'tisām ١٦); Muslim (al-Imārah ٦); Ibn Mājah -٣١

((al-Jihād ٤٤); Nasā'i (al-Khayl ٢

Wāqidi ١:٢-٧, ٣:١٠٣٩; Bukhāri (al-Jihād ٨٠, al-Manāqib ٤, al-Maghāzi ١٠); Tirmidhi - ٣٢

((Fadhā'il al-Jihād ١١

armed forces today conduct training exercises so as to gain experience and remain
.free from fear, sluggishness or laziness

Military training in the Muslim army was something that was conducted on a
continuous basis(1). Between one Sariya and another or between one battle and the
.(next there was not a long gap(2)

For example, after the completion of the Sariya of Hamza ibn ‘Abd al-Muttalib, a
month later the Sariya of ‘Ubaydah ibn Hārith was conducted. The Battle of Dhi
al-‘Asheera took place a month after the Sariya of ‘Abdullah ibn Jahash and the gap
between the battles of Dhi Amr and Bahrān was no more than two months. The Sariya
of Muhammad ibn Maslamah against the Bani Tha’labah and ‘Awāl took one month
and the Sariya of Abi ‘Ubaydah ibn Jarrāh came immediately after it. During these
short gaps, the forces would prepare to march against the (next) enemy and some of
the units would undergo training before battle(3); just as they had done in the Battle
.of Badr and the Conquest

:The continuous training (of the troops) had the following results

It would increase in the steadfastness of the individuals(4), like in the Sariya of Zayd
ibn Hāritha where his later missions were carried out with more steadfastness than
his previous missions. Similarly, the ‘battle of the fortress’ that took place at Khaybar
,’was better than the battles of Bani Nadhir and Bani Qaynuqā

The hesitation and fear of coming face to face with the enemy was removed(5). In the
,Battle of Badr

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Wāqidi 1:10, 193, 2:551; Ibn Sa’d 2:4, 62-1

.Ibid -2

Wāqidi 1:11, 13, 2:769; Ibn Hishām 2:245, 252, 4:272; Ibn Sa’d 2:1, 94; Tabari 2:259; Ibn -3

Hazm: 103; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās 2:157, 161

Zuhri: 71, 79, 84; Wāqidi 1:76, 363, 2:496, 553, 564, 633; Ibn Sa’d 2:19, 40, 53, 77; Tabari -4

٢:٤٧٩, ٥٥٣; Suhayli ٤:٢٥٢; Kalā'i ١:١٥٨; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ١:١٠٥, ١١٠
W٨:٧; Wāqidi ١:٢١, ٤٩; Ibn Hishām ٣:٤٨; Tabari ٢:٥٠٣; Ibn Qayyim ٢:٢٣١ –٥

the forces were more hopeful of taking over the caravan of the Quraysh without having to fight a battle and they were fearful of face to face combat. However, in the Battle of Uhud, they were competing with each other to go to battle and most of them gave the view that they should go out of Madina to face the enemy threat, because at this time fear and trepidation had totally disappeared from them

It strengthened the spirits of the forces^(١) and established the certainty of victory in them^(٢); as in the battles of Hunayn and Ahzāb

Swiftness in getting prepared for battle^(٣) was maintained with precision and quality as in the Battle of Dhāt al-Suwayq, the war against the Bani Mahārib and Tha'labah in the Battle of Dhāt al-Ruqā', and in the Battle of Bani Quraydhah. This made them stronger and more capable to quickly carry out orders, remain swift in the difficult circumstances of battle and able to change tactics^(٤); in the same way as was witnessed after the army had dispersed and the forces had made blunders in the battles of Uhud and Hunayn

Third: Department of Armament

point

This was the department responsible for securing the weaponry and battle gear, either by producing it, buying it or taking it from the spoils of war, and then distributing it and the issue of armament was done in conjunction with the department of munitions and the training of weapons-use was in co-operation with the department of training; and in the end the discharge, restore and

p: ١٨٠

Wāqidi ١:١٢ onwards, ٢٠٠ onwards; Ibn Hishām ٢:٢٥٧ onwards, ٣:١٠ onwards; Kalā'ī – ١
١:٨٥, ١٠٤; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ١:٢٤١, ٢:٢

Q٣٣:٢٢; Wāqidi ٢:٤٤٤, ٣:٨٩٠; Ibn Katheer ٤:١٠٤ – ٢

Wāqidi ١:٢٨; Ibn Hishām ٣:٢١٣; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٤٣; Ibn Atheer ٢:١٨٥; Kalā'ī ١:١١٤; Ibn Sayyid – ٣
al-Nās ١:٢٩٤

Q3:152, Q9:26; Ibn Hishām 4:85; Ibn Sa'd 2:109; Kalā'i 1:143; Dhahabi, Tārikh al-Islām –4

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[\(1\)](#) stockpile the armaments

The most important weapons that were used by the Muslim army were

Offensive weapons [\(2\)](#): these included mainly the sword, spear and bow .1

Defensive weapons: the most important of which were the armor, shield, helmet .2
and the mail that was worn under it

a) Offensive weapons

The sword was considered the most important weapon for offense and the Holy Prophet (S) also gave a lot of importance to it. He (S) had many swords that were either from war booty, gifts or inheritance of his father, and he had named each of [\(3\)](#) them with specific names

The spear was another of the weapons of offense. The supreme commander had [\(4\)](#) different types of spears and would use whichever one he wanted. In total they were [\(5\)](#) of four types

The bow was of various types and each one had a specific name depending on its [\(6\)](#) attributes, the type of action it would be used for and how it would be carried. The most important types were the hand-held bow and the ‘Hijāzi’ bow. The Holy Prophet (S) had four bows: i) al-Safrā’ (the Yellow) ii) al-Rawhā’ (the Open) iii) al-Baydhā’ (the [\(7\)](#) White) and iv) al-Katum (the Secret-keeper)

b) Defensive weapons

Armor was considered one of the most important weapons of defense which was worn to remain protected from the strikes of swords, spears or arrows [\(8\)](#). Armors ,were of different shapes and types

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(Bukhāri (al-Jihād ٢٢, ٥٤); Muslim (al-Jihād ٢٠, al-Sulh ٧, al-Maghāzi ٤٤ –٢
Ibn Sa'd ٢:١٧١; Tabari ٣:١٧٤; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٢:٣١٨ –٣
Ibn Hanbal ٢:٥٠; Bukhāri (al-Jihād ٨٨); Ibn Sayyidah, al-Mukhassis ٤:٢٤ onwards –٤
Ibn 'Abd Rabbih, al-'Iqd al-Farid ١:١٨٤ onwards; Ibn Sayyidah ٤:٣٧ onwards –٥
Ibn Hanbal ٤:١٤٤ onwards; Dārimi (al-Jihād ١٤); Ibn Mājah (al-Jihād ١٨); Abu Dāwud –٦
(Fadhā'il al-Jihād ١١
Abu Dāwud (al-Jihād ١٨); Tirmidhi (al-Jihād ١٧); Tabari ٣:١٧٧ –٧

each with a different name^(١). The supreme commander also had a number of armors, the most important of which were: Dhāt al-Fudhul, al-Sadriyya and al-Sird^(٢)

Helmets would be made from iron and would be worn to protect the head from attacks by offensive weapons^(٣)

Mighfar' was the armor or mail that a soldier would place under his helmet and would cover his head and face with it so that he does not get injured^(٤). The Holy Prophet (S) and the soldiers who fought alongside him in battle would use this^(٥)

Minjineeq' (catapult) was one of the 'heavy' weapons which was used to throw huge boulders or fireballs on the enemy^(٦)

Dabbābah' (tank)^(٧): These two weapons (i.e. the catapult and the tank) were used in the Battle of Tā'if

In the same way, the Muslim army would give importance to the arming of the cavalry^(٨) and would give it a priority over the other ranks. In the first battles, the soldiers on horseback were few. For example, in the Battle of Badr, there were only two soldiers on horseback^(٩). This number reached two hundred in the Battle of Khaybar^(١٠) and in the Conquest of Makkah there were more than two thousand soldiers on horseback^(١١)

:As for the sources from where weapons could be procured, these included

By way of those who would engage in making them and selling them to the soldiers^(١٢) but this small number was not enough for the whole army

From the buyers who

p: ١٨٢

Ibn Sa'd ٢:١٧٢; Ibn Hanbal ١:٨٠; Bukhāri (al-Istiqrādh ١); Abu Dāwud (al-Nikāh ٣٥); -١ (Nasā'i (al-Nikāh ٧٩

Ibn Sa'd ٢:١٧٤; Tabari ٢:١٧٧; Ibn Atheer ٢:٣١٦-٢

Bukhāri (al-Jihād ٧٥); Ibn Sayyidah ٤:٧٣ –٣

Bukhāri (al-Libās ١٧); Tirmidhi (al-Jihād ١٨); Ibn Mandhur ٥:٢٤ –٤

Bukhāri (al-Jihād ١٤٩, al-Maghāzi ٤٨, al-Libās ١٧); Muslim (al-Hajj ٤٥٠); Ibn Mājah (al-Jihād ١٨); Abu Dāwud (al-Jihād ١١٧); Tirmidhi (al-Jihād ١٨); Nasā'i (al-Manāsik ١٠٧

It is reported that the Arabs learnt how to create the catapult from the Persians –٤

(.and would use it to throw large boulders (and later fireballs) at the enemy (Tr

Wāqidi ٣:٩٢٧; Ibn Hishām ٣:١٢١; Ibn Sa'd ٢:١٤; Kalā'i ١:١٤٤; Ibn Sayyidah ٤:١٤; The –٧

Dabbābah was a primitive version of today's tanks. It was a means used to break

(.walls and barriers set up by the enemy. (Tr

Bukhāri (al-Jihād ٥٤, ٥٨; al-Maghāzi ٣٨; al-Adab ٨٠); Muslim (al-Imārah ٤٥, al-Jihād –٨

(١٣٢); Ibn Mājah (al-Jihād ٩, ٤٤); Abu Dāwud (al-Jihād ٤, al-Khayl ١٢

Wāqidi ١:٢٧; Ibn Hishām ٢:٣٢١; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٧; Tabari ٢:٤٧٨ –٩

Ibn Sa'd ٢:٧٨; Ibn Atheer ٢:٢١٤; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٢:١٢٩ –١٠

Wāqidi ٢:٨١٢, ٨١٩ –١١

Bukhāri (al-Buyu' ٣٧, Tafseer of Surah ١٩); Tirmidhi (al-Jihād ١٢); Nasā'i (al-Jihād –١٢

٢٤); Tabari, Tafseer al-Tabari ١٤:١١٩

would buy from inside the Arabian Peninsula(1) and outside it(2). The budget for buying the weapons from this source would be gotten from

(a) The personal wealth and possessions of the soldiers(3)

b) Those who were in charge of the army

(c) The wealth that would remain after distribution(4)

d) The booty that was taken from the enemy(5) and especially the Jews

The supreme commander would leave behind some of the wealth after making pacts of alliance with the defeated enemies, however he would never leave behind any of their weapons; because this was the main source of weapons and strengthening the army while at the same time weakening the enemy in order to prevent any future attacks and incursions(6). There was also another source of weapons for the army and that was taking them on loan and then returning them to their owners after the battle(7)

Training with weapons was one of the requirements of the Muslim army and the supreme commander would insist and encourage the fighters to train on how to carry the weapons(8), the principles of their usage(9), archery and gaining mastery over it(10), training on the use of the catapult(11). Many of the Muslims such as Talha ibn ‘Abdillah al-Qarashi and Sa’d ibn Abi Waqqās(12) were well known for their skill in archery. At the same time, the Prophet (S) emphasized on training the riders who would fight on horseback(13). He (S)

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Ibn Mājah (al-Jihād 18); Abu Dāwud (al-Jihād 23); Tirmidhi (Fadhā’il al-Jihād 11); – 1 (Nasā’i (al-Jihād 26, al-Khayl 8.

Wāqidi 3:927; Ibn Hishām 4:121; Ibn Sa’d 2:114; Kalā’i 1:146 – 2

Bukhāri (al-Buyu’ 108, al-Maghāzi 2); Abu Dāwud (al-Jihād 24, al-Buyu’ 26); Tirmidhi – 3 ((al-Jihād 20); Nasā’i (al-Khayl 3

Bukhāri (al-Jihād ٨٠); Muslim (al-Musāfirun ١٣٩, al-Jihād ٤٩); Abu Dāwud (al-Imārah –٤
(١٩); Tirmidhi (al-Jihād ٣٩); Nasā'i (al-Fay' ١
Wāqidi ١:٩٦, ٣٧٣, ٢:٥١٠, ٥٤٤, ٦٥٨, ٣:٩٨٧; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٢٠, ٤١, ١٢٠ –٥
Wāqidi ١:١٧٨; Ibn Hishām ٣:٢٠١; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٨٠; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٢:٥٠ –٦
(Ibn Hanbal ٣:١; Dārimi (al-Buyu' ٥٦); Abu Dāwud (al-Buyu' ٨٨ –٧
Bukhāri (al-Jihād ٢٤, ٥٦) Ibn Mājah (al-Jihād ٢٩, al-Nikāh ٥٠); Tirmidhi (al-Fitan ٣٩); –٨
(Nasā'i (al-Khayl ١٣, ١٦
Bukhāri (al-Jihād ١٢, ٢٢, ٨٨, ١٥٦); Muslim (al-Jihād ٩٢); Ibn Mājah (al-Fitan ١٠, al- –٩
(Hudud ٣٤); Abu Dāwud (al-Jihād ٦٤, ١٠٨
Bukhāri (al-Riqāq ١٧, al-Maghāzi ٥٦, al-Manāqib ٤, al-Jihād ٣٨); Muslim (al-Zuhd ١٢, –١٠
Fadhā'il al-Sahābah ٤١); Ibn Mājah (al-Muqaddimah ١١); Abu Dāwud (al-Jihād ٢٣);
(Tirmidhi (Fadhā'il al-Jihād ١١, al-Sayd ١); Nasā'i (al-Jihād ٢٦, al-Khayl ٨
Wāqidi ٢:٦٤٨; Ibn Hishām ٤:١٢٦; Ibn Sa'd ٢:١١٤; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٢:٢٠١ –١١
Bukhāri (al-Maghāzi ٥٦, al-Jihād ٨٠); Muslim (Fadhā'il al-Sahābah ٤١); Ibn 'Abd al- –١٢
Barr ٢:٦٠٦, ٧٦٤
Bukhāri (al-Manāqib ٢٨, al-Jihād ١٩٢); Muslim (al-Imārah ٩٦, ٩٩); Ibn Mājah (al- –١٣
(Jihād ١٤); Abu Dāwud (al-Jihād ٤١, ٤٥, ٦٠); Nasā'i (al-Khayl ٨, ١٢

also gave importance to the creation of weapons and encouraged and promised paradise to those who would undertake this task^(١). For this purpose, he sent a group to Jurash (Yemen) in order to learn how to make new weapons and acquire them ^(٢) before the siege of Tā'if.

The importance given to making various light weaponry^(٣) was another of the goals of the supreme commander and for this he would give orders to the weapon makers in the area for different models of spears and bows^(٤). When the weapons were distributed among the soldiers, those that were on loan would be taken back and those acquired from war booty would be kept by them. In this way, each soldier would ^(٥) get to use more than one type of weapon.

As for supplies of weapons during battle, the situation was not as it is in the new age. A soldier would bring whatever weapon he had in his possession, and whatever he needed in the battlefield, he would have to carry himself. So if he were to lose one of his weapons or it were to break, he would exchange it and continue to fight^(٦). With regards to the storing and stockpiling of weapons, each individual would store his own weapons in his home^(٧) and things were not as they are today i.e. there was no central repository where the weapons would be stockpiled. In the house of every soldier, a number of swords, spears and bows could be found, and he would pay

p: ١٨٤

Ibn Mājah (al-Jihād ١٩); Abu Dāwud (al-Jihād ٢٣); Tirmidhi (Fadhā'il al-Jihād ١١); – ١
(Nasā'i (al-Jihād ٨, ٢٤
Wāqidi ٣:٩٢٧ – ٢
Bukhāri (al-Jihād ١٢, ٨٨, al-Shurut ١٥); Muslim (al-Jihād ٢٠, al-Imārah ١٤٤); Abu – ٣
(Dāwud (al-Fitan ١, al-Buyu' ١٣, al-jihād ٤٤, ١٠٨
(Ibn Hanbal ١:٨٨; Ibn Mājah (al-Jihād ١٨ – ٤
Bukhāri (al-Jihād ٨٨); Ibn Mājah (al-Jihād ١٨); Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٢:٣١٨ – ٥
(Bukhāri (al-Maghāzi ٤٤ – ٤
Bukhāri (al-Jihād ٨٨); Ibn Sa'd ٢:١٧١; Tabari ٣:١٧٤ – ٧

(1) due attention to their repair and maintenance (1)

In times of 'peace', the weapons would be kept in a large warehouse that was strategically located and would be guarded (2). The supreme commander would order that weapons must be carried at all times, in every situation, even when the enemies are not (apparently) present. He would forbid the forces who had returned from battle and were tired and weary, and intended to remove their weapons (3), from doing so and he was always put the thought about the struggle (against the sworn enemy), whether in times of war or peace, in the present or future, despite the presence or (4) absence of the enemy in their minds and would strengthen this idea in them (4)

:Image

Department Of Supplies And Reinforcements

point

This department was responsible for matters pertaining to reinforcements, supplies, means of transport, food for the soldiers, the type of clothes and shelter of the forces, (1) dividing the spoils of war, medical issues and all related concerns

A) Department Of Supplies And Reinforcements

point

The responsibility of this department was to secure the material resources and assistance to the armed forces in general. This included personal accessories and other necessities like water, tents, clothes and moving the residents away from areas (1) where military operations were taking place (1)

The Rear

point

This comprised of groups whose work was to prepare and supply material provisions, military equipment and other needed supplies to the troops (1). The most important groups that were present in the rear were the guards, those responsible for

munitions and supplies, the camp of the commander, and the non-combatants (i.e. womenfolk).

They

p: ۱۸۵

Ibn Hanbal ۱:۱۹۳; Ibn Hishām ۳:۱۰۶; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ۲:۲۴ –۱
Wāqidi ۲:۷۴۳; Ibn Sa’d ۲:۸۷; Bakri ۴:۱۳۸۵; Hamawi ۵:۴۲۴ –۲
(Ibn Hanbal ۵:۸۶; Muslim (al-Imārah ۱۷۲, ۱۷۵, ۱۷۶); Abu Dāwud (al-Jihād ۳۳ –۳
Abu Dāwud (al-Jihād ۲۳۳); Wāqidi ۳:۱۰۵۷; Ibn Sa’d ۲:۱۲۰ –۴
Zuhri: ۹۳; Ibn Hishām ۲:۳۷۲, ۳:۲۶۴; Faryābi, Dalā’il al-Nubuwwah: ۱۲ –۵
Wāqidi ۳:۹۹۶; Ibn Hishām ۲:۲۶۴ –۶

carried some amount of supplies and munitions(١) with them and each one of these groups would be supervised by a commander who would oversee their work(٢). The Prophet (S) would emphasize on keeping the supplies and military equipment well hidden. He (S) would only specify where the rear of the army began(٣) and would not .give importance to where it ended

The limits of the rear of the army during encampment was defined as the last lines of the army(٤), and while marching also, it was the last group(٥). The main missions of this department was to secure the facilities and material resources needed by the army, carry out medical treatment, assist the injured and handicapped and carry them away from the battlefield, burying the martyrs and gathering the spoils of .(war(٦)

:Types of supplies and support (١)

Madina was known as the main center for supplies and munitions, and reinforcement and support during battle would rarely take place from there(٧); because the backing and rear of the army would usually take the necessary supplies with them, and from the very beginning whatever wa needed by the army would be put at their disposal. They would go to the battle and whenever their mission was complete, they would .(return to their own lands(٨)

Despite this, in some of the battles, the army had to face severe hunger(٩), like what happened in the battles of Khaybar and Tabuk, but they would bear this pressure and difficulty(١٠). This is precisely what they did in the Sariya of al-Khabt. Sometimes they would

p: ١٨٦

Wāqidi ١:٢١٧, ٢٣, ٣:٩٩٦; Ibn Hishām ٤:٢٤, ٤٩; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٤٨; Tabari ٢:٥٦٨ –١

Ibn Hishām ٢:٢٦٤; Ibn 'Abd al-Barr ٣:١٩٢٤; Kalā'i ١:١٣٠ –٢

Wāqidi ٣:٩٩٦; Ibn Hishām ٢:٢٦٤ –٣

(Dārimi (al-Muqaddimah ٢); Muslim (٣:٨٩٥); Abu Dāwud (al-Jihād ١٠٧ –٤

Wāqidi ٣:٩٩٦ –٥

Wāqidi ١:٢٥, ٢٣٠, ٢:٤٤٥; Ibn Hishām ٤:١٧٠; Tabari ٢:٥٤٨; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٢:١٣١ –٤

Ibn Sa'd ٢:١, ١٣٤; Tabari ٢:٤٠٨, ٤٥٧, ٣:٩, ١٥٩; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ١:٢٢٢, ٢:٢٢٠ –٧

Wāqidi ١:١٩٣, ٣٩١; Ibn Khayyāt ١:٧; Ibn Hazm: ١٠٠ –٨

Wāqidi ٢:٤٤٤, ٤٥٨, ٤٤٤, ٣:١٠٣٨; Ibn Hishām ٣:٢٤٠; Tabari ٣:١٠; Kalā'i ١:١١٤ –٩

Wāqidi ٢:٧٧٤ onwards; Ibn Hishām ٤:٢٨١; Tabari ٣:٣٢; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٢:١٥٨ –١٠

[\(1\)](#) also benefit from the abundant local resources

The sources of food and supplies for the army in the areas where the battles were fought included: In the Battle of Badr from the hunting of deer; in the Battle of Dhāt al-Ruqā' from cucumbers and ostrich eggs; in the Battle of Hudaybiyya from cucumbers, the meat of deer, wild donkeys and other animals whose meat is permissible to eat, and yoghurt; and in the Battle of Khaybar from a variety of different sources

Full reinforcements from Madina only came when Sa'd ibn 'Ubādah had the responsibility of bringing the reinforcements [\(2\)](#) in the Battle of Hamrā al-Asad. At this time he would slaughter two to three animals (whose meat was permissible to eat) every day. In the battles of Dhi Qurā and Waddān, he brought reinforcements with dates and meat from slaughtered animals [\(3\)](#). At times, like in the Sariya of 'Amr ibn 'Aās, the supplies were sent by soldiers on foot [\(4\)](#)

As for the food for horses and camels, it was provided for from the abundant grazing grounds especially in the areas where the army was camped [\(5\)](#). In the Battle of Uhud, the Quraysh used the grazing grounds and fields that belonged to the Ansār. In the battles of Badr and Bani al-Mustalaq, the Muslim army took benefit from the wells of Badr and Murisiyya'. Muslim soldiers would sometimes use crushed date seeds to feed their horses and camels [\(6\)](#) while in the Battle of Khandaq, the Quraysh carried [\(7\)](#) corn as fodder for their horses

Relief in

p: ۱۸۷

Wāqidi ۱:۲۶, ۳۹۸ onwards, ۲:۵۷۵, ۶۵۸, ۶۶۸; Ibn Hishām ۲:۳۴۶ –۱

Wāqidi ۱:۳۳۸ –۲

Wāqidi ۲:۵۴۶ –۳

Bukhāri (al-Maghāzi ۶۵); Muslim (al-Sayd ۱۷, ۱۹); Abu Dāwud (al-At'imah ۴۶); Nasā'i –۴

((al-Sayd ۳۵

Wāqidi ۱:۵۳; Ibn Hishām ۲:۲۷۱, ۳:۳۰۲; Ibn Sa'd ۲:۴۵; Bakri ۴:۱۲۲۰ –۵

(Muslim (al-Salām ۳۴ -۶

Wāqidi ۲:۴۴۴ -۷

its true and complete sense during battle was not done except through giving drinking water(١). This was done by means of water bags which were carried by soldiers(٢), or through injured and handicapped soldiers(٣). The women would also at times participate in this exercise and would carry the water bags for long distances and exchange them for empty water bags. These relief operations continued even in the time when the heat of battle had subsided(٤) and some of the helpers would take (water to the supreme commander and the troops during this time(٥

The main points of relief support (٢

These points were the very same routes that were used by the troops, and the rear would usually not move in one position behind the main ranks of the army(٦); like in the battles of Badr and Tabuk. The movement from these points by the rear of the army would not take place more than once, because this would cause a split and a cessation of the relief support operations. For the soldiers, there was more than one central point for supplies but despite this, they would always use the closest point like Madina in the Battle of Hdaybiyya and from there (the route) to Fadak would be (used(٧

Of course the original and primary points of relief supply were Makkah and Madina which had links with the outside and were considered the main centers of relief support(٨). Between Makkah and outside it there were two roads to the west (coastal) and east (desert), and between Madina and outside

p: ١٨٨

Wāqidi ١:٥٣, ٢:٦٤٣; Ibn Hishām ٢:٢٧٦, ٣:٢٣٣ -١

Ibn Hishām ٣:٩٠; Tabari ٢:٥١٩; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٢:١٥ -٢

(Bukhāri (al-Jihād ٦٧, al-Maghāzi ٣٧); Muslim (al-Jihād ١٣٥); Tirmidhi (al-Qiyāmah ١٨ -٣

Bukhāri (al-Jihād ٦٥, ٦٧); Muslim (al-Jihād ١٣٧, ١٤١); Abu Dāwud (al-Jihād ٣٢); Tirmidhi -٤

((al-Siyar ٢٢

(Bukhāri (al-Maghāzi ٣٧); Muslim (al-Jihād ١٣٥ -٥

Wāqidi ٣:٩٦٦; Ibn Hishām ٢:٢٦٣, ٤:١٧٠; Tabari ٢:٤٣٣ -٦

Wāqidi ١:١٣, ٢:٥٦٢, ٥٧١, ٦٣٦; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٦٥; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٢:٥٤ -٧
al-Fākihi, Akhbāru Makkah ٢:٣; Tabari ٢:٤٢٧; Hamawi ٥٧, ٨٧, ١٨٨ -٨

it there was an important road that led towards the land of Shām (Syria) and there was continuous relief support conducted using different means between these two routes. Whenever these central points were cut off for any reason, the army forces would face hardships in terms of lack of sufficient relief supplies and provisions

Similarly, in the beginning the Muslim army tried to cut off the supply routes of the Quraysh and they would be so harsh on them that at times they would be pushed to the brink of destruction^(١). When the point of supply from Madina was partially cut off, the supreme commander would reopen them by gaining victory of the tribes that were responsible for closing the route^(٢)

Places of rest for the army (٣)

After marching a specified distance, the Muslim army would stop for a brief period in a suitable location^(٣). At this time, the troops would carry out repairs and maintenance on their battle equipment, and would eat and drink. Then they would refill their vessels with water and continue their march^(٤). The army would usually stop at a place where there was a well and plentiful grass for grazing^(٥). The places of rest for the army would be selected according to the length of their journey, the army's size and the suitability of the area for remaining hidden and concealed^(٦)

The time of these rest-stops would be in accordance to the mission given to the forces, the weather or time of day (and night)^(٧). In the Battle of Dumat al-Jundal, the rest was

p: ١٨٩

Ibn Sa'd ٢:٢-٦, ٢٤; Ibn Atheer ٢:١١٣, ١١٦-١

Wāqidi ١:٤٠٢; Ibn Hishām ٣:٢٢٤; Ibn Hazm: ١٨٤; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٢:٥٤-٢

Wāqidi ١:٤٠٣ ٢:٧٥٦; Ibn Hishām ٢:٢٥٧; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٩٢; Bakri ٤:١١٧٢; Hamawi ٥:٢١٩; Mawri, -٣

Ghāyat al-Aāmāl fi Fann al-Harb wal-Qitāl ٢:١٤

Ibn Hishām ٢:٦٨ onwards; ٣:٦٩, ٩٠; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٩٦; Bakri ٣:٤٧٣-٤

(Bukhārī (al-Anbiyā' ٩); Muslim (al-Imārah ١٧٨); Abu Dāwud (al-Jihād ٥٥-٥

Wāqidi ١:٢٥٣, ٦٤٣; Ibn Hishām ٤:٢٣٤; Bajri ٢:١١٩٠-٦

(Zuhri: ٨٤; Ibn Hanbal ٣:٣٠٥; Abu Dāwud (al-Jihād ٥٧ -٧

taken at night and during the Conquest of Makkah, because of the speed required, it was only for a brief period of time. Aside from this, the period of rest would be determined by the state of the troops and the distance they had covered and would [\(be short or long accordingly\)](#)

And if there was a serious need to reach the enemy (as quick as possible), the rest-stops would be shortened. If this was not done, like in the Sariya of Muhammad ibn Maslamah against the Bani Bakr, the duration would be prolonged. In some of the Sariya missions, the army would rest the whole day and would march at night in order [to carry out a surprise attack](#)

Modes of transport (٢)

The modes of transport were mainly camels and then followed by donkeys. Camels would be used to traverse long distances of up to eight hundred kilometers, like in the Battle of Dumat al-Jundal [\(٢\)](#) which was located at a distance of ‘ten stations of Madina’ and ‘seven stations of the Damascus’, or the Battle of Muta [\(٣\)](#) near the province of Dir’ā from the land of Balqā’ in Shām [\(٤\)](#), or the Battle of Tabuk [\(٥\)](#) which was at a distance of twelve stations from Madina and was close to Shām. The same was the case of the Battle of Abnā [\(٦\)](#) in the land of al-Sarrāh near Balqā’ which was a [village in Muta between Palestine and Shām](#)

The camel is known for its ability to bear thirst and hunger and carry heavy loads in the dry

p: ١٩٠

Wāqidi ٢:٥٣٤; Ibn Hishām ٣:٢٤٤; Muslim ٣:١٣٩١ –١

Ibn Sa’d ٢:٤٤; Bakri ٢:٥٦٤; Hamawī ٢:٤٨٧ –٢

Ibn Sa’d ٢:٩٢; Bakri ٤:١١٧٢; Hamawī ٥:٢١٩ –٣

Dir’ā is presently located in the south of Syria while Muta is in the north of Jordan. –٤

(Tr

Bakri ١:٣٠٣; Hamawī ٢:١٤ –٥

Ibn Sa’d ٢:٩٢, ١٣٦; Bakri ١:١٠١ –٦

and hard desert(1). However, donkeys were mostly used for non-military purposes(2) to cover short distances in and around Madina. A number of troops would bring camels to the battlefield(3). They would carry their battle gear and rations and also .the special fodder for camels on the camels' backs

Women would also sit in howdahs on these animals at the rear of the army and would be taken along(4). The army would be divided into sections depending on the number of soldiers and camels that were used for transport. Each section had two to four soldiers(5) who would put the equipment that could be carried on the backs of camels like one big caravan(6). The length of these sections when marching depended on the .(number of camels and soldiers in it(7

Foods and rations (8)

The most important foodstuffs that were used by the Muslim forces in battle included: dates(8), locusts(9), meat(10) (mostly from animals that were halāl(11)), wheat(12), raisins, bread(13), barley flour(14) and some of the foods that were prepared from wheat(15), flour(16), cucumbers(17) and milk(18). Among these, dates were the staple food that the soldiers would be provided with when attacking or defending, travelling or remaining back, and they would always have with them a little under three kilos (one Sā')(19) of dates and if something (from the dates produced) would remain, they .would store it in their house and would use it throughout the year

Sources for procuring the food (9)

From the troops(20), locals and residents of the area(21), and some of the wealthy soldiers – who were sometimes responsible

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Ibn Hanbal ۲:۲۶۷; Muslim (al-Imārah ۱۷۸); Abu Dāwud (al-Tibb ۲۴); al-Nuwayri, – ۱
Nihāyat al-Adab ۱۰:۱۰۳

Wāqidi ۲:۵۱۱; Abu Dāwud (al-Manāsik ۶۵); Tirmidhi (al-Janā'iz ۳۲); Ibn Sayyidah ۶:۲۵ – ۲

Wāqidi ۱:۱۷, ۳۳۸; Ibn Hishām ۲:۲۶۴; Ibn Sa'd ۲:۱۲ – ۳

Ibn Hishām ٣:٣١١; Tabari ٢:٦١١; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٢:٩٦-٩٧
(Bukhāri (al-Maghāzi ٣١); Muslim (al-Jihād ١٤٩); Abu Dāwud (al-Jihād ٣٤-٣٥)
Wāqidi ١:٢٧٤; Ibn Hishām ٢:٢٦٤; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٢:٢٠٦-٢٠٧
Ibn Sa'd ٢:٧, ١٣; Mawri, Ghāyat al-Aāmāl fi Fann al-Harb wal-Qitāl ٢:٢٥-٢٦
Bukhāri (al-Maghāzi ١٧); Muslim (al-Imārah ١٤٣-١٤٤)
Bukhāri (al-Dhabā'ih ١٣); Muslim (al-Sayd ٥٢); Tirmidhi (al-Asa'mah ٢٢); Nasā'i (al-
Sayd ٣٧)
(Bukhāri (al-Riqāq ١٧, al-At'imah ٢٣); Muslim (al-Zuhd ٢١); Abu Dāwud (al-Imārah ٢٠-٢١)
(Ibn Hanbal ١:٢٢٤; Muslim (al-Ashribah ٨٣; Fadhā'il al-Sahābah ١٣٢-١٣٣)
Bukhāri (al-Hibah ٧, al-At'imah ٨, ١٦, al-Maghāzi ٣٨); Muslim (al-Sayd ٤٦); Abu
(Dāwud (al-At'imah ٢٨); Nasā'i (al-Sayd ٢٦)
(Ibn Hanbal ٦:٤٥٦; Bukhāri (al-Maghāzi ٢٩-٣٠)
(Ibn Hanbal ٣:٤٨٨; Bukhāri (al-Maghāzi ٣٥, ٣٨, al-Jihād ١٢٣-١٢٤)
Wāqidi ٢:٧٩٦-٧٩٧
Wāqidi ٢:٤٥٢, ٤٧٦; Ibn Hishām ٣:٢٦٠-٢٦١
Wāqidi ١:٣٩٨, ٢:٥٠٠, ٥٧٧-٥٧٨
Wāqidi ٢:٥٧٧-٥٧٨
Wāqidi ٢:٢٤, ٣٣٨; Kalā'i ٢:١١٢-١١٣
(Wāqidi ١:٢٤; Muslim (al-Jihād ٤٩-٥٠)
Wāqidi ١:٣٩١-٣٩٢

for providing the food – and also through other means(١) of securing it(٢). Rations in the Muslim army were such that each person would eat one portion per day before .(marching or prior to the start of battle or when he felt hungry(٣)

Most of the times, these rations i.e. a few dates(٤) or a slaughtered animal whose meat was shared among a hundred men, would not be sufficient(٥) and it was common for the forces to remain hungry due to lack of sufficient food; that is why in some of the battles it was necessary for them to economize and forbear(٦). So much so that in some situations the troops were left with no option but to eat some of the grass, leaves(٧), the remainder of the food eaten by others(٨) and at times they would slaughter the animals that were used for transport(٩) and use the meat; meaning .(they would eat the meat of horses, wild and tame donkeys, deer etc(١٠)

At times a day or two would pass before they ate anything(١١) and the Holy Prophet (S) was forced to take a loan from the rich(١٢) and divide it among the soldiers in order for them to buy food, until things improved and the financial situation became better, .then he would repay the loan

Water (٧)

The most important of all things that were considered in the battles were: drinking water(١٣), washing the injured(١٤) and treating some of the sick(١٥). War between the two opposing sides would take place in a place

p: ١٩٢

Wāqidi ١:٢٤, ٢:٥٧٤, ٣:١٠٣٥ –١

Wāqidi ١:٣٣٨; Kalā'i ١:١١٢ –٢

(Bukhāri (al-Maghāzi ٣٨); Abu Dāwud (al-Jihād ١٤٥ –٣

Wāqidi ٢:٧٧٥; Ibn Hishām ٤:٢٨١ –٤

Wāqidi ١:٢٣٨; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٢:١٥٩ –٥

Wāqidi ١:٢٤; Ibn Hishām ٣:٣٤٤; Tabari ٣:١٠ –٦

Bukhāri (al-Maghāzi ٤٥); Muslim (al-Sayd ١٧); Abu Dāwud (al-At'imah ٤٤); Nasā'i (al- –٧
(Sayd ٣٥

Wāqidi ٢:٥٧٥ onwards, ٣:١٠٣٧; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٢:١٢٣-٨

Wāqidi ٢:٦٦١; Suhayli ٤:٥٨; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٢:١٢٣-٩

(Ibn Hanbal ٦:٣٤٦; Bukhāri (al-Dhabā'ih ٢٨, al-Maghāzi ٣٥); Tirmidhi (al-At'imah ٦-١٠

(Bukhāri (al-Maghāzi ٢٩, al-Riqāq ١٧); Muslim (al-Zuhd ١٢); Tirmidhi (al-Zuhd ٣٩-١١

Wāqidi ٢:٨٦٣, ٨٨٢-١٢

(Zuhri: ٥٢; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٤٥; Bukhāri (al-Ashribah ١٦-١٣

(Bukhāri (al-Jihād ٨٥); Muslim (al-Jihād ١٠١-١٤

(Bukhāri (al-Tibb ٢٨); Muslim (al-Islām ٧٨); Tirmidhi (al-Tibb ٢٥, ٣٣-١٥

that had plenty of water^(١). Each of the two sides would try to take advantage of the well and gain the upper hand over the other, preventing him from coming near it^(٢). For this reason, gaining access to water was considered an important factor in victory ^(or surrender and defeat)^(٣)

In all the battles, the Holy Prophet (S) would choose a land that had abundance of life-giving water and would take control over it while keeping the enemy at bay^(٤); just as he had eventually blocked it from the fortresses of Khaybar etc^(٥). in order to speed up the surrender of the inhabitants of those fortresses^(٦). He (S) would forbid the drinking of unhygienic water^(٧). In the end, there were many hardships faced in securing water while marching through the dry, harsh, scorching deserts^(٨) especially .in the long routes

Sources of nourishment (٨)

The most important sources of nourishment were foods the animals, edible plants and the drinking water that were found in the fields in the area where the military operations were conducted. The most important animals included: fawns^(٩), wild donkeys^(١٠), rabbits^(١١), deer^(١٢), cows and camels^(١٣), sheep^(١٤), birds (that were permissible to eat)^(١٥), cucumbers^(١٦), fruits of the Miswāk tree^(١٧) and other types of ^(edibles)^(١٨)

The above-mentioned foods made up a large portion of the supplies that were required during battle and through this the Muslim army was saved from starvation and severe thirst and gave them the ability to carry out their mission effectively. In the Battle of Khaybar, the Muslim soldiers suffered a lot of

p: ١٩٣

(Wāqidi ١:٥٣; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٩; Mālik, al-Muwatta' (al-At'imah ٨٣ -١

Ibn Hishām ٢:٢٧٢; Ibn Atheer ٢:١٢٢; Ibn Qayyim ٣:٢٣٠ -٢

Ibn Sa'd ٢:٩; Ibn Qutayba ٢:١١٣; Harthami, Mukhtasar Siyāsat al-Hurub: ٦٥ -٣

Q٨:٤٢; Wāqidi ١:٥٣; Ibn Hishām ٣:٢٣٤; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٣٥, ٤٥; of course this was not always -٤ done. For example, even though the Prophet (S) had gained control over the wells of

(Badr, he allowed the enemy to take some water from it. (Tr
Wāqidi ١:١٧٧, ٣٦٨, ٢:٤٩٩, ٦٨٠, ٧٨٧; Ibn Qayyim, Zād al-Ma'ād ٢:٣٣٠ –٥

Wāqidi ٢:٦٨٥; Ibn Sa'd ٢:١١٤; Tabari ٢:٥٨٢ –٦

(Bukhāri (al-Jihād ٨٥); Muslim (al-Jihād ١٠١ –٧

Zuhri: ٥٢; Wāqidi ٢:٥٨٧, ٦٦١, ٣:١٠٣٩; Ibn Hazm: ٢٥١; Kalā'i ١:١٥٢ –٨

Wāqidi ٣:١٠١٨, ١٠٣٥ –٩

Bukhāri (al-Sayd ٣); Muslim (al-Sayd ٣٧); Ibn Mājah (al-Dhabā'ih ١٠); Nasā'i (al- – ١٠

(Sayd ٣٢

(Bukhāri (al-Hibah ٥, al-Dhabā'ih ١٠); Muslim (al-Sayd ٥٣); Tirmidhi (al-At'imah ٢ –١١

(Bukhāri (al-At'imah ١٤); Muslim (al-Sayd ٤٢, ٤٧); Nasā'i (al-Sayd ٢٦ –١٢

Ibn Hanbal ١:١٠٠, ١٠٤ –١٣

(Ibn Hanbal ١:٣٦٦; Muslim (al-Zakāh ١٧٠); Abu Dāwud (al-Buyu' ٣ –١٤

Wāqidi ١:٣٣٨, ٢:٧٧٥; Ibn Hanbal ١:٢٦٠ –١٥

(Bukhāri (al-At'imah ٣٩, ٤٥); Ibn Mājah (al-At'imah ٣٧); Tirmidhi (al-At'imah ٣٧ –١٦

(Bukhāri (al-At'imah ٥٠, al-Anbiyā' ٢٩); Muslim (al-Ashriba ١٦٥ –١٧

Wāqidi ٢:٥٧٧, ٦٥٨, ٦٦٤–٦٧٠, ٣:١٠٣٥; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٩٥; Tabari ٣:١٠ –١٨

hunger^(١) and in the Battle of Tabuk, the soldiers were about to collapse out of severe
hunger^(٢).

Shelter, tents and clothes (٩)

In Madina there were many tents but in the battles, tents would rarely be used^(٣).
Mattresses and beddings as we see today never existed^(٤). In those days, tents were
made of skin or fur^(٥), or both together^(٦). As for the clothing, it remained the same as
it was before the advent of Islām^(٧).

Storing foodstuffs (١٠)

The portion of food that was extra would be stored inside storehouses and homes to
such an extent that it would suffice for the soldiers for some time^(٨). The storing of
food by the Muslim army was done differently to the way the Jewish army or other
armies did it, as it was done based on the material resources, military mission, type of
enemy and other factors^(٩). The Muslim army did not have many resources. When the
army would prepare for war, they would come under pressure out of the insufficiency
and lack of resources; that is why this army was an offensive army and did not have
much need for storing foodstuffs. Aside from this, donation and generosity and not
hoarding and storing are matters that were emphasized by the new religion (Islām),
and this was also considered one of the factors

The supreme commander and his soldiers took to storing the excess foodstuffs in
times when the supplies were abundantly available. This took place especially after
the Battle of Bani Nadhir and after gaining access to a lot of necessary resources^(١٠).

p: ١٩٤

Wāqidi ٢:٦٥٨, ٦٦١, ٦٧٠; Ibn Hishām ٣:٣٤٦; Kalā'ī ١:١٣٢; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٢:١٣٤ –١

Wāqidi ٣:١٠٣٩; Ibn Hishām ٤:١٦٤, ١٧١; Kalā'ī ١:١٥٢ –٢

Q٢٧:٨٠; Wāqidi ١:٣٧١, ٢:٨٢٢, ٨٢٧; Tabari ٢:٥٦٨ –٣

Majmu'āt Muhādharāt Alqaytu fi al-Akādimiyya al-Askariyya al-'Ulyā al-Suriyya –٤

Wāqidi ١:٣٧١; Ibn Hanbal ٦:٢٧; Ibn Mandhur ١:٦٥٩ –٥

Bukhāri (al-Salāh ١٧, al-Libās ٤٢, al-Maghāzi ٥٦); Muslim (al-Salāh ٢٥٠); Abu Dāwud –٦
((al-Salāh ٣٦
Ibn al-Sikkeet, Mukhtsar Tahdheeb al-Alfādh: ٤٠٧, ٤٠٨; Ibn ‘Abd Rabbih ٢:٢٢٥ –٧
(Bukhāri (al-Nafaqāt ٣, al-Jihād ٨٠); Muslim (al-Jihād ٤٩); Nasā’i (al-Fay’ ١ –٨
Q٩:٤١; Wāqidi ٣:٩٩١, ١٠١٩; Ibn Hishām ٤:١٤١, ٣:٢٢٦; Tabari ٣:١٠٠ –٩
Zuhri: ٧٣; Wāqidi ١:٣٧٧; Ibn Hishām ٣:٢٠١; Ibn Sa’d ٢:٤١; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٢:٥٠ –١٠

However, in the earlier period and during the start of the first wars there was no [thought given to this type of action](#)(1)

The Holy Prophet (S) would keep some barley and dates – to the extent that would suffice for a number of days – in his house [\(2\)](#). We have no other report that suggests that storing foodstuffs was considered a priority for the Muslim army. Even in the Battle of Khandaq, when they dug the trench by which Madina was saved, they did not [make any efforts with regards to storing supplies](#)(3)

The enemy, however, went to great lengths to store foodstuffs, especially the Jews who store provisions and water inside their fortresses – to the extent that would suffice them for the duration of a long war [\(4\)](#). The Muslim army had no choice but to completely cut off the enemy’s relief supplies [\(5\)](#), besiege them from all sides [\(6\)](#), attack their front-line [\(7\)](#), conduct psychological warfare [\(8\)](#), and all those actions that would [force the Jews to surrender quickly, before their stores were empty](#)(9)

Clearing the field of operations (11)

Another one of the responsibilities of the ‘department of supplies (and relief support)’
:was clearing the following from the battlefield

□All the people who would cause the military operations to be delayed, like the [womenfolk, the children, the old and those who were unable to fight](#)(10)

[□Those considered enemies and those who were not from their side](#)(11)

□The equipment and weapons that were broken or needed repair for use in the next
battle

The first group was transferred to a suitable place where the

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Ibn Sa’d 2:1, 39; Tabari 2:408, 493; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās 1:224, 2:2, 48 –1
Bukhāri (al-Nafaqāt 3, al-Jihād 80, al-Maghāzi 14); Muslim (al-Jihād 49); Abu Dāwud –2

((al-Imārah ١٩); Nasā'i (al-Fay' ١
Wāqidi ٢:٤٤٤; Ibn Hishām ٣:٢٦٠; Kalā'i ١:١١٤-٣
Wāqidi ١L٣٦٨, ٤٩٦, ٢:٦٣٧; Suhayli ٤:٦٥; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٢:١٣٤-٤
Wāqidi ١:١٧٧, ٣٦٣, ٢:٤٩٩, ٦٤٤; Ibn Hishām ٢:٢٠٠, ٣٤٤; Ibn Sa'd ٢:١١٤-٥
Ibn Sa'd ٢:٤٠; Tabari ٢:٥٨٣-٦
Wāqidi ٢:٦٧١, ٦٧٣; Ibn Hishām ٣:٣٤٤; Tabari ٣:٩-٧
Wāqidi ١:٣٧٨, ٢:٤٩٦, ٦٦٢; Tabari ٢:٥٥٤; Ibn Hazm: ١٨٢-٨
Ibn Hishām ٣:٢٤٥; Ibn Sa'd ٢:١٩, ٤٠, ٧٧; Ibn Khayyāt ١:٢٧; Ibn Hazm: ١٥٤, ١٨٢-٩
Wāqidi ١:١٧٩, ٣٧٤, ٢:٤٥٣, ٤٦٢; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٢٠, ٤١, ٨٣; Tabari ٢:٤٨١-١٠
Wāqidi ١:١٧٩, ٢:٦٧١; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٢٠, ٤١, ٨٣; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٢:٥٠-١١

living conditions' were better^(١). The second group was also taken to far off places that were outside the domain and control of the Muslim army^(٢). As for the equipment, it was carried to the appropriate place where it could undergo repair and maintenance after which it would be distributed to the soldiers, and sometime a group would carry out repairs on the weapons right there on the battlefield

Trade and agriculture (١٢)

After the military missions were completed, the Holy Prophet (S) would give permission to the soldiers to embark on trade. He (S) had tolerated their exchange of goods in Badr al-Aākhar^(٣), and the forces returned back to Madina after having made a handsome profit^(٤). In this way, aside from battle operations, the army would engage in trade also. The Ansār would also pursue their own agricultural work^(٥)

Welcoming the soldiers (١٣)

After achieving victory in battle, the army would send the glad tidings and news of their return to Madina^(٦). All the people of Madina, men, women and children, would come out to welcome the victorious soldiers^(٧). The supreme commander had also come out with a group of tribesmen to welcome the army that was returning from Muta^(٨). In his caliphate, Abu Bakr also came out to welcome the army of Usāma^(٩)

The minimum age for being accepted into the army (١٤)

Joining the army was something done voluntarily^(١٠) and was not done as it is today i.e. joining the armed forces (for training) becomes mandatory at a certain age. The Holy Prophet (S) had laid down some conditions for those wishing to join the army.

The volunteers had

p: ١٩٦

Wāqidi ٢:٤٥٣, ٤٦٢; Ibn Hishām ٣:٢٦٤; Tabari ٢:٥٧٠ -١

Wāqidi ١:١٧٩, ٣٧٤, ٢:٦٧١; Ibn Atheer ٢:١٣٨, ١٧٣, ٢٢١; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ١:٢٩٥, ٢:٥٠ -٢

(Q٣:١٧٤; ibn Sa'd ٢:٤٢; Ibn Mājah (al-Jihād ٢٣ -٣

Wāqidi ١:٣٨٧-٤

(Bukhāri (al-Harth ١٨, ٢٠); Abu Dāwud (al-Buyu' ٣٠, ٥٤); Nasā'i (al-Eimān ٤٥-٥

(Ibn Hanbal ٥:٤٥; Bukhāri (al-Jihād ١٩٢-٦

Wāqidi ١:١١٦ onwards; Ibn Hishām ٢:١٩٧; Bayhaqi, al-Sunan al-Kubrā ٩:١٧٥-٧

Wāqidi ٢:٧٤٥; Ibn Hishām ٤:٢٤; Tabari ٣:٤٢-٨

Wāqidi ٣:١١٢٤; Ibn Sa'd ٢:١٣٧; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٢:٢٨٢-٩

Wāqidi ١:٢٠, ١٨١, ١٩٤, ٢:٤٤٥; Ibn Mandhur ١:٧٥٤-١٠

to be at least fifteen or sixteen years old^(١), strong and of sound body, and capable of fighting in battle^(٢).

For this reason, the young boys who had stepped forward for the Battle of Uhud, like ‘Abdullah ibn ‘Umar^(٣), Barrā’ ibn ‘Aāzib and others, were not accepted while ‘Umayr ibn Abi Waqqās got permission to join the army in the Battle of Badr when he was sixteen years old^(٤). Ibn ‘Umar himself said: The Holy Prophet (S) turned me back on the day of Uhud when I was fourteen years old and later accepted me in the Battle of Khandaq when I was fifteen^(٥).

Today, the minimum age for recruitment differs from country to country and most countries have kept the minimum age at eighteen years and have stipulated that the person should be healthy

Teaching and education (١٥)

The Holy Prophet (S) gave importance to teaching and education^(٦) and emphasized on its promotion. Due to this emphasis, he instructed Mundhir ibn ‘Amr al-Sā’idi to go with seventy teachers and educate the Bani ‘Aāmir^(٧). He (S) also sent Ibn Abi Murthid^(٨) with ten ‘reciters’ in order to teach the tribes of Adhal and al-Qārrah^(٩). The Prophet (S) would also employ those prisoners who were not able to pay the ransom to secure their freedom to teach others^(١٠).

Securing relief support in pre-emptive battle (١٦)

For securing relief support in this type of battle which was conducted against the enemy, the Holy Prophet (S) was not in need of a strong ‘rear’^(١١) in the army as this would act as a burden and would hold back

p: ١٩٧

Ibn Hanbal ٢:١٧; Abu Dāwud (al-Hudud ١٨); Bayhaqi ٩:٢١ –١

Wāqidi ١:٢١, ٢:٤٥٣; Bayhaqi ٩:٢١ –٢

Wāqidi ١:٢١٤; Ibn Hishām ٣:٧٠; Tabari ٢:٥٠٥ –٣

Wāqidi ١:٢١ -٤

Ibn Hanbal ٢:١٧; Abu Dāwud (al-Hudud ١٨); Bayhaqi ٩:٢١ -٥

(Bukhāri (al-‘Ilm ١, ٢٣, ٢٤, ٣٤); Ibn Mājah (al-Iqāmah ٢٣); Tirmidhi (al-‘Ilm ١٩ -٦

Bukhāri (al-Jizyah ٨); Kalā’i ١:١١١); Details about this can be found in Wāqidi ١:٣٤٧ -٧

Murthid ibn Abi Murthid was one of the companions of the Prophet (S) who went -٨
with ten reciters in order to teach the tribes of Adhal and al-Qārrah but when they
(.arrived at the well of Rajee’, the tribes broke their pact with them and killed them (Tr

Wāqidi ١:٣٥٤; Ibn Sa’d ٢:٣٩; Ibn Hishām ٣:١٧٨; Ibn Khayyāt ١:٤٢ -٩

Ibn Sa’d ٢:١٤; Bayhaqi ٦:٣٢٢; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٢:٢٨٧ -١٠

Wāqidi ١:٨٢; Ibn Hishām ٣:٤٩; Ibn Sa’d ٢:٢١; Mishelah, al-Harb al-Khātifah: ٧٧ -١١

the army preventing them from swift movement and battle maneuvers; rather he would only take the rear when a large army was required^(١). Single units and small contingents did not usually have a rear^(٢) and would carry the necessary provisions like dates, some foodstuffs and water, along with them^(٣) or would depend on the locally available resources^(٤). This type of securing of supplies needed quick transport, but because this was not fully and abundantly available (in the Muslim army), a clever soldier could make up for this deficiency^(٥) by carrying whatever supplies he needed himself.

Securing reinforcements when capturing fortresses (١٧)

The enemy forces would usually take refuge in forts and would store provisions that would last for a long time^(٦). In the same way, supply centers were divided along the line of defense.^(٧) In these situations, more than three supply centers were set up with the needed supplies^(٨). The Muslim army would not fight between the fortresses, rather they would attack the forts from the front and from different sides^(٩) and besiege it for long periods of time.^(١٠) During this time, they would take advantage of (the resources available in the area^(١١) or that which was possessed by the enemy^(١٢)

Difficulties in securing supplies (١٨)

The Muslim army faced numerous difficulties when trying to secure supplies. These included: Lack of adequate means of transport^(١٣), even camels that were used by a number of soldiers^(١٤) to carry provisions and water. Food rations were also not enough^(١٥). Many of the soldiers faced severe hunger especially during the final days of the battles^(١٦) and had to

p: ١٩٨

Wāqidi ٣:٩٩٦; Ibn Hishām ٢:٢٦٤ –١

Wāqidi ٢:٥٣٤, ٥٥٠; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٥٦, ٦١; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٢:٧٩, ١٠٣ –٢

(Ibn Hanbal ٤:٤٥٦; Bukhārī (al-Dhabā'ih ١٣ –٣

Bukhārī (al-Sayd ٣); Muslim (al-Sayd ٥٣); Ibn Mājah (al-At'imah ٢٧); Tirmidhi (al- – ٤

(At'imah ۲

(Muslim ۳:۱۴۳۳; Abu Dāwud (al-Jihād ۶۱ –۵

Wāqidi ۱:۱۷۷, ۲:۶۴۴, ۶۸۵; Ibn Hishām ۳:۲۰۰; Ibn Sa'd ۲:۱۴۱ –۶

Wāqidi ۲:۶۴۷, ۶۴۴, ۶۷۰; Ibn Hishām ۳:۳۴۴ –۷

Wāqidi ۲:۶۴۷, ۶۴۴, ۶۷۰ –۸

Wāqidi ۲:۶۷۱, ۶۸۰; Ibn Hishām ۳:۳۴۴; Tabari ۳:۹ –۹

Wāqidi ۱:۱۷۷, ۳۶۳, ۲:۴۹۶; Ibn Hishām ۳:۲۴۵; Ibn Sa'd ۲:۴۰ –۱۰

(Bukhāri (al-Jihād ۱۳۰); Muslim (al-Sayd ۲۶ –۱۱

Wāqidi ۲:۶۳۹, ۶۶۲ –۱۲

Wāqidi ۱:۱۷; Ibn Hishām ۲:۲۶۴; Ibn Sa'd ۲:۵; Tabari ۲:۴۳۱ –۱۳

(Bukhāri (al-Maghāzi ۳۱); Muslim (al-Jihād ۱۴۹); Abu Dāwud (al-Jihād ۳۴ –۱۴

Wāqidi ۲:۷۵۵; Ibn Hishām ۴:۲۸۱; Kalā'i ۱:۱۱۲ –۱۵

(Bukhāri (al-Maghāzi ۶۵); Abu Dāwud (al-At'imah ۴۶ –۱۶

eat hunted prey(١) and some of the plants and herbs(٢)

Similarly, the lack of wells(٣) and sufficient water especially in the hot months, would cause the soldiers to be overcome(٤) by thirst(٥). Lack of weapons and battle equipment(٦), which was difficult to buy or procure due to poor resources and also the suitable clothes for fighting against the enemy in the desert were not easy to come by(٧). Many of the soldiers came to face the enemy without any armor(٨) while some did not even have anything to cover themselves(٩)

These harsh weather conditions in the heart of the dry, scorching desert with frequent strong sandstorms(١٠) effected the strength and ability of the forces to fight in battle. The rays of the midday sun would be like arrows attacking the soldiers and the sand would cover their possessions in dust(١١). This army, especially in the battles against the Jews when the duration of the siege was prolonged, faced difficulties with supplies(١٢)

During this time the food supplies that were consumed by the soldiers depleted very quickly and put the army under threat of starvation. In the Battle of Khaybar, the field of operations had become polluted with disease and cholera(١٣), to such an extent that it was not possible to remain in that place for a long period of time and it would cause the forces to be afflicted by other sicknesses(١٤)

In the same way, the Muslim army was always faced with great economic pressures that had been put against the Muslims by

p: ١٩٩

Bukhāri (al-Sayd ٣, al-Dhabā'ih ١٠, al-At'imah ١٤); Muslim (al-Sayd ٣٧, ٥٣); Abu – ١
(Dāwud (al-At'imah ٢٧
Bukhāri (al-At'imah ٣٩, ٤٥, ٥٠, al-Anbiyā' ٢٩, al-Maghāzi ٦٥); Muslim (al-Ashribah ١٦٥); –٢
(Abu Dāwud (al-At'imah ٢٦
(Zuhri: ٥٢; Bukhāri (al-Jihād ٨٥ –٣
(Bukhāri (al-Maghāzi ٣٥, ١٣٧); Muslim (al-Jihād ١٣١ –٤
(Bukhāri (al-Maghāzi ٧٩); Muslim (al-Tawba ٥٣ –٥

(Dārimi (al-Buyu' ٥٤); Abu Dāwud (al-Buyu' ٨٨ –٦
Ibn 'Abd Rabbih, al-'Iqd al-Fareed ٢:٢٢٥; Mas'udi, Muruj al-Dhahab ٢:٢٣٣; Lord –٧
Monister, Risālah fi Harb 'ind al-'Arab: ٥٢; Farrukh, Tārikh al-Jāhiliyya: ٣٠
(Bukhāri (al-Jihād ٩٧); Muslim (al-Jihād ٧٨ –٨
Q٩:٩٢; Ibn Hishām ٤:١٦١; Tabari ٣:١٠٢; Qāsimi, Mahāsin al-Ta'wil ٨:٣٢٣٣ –٩
Mas'udi ٢:٢٣٣; Watt: ١٤, ١٧ –١٠
(Ibn Hanbal ٤:٣٧٢; Muslim (al-Sayd ١٠٠); Nasā'i (al-Mawāqeet ٥٥ –١١
Wāqidi ١:١٧٧; Ibn Hishām ٣:٢٤٥; Tabari ٢:٥٨٣; Dianna, Muhammad Rasulullah: ٢٧٨ –١٢
Wāqidi ٢:٦٤٤, ٦٦٧; Ibn Hazm: ٢١٢; Ibn Katheer ٤:١٩٩ –١٣
(Bukhāri (al-Tibb ٢٨); Muslim (al-Islām ٧٨, ٨١); Tirmidhi (al-Tibb ٢٥, ٣٣ –١٤

the Jews^(١); because they had numerous economic centers and interests in the Arabian peninsula. Another of the hardships related to supplies that the army faced was the distance between the battlefields and the city of Madina (which was a center for procurement of supplies)^(٢) especially in the battles of Dumat al-Jundal, Abnā and Tabuk which were towards the north of the Arabian peninsula and also those that took place in Yemen^(٣).

The division for training and exercise (١٩)

Military training would be conducted in the actual battles and wars. The army would travel long distances^(٤) in the desert until they would reach the enemy, and along the way, the army would undergo training in the following: bearing hunger^(٥) and thirst^(٦) on the way^(٧), the harsh conditions of the desert, including its heat, winds and dryness^(٨), staying in prolonged military expeditions^(٩), sleeping in open spaces^(١٠), economizing on food rations^(١١) and being satisfied with small portions of it, being generous with provisions despite the hard times^(١٢), helping other soldiers^(١٣), how to take advantage of locally available resources^(١٤), digging trenches and pits^(١٥), hunting animals^(١٦), how to deal with prisoners^(١٧), arrangements that needed to be made when the army stopped at any place^(١٨), gathering the war booty and accepting the system of its distribution^(١٩), finding clean water^(٢٠), and in the end, how to bury those who had been killed^(٢١).

These matters gave the Muslim army a special zeal for battle and made them capable, strong and ready for fighting the enemy.

B) Department Of War Booty

point

This was the department that was answerable for collecting the booty, arranging it

p: ٢٠٠

Ibn Sa'd ۲:۴۴, ۹۲, ۱۳۶; Bakri ۱:۱۰۱, ۳۰۳, ۲:۵۶۴; Hamawi ۱:۷۹, ۲:۱۴, ۴۸۷-۲
Wāqidi ۳:۱۰۷۹; Ibn Hishām ۴:۲۳۹; Ibn Sa'd ۲:۱۲۲; Tabari ۳:۱۲۶-۳
(Ibn Sa'd ۲:۴۴, ۵۶; Bukhāri (al-Maghāzi ۲۸-۴
(Dārimi (al-Jihād ۲۲); Bukhāri (al-Maghāzi ۲۰, al-Riqāq ۱۱۷-۵
Zuhri: ۵۲; Ibn Hazm: ۲۵۱; Hamawi ۲:۳۵۰; Kalā'i ۱:۱۵۲-۶
Wāqidi ۳:۱۰۷۹; Ibn Hishām ۳:۲۰۳; Ibn Sa'd ۲:۴۵; Tabari ۳:۱۲۶, ۱۳۱; Bakri ۱:۱۰۱, ۲:۵۶۴, -۷
۴:۱۲۲۰
Kalā'i ۱:۱۵۱; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ۲:۲۱۸; Watt: ۱۶, ۱۷-۸
Wāqidi ۳:۱۰۱۵; Ibn Khayyāt ۱:۱۷; Ibn Hazm: ۲۵۳-۹
Wāqidi ۲:۸۰۰-۸۰۶; Ibn Hishām ۳:۲۶۴; Ibn Sa'd ۲:۴۵-۱۰
Wāqidi ۱:۲۶; Ibn Hishām ۳:۳۴۶; Ibn Sa'd ۲:۹۵; Tabari ۳:۱۰-۱۱
Wāqidi ۳:۹۹۱, ۹۹۴; Ibn Hishām ۴:۱۶۱; Ibn Sa'd ۲:۱۲۰-۱۲
(Bukhāri (al-Maghāzi ۱۶-۱۳
(Bukhāri (al-Sayd ۳, al-At'imah ۳۹, ۴۵, ۵۰); Muslim (al-Sayd ۳۷, ۵۳-۱۴
Wāqidi ۲:۴۴۵, ۴۴۸; Ibn Hishām ۳:۲۶۰; Tabari ۲:۵۶۸; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ۲:۵۷-۱۵
(Bukhāri (al-Dhabā'ih ۱۰); Abu Dāwud (al-At'imah ۲۷); Nasā'i (al-Sayd ۳۲-۱۶
Shaybāni ۲:۴۰۹; Ibn Hanbal ۶:۲۷۶; Muslim (al-Jihād ۵۸); Bayhaqi ۹:۸۹-۱۷
Wāqidi ۱:۵۳; Ibn Hishām ۲:۲۵۷; Ibn Sa'd ۲:۹۶-۱۸
Q۸:۴۱; Bukhāri (al-Eimān ۴۰); Muslim (al-Eimān ۲۳); Abu Dāwud (al-Jihād ۱۳۴); - ۱۹
(Tirmidhi (Aseer ۱۴
(Bukhāri (al-Maghāzi ۸); Muslim (al-Jihād ۲); Abu Dāwud (al-Jihād ۲۵-۲۰
(Dārimi (al-Muqaddimah ۷); Abu Dāwud (al-Janā'iz ۳۲); Tirmidhi (al-Janā'iz ۳۱-۲۱)

and distributing it. All the wealth of the enemy forces that was taken by overpowering them or winning the battle was considered as war booty(١). The first war booty that was obtained by the Muslims was in the second year after Hijra which was the year when the fighting was first ordained. During this time, the Holy Prophet (S) sent ‘Abdullah ibn Jahash, accompanied by seventy men, for a mission. He gave a letter to the commander of the Sariya and ordered him to open it after he had travelled for two days and then follow the path directed therein. This was done in order to protect military secrets. The commander of the Sariya did as he was instructed and when he opened the letter he found the order to raid the caravan of the Quraysh at Nakhlah. (He did just that and took the wealth of the caravan as booty(٢)

Ways of using the booty on the battlefield (١)

Once the appropriation of the war booty was completed, there would be no delay in taking advantage of it especially with regards to the foodstuffs, drinks, fodder for animals, firewood and all the other requirements; whether those who used it were rich or poor, because even the rich would have to bear the difficulty of carrying (foodstuffs and fodder from Madina to the battlefield(٣)

The rules of distribution of war booty (٢)

The Noble Prophet (S) organized the booty and ordered that it be gathered up in a suitable place(٤). He appointed certain people to count and distribute it and would specify the people who would use it(٥), forbidding

p: ٢٠١

Zuhayli, al-Fiqh al-Islāmiyya wa Adillatih ٦:٤٥٥ –١

Suhayli ٣:٢٢ onwards –٢

Zuhayli ٦:٤٥٨ –٣

(Wāqidi ٣:٢٩٥; Dārimi (al-Siyar ٣٥); Bukhāri (al-‘Umrah ٣ –٤

Wāqidi ٢:٥٤٤; Ibn Sa’d ٢:٦١ –٥

anyone to take anything (from it) before its distribution(۱) while being very strict with (those people who infringed on these instructions(۲

:The booty would be divided into five parts and was distributed as follows(۳

The first part would be given to the following: orphans, needy, those who were travelers but had no more money (Ibn al-Sabil), and for basic requirements like buying battle equipment and things that were needed by the army including foodstuffs, weapons, battle gear, clothes etc

The four remaining parts would be distributed to the soldiers and every Muslim who participated in the battle, meaning one who was part of the army and entered the battlefield with the intention of fighting, whether he fought or not, would get a share; because frightening the enemy is akin to participating in the battle

As for the gauge of merit by which it each person got what they deserved, it was relative. For example, for the soldiers who were on horseback three portions were allotted (two portions for the horse and one for the soldier) while the one who was on foot got one portion. The reason for this was that a horse had to be specially treated and readied for battle and this incurred an extra expense. It is obvious that the expense incurred by a soldier on horseback was more than one who was on foot. As for the women and young children who were present in the battle, they would not get a full share, because they were not considered part

p: ۲۰۲

Bukhāri (al-Madhālim ۲۰); Muslim (al-Adh'hā ۲۰); Ibn Mājah (al-Fitan ۳); Abu Dāwud –۱

((al-Hudud ۱۴

(Bukhāri (al-Eimān ۳); Muslim (al-Jihād ۳۲ –۲

Shāfi'i, al-Umm ۴:۶۴ onwards –۳

of the forces. Rather, they got a small share i.e. smaller than one full portion, depending on what the supreme commander decided based on their contribution and participation during the battle

The place where the booty was divided (۳)

Division of the booty took place in a secure location or after it had been carried back to the Muslim lands. The supreme commander could transfer the army along with the booty to another area if the current location was not deemed to be safe^(۱). The division would either be done personally by the commander or by someone who was appointed by him to carry out this task^(۲).

Sources of booty (۴)

One of the important sources for acquiring booty were the Jews^(۳) and the Muslim army had taken possession of a lot of weapons, wealth and farming lands from them as war booty^(۴). As for the (enemy) Arab tribes, they took sheep, camels and some horses from them. This booty was used to cater for the material needs of the army

Prisoners (۵)

Prisoners were enemy combatants and those who were considered part of the enemy's army that were captured alive^(۵). Generally, prisoners would either be killed^(۶), or secure their release through the payment of ransom or by being exchanged for Muslim prisoners^(۷), or they would be forgiven and freed^(۸); and this was decided according to what was in the best interests (of the Muslims). The Holy Prophet (S) had ordered the killing of 'Aqabah ibn Abi Mu'eet and Nadhr bin Hārith in the Battle of Badr^(۹), 'Amr ibn al-Jamhā, the poet of the Age of Ignorance

p: ۲۰۳

.Ibid –۱

Ibn Sa'd ۲:۴۶; Suhayli ۴:۶۵ –۲

Wāqidi ۱:۱۷۸, ۳۷۷, ۲:۵۱۰, ۵۲۴; Ibn Sa'd ۲:۴۱ –۳

Wāqidi ١:٩٤, ٢:٥٣٥, ٩٤٤, ٣:٩٤٣; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٤١, ٩٥-٤

Ibn Qudāmah, al-Mughni ٨:٣٧٢ onwards; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٢:٢٨٧; Zuhayli, Athār al-

Harb fi Fiqh al-Islāmi: ٤٢٩

(Shaybāni ٢:٤٠٩; Ibn Mājah (al-Diyāt ٣); Tirmidhi (al-Siyar ١٨-٤

Dārimi (al-Siyar ٢٧); Ibn Mājah (al-Jihād ٣٢); Abu Dāwud (al-Jihād ١٢٤); Tirmidhi (al-

Siyar ١٨

Bukhāri (al-Khums ١٤); Abu Dāwud (al-Jihād ١٢٠); Tirmidhi (al-Siyar ١٨); Ibn - ٨

Qudāmah ٨:٣٧٢

Wāqidi ١:١٣٨, ١٤٨; Ibn Hishām ٢:٢٩٨; Ibn Sa'd ٢:١١; Tabari ٢:٤٥٩-٩

in the Battle of Uhud(1) and also the Bani Quraydha after the siege(2). A number of prisoners of Badr were freed by ransom(3). Some of them who did not have wealth had to teach ten youths of Madian (in order to secure their freedom)(4) and two (prisoners from the Sariya of Abdullah ibn Jahash were also freed by ransom(5)

The exchange of prisoners with the Quraysh began after the Treaty of Hudaibiyya (6). A woman from the Bani Kilāb was given as a ransom to secure the freedom of a prisoner from the Muslims who had been captured by the Quraysh(7). This woman had been taken prisoner in the Sariya of Abu Bakr against the Bani Kilāb. Abi ‘Uzza al-Jamhā was freed as an act of kindness because of his poverty(8). The same was done with Abi al-‘Aās ibn Rabe’e(9) and other prisoners of Badr(10), prisoners of Bani al-Mustalaq(11), Tamāmah ibn Athāl al-Hanafi after his imprisonment in the Sariya of Muhammad ibn Maslamah against the Bani Bakr(12), and also a man from Bani Tha’labah who had become a Muslim(13) after his imprisonment in the Sariya of Abi ‘Ubaydah ibn Jarrāh for the revenge against the Bani Tha’labah

Similarly, a woman who had divulged sensitive information to the enemy in the Sariya of Zayd ibn Hāritha against the Bani Saleem and was taken prisoner, was forgiven (and set free(14)

The Holy Prophet (S) would deal mercifully and humanely with the prisoners(15) and would urge that they be treated well(16) and forgiven when victory had been

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Wāqidi 1:142, 309; Ibn Hishām 3:110; Bayhaqi 6:320 –1

Wāqidi 2:513; Ibn Hishām 3:249; Ibn Sa’d 2:56; Tabari 3:593 –2

Wāqidi 1:138 onwards; Ibn Sa’d 2:14; Ibn Hanbal 1:353 –3

Ibn Hanbal 1:247; Bayhaqi 6:322 –4

Wāqidi 1:16; Ibn Hishām 2:255; Ibn Sa’d 2:5; Tabari 2:413 –5

Wāqidi 2:602 –6

(Dārimi (al-Siyar 27); Muslim 3:376; Ibn Mājah (al-Jihād 32 –7

Wāqidi 1:142; Ibn Hishām 3:110; Ibn Atheer 2:165 –8

Ibn Hanbal ٤:٢٧٤; Abu Dāwud (al-Jihād ١٢١); This was the husband of the Prophet's –٩
(.daughter Zainab (Tr
(Wāqidi ١:١٣٨ onwards; Abu Dāwud (al-Jihād ١٢ –١٠
Wāqidi ١:٤٠٧, ٤١٠; Ibn Hishām ٣:٣٠٧ onwards; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٤٤ –١١
Ibn Sa'd ٢:٥٤; Muslim ٣:١٣٨٤; Bayhaqi ٤:٣١٩ –١٢
Wāqidi ٢:٥٥٢; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٤٢; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٢:١٠٥ –١٣
Ibn Sa'd ٢:٤٢; Ibn Atheer ٢:٢٠٧; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٢:١٠٥; Ibn Qayyim ٢:٢٩٧ –١٤
Bukhāri (al-Ahkām ٣٥); Muslim (al-Jihād ٥٨); Tirmidhi (al-Siyar ١٨); Nasā'i (al- – ١٥
(Qudhāt ١٧
Ibn Hishām ٢:١٩٩; Tabari ٢:٤٤; Ibn Atheer ٢:١٣١ –١٤

gained over them(1). Whenever he (S) would hear the cries of any of them he would open their tied hands(2). The result of this kind treatment to the prisoners was that they would become believers in Islām(3) and out of their own free will, accept this new religion. Usually the prisoners would be tied up and not left free, and they would be kept in a place where hygiene(4) was good. They would be imprisoned in the Masjid(5) or in the house of the soldiers to whom they had been given(6) or were imprisoned all together in the house of one of the soldiers(7). This would be done to prevent any of them from fleeing. These houses were not built as prisons and if they were not tied, the prisoners could escape at any time

The Glorious Qur’ān has encouraged the feeding of prisoners(8) and the Holy Prophet (S) would also recommend it(9). The troops would also give precedence to the prisoners when it came to food and would sacrifice their own food for them(10).

Like ‘Aziz ibn ‘Umayr who used to eat bread and good foods. The food of the prisoners was dates(11). When the supreme commander was requested for some food by a prisoner, he replied with kindness and generosity(12) and asked the companions to prepare some food for him(13). They immediately gave him milk and delicious food

At the same time, the prisoners were covered with proper clothes. For instance, the supreme commander gave a shirt to ‘Abbās ibn ‘Abd

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Wāqidi ۱:۴۰۷, ۴۱۰; Ibn Salām, al-Amwāl ۱:۱۰۶; Muslim ۳:۱۳۸۶ –۱

Tabari ۲:۴۶۳; Bayhaqi ۹:۸۹ –۲

Wāqidi ۲:۲۵۲; Muslim ۳:۱۳۶۸; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ۱:۲۸۷ –۳

Ibn Hanbal ۳:۳۷۷; Bukhāri (al-Jihād ۱۴۴); Abu Dāwud (al-Eimān ۳۱); Tirmidhi (al-Jihād –۴
(۳۴

Dārimi (al-Farā’idh ۴۳); Bukhāri (al-Salāh ۷۵); Abu Dāwud (al-Jihād ۹۷, ۱۴); Nasā’i (al- –۵
(Masājid ۲۰

Ibn Hishām ۲:۱۹۹; Tabari ۲:۴۶; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ۱:۲۶۵ –۶

Ibn Sa’d ۳:۱۱۶; Bayhaqi ۹:۸۹; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ۲:۲۰۳ –۷

Q76:8-8

(Ibn Hanbal 5:294; Abu Dāwud (al-Buyu' 3-9

Ibn Hishām 1:300; Tabari 2:461; Ibn Atheer 2:131-10

.Ibid -11

Bayhaqi 6:230; Zuhayli, Athār al-Harb fi Fiqh al-Islāmi: 412-12

Ibn 'Abd al-Barr 1:213; Ibn Atheer 1:246; Zuhayli: 412-13

al-Muttalib^(١) and while giving some clothes as a gift to Safānah bint Hātim Tā'ī, the Prophet (S) favored her by setting her free^(٢).

He (S) would never force any prisoner to divulge secret military information^(٣), however, if he tried to deceive the Muslim army by giving them false information, he would be pressurized and would even be beaten^(٤). If a prisoner did not give up secret information about the enemy, he would never be beaten or abused. However, if he did give up any vital information, he would be set free^(٥).

C) Department Of Medical Services

Designation and goals of the department of medical services (١)

The goal of this department was the preservation of the health of soldiers. To this end, offering medical assistance to the injured and taking them from the battlefield to the medical camps for treatment were the functions that this department was responsible for. Other functions included taking preventative measures to stop the spread of different diseases and epidemics and taking care of the hygiene in the places where the troops and commanders camped and ensuring the cleanliness and soundness of these places.^(٦)

The supreme commander would also participate in giving medical assistance^(٧), for instance when Qatāda ibn Nu'mān was injured in the Battle of Uhud and the news reached him, he (S) wrapped Qatāda in his cloak and gave him treatment, such that he regained his health and returned to his previous state^(٨). In the same way, he (S) treated the injury of Sa'd ibn Ma'ādh, who was injured in the Sariya of Muhammad ibn Maslamah (that was undertaken) to assassinate Ka'b

p: ٢٠٦

Bukhāri (al-Jihād ١٤٦); Qurtubi ٤:٣٠٥٩ -١

(Wāqidi ٣:٩٨٩; Bukhāri (al-Jihād ١٤٢ -٢

(Abu Dāwud (al-Jihād ٩٧, ١١٦ -٣

Wāqidi ١:٥٣, ٢:٥٦٣, ٣:٩٨٦; Ibn Hishām ٢:٢٦٨; Tabari ٢:٤٣٦ -٤

(Wāqidi ٢:٥٥٢; Abu Dāwud (al-Jihād ٨٤ -٥

(Zuhri: ٩٣; Ibn Hanbal ٥:٣٠٩; Bukhāri (al-Madina ١٢); Nasā'i (al-Ashribah ٤٠ -٦

Refer to the books on Tibb including Tibb al-Nabawi and the chapters on al-Tibb in -٧

Bukhāri and Muslim

Ibn Is'hāq: ٣٠٨; Wāqidi ١:٢٤١; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٢:١٤ -٨

ibn Ashraf⁽¹⁾. The Prophet (S) put his own saliva on the eyes of ‘Ali (‘a), who was suffering from an ailment in his eyes, and he was cured and could continue fighting the battle⁽²⁾.

The support forces would always provide the required medicines to those who were sick or injured⁽³⁾. General medical services in the Muslim army were based on the individual⁽⁴⁾, collective⁽⁵⁾ and the women⁽⁶⁾. When the supreme commander was attacked and became injured, Abi ‘Ubaydah ibn Jarrāh would pull out the chains of his helmet from his cheeks⁽⁷⁾ and Fātima (‘a) also would put a heated mat with palm leaves on his wounds⁽⁸⁾. The injured would come as outpatients and would get their wounds dressed and this would happen after they had returned to Madina⁽⁹⁾. Some of the wounds would be given basic treatment and dressing during the battle

Another responsibility of this department was evacuating the injured to a specific location for treatment in Madina. When Sa’d ibn Mu’ādh was injured in the Battle of Khandaq, he was transferred to a tent in Masjid al-Nabi (S)⁽¹⁰⁾. In the same way, when Muhammad ibn Maslamah⁽¹¹⁾ was injured in battle against the Bani Tha’labah and ‘Awāl, he was taken to Madina (for treatment). The medications and medical equipment that were used to treat and cure the injured were very basic and the most important among these included: water, (heated) mats, fabrics⁽¹²⁾ that were used by men in their trousers or the turbans⁽¹³⁾ that they wore on their heads – and this

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Wāqidi 1:190; Ibn Hishām 3:60; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās 1:301 – 1
Bukhāri (al-Maghāzi 38, 121); Muslim (Fadhā’il al-Sahābah 32, 35); The Prophet (S) – 2
had initially given the opportunity to his other companions like Abu Bakr, ‘Umar and
Sa’d ibn Abi Waqqās but they were unable to take down the fort of Khaybar. It is then
that the Prophet (S) gave the command to ‘Ali ibn Abi Tālib (‘a) who finally gained
(victory over the Jews and brought down Khaybar (Ibn Hajar 2:503) (Tr

Wāqidi 1:350, 2:644 – 3

(Wāqidi 1:87, 250, 334 onwards; Ibn Sa’d 2:34; Bukhāri (al-Maghāzi 16 – 4

Wāqidi 1:393, 2:551; Ibn Hishām 3:85; Ibn Sa’d 2:117 – 5

Bukhāri (al-Jihād ٤٧, Tibb ٢); Muslim (al-Jihād ١٣٧, ١٤١); Abu Dāwud (al-Jihād ٣٢, ١٤١); -٤
(Tirmidhi (al-Siyar ٢٢
Wāqidi ١:٢٤٧; Ibn Hishām ٣:٨٥; Ibn Atheer ٣:٧٨; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٢:١٢ -٧
(Ibn Hanbal ٣:٣٣٤; Bukhāri (al-Jihād ٨٠, al-Tibb ٢٧); Tirmidhi (al-Tibb ٣٤ -٨
Wāqidi ١:٣٣٤; Ibn Hishām ٣:١٠٧; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٣٤; Tabari ٢:٥٣٤ onwards; Ibn Sayyid al- -٩
Nās ٢:١٣
Bukhāri (al-Maghāzi ٣٠); Muslim (al-Jihād ٤٤); Abu Dāwud (al-Janā'iz ٤); Nasā'i (al- -١٠
(Masājid ١٨
Wāqidi ٢:٥٥١; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٤٢; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٢:١٠٤ -١١
Shaybāni ١:١٢٧; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٣٤ -١٢
(Bukhāri (al-Maghāzi ١٤ -١٣

would be used to dress the wounds and cuts. Honey^(١), oil^(٢), a special type of dates^(٣), milk, camel urine^(٤), salt with water^(٥) and other remedies (were used)^(٦)

The Holy Prophet (S) would take it upon himself to find out about the situation of hygiene in the army. He (S) would send some troops to check this and give him news about the situation^(٧) and to select (hygienic and) sound locations^(٨). He would choose such (clean and hygienic) locations for the army to set up camp. He would select clean and suitable water for drinking^(٩) and would only permit the using of water that had (not changed in smell or color for washing hands and cleaning wounds)^(١٠).

Losses (٢)

Losses in the battlefield would be suffered because of a number of reasons, the most :important among which were

Their resources and conditions of warfare and those of the enemy

(.The type of battle (offensive, defensive, siege etc

The types of weapons used

. Preparation for war and the type of terrain

(The time of day (whether day or night

The zeal and morale of the soldiers

(Ability and precaution^(١١)

In the battle of Badr, the resources were equally accessible to both the sides. The type of war was defensive in Khandaq and offensive in the Conquest of Makkah. Entering the fortresses, the conditions of terrain and time of the battle (during the last hours of the night) in Khaybar, the type of weapons used in the Battle of Tā'if, the preparation in the Battle of Bani Quraydha and the great care and precaution taken

(Bukhāri (al-Tibb ٣, ٥, al-Hajj ١٨); Muslim (al-Islām ١٨ –١
(Bukhāri (al-Tibb ٥٢, ٥٦); Muslim (al-Ashribah ١٥٥); Abu Dāwud (al-Tibb ١٢ –٢
(Ibn Hanbal ٦:٧٧; Bukhāri (al-At'imah ٤٣, al-Tibb ٥٢); Ibn Mājah (al-Tibb ٣ –٣
(Wāqidi ٢:٥٦٩; Ibn Hanbal ٦:٣٨٠; Bukhāri (al-Tibb ٦, ٥٧); Ibn Mājah (al-Tibb ٣٠ –٤
(Ibn Hanbal ٦:٣٨٠; Abu Dāwud (al-Tahārah ١٢٠ –٥
Ibn Qayyim ٣:١٣٤, ٤١٥; Ibn Katheer ٤:١٩٥ –٦
Wāqidi ١:٥٣, ٢:٦٤٤; Ibn Hishām ٣:٦٩, ٢٣١; Kalā'ī ١:١٣٠ –٧
(Wāqidi ٢:٦٤٤; Bukhāri (al-Madina ١٢); Tirmidhi (al-Ru'yā ١٠ –٨
(Bukhāri (al-Jihād ٨٥, al-Ashribah ١٦ –٩
Bukhāri (al-Anbiyā' ١٧); Muslim (al-Jihād ١٠١); Abu Dāwud (al-Tahārah ٣٣); Nasā'ī – ١٠
(al-Tahārah ٤٣
Zuhri: ٧٩; Wāqidi ١:١٤٥, ١٥٢, ٢:٧٠٠, ٨٢٥; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٤٣, ١٠٩; Ibn Hanbal ٢:٥٥٢; Nasā'ī (al- – ١١
Khawf ١٦); Kalā'ī ١:١١٢, ١٣٠; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٢:٥٢٣ ١٣١

in the Battle of Dhāt al-Ruqā' were all important factors. The losses faced by the Muslim army in the first defensive battles were greater. In the Battle of Badr fourteen people^(١), in Uhud eighty^(٢) and in Khandaq six people^(٣) were martyred. But in the offensive battles, the numbers were relatively less. In the Battle of Muta nine people^(٤), in the Conquest of Makkah two people^(٥), in Hunayn fourteen people^(٦), in conquering the fortresses of Khaybar fifteen people^(٧) and in Tā'if twelve people^(٨) were martyred. When conquering the fortresses of Bani Qaynuqā', Bani Nadhir and Bani Quraydha, the Muslim army suffered no losses at all^(٩).

As for the losses faced in the Sariya missions, they included: ten people^(١٠) were martyred in the Sariya of Muhammad ibn Maslamah against the Bani Tha'labah, three people^(١١) in the Sariya of Bashir ibn Sa'd al-Ansāri against the Bani Murrah, five people^(١٢) in the Sariya of Abi al-'Awjā al-Sulami against the Bani Saleem and fifteen people^(١٣) in the Sariya of Kalā'i'ib ibn 'Umayr al-Ghaffāri against the Bani Qudhā'ah. In missions where the enemy ambushed the Muslims, many losses were suffered. Like the event of Bi'r Ma'unah where seventy people^(١٤) and Rajee' where ten people were martyred^(١٥).

By studying these numbers one can see that the losses in defensive war were greater than those in offensive war, and this was because after the Battle of Khandaq, the Muslim army had gained experience and were better trained^(١٦). The losses in some of the Sariya missions^(١٧) were higher due to the

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Ibn Is'hāq: ٢٨٩; Wāqidi ١:١٤٥; Ibn Sa'd ٢:١١; Tabari ٢:٤٧٧; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ١:٢٨٥ -١

Wāqidi ١:٣٠٠ onwards; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٢٩; Ibn Hanbal ٥:١٣٥ -٢

Wāqidi ٢:٢٩٥; Ibn Hishām ٣:٢٦٣; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٢:٦٧ -٣

Wāqidi ٢:٧٦٩; Ibn Hishām ٤:٣٠; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٢:١٥٦ -٤

Ibn Hishām ٤:٥٠; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٩٨; Ibn 'Abd al-Barr, al-Durar fi Ikhtisār al-Maghāzi wal-

Siyar: ٢٣٢; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٢:١٧٣

Wāqidi ٣:٩٢٢; Ibn Hishām ٤:١٠١; Ibn Sa'd ٢:١٠٩; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٢:١٩٢, ١٩٣ -٦

Wāqidi ٢:٧٥٠; Ibn Hishām ٣:٣٥٧; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٢:١٤٢ -٧

Wāqidi ٣:٩٣٨; Ibn Hishām ٤:١٢٩; Tabari ٣:٥٨; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٢:٢٠٢ –٨
Zuhri: ٧١; Wāqidi ١:١٧٦; Ibn Sa'd ٢:١٩, ٤٠; Ibn Khayyāt ١:٢٧; Kalā'i ١:١١١ –٩
Wāqidi ٢:٥٥١; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٦١; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٢:١٠٤; Ibn Qayyim ٢:٢٧٩ –١٠
Wāqidi ٢:٧٢٣; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٨٦; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٢:١٤٦; Ibn Qayyim ٢:٣٥٨ –١١
Wāqidi ٢:٧٤١; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٨٩; Ibn Atheer ٥:٢٦٦; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٥:١٤٩ –١٢
Wāqidi ٢:٧٥٢; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٩٢; Tabari ٣:٢٩; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٢:١٥٢ –١٣

Wāqidi ١:١:٣٤٧; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٣٦; Bukhāri ٥:٤١; Kalā'i ١:١١١ –١٤

Ibn Sa'd ٢:٣٩; Wāqidi ١:٣٥٥; Ibn Hishām ٣:١٧٨; Ibn Khayyāt ١:٣٠ (some of whom – ١٥

(mention different numbers

Bukhāri (al-Maghāzi ٢٩); Abu Dāwud (al-Jihād ١٥٦); Ibn Hishām ٤:٤٩; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٩٨ –١٦

Wāqidi ٢:٥٥١, ٧٢٣, ٧٤١; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٦١, ٨٦, ٨٩; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٢:١٠٤, ١٤٦, ١٥٢ –١٧

commanders not having taken all the necessary precautions, a stronger enemy army, the element of surprise was not there in their attack, the secretive nature of the military operation and the inability to assist the injured because of which they would die.

The number of martyrs in the battles (۳)

The percentage of those who were martyred were as follows: Badr(۱) – ۵% of the forces, Uhud(۲) – ۱۰%, Khandaq(۳) – ۱۰۰۲%, Khaybar(۴) – ۱%, Muta(۵) – ۲.۵%; Conquest of Makkah(۶) – ۱۰۰۲%, Hunayn(۷) – ۱۰۰۳%, Tā'if(۸) – ۱۰۲% and in the Sariya and other missions put together(۹) – ۱۰%. The highest number of martyrs was in the Battle of Uhud (۷۰) and the lowest was in the Conquest of Makkah (۲

Burying the Martyrs (۴)

The Holy Prophet (S) gave the order that the martyrs should be buried in the battlefield(۱۰), just as is done in some of the battles of our time. He (S) would not give permission to take their bodies back to Madina and it has been said that some of the heirs had taken the corpses of their dead back to Madina, but the Prophet (S) ordered that they be taken back. The announcer of the supreme commander would call out: 'Return those who have been killed to their place of rest (i.e. the place where they fell in battle)(۱۱)

The reason for this was that transferring the dead to another place would put their families under financial strain and other difficulties and it was possible that the change in weather conditions could affect the corpses and cause them to

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Wāqidi ۱:۴۵, ۱۵۲; Ibn Sa'd ۲:۶, ۱۱; Tabari ۲:۴۳۱, ۴۷۷; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ۱:۲۴۵, ۲۸۵ – ۱

Wāqidi ۱:۳۰۰; Ibn Hishām ۳:۶۸, ۱۲۹; Ibn Sa'd ۲:۲۷, ۲۹; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ۲:۵, ۲۷ – ۲

Ibn Hishām ۳:۲۳۱, ۲۶۴; Ibn Sa'd ۲:۴۷; Tabari ۲:۵۷۰; Ibn 'Abd al-Barr: ۱۹۴ – ۳

Wāqidi ۲:۵۷۴, ۷۵۰; Ibn Hishām ۳:۲۳۱, ۲۶۴; Ibn Sa'd ۲:۷۸; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ۲:۱۵۳ – ۴

Wāqidi ۲:۷۵۶, ۷۶۹; Ibn Hishām ۴:۱۵, ۳۰; Ibn Sa'd ۲:۹۷; Tabari ۳:۳۶; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās – ۵

Wāqidi ٢:٨٠٠, ٨١٢; Ibn Hishām ٢:٤٢, ٥٠; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٩٧; Tabari ٣:٧٣, ٨١; Ibn 'Abd al-Barr: -٦

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Wāqidi ٣:٨٨٩, ٩٩٢; Ibn Hishām ٤:٨٣; Ibn Sa'd ٢:١٠٨-١١٠; Tabari ٣:٧٣, ٨١; Ibn 'Abd al-Barr: -٧

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Wāqidi ٢:٨٨٩, ٩٢٣, ٩٣٨; Ibn Sa'd ٢:١١٤-٨

Wāqidi ٢:٥٥١, ٧٢٣, ٧٤١, ٧٥٢; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٣٤, ٣٩, ٤١, ٨٤, ٩٢; Bukhāri ٥:٤١; Kalā'i ١:١١١; Ibn -٩

Sayyid al-Nās ٢:١٠٤, ١٤٤, ١٤٩, ١٥٢

Dārimi (al-Muqaddimah ٧); Ibn Mājah (al-Janā'iz ٢٨); Abu Dāwud (al-Janā'iz ٢٣); -١٠

(Tirmidhi (al-Janā'iz ٣١

(Abu Dāwud (al-Janā'iz ٣٨); Tirmidhi (al-Janā'iz ٣١ -١١

be cut into pieces. Aside from this, the means of transport were not abundant and could not even cater for all the soldiers. Most important of all, burying the fallen soldiers in the battlefield was a secret for keeping their memory alive, heightening emotions about them and expressing the meaning of courage by their example

The Holy Prophet (S) would honor the martyrs(1), put them on the pedestal of respect and glory in this world and the hereafter(2) and would give the glad tidings about this to the family and relatives of the martyred(3); so their hearts would be filled with happiness. The Prophet (S) would bury one, two or three martyrs in a single grave(4) depending on their closeness with each other or their relationship (to each other) or the amount of Qur'ān they had memorized in their lifetimes

The Prophet (S) forbade the disfigurement and cutting off of parts of the enemy corpses(5) and gave the order that once they were identified, they were to be buried without taking any revenge on their dead bodies by burning, drowning or decapitating them(6). The supreme commander would also instruct the commanders and leaders of Sariya missions not to disfigure the corpses of the enemy(7) and preserve the respect of their dead(8). This was despite the fact that the Quraysh had disfigured the body of Hamza and others in the Battle of Uhud, and Hind bint 'Aqabah, the wife of the commander of the enemy's army i.e. Abu Sufyān, had chewed the liver

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Ibn Hanbal ۴:۱۸۵; Dārimi (al-Jihād ۱۹); Ibn Mājah (al-Muqaddimah ۱۱۰, al-Libās ۲); – ۱
(Abu Dāwud (al-Jihād ۲۵); Tirmidhi (Fadhā'il al-Jihād ۱۳); Nasā'i (al-Qisāmah ۱۸
Ibn Hanbal ۱:۲۸۸, ۴۶۳; Dārimi (al-Jihād ۱۶); Bukhāri (al-Jihād ۲); Abu Dāwud (al-Jihād – ۲
(۲۶); Tirmidhi (Fadhā'il al-Jihād ۲۵); Nasā'i (Fadhā'il al-Jihād ۸۳
Ibn Hanbal ۱:۳۸۶; Dārimi (al-Jihād ۱۸); Muslim (al-Aqdhiya ۱۶); Abu Dāwud (al- – ۳
(Aqdhiya ۱۳); Tirmidhi (Fadhā'il al-Jihād ۱۳
Bukhāri (al-Janā'iz ۷۳, ۷۹); Abu Dāwud (al-Janā'iz ۲۷); Tirmidhi (al-Janā'iz ۴۶); Nasā'i – ۴
(al-Janā'iz ۶۲
Bukhāri (al-Salāh ۱۰۹, Manāqib al-Ansār ۴۵, al-Maghāzi ۸); Muslim (al-Janā'iz ۲۶); – ۵
(Abu Dāwud (al-Jihād ۱۱۵); Nasā'i (al-Janā'iz ۱۱۷

Bukhāri (al-Maghāzi ٣٤); Muslim (al-Jihād ٢, al-Birr ١١٧, ١١٩); Abu Dāwud (al-Jihād – ٤
(١١٣); Tirmidhi (al-Jihād ١٤
Bukhāri (al-Maghāzi ٣٤, al-Dhabā'ih ٢٥); Muslim (al-Jihād ٢); Abu Dāwud (al-Jihād – ٧
(٨٢); Tirmidhi (al-Siyar ٤٨, al-Jihād ١٤
Bukhāri (al-Janā'iz ٧٥); Abu Dāwud (al-Adh'hā ١١); Tirmidhi (al-Diyāt ١٤); Nasā'i (al- – ٨
(Dhahāyā ٢٢, ٢٤

of this martyr (Hamza)(1). Despite all this, if the enemies were keen to take their
corpses, the Prophet (S) would allow them to do so(2)

The role of women in securing supplies and relief support (3)

Women had an important role in (securing) supplies and relief support of the Muslim army. They would prepare food for the soldiers(3), give water to the thirsty(4), carry water-bags on their shoulders and take them to the troops in the battlefield(5), treat the injured by burning medicinal herbs and teas(6) and putting them on heated mats which would be placed on the injuries(7), and assist in evacuating the injured to specific areas such as Masjids. Their role in lifting the morale and encouraging the
soldiers before battle was important(8)

They would force those fleeing from battle to return(9), repair clothes and coverings and stitch water-bags(10) and assist in medical evacuations(11). The women would share their advice with the supreme commander(12) and would, in times of desperation, fight(13) and would guard and protect the weapons and military
equipment(14)

By allowing the women to participate in battle, the Prophet (S) raised their status. In the Battle of Hudaibiyya, he took their advice when leaving for 'Umrah(15) and they had told him to go ahead and do whatever he saw fit as the Muslims would all follow him. In the Conquest of Makkah, the women pledged allegiance to him just as the men did(16) and when making the Treaty of Hudaibiyya with the Quraysh, even though the men did not agree to the conditions(17) and protested them, the women
did not

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Bukhāri (al-Janā'iz 34; al-Jihād 20); Muslim (Fadhā'il al-Sahābah 129); Tirmidhi (al-
Janā'iz 31); Nasā'i (al-Janā'iz 12
Ibn Hanbal 1:248, 271; Abu Dāwud 2:279-2
Ibn Hanbal 5:84; Dārimi (al-Jihād 30); Muslim (al-Jihād 141); Ibn Mājah (al-Jihād 37, -3
(al-Ahkām 14); Abu Dāwud (al-Buyu' 89, al-Salāh 7.

(Bukhāri (al-Jihād ٤٧, al-Tibb ٢); Abu Dāwud (al-Ashriba ٤٤, al-Imārah ٢٠, al-Adab ١٠٠ –٤

(Bukhāri (al-Jihād ٤٥, Manāqib al-Ansār ١٨, al-Maghāzi ١٨); Muslim (al-Jihād ١٣٤ –٥

Ibn Hanbal ٥:٨٤; Dārimi (al-Jihād ٣٠); Muslim (al-Jihād ١٤١); Ibn Mājah (al-Jihād ٣٧); –٦

Bayhaqi ٩:٢٢, ٣٠

Bukhāri (al-Maghāzi ٣٠); Muslim (al-Jihād ٤٤, ١٤١); Abu Dāwud (al-Janā'iz ٤); Nasā'i –٧

((al-Masājid ١٨

Wāqidi ١:٢٠٨; Ibn Hishām ٣:٧٢; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٢:٩ onwards –٨

Wāqidi ٢:٢٧٨, ٣:٩٠٣; Ibn Hishām ٤:٨٩; Tabari ٣:٧٧; Kalā'i ١:١٤٥ –٩

(Bukhāri (al-Jihād ٤٤, al-Maghāzi ٢٢); Tirmidhi (al-Libās ٣٨ –١٠

(Ibn Hanbal ٤:٣٨٥; Bukhāri (al-Tibb ٢, al-Jihād ٤٧ –١١

(Bukhāri (al-Hajj ٣١٤ –١٢

Wāqidi ١:٢٤٩, ٣:٩٠٤; Ibn Hishām ٣:٨٧, ٨٨; Tabari ٣:٧٧; Kalā'i ١:١٤٥; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās –١٣

٢:١١, ١٣

Ibn Hishām ٣:١٠٤; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٢:٢٤ –١٤

Wāqidi ٢:٤١٣; Ibn 'Abd al-Barr ٤:١٩٣٩; Ibn Atheer ٢:٢٠٥; Ibn Qayyim ٢:٣٠٨ –١٥

Bukhāri (al-Jihād ٤٤, al-Maghāzi ٢٢); Muslim (al-Imārah ٨٩, al-Salām ٨٩); Ibn Mājah –١٦

((al-Jihād ٤٣); Abu Dāwud (al-Zakāh ٣٣

Wāqidi ٣:٤٢٩; Ibn Hishām ٣:٣٤٠; Tabari ٢:٤٤٠; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٢:١٢٢ –١٧

do so^(١). It was at this point that the verses of the Qur'ān^(٢) were revealed that elevated their status

The place of the women in the battles^(٣) while marching or camping, was in the rear of the army and in Madina and the fortresses^(٤) during defense^(٥), it was behind the men and they would give the necessary assistance and support to the soldiers^(٦).
Whenever they participated in the battle, they would be behind the male soldiers^(٧)

An Analysis of the Military Management

A study of all the battles that were fought by the Muslim army in all the front-lines establishes the fact that possessing greater forces and resources was not sufficient for achieving victory. Rather, the organization of resources and proper utilization of the same at the right place and right time^(٨), even if these resources were few^(٩) or even lacking^(١٠), was considered the most evident cause of victory. It is because of this that the Muslim army was able to attain victory over the Jews who were stronger in terms of resources^(١١), the Romans who had a variety of different types of resources^(١٢) and even the enemy tribes who possessed thousands of sheep, mules and horses^(١٣)

After gaining victory over the enemy, the Muslims added the acquired resources to what little they had and began organizing it^(١٤). The Prophet (S) would never face the enemy altogether, rather he would face them separately attacking one after the other^(١٥). This was the strategy that made the forces develop gradually in different fields, to such a degree that in time, they

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For an example of the important role played by women in these battles see: Ibn Hishām ٣:٨٦

Qe: ١٠; Suhayli ١:٢٦; Qāsimi, Mahāsin al-Ta'wil ١٦:٥٧٧ - ٢

(Wāqidi ١:٢٢٣, ٣:٨٩٧; Muslim ٣:٨٩٥; Abu Dāwud (al-Jihād ١٠٧ - ٣

(Wāqidi ٢:٩٩٦; Muslim ٣:٨٩٥; Abu Dāwud (al-Jihād ١٠٧ - ٤

Wāqidi ٢:٢٦٢, ٢٦٩; Ibn Hishām ٣:٢٦٢; Ibn Hanbal ١:١٦٤; Tabari ٢:٥٧٠ - ٥

Wāqidi ٢:٤٦٠; Ibn Hishām ٣:٢٣٩ –٦

Wāqidi ١:٢٦٩, ٣:٩٠٤; Ibn Hishām ٣:٨٧, ٤:٨٨; Kalā'ī ١:١٤٥; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٢:١١, ١٣ –٧

Wāqidi ٢:٦٦١, ٣:٩٩١; Ibn Hishām ٤:١٥٩; Ibn Sa'd ٢:١٢٠; Tabari ٣:١٠٢ –٨

Wāqidi ٢:٧٧٥; Ibn Hishām ٤:٢٨١; Tabari ٣:١٠; Kalā'ī ١:١١٢ –٩

Bukhāri (al-Maghāzi ٦٥); Muslim (al-Sayd ١٧); Abu Dāwud (al-At'imah ٤٦); Nasā'ī –١٠

((al-Sayd ٣٥

Wāqidi ٣:٣٦٨, ٢:٦٣٧; Ibn Sa'd ٢:١٩; Kalā'ī ١:١٣٠; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٢:٧٤; Wāqidi ٢:٦٤٤, –١١

٦٧٠, ٦٨٠

Wāqidi ١:٧٥٥, ٣:٩٩٠; Ibn Hishām ٤:١٦, ١٩; Ibn Sa'd ٢:١١٩ –١٢

Zuhri: ٩٣; Wāqidi ١:١٨٣, ٢:٥٣٥, ٣:٩٤٣; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٦١ –١٣

(Ibn Sa'd ٢:٢٠, ٤١, ١٢٠; Bukhāri (al-Jihād ٨٠); Muslim (al-Jihād ٤٩ –١٤

Wāqidi ١:١٧٦, ٣٦٣, ٢:٤٩٦, ٦٣٣, ٢٦٧; Ibn Sa'd ٢:١, ١٩, ٤٠; Tabari ٢:٤٧٩, ٥٨١, ٣:٩; Ibn Hazm: –١٥

٢٣٩

were able to overcome larger enemy forces^(١). In the beginning the army fought against the Bani Qaynuqā' and took over the few material resources that they had^(٢). The Prophet (S) fought against the Bani Qaynuqā' at a time when the resources of the Muslim army were incomparable^(٣) to those that were used in the Battle of Khaybar that took place a few years later, in which they overcame the enemy, and in this way .each battle would increase the resources and capability of the Muslim army

In his battles, the Holy Prophet (S) would use methods that required fewer material resources, like the pre-emptive battles^(٤), surprise attacks^(٥), full scale and revolutionary attacks^(٦), because these methods created a high morale^(٧), swiftness in attack^(٨), strong faith and steadfastness^(٩), complete general readiness^(١٠) and .fear in the enemy^(١١)

Conclusion

The organization and Islāmic government developed gradually after the migration of the Holy Prophet (S) to Madina. At this time the Prophet (S) made this city the capital of the Islāmic government, managed and supervised the affairs of the Muslims, planned and created a program for spreading the call of Islām and took steps which put him, in the short term, in situations of grave hardship. These steps were always taken with complete wisdom and awareness, and became a stepping stone and a basis for the .expansion of the management and the great foundation of human reform

The measures he (S) took made Madina a homeland for its residents and not a place .of continuous disputes between its tribes

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Zuhri: ٨٤; Ibn Shihāb ٣:٥٠ onwards; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٢١, ٤٤; Tabari ٢:٩; Kalā'i ١:١٣٠ -١

Wāqidi ١:١٨٧; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٢٠; Tabari ٢:٤٨١; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ١:٢٩٦ -٢

Wāqidi ٢:٦٥٨, ٦٦٤, ٦٧٠; Ibn Hishām ٣:٢٥٣; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٧٨ -٣

Wāqidi ١:١٨٢, ١٩٤; Ibn Hishām ٣:٤٦; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٢١, ٣٥, ٤٣, ٦٢ -٤

Wāqidi ١:٣٩٦; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٢١; Suhayli ٣:٢٨; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ١:٣٠٤ -٥

Wāqidi ١:٢٠, ٨٨; Ibn Hishām ٣:١٨١; Tabari ٢:٥١٣ -٦

Zuhri: ٨٧; Wāqidi ١:١٨٢, ٢:٧٤٩, ٣:١١٢٣; Ibn Hishām ٣:٤٤; Ibn Sa'd ٢:٢١, ٢٨, ٤٩, ٩٧; Ibn – ٧
Sayyid al-Nās ٢:٢٨١

Wāqidi ١:٣٩٤; Kalā'i ١:١٢٣; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās ٢:١٠٤–٨

Bukhāri (al-Jihād ١٢٢); Muslim (al-Masājid ٣, ٥); Tirmidhi (al-Siyar ٥); Nasā'i (al-Jihād –٩
(١

(Q٨:٤٥, Q٩:١٩, ٢٠, ٤١, ٨٩; Bukhāri (al-Maghāzi ٥٣, al-Jihād ١١٠ –١٠

Wāqidi ٣:٩٩٠ onwards, Tabari ٣:١٠١; Kalā'i ١:١٥١ –١١

It became a peaceful home for those who upheld its sanctity. Madina welcomed the Muhājirs, from whatever tribe and group they may have been. Actually, this was the first time that a homeland in which the people lived as equals got its true meaning, and in which the people would take up responsibilities without looking at lineage of status.

The Holy Prophet (S) was successful in making leadership dignified and honored so that all the people could benefit from his guidance and leadership and would be ready to submit to and obey him after having been freed from the yoke of other tyrant rulers(1). With the ingenuity and intelligence that he had been granted, the Prophet (S) understood that the head and guide who would be responsible for organizing affairs initially in Madina and later throughout the world cannot succeed without the strength of the divine call and guardianship of the Islāmic system, and this strength was found in the arms of the believers who decided to migrate with him to Madina and were the first group to form a Muslim army, which the Ansār also joined later.

The role of the Holy Prophet (S) in nurturing the military forces started when Jihād was made obligatory. During this time, he embarked on organizing, recruiting and training the army following the battles and Sariya missions that were aimed at attaining political and military goals; because in order to establish the government and expand the call to Islām, there was no other choice. He

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would give hope to the fighters and mobilize them to come together under the leadership of the unit commanders and would strive to increase the awe and .eminence of the Muslims among the enemy

The supreme commander would always try to prepare the army and train them in the different arts of warfare, until they were fully prepared and well trained so that they could show the superiority of their skills when they came face to face with the enemy .in battle

His goal in these battles was self-defense(۱), safeguarding the call to Islām and defending it against those people who would act as hindrances in its way. As we study the progress of the battles that were commanded by the Holy Prophet (S) – that we :have mentioned in detail, we find the most evident factors that led to victory included

First: the usage of certain methods of warfare by the Prophet (S) that the enemy did not have any knowledge of, such as ‘siege’, ‘acquiring intelligence’, ‘specifying the goals and objectives’, ‘mobilizing the forces for the primary objective’, ‘surprise attacks’, ‘secret (Sariya) missions’, ‘swiftness’, ‘maneuvers’ and ‘spiritual force and .(securing all the military resources’ which are all principles of present-day warfare(۲)

The types of warfare that were employed by the Holy Prophet (S) in his battles had a huge impact in victory over the enemy. For instance, psychological warfare(۳) was an important means of reducing and weakening the morale of the enemy and in most of the battles, just by the enemy

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Q۲:۱۹۰, ۱۹۳-۱

Howard, Nadhariyat al-Harb Wāqidi Mumārasatiha: ۱۶, ۱۵۸-۲

(Bukhāri (al-Salāh ۴۳۸-۳

hearing the thunderous sounds of the Muslim army, it was enough to gain them
.victory

The same was the case of revolutionary and collective war where all the military and non-military groups were involved where he (S) used special methods to mobilize all of them together in a spirit of revolution. The result of this type of leadership was that the forces, having seen his just attitude and superior goal, accepted all that he gave them and believed in it. Similarly, the innovations in warfare that the Prophet (S) had brought led to the perplexity and reduced grandeur of the enemy and in the end led to
.their downfall

More than anything else, the ingenuity of the supreme commander and the qualities that distinguished him as a leader, and also his uniqueness and superiority in politics, military management and a complete awareness of the principles and etiquettes of
.war both at the tactical and strategic levels, deserves praise

Second: Islāmic training and nurturing – the Holy Prophet (S) gave full attention and importance to this. He (S) created a new force among the Muslim army which had never been witnessed by the Arabs before, and that was the force of spirituality that Islām put in their hearts and made them willing to sacrifice their lives and wealth in the way of spreading the true religion and made them volunteer for death. This was
.something that guaranteed their felicity and reward in this world and the hereafter

The Muslim army was distinguished for its united

leadership, sincerity and total obedience to them. The fact that Miqdād ibn ‘Amr turned to the Holy Prophet (S) in the Battle of Badr and said: “If you march towards Bark al-‘Imād (a remote place in Yemen), we will follow you with strength until we reach there!” and Sa’d ibn Mu’ādh said: “If you give us the order to enter this sea, we will enter it with you and none of us will disobey you in this matter!” proves this point

The invitation of the Holy Prophet (S) to Islām was a call based on reformation and peace, and war was not considered except when the hardheartedness and harsh treatment of the enemy upon the Muslims increased. In reality it was a defensive response of force against force. In this way, his battles were based on steadfastness from the very beginning and the Muslim army was never negligent of this. They would invite the people to the new religion, enact peace treaties with them, take Jizya tax or conquer their lands and fight against those who expressed enmity towards him

The most important feature of the time of the Prophet (S) was his many battle and Sariya missions. Despite the fact the Jihād was ordained after migration to Madina, but in the span of seven years, the number of battles had reached ٢٧, starting from the Battle of Waddān and ending with the Battle of Tabuk. The Holy Prophet (S) was present in nine of the battles. During this time, he (S

organized ۴۷ Sariya missions where some of them were just to invite others to Islām
.or come face to face with those who posed a threat to the security of the Muslims

A point worth noting here is that this military training and the battles that have been mentioned gave the Islāmic government eminence and put it in the category of the largest empires in human history, without this being the real goal. Accepting the notion that the primary goal of the Holy Prophet (S) was to establish an Islāmic empire would be contrary to the ‘historical truth’ because actually this matter was only part of the overall means of attaining the primary objective which was to destroy
.polytheism and spread Islām through peaceful and friendly means

The way in which this government dealt with its enemies and other governments opened up a new door, because its principle of encounter and relationship were based on the rules and principles of justice and humanity, both in times of peace and war. The fact that after the supreme commander passed away the Muslim army continued its conquests and were able to capture the lands of Syria, Egypt and ‘Iraq, and were able to bring the two largest empires of the time, i.e. the Romans and Persians, to submission, this was only because they gave importance and special significance to the fact that the Holy Prophet (S) was the first conqueror of these lands. Because during his time, he (S) laid the groundwork for them

through his battles and wars and had given the army glad tidings about the expansion of their domain, and this was the reason for the increase in their morale and .guarantee of gaining victory

In reality, the Islāmic conquests during the reign of the Caliphs were the fruits of the seeds that were sowed by the Holy Prophet (S) in the battles that he led. There were always two factors that enabled the Muslim army to close the scrolls of the kings and :overthrow them and overcome all the hardships and these were

.The love for Islāmic government and obedience to its leader (١)

.Considering death to be insignificant (٢)

It was because of these reasons that the domain of Islām reached China in the east .and Andalusia in the west

The Islāmic government will never achieve its past glory again unless the organization of its armies are once again based on the principles that the Holy Prophet (S) laid down, the most important of which were: Love for the (Islāmic) government, unity, sacrificing of lives and souls in the quest of achieving security and .peace throughout the lands

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About center

In the name of Allah

هَلِيسَتْوَ يَا لَذِي تَعْلَمُونَ وَالَّذِي تَلَّا يَعْلَمُونَ

?Are those who know equal to those who do not know

al-Zumar: ٩

:Introduction

Ghaemiyeh Computer Research Institute of Isfahan, from ٢٠٠٧, under the authority of Ayatollah Haj Sayyed Hasan Faqih Imami (God blesses his soul), by sincere and daily efforts of university and seminary elites and sophisticated groups began its activities .in religious, cultural and scientific fields

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Ghaemiyeh Computer Research Institute of Isfahan in order to facilitate and accelerate the accessibility of researchers to the books and tools of research, in the field of Islamic science, and regarding the multiplicity and dispersion of active centers in this field and numerous and inaccessible sources by a mere scientific intention and far from any kind of social, political, tribal and personal prejudices and currents, based on performing a project in the shape of (management of produced and published works from all Shia centers) tries to provide a rich and free collection of books and research papers for the experts, and helpful contents and discussions for the educated generation and all classes of people interested in reading, with various formats in the .cyberspace

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We would appreciate the centers, institutes, publications, authors and all honorable
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